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In   this   thesis   I   explore   from   a   phenomenological   perspective   the   relationship  
between  affectivity   and  narrativity   and   its   relevance   for   the  understanding  of  
the   structure   of   selfhood.   In   contemporary  phenomenology   it   is   often   argued  
that  there  are  two  complementary  but  distinct  forms  of  selfhood:  the  “minimal”  
and  “narrative”   self.   In   this   context,   affectivity   is  usually  associated  with  pre-­‐‑
reflective   forms   of   bodily   and   self-­‐‑experience,   thus   conceiving   of   it   as   a  
constitutive  dimension  of  minimal  selfhood.  Some  phenomenological  accounts,  
however,   also   draw   attention   to   the   existence   of   a   connection   between  
affectivity   and   some   features   of   the   narrative   self.   In   this  work,   I   extend   and  
refine   in   various   ways   the   conceptions   of   affective   experience   and   selfhood  
defended  by   these  accounts.   In   the   first  place,   I   show  how  affectivity  exerts  a  
cardinal  role  in  the  emergence  and  development  of  narrativity,  thus  identifying  
various   dynamics   through   which   minimal   self-­‐‑experience   impacts   on   the  
structure   of   narrative   understanding.   Secondly,   I   illustrate   different   ways   in  
which   narrativity   in   turn   shapes   the   structure   of   affectivity.   In   so   doing   I  
challenge  one  of  the  ideas  which  are  central  to  the  distinction  between  minimal  
and   narrative   self,   namely   that   minimal   self-­‐‑experience   is   impervious   to   the  
dynamics  which  characterise  narrative  self-­‐‑understanding.  My  account   indeed  
shows  that  emotions  are  complex  phenomena  in  which  minimal  and  narrative  
forms   of   self-­‐‑awareness   are   phenomenologically   entwined.   Finally,   I   apply  
these  insights  to  the  analysis  of  depression  and  borderline  personality  disorder.  
I  claim  that  characteristic  of  depression  is  the  weakening  or  abandonment  of  the  
life   stories   with   which   the   person   identified   prior   to   the   illness   and   the  
 emergence  of  new  narratives  which  possess  specific  features  and  are  shaped  by  
feelings  of  guilt,  hopelessness,  and  a  particular  temporal  and  spatial  experience.  
As   far   as   borderline   personality   disorder   is   concerned,   I   argue   that   the  
disturbances  of  narrative  selfhood  typical  of  the  illness  depend  on  the  frequent  
alternation   of   existential   feelings   of   shame   and   anger   and   I   claim   that   these  
disturbances  in  turn  shape  the  bodily  experience  associated  with  affectivity  and  
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The   aim   of   this   work   is   to   investigate   the   relationship   between   affectivity,  
narrative   understanding,   and   selfhood   from   a   phenomenological   perspective.  
Although   each   of   these   areas   has   been   separately   the   object   of   extensive  
philosophical  research,  comparatively  few  contributions  have  been  made  to  the  
investigation   of   how   they   are   connected   and   in   this   thesis   I   engage   in   a  
philosophical   exploration   of   the   topic   which   extends   existing   accounts   in  
various  respects.  
  
The   contemporary   debate   on   the   nature   of   selfhood   is   characterised   by   the  
presence  of  a  significant  number  of  different  notions  of  what  a  self  is  (Gallagher  
and   Zahavi,   2008:   197;   Strawson,   1999:   100;   Zahavi,   2008:   103).   The  
“conceptual”,   “core”,   “ecological”,   “emergent”,   “embodied”,   “fictional”,  
“material”,   and   “social”   self   are   just   some   of   the   numerous   conceptions   of  
selfhood  which  have  been  put  forward  and  it  has  been  argued  that  at  least  some  
of   these   notions   can   be   combined   in   a   view   of   the   self   as   a   complex  
phenomenon.   In   particular,   those   among   contemporary   scholars   who   have  
investigated   the   self   from   a   phenomenological   perspective   have   recognised  
“multidimensionality”   as   a   fundamental   character   of   selfhood   (Zahavi,   2010).  
From   this   perspective,   elaborating   on   the   insights   provided   by   classical  
phenomenology,   hermeneutics,   and   philosophy   of   cognitive   sciences,   two  
specific   forms   of   selfhood   have   been   identified:   the   “minimal   self”   and   the  
“narrative   self”   (Gallagher,   2000;   Gallagher   and   Zahavi,   2008;   Zahavi,   2007;  
2008;  2010;  2014).    
  
The  minimal  self   is  conceived  in  this  context  as  a  sense  of  self   intrinsic   to  any  
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phenomenally   conscious   state.   According   to   this   position,   it   is   impossible   to  
undergo   any   sort   of   experience  without   being   simultaneously   aware   that   the  
experience  belongs  to  us,  as  there  is  a  “sense  of  mineness”,  a  primitive  form  of  
self-­‐‑reference,   inherent   to   any   form  of   consciousness.  The   self   at   issue  here   is  
not  given  as  an  object,  but  rather  as  the  subject  of  experience  and  the  notion  of  
“pre-­‐‑reflective  self-­‐‑consciousness”,  through  which  this  experiential  structure  is  
usually  referred  to,  aims  to  highlight  this   feature.  The  minimal  sense  of  self   is  
thought   to   remain   the   same   across   the   variety   of   experiences   that   a   subject  
undergoes  and  is  considered  to  be  essentially  embodied  and  embedded  in  the  
environment.  
  
Gallagher   and  Zahavi,   however,   draw   attention   to   the   fact   that   the   notion   of  
minimal   self   does   not   capture   all   the   aspects   that   we   usually   associate   with  
selfhood.   In   particular,   they   claim   that   we   tend   to   conceive   of   the   self   as  
possessing   an   individual   “history”   (Gallagher,   2000:   18)   and   a   “personal  
character”   or   “personality”   (Zahavi,   2007:   193).   Drawing   in   particular   on   the  
insights  provided  by   the  hermeneutic   tradition   (e.g.  Ricoeur,  1988;  1994),   they  
consider  this  dimension  to  be  developed  through  the  stories  that  we  and  others  
tell  about  ourselves  and  refer  to  it  as  the  “narrative  self”.  
  
As  far  as  the  relationship  between  the  two  forms  of  selfhood  is  concerned,  this  
account  maintains   that   the  minimal   and   the  narrative   self   are   complementary  
but  distinct  facets  of  the  self.  The  presence  of  a  minimal  level  of  self-­‐‑awareness  
is  considered  as  a  condition  of  possibility  for  the  emergence  of  a  narrative  self.  
The  latter,   in  other  terms,   is   founded  on  the  former  and,  although  in  ordinary  
experience  they  are  usually  integrated,  it  is  implied  that  in  some  serious  cases  of  
erosion   of   narrative   selfhood   –   for   example   in   the   most   advanced   stages   of  




According   to   this   perspective,   then,   when   disturbances   of   self-­‐‑awareness   are  
considered,   it   is   possible   to   distinguish   between   basic   and   more   superficial  
alterations,   depending   on   the   dimension   of   selfhood  which   is   affected.   These  
ideas  have  been  widely  applied  in  the  field  of  philosophy  of  psychiatry,  where  
it   has   been   argued,   for   instance,   that  while   the   disruptions   of   self-­‐‑awareness  
characteristic   of   schizophrenia   occur   at   the   level   of   pre-­‐‑reflective   self-­‐‑
consciousness   (e.g.   Parnas   and   Sass,   2001;   Sass   and   Parnas,   2003),   it   is   the  
narrative   sense   of   self   which   is   altered   in   the   experience   of   people   with  
depression  (e.g.  Stanghellini,  2004)  and  borderline  personality  disorder  (Fuchs,  
2007).  
  
Despite  the  very  influential  role  of  this  account  in  contemporary  philosophical  
debates,  the  distinction  between  minimal  and  narrative  self  needs  to  be  further  
investigated.   In   particular,   it   is   important   to   clarify   how   the   two   notions   are  
related.   Zahavi   remarks   that,   in   this   context,   conceiving   of   the   self   as   a  
multidimensional   concept   does   not   entail   that   a   “multiplicity   of   co-­‐‑existing  
selves”   (2010:   6)   is   present.   On   the   contrary,   as   previously   mentioned,   it   is  
claimed  that  the  self  is  a  complex,  “multifaceted”  phenomenon.  The  approaches  
which   endorse   this   claim,   however,   are   not   clear   as   to   how   the   relationship  
between   the   various   facets   of   selfhood   should   be   conceived.   In   particular,  
although   it   is  maintained   that   a  minimal   level  of   self-­‐‑experience   should  be   in  
place   in   order   for   a   narrative   self   to   develop,   no   account   is   given   of   the  
dynamics  through  which  the  latter  could  emerge  from  the  former.  In  addition,  
it  is  questionable  whether  the  minimal  self  is  as  independent  from  the  narrative  
self  as  Gallagher  and  Zahavi  suggest.  Various  supporters  of  a  narrative  account  
of   selfhood   indeed  maintain   that   narrative   self-­‐‑understanding   can   shape   our  
experience   in  various  ways  and  there  seems  to  be  no  reason  to   think  that   this  




My  work  attempts  to  clarify  these  issues  by  examining  the  relationship  between  
affective   experience   and   the  minimal   and   narrative   self.   In   both   classical   and  
contemporary   phenomenology   affectivity   has   been   associated   with   pre-­‐‑
reflective   forms   of   bodily   and   self-­‐‑experience   (e.g.   Colombetti,   2011;   Slaby,  
2008),   thus  highlighting   the  existence  of   a   connection  between   this  dimension  
and  minimal  selfhood.  In  addition,  the  idea  that  affectivity  is  crucially  involved  
in   basic   forms   of   self-­‐‑awareness   seems   to   be   corroborated   also   by   research  
conducted   in   the   field   of   cognitive   sciences   (e.g.   Damasio,   2000;   2012).  
However,   some   of   the   accounts   of   affective   experience   which   have   been  
developed  within   the   phenomenological   tradition   suggest   also   that   there   is   a  
connection   between   affectivity   and  more   complex   forms  of   self-­‐‑consciousness  
and   selfhood   (e.g.   De   Monticelli,   2003;   2006;   Scheler,   1973a).   While   these  
approaches   are   not   specifically   concerned  with   the  notion   of   narrativity,   they  
draw   attention   to   the   centrality   of   affective   experience   to  dimensions   such   as  
“personality”   and   “personhood”   which,   as   previously   mentioned,   are  
considered  by  authors  like  Gallagher  and  Zahavi  to  be  integral  to  the  narrative  
self.    
  
The   conception   of   the   relationship   between   affectivity   and   selfhood   that  
emerges  from  existing  phenomenological  accounts  is  thus  two-­‐‑fold.  On  the  one  
hand,   affective   experience   is   associated   with   pre-­‐‑reflective   forms   of   self-­‐‑
awareness   and   thus  with   the  minimal   self.   On   the   other,   it   is   suggested   that  
affectivity   plays   a   role   also   in   the   dynamics   through   which   forms   of   self-­‐‑
consciousness   akin   to   narrative   self-­‐‑understanding   emerge   from   the  minimal  
self.   Such   an   approach,   I   argue,   paves   the   way   to   the   clarification   of   some  
aspects   of   the   relationship   between  minimal   and  narrative   self  which   are   not  
explored   by   Gallagher   and   Zahavi.   Yet,   as   I   mentioned   before,   existing  
phenomenological   accounts  of   affectivity,   in   their   investigation  of   the   relation  
between  affective  experience  and  the  self,  do  not  take  narrativity  explicitly  into  
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consideration.  As  such,  in  order  to  expand  our  understanding  of  both  affective  
experience  and  the  self,  in  this  work  I  endeavour  to  provide  a  cohesive  account  
of  the  relationship  which  exists  between  affectivity  and  narrative  selfhood.    
  
To  do  so,  I  first  explore  the  influence  that  affective  experience  has  on  narrative  
self-­‐‑understanding,   arguing   that   various   kinds   of   affective   states   play   a  
constitutive   role   in   the   emergence   and   development   of   our   life   stories.   This  
analysis  allows  me   to   identify  some  of   the  dynamics   through  which  narrative  
self-­‐‑awareness  emerges  from  minimal  self-­‐‑experience,   thus  contributing  to   the  
clarification  of  one  of  the  issues  which  are  not  addressed  by  current  accounts  of  
minimal  and  narrative  self.  Secondly,  I  claim  that  narrativity  itself  moulds  the  
structure  of  affective  experience   in  various  ways  and   in  so  doing   I   show  that,  
while  minimal  forms  of  self-­‐‑experience  predate  the  appearance  of  the  narrative  
self   and   influence   its   development   in   various   ways,   also   narrative  
understanding  constitutively  shapes  the  minimal  self.    
  
I  then  apply  these  insights  to  the  analysis  of  the  disturbances  of  self-­‐‑experience  
characteristic  of  depression  and  borderline  personality  disorder  and  this   leads  
to  two  main  outcomes.  On  the  one  hand,  by  focusing  on  the  various  dynamics  
through   which   affectivity   and   narrativity   shape   each   other,   I   expand   our  
understanding  of   these  forms  of  psychiatric   illness   in  various  respects.  On  the  
other,  the  phenomenological  exploration  conducted  in  this  section  allows  me  to  
put   into   question   the   claim   that   in   depression   and   borderline   personality  
disorder  it  is  the  narrative  and  not  the  minimal  level  of  self-­‐‑consciousness  that  
is  disrupted.    I  indeed  show  that  characteristic  of  these  disorders  are  alterations  
of  self-­‐‑experience   in  which  minimal  and  narrative   forms  of  self-­‐‑awareness  are  
structurally  entangled.  
  
By   developing   a   phenomenological   account   of   the   relationship   between  
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affectivity  and  narrativity,  this  work  shows  not  only  that  minimal  and  narrative  
selfhood   are   causally   interdependent,   but   also   that   the   structures   of   these  
phenomena   are   so   deeply   entwined   that   they   are,   from   a   phenomenological  
perspective,   inextricable.   This   account,   however,   does   not   suggest   that   the  
distinction   between   minimal   and   narrative   self   should   be   rejected.   For  
theoretical  purposes  it  might  still  be  useful  to  distinguish  between  the  dynamics  
characteristic  of  each   level  of  self-­‐‑consciousness,  but,   in  so  far  as  minimal  and  
narrative  self  in  various  ways  constitute  each  other,  they  should  be  considered  




In  Chapter   1   (“Minimal   Self   and  Narrative   Self”)   I   introduce   and  discuss   the  
notions  of  minimal  and  narrative  self.  As  far  as  the  former  is  concerned,  I  show  
that   this   form   of   selfhood   is   usually   identified   with   pre-­‐‑reflective   self-­‐‑
consciousness,  that  is  a  “non-­‐‑observational”  and  “non-­‐‑objectifying”  (Gallagher  
and   Zahavi,   2008:   46)   awareness   of   the   self   considered   to   be   temporally  
extended   and   independent   of   the   possession   of   linguistic   and   conceptual  
abilities.   I   illustrate   how   the  minimal   self   has   been   characterised   in   terms   of  
bodily   self-­‐‑consciousness   and   examine   further   notions   relevant   to   the  
understanding  of  this  concept,  such  as  that  of  sense  of  ownership  and  sense  of  
agency.  I  then  move  to  the  analysis  of  narrative  selfhood,  which  is  characterised  
as  a  form  of  reflective  self-­‐‑awareness  dependent  on  the  possession  of  evaluative  
position-­‐‑taking  abilities  and  the  capacity  to  engage  in  implicit  or  explicit  forms  
of   story-­‐‑telling.   Having   clarified   what   is   meant   by   the   terms   “minimal”   and  
“narrative   self”,   I   illustrate   how   their   relationship   is   conceived   in   the   current  
debate   and,   in   this   regard,   I   Identify   two  main   issues  which   current   accounts  




In  Chapter   2   (“Affectivity   and   the   Self   in   the   Phenomenological   Tradition”)   I  
consider   how   the   relationship   between   affectivity   and   selfhood   has   been  
conceived   within   the   phenomenological   tradition.   I   start   by   illustrating   the  
insights   into   this   topic   developed   by   Colombetti   (2011)   and   Slaby   (2008).  
According  to  these  positions,  the  bodily  feelings  implicated  in  the  experience  of  
emotions   are   forms   of   pre-­‐‑reflective   self-­‐‑consciousness,   an   idea  which   draws  
attention  to  the  fact  that  the  minimal  self  is  also,  essentially,  an  affective  self.  I  
then   move   to   examine   the   account   of   affective   experience   put   forward   by  
Scheler   (1973a)   and   De  Monticelli   (2003;   2006).   Central   to   this   account   is   the  
idea  that  affectivity  is  fundamentally  involved  in  the  dynamics  through  which  
personhood   –   a   form   of   selfhood   akin   to   the   narrative   self   –   is   constituted.  
Drawing  also  on  the  observations  regarding  the  relationship  between  existential  
feelings   and   self-­‐‑consciousness   developed   by   Slaby   and   Stephan   (2008),   I  
suggest  that  affectivity  is  a  minimal  form  of  self-­‐‑experience  which  both  shapes  
and  is  shaped  by  the  narrative  self.  
  
In   Chapter   3   (“The   Role   of   Affectivity   in   the   Constitution   of   Narratives”)   I  
examine  the  role  played  by  affectivity   in  the  development  of  autobiographical  
narrativity.  In  this  regard,  it  is  claimed  that  affective  experience  has  an  impact  
on   the  way   in  which   stories   are   structured,   shaping,   for   example,   the  way   in  
which   narratives   are   temporally   organised   (Hogan,   2011).   In   addition,   it   is  
emphasised   that   emotions   are   fundamental   in   allowing   us   to   select   which  
events   are   to   be   included   in   the   stories   we   tell   (Hardcastle,   2003;   2008).  
According   to   this  position,   it   is  because  of   their  possessing  a  specific  affective  
relevance   that   some   experiences   are   narrated   while   others   are   not.   In   this  
chapter  I  aim  to  expand  these  insights  by  advancing  three  specific  claims.  In  the  
first  place,  I  argue  that  affectivity  confers  authenticity  on  our  life  stories.  More  
specifically,   thanks   to   the   existence   of   a   degree   of   congruence   between   the  
contents  of  our  life  stories  and  our  affective  states,  we  come  to  experience  these  
 
14 
stories  as  truly  representative  of  who  we  are.  Secondly,  I  suggest  that  affectivity  
has   a   significant   role   in   determining   the   continuity   of   the   narrative   self   by  
granting   us   a   particular   form   of   experiential   access   -­‐‑   which,   following  
Schechtman   (1996;   2001;   2007),   I   call   “empathic   access”   -­‐‑   to   our   previous  
experiences.  I  then  claim  that  affective  experience  not  only  influences  narrative  
content  and  form,  but  also  determines  the  range  of  stories  that  it  is  possible  for  
us  to  tell,   the  scope,  so  to  speak,  of  our  narrative  repertoire.  This,   I  suggest,   is  
due   in   particular   to   the   role   played   by   “existential   feelings”   (Ratcliffe,   2005;  
2008)  in  determining  the  range  of  affective,  cognitive,  and  volitional  experiences  
that  we  can  undergo.  
    
In   Chapter   4   (“The   Role   of   Narrativity   in   the   Constitution   of   Affectivity”)   I  
further   develop   the   analysis   of   the   relationship   between   affectivity   and  
narrativity   by   examining   the   role   played   by   story-­‐‑telling   in   shaping   the  
structure   of   emotions.  As   illustrated   in  Chapter   3,   various   accounts   recognise  
that   emotions   can   influence   both   the   form   and   contents   of   our   narratives.  
However,   while   they   acknowledge   the   existence   of   a   relationship   between  
affectivity  and  narrativity,  these  approaches  consider  the  structure  of  emotions  
as   essentially   distinct   and   independent   from   narrative   self-­‐‑understanding.   In  
Chapter   4   I   challenge   this   view   by   arguing   that   narratives   are   indeed  
constitutive   of   emotions.   In   particular,   I   claim   that   narrativity   moulds   the  
experiential   structure  of  emotions   in  various  ways.   In   the   first  place,  drawing  
on  the  insights  into  the  relationship  between  emotions  and  language  developed  
by   Colombetti   (2009),   I   claim   that   narratives   contribute   to   render   affective  
experience  more   precise   and   differentiated.   Secondly,   endorsing   some   of   the  
claims  central  to  Goldie’s  account  of  affectivity  (2002),  I  maintain  that,  through  
their   being   incorporated   in   an   implicit   or   explicit   narrative,   emotions   can  
acquire   a   higher   degree   of   complexity   and   be   experienced   as   unitary   and  
meaningful   processes.   This   approach,   I   argue,   constitutes   a   theoretical  
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framework  capable  of  accounting  for  the  interpersonal  and  cultural  variability  
of   emotions,   as   well   as   for   the   changes   they   undergo   during   development.  
Finally,   I   claim   that   another   fundamental   way   in   which   narrativity   moulds  
affectivity   is  by  being  involved  in  various  dynamics  responsible  for  emotional  
regulation.    
  
In   Chapter   5   (“Self-­‐‑Experience   in   Depression”)   I   examine   the   relationship  
between   affectivity   and   narrativity   in   depression.   Moving   from   some   of   the  
insights  into  the  structure  of  the  illness  developed  by  Stanghellini  (2004),  I  first  
draw  attention  to  the  fact  that,  due  to  the  loss  of  feeling  typical  of  the  disorder,  
the   patient’s   autobiographical   narratives   are   no   longer   accompanied   by  
congruent   affective   states   and,   as   a   result,   the  person   comes   to   feel   estranged  
from  the  narratives  which  were  central  to  her  autobiography  prior  to  the  onset  
of  depression.  The  stories  that  are  stripped  of  their  affective  counterparts  are  no  
longer  experienced  as  authentic  and  this  in  turn  can  result  in  the  weakening  or  
abandonment   of   the   stories   themselves.   Given   the   role   played   by  
autobiographical   narratives   in   the   constitution   of   selfhood,   I   argue   that   these  
dynamics  can  lead  also  to  the  experience  of  “losing  oneself”  often  reported  by  
depressed   patients.   Depression,   however,   is   characterised   not   only   by   the  
diminishment   or   disappearance   of   certain   affective   reactions,   but   also   by   the  
presence   of   a   number   of   feelings   which   in   non-­‐‑pathological   conditions   are  
usually   absent   or   possess   a   different   form   and   I   argue   that   these   affective  
experiences   are   responsible   for   the   emergence   of   new   stories   which   tend   to  
replace  the  ones  that  no  longer  mirror  the  person’s  feelings.  More  specifically,  I  
illustrate   how   the   depressed   person’s   pessimistic   “explanatory   style”  
(Seligman,   2006)   –   that   is   the   tendency   to   explain   bad   events   in   personal,  
pervasive,   and   permanent   terms   –   is   rooted   in   configurations   of   affective  
experience   central   to  which   are   existential   feelings  of   guilt,   hopelessness,   and  
particular   forms   of   temporal   and   spatial   experience.   Finally,   I   argue   that   the  
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narratives   crafted   by   the   depressed   person   in   turn   influence   her   affective  
experience  by  exacerbating  feelings  of  helplessness  and  lack  of  control  and  by  
making  it  difficult  for  the  person  to  evaluate  her  own  emotions.      
  
In   Chapter   6   (“Self-­‐‑Experience   in   Borderline   Personality   Disorder”)   I   explore  
the   relationship   between   affective   experience   and   narrativity   in   borderline  
personality  disorder  (BPD).  From  various  perspectives  it  has  been  argued  that  
BPD   is   characterised   by   disturbances   of   narrative   understanding   and   it   has  
been  suggested  that  affectivity   is  crucially   involved   in   these  disturbances   (e.g.  
Fuchs,   2007).   Aiming   to   complement   and   expand   existing   accounts   of   these  
dynamics,  in  the  first  part  of  the  chapter  I  show  how  a  particular  configuration  
of   affective   experience   is   at   the   origin   of   the   disruption   of   narrative   selfhood  
typical  of  the  disorder.  More  specifically,  I  suggest  that  characteristic  of  BPD  is  
a  frequent  alternation  of  existential  feelings  of  anger  and  shame  and  I  argue  that  
the   evaluations   of   self   and   other   integral   to   these   feelings   have   an   opposite  
structure.   I   maintain   that,   due   to   this   predicament,   the   borderline   patient   is  
unable   to   retain   “empathic   access”   to   his   past   experience   and   this   is   what  
grounds   his   inability   to   integrate   different   aspects   of   his   story   in   a   coherent  
autobiographical  narrative.  In  the  second  part  of  the  chapter  I  analyse  how  the  
disruptions   of   narrative   self-­‐‑understanding   characteristic   of   the   syndrome   in  
turn  influence  the  structure  of  affectivity.  In  the  first  place,  I  suggest  that,  due  to  
not   being   narrativised,   the   emotions   of   the   borderline   person   are   less   precise  
and   differentiated   and   the   body   plays   a   predominant   role   in   both   their  
experience  and  expression.  Secondly,  I  show  how  the  impairments  of  narrative  
understanding   exacerbate   the   affective   dysregulation   characteristic   of   the  
disorder.  
  
In  summary,  my  thesis  contributes  to  the  current  phenomenological  debate  on  
the  nature  of  selfhood  and  the  relationship  between  minimal  and  narrative  self  
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in  various  respects.   In   the  first  place,  by  providing  an  account  of   the  different  
ways   in   which   affectivity   shapes   the   structure   and   contents   of   our  
autobiographical   narratives,   I   identify   some   of   the   dynamics   through   which  
minimal  selfhood  impacts  on  narrative  self-­‐‑understanding,  thus  clarifying  how  
the   latter   can   emerge   from   the   former.   Secondly,   by   showing   that   also  
narrativity  constitutively  shapes  affectivity,  I  draw  attention  to  the  existence  of  
forms   of   self-­‐‑experience   where   minimal   and   narrative   self-­‐‑consciousness   are  
deeply  entangled  and   in  so  doing  I  challenge  the   idea   that   the  minimal  self   is  
impervious  to  the  dynamics  which  characterise  narrative  self-­‐‑understanding.  In  
addition,   by   applying   these   insights   to   the   analysis   of   depression   and  
borderline   personality   disorder,   I   contribute   to   expand   our   understanding   of  
some   of   the   central   features   of   these   forms   of   psychiatric   illness.   Finally,   as  
highlighted  in  my  final  chapter,  the  research  conducted  in  this  thesis  provides  a  
theoretical  framework  that  could  be  used  to  address  a  number  of  other  issues  in  



















The   purpose   of   this   chapter   is   to   provide   an   account   of   how   the   notions   of  
minimal  and  narrative  selfhood  and  their  relationship  are  conceived  by  various  
phenomenologically   oriented   authors,   in  particular   Shaun  Gallagher   and  Dan  
Zahavi.  I  will  start  by  illustrating  that  integral  to  the  definition  of  minimal  self  
is   a   certain   form   of   self-­‐‑awareness   referred   to   as   “pre-­‐‑reflective   self-­‐‑
consciousness”.   I  will   show   that,   from   this  perspective,   being  a   self   is   to  be   a  
subject   of   experience   who   is   aware   of   himself   in   a   “non-­‐‑observational”   and  
“non-­‐‑objectifying   manner”   (Gallagher   and   Zahavi,   2008:   46).   I   will   also  
highlight   that   pre-­‐‑reflective   self-­‐‑consciousness   has   been   predominantly  
characterised  as  a  form  of  bodily  experience  which  is  temporally  structured  and  
independent  of  the  possession  of  conceptual  and  linguistic  abilities.  I  will  then  
move   to   consider   the   notion   of   narrative   self.   In   this   regard,   I   will   draw  
attention  to  some  aspects  of  the  work  of  Paul  Ricoeur  (1988;  1994)  which  have  
influenced   the   way   in   which   narrativity   and   selfhood   are   conceived   by  
Gallagher   and   Zahavi   and   other   contemporary   scholars.   In   this   context,   the  
narrative   self   is   viewed   as   a   self   which   possesses   an   individual   history   and  
personal  identity  and  is  constituted  through  various  forms  of  autobiographical  
story-­‐‑telling.  More  specifically,  it  is  claimed  that  cardinal  to  the  narrative  self  is  
the   ability   to   reflectively   endorse   certain   experiences   and   values   and   to  
integrate  them  in  a  coherent  self-­‐‑conception.  As  far  as  the  relationship  between  
minimal   and   narrative   self   is   concerned,   I   will   highlight   that,   according   to  
Gallagher  and  Zahavi,  the  former  is  a  condition  of  possibility  for  the  emergence  
of  the  latter,   that   is  a  minimal  form  of  self-­‐‑consciousness  should  already  be  in  
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place   in   order   for   narrative   self-­‐‑understanding   to   develop.   However,   it   is  
suggested  that  the  dynamics  characteristic  of  narrative  selfhood  do  not  have  a  
constitutive   impact   on   the   structure   of   minimal   self-­‐‑experience.   These  
dimensions,  it  is  argued,  are  usually  integrated,  but  when  severe  disruptions  of  
narrative  ability  occur,  the  minimal  self  might  still  be  intact  and  encountered  in  
“its  purity”  (Zahavi,  2010:  5).  As  such,  minimal  and  narrative  self  are  conceived  
as  complementary  but  distinct  facets  of  selfhood.  In  the  last  part  of  the  chapter  I  
will   suggest   that,   despite   its   doing   justice   to   a   number   of   our   intuitions  
regarding   the   nature   of   the   self,   this   way   of   conceiving   of   the  
“multidimensionality”   (Zahavi,   2010)   of   selfhood   leaves   some   questions  
unanswered.  In  the  first  place,  I  will  claim  that,  although  it   is  maintained  that  
the  development  of  a  narrative  self  depends  on  the  presence  of  a  minimal  level  
of  self-­‐‑experience,  it  is  unclear  how,  if  at  all,  the  structure  of  pre-­‐‑reflective  self-­‐‑
consciousness   impacts   on   the   structure   of   narrative   self-­‐‑understanding.  
Secondly,   I   will   question   the   plausibility   of   the   idea   that   the  minimal   self   is  
impervious   to   the   processes   which   take   place   at   the   level   of   narrative   self-­‐‑
understanding,  suggesting  on  the  contrary  that  narrativity  constitutively  shapes  
minimal  self-­‐‑experience.  
  
1.  The  Minimal  Self  
1.1.  Minimal  Self  and  Pre-­‐‑Reflective  Self-­‐‑Consciousness  
  
The   notion   of   “minimal   self”   is   essentially   connected   to   the   concepts   of   self-­‐‑
consciousness  and  conscious  experience.  Consciousness,   in   this   context,   refers  
to  the  experiential  or  qualitative  aspect  of  mental  life,  to  the  fact  that  “it  is  like  
something”   to   be   in   a   particular   mental   state.   Central   to   both   classical   (e.g.  
Henry,   1973;   Sartre,   1958)   and   contemporary   phenomenology   (Gallagher   and  
Zahavi,  2008;  Zahavi,  2008)  is  the  idea  that  every  experience  which  is  conscious  
in   this   sense   is   also   self-­‐‑conscious.   Sartre,   for   example,   claims   that   “[e]very  
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conscious   existence   exists   as   consciousness   of   existing”   (1958:   xxx)      and  
suggests   that   it   is   not   possible   for   consciousness   and   self-­‐‑consciousness   to   be  
dissociated:  
  
This  self-­‐‑consciousness  we  ought  to  consider  not  as  a  new  consciousness,  but  
as  the  only  mode  of  existence  which  is  possible  for  a  consciousness  of  something.  Just  
as  an  extended  object  is  compelled  to  exist  according  to  three  dimensions,  so  
an  intention,  a  pleasure,  a  grief  can  exist  only  as  immediate  self-­‐‑consciousness.  
(xxx)  
  
More   specifically,   it   is   claimed   that   integral   to   the   phenomenality   of  
consciousness  is  a  “first-­‐‑personal  givenness”  (Gallagher  and  Zahavi,  2008:  50),  
namely   that   experiences   are   given   immediately   as   one’s   own   experiences  
without  any   inferential  process  being  needed.  Characteristic   to   the  “what   it   is  
like”   of   every  mental   state  would   then   be   a   “sense   of  mineness”,   that   is   the  
sense  that  the  mental  states  belong  to  oneself.  According  to  Zahavi:  
  
When   I   (in  non  pathological   standard  cases)  am  aware  of  an  occurrent  pain,  
perception   or   thought   from   the   first-­‐‑person   perspective,   the   experience   in  
question  is  given  immediately,  noninferentially  and  noncriterially  as  mine.  If  I  
feel  hunger  or  see  a  sunrise,   I   cannot  be   in  doubt  or  be  mistaken  about  who  
the  subject  of  that  experience  is,  and  it  is  nonsensical  to  ask  whether  I  am  sure  
that  I  am  the  one  who  feels  the  hunger.  (Zahavi  2008:  124)  
  
From   this   perspective,   essential   to   every   experience   is   a   basic   form   of   self-­‐‑
referentiality,  which   can  be  defined  as   “primitive”  because   it   is   “built   in”   the  
experience   itself   and  does  not  derive   from   the   relation  with  any  other  mental  
state   (Zahavi,   2008:   122).   Self-­‐‑consciousness,   in   Sartre’s   words,   is   “not  
positional”,   that   is   “it   is   one   with   the   consciousness   of   which   it   is  
consciousness”  (1958:  xxx).  
  
On  the  other  hand,  as  observed  by  Gallagher  and  Zahavi   (2008),   the   idea   that  
self-­‐‑consciousness  should  be  accounted  for   in  relational   terms  is  at   the  core  of  
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various   other   positions   known   as   “higher-­‐‑order   theories   of   consciousness”.1  
According   to   these   approaches,   in   order   for   a   particular   mental   state   to   be  
conscious,   the   state   should   be   the   object   of   a   higher-­‐‑order   mental   state.  
Although  there  is  a  difference  in  the  way  in  which  the  higher-­‐‑order  mental  state  
is   characterised   (Kim,  2006:  216-­‐‑217)  –  with  some  claiming   that   it   should  be  a  
perceptual  state  and  others  maintaining  that  it  must  be  some  kind  of  thought  –  
these   approaches   agree   that   phenomenal   consciousness,   rather   than   being   an  
intrinsic   property   of   experience,   depends   on   the   relationship   between   the  
conscious  mental   state   and  another  mental   state   (Gallagher   and  Zahavi,   2008:  
52).      
  
Although  metarepresentational  theories  conceive  of  phenomenal  consciousness  
as   essentially   connected   to   self-­‐‑consciousness,  Gallagher   and  Zahavi   consider  
their  theoretical  account  problematic  for  at  least  two  reasons.  In  the  first-­‐‑place,  
they  claim  that  the  account  of  consciousness  provided  by  higher-­‐‑order  theories  
can   generate   an   “infinite   regress”.   If   a   mental   state   in   order   to   be   conscious  
needs  to  be  the  object  of  another  mental  state,  the  second-­‐‑order  mental  state  in  
its   turn   in   order   to   be   conscious   should  be   the   object   of   a   third   order  mental  
state,   and   so   on   ad   infinitum   (Gallagher   and   Zahavi,   2008:   55).   The   regress  
however,  only  takes  place  if  it  is  maintained  that  all  mental  states  are  conscious.  
Metarepresentational   theorists,  on   the  contrary,  admit  of   the  existence  of  non-­‐‑
conscious   mental   states   and   are   consequently   able   to   halt   the   regress   by  
claiming  that  the  second-­‐‑order  mental  state  which  has  the  first-­‐‑order  one  as  its  
object  is  non-­‐‑conscious.  However,  Gallagher  and  Zahavi  believe  that  this  move  
generates  an  “explanatory  vacuity”   in   so   far  as   it  becomes  difficult   to  explain  
how  the  consciousness  of  the  first-­‐‑order  mental  state  could  be  generated  by  the  
relationship   between   two   non-­‐‑conscious   mental   states   (i.e.   the   second-­‐‑order  
                                                   
1 For  a  critical  exposition  of  first-­‐‑order  and  higher-­‐‑order  accounts  of  consciousness   in  
relation  to  the  phenomenological  approach  see  Gallagher  and  Zahavi  (2008:  52-­‐‑57).  
 
22 
mental  state  and  the  first-­‐‑order  mental  state  before  it  becomes  the  object  of  the  
second-­‐‑order   one)   (2008:   55).   Therefore,   any   possible   interpretation   of   the  
metarepresentational   account   has   theoretical   implications   which   are  
unacceptable   from  a  phenomenological  perspective.   In  his  discussion  of   ideas  
akin   to   the   ones   defended   by   higher-­‐‑order   theories,   Sartre   makes   the   same  
point:  
  
Either  we  stop  at  any  one  term  of  the  series  –  the  known,  the  knower  known,  
the   knower   known   by   the   knower,   etc.   In   this   case   the   totality   of   the  
phenomenon  falls  into  the  unknown;  that  is,  we  always  bump  against  a  non-­‐‑
self-­‐‑conscious  reflection  and  a  final  term.  Or  else  we  affirm  the  necessity  of  an  
infinite  regress  (idea  ideae  ideae,  etc.),  which  is  absurd.  (Sartre,  1958:  xxviii)  
  
The  phenomenological  account  then  maintains  that  there  exists  a  basic  form  of  
self-­‐‑consciousness  which  is   intrinsic   to  any  conscious  experience  and  does  not  
require  the  presence  of  mental  states  of  a  higher  order.  Most   importantly,   this  
form  of  self-­‐‑consciousness  is  attributed  a  “pre-­‐‑reflective”  character.  The  notion  
of   pre-­‐‑reflectivity   adopted   by   Gallagher   and   Zahavi   has   various   aspects,  
however,  key  to  their  account  is  the  idea  that  pre-­‐‑reflective  self-­‐‑awareness  has  
both  a  “non-­‐‑objectifying”  and  “non-­‐‑observational”  nature  (2008:  46).  On  the  one  
hand,  this  form  of  experience  is  “non-­‐‑objectifying”  because  in  it   the  self   is  not  
given  as  an  object,  but  rather  as  the  subject  of  the  conscious  state.    On  the  other,  
it   is   “non-­‐‑observational”   because   it   does   not   depend   on   any   kind   of  
introspective  attitude  taken  by  the  subject  towards  his  own  experiences.    
  
Minimal   selfhood   is   considered   to   be   fundamentally   connected   with   pre-­‐‑
reflective   self-­‐‑consciousness.   Indeed,   by   drawing   attention   to   the   self-­‐‑
referentiality   characteristic   of   any   form   of   phenomenal   consciousness,  
Gallagher   and   Zahavi   claim   that   selfhood   is   essentially   dependent   on   the  




More   precisely,   the   claim   is   that   the   (minimal   or   core)   self   possesses  
experiential  reality,  and  is  in  fact  identified  with  the  first-­‐‑personal  appearance  
of   the   experiential   phenomena   […].   In   short,   the   self   is   conceived   as   the  
invariant  dimension  of   first-­‐‑personal  givenness   in   the  multitude  of  changing  
experiences.  (2008:  204)  
  
From   this   perspective,   the   notions   of   pre-­‐‑reflective   self-­‐‑consciousness   and  
minimal   selfhood   seem   to   overlap,   as   the   minimal   self   is   described   as   “a  
consciousness   of   oneself   as   an   immediate   subject   of   experience”   (Gallagher,  
2000:   15).   In   other   words,   the   idea   is   that   the   first-­‐‑personal   givenness   which  
characterises  our  experiential  life  is  constitutive  of  an  experiential  sense  of  self  
with  which  a  basic  form  of  selfhood  is  identified.  Therefore,  the  self  is  not  seen  
as   something   “which   stands   opposed   to   the   stream   of   consciousness,   but   is,  
rather,  immersed  in  conscious  life,  it  is  an  integral  part  of  its  structure”  (Zahavi,  
2008:  125).2    
  
The  minimal  self  is  thus  conceived  by  Gallagher  and  Zahavi  as  a  self  of  which  
we  are  pre-­‐‑reflectively  aware  as  the  owner  of  experiences.  It  is  indeed  claimed  
that,  due  to  the  “sense  of  mineness”  which  accompanies  every  conscious  state,  
the  minimal   self   is   given   as   the   subject   to  whom   the   experience  belongs   and,  
because   of   this   reason,   the   “sense   of   ownership”   is   a   fundamental   feature   of  
minimal  selfhood  (Gallagher  and  Zahavi,  2008:  209;  Gallagher,  2000).  As  I  will  
                                                   
2   In   phenomenology   the   connection   between   selfhood   and   pre-­‐‑reflectve   self-­‐‑
consciousness  has  often  been  referred  to  through  the  notion  of  “ipseity”.  Michel  Henry  
(1973),  for  instance,  conceives  of  subjectivity  as  being  characterised  by  “auto-­‐‑affection”,  
that  is  an  immediate  manifestation  of  the  self  to  the  self  which  is  considered  to  be  the  
condition   of   possibility   for   the   manifestation   of   anything   else   (1973:   459-­‐‑461).   The  
notion  of  ipseity  is  also  frequently  employed  in  phenomenological  psychopathology  to  
account   for   the  disturbances  of   self-­‐‑consciousness   characteristic  of   certain  psychiatric  
disorders.   For   example,   Sass   and   Parnas   (2003)   conceive   of   schizophrenia   as   a  
disturbance   of   ipseity   central   to   which   is   a   “diminished   self-­‐‑affection”,   that   is   “a  
weakened   sense   of   existing   as   a   vital   and   self-­‐‑coinciding   source   of   awareness   and  
action”  (2003:  427).  According  to  Sass  and  Parnas,  “complementary”  to  this  disruption  
of  self-­‐‑awareness  is  the  “hyperriflexivity”  typical  of  schizophrenic  experience,  namely  




highlight   later,   the  minimal   self   is   also   attributed  other   characteristic   features  
and  it  can  be  questioned  whether  Gallagher  and  Zahavi’s  account  is  exhaustive  
in   this   respect.   Before   exploring   this   point,   however,   in   order   to   best  
understand  the  main  claims  advanced  by  this  approach  and  its  position  within  
the  current  theoretical  debate,  it  is  necessary  to  briefly  discuss  the  relationship  
between  minimal  self  and  language.  
  
1.2.  Minimal  Self  and  Language  
  
In   the   contemporary   phenomenological   literature   the   term   “pre-­‐‑reflective”   is  
also   considered   to  mean   “pre-­‐‑conceptual”   and   “pre-­‐‑linguistic”,   thus   entailing  
that   the   primitive   self-­‐‑experience   integral   to   phenomenal   consciousness   is  
independent  of   the  possession  of   a   self-­‐‑concept   and   the   ability   to   articulate   it  
linguistically  (Gallagher  and  Zahavi,  2008:  205).  This  claim  not  only  clarifies  the  
notion  of  self-­‐‑awareness  Gallagher  and  Zahavi  operate  with,  but  also  highlights  
one  of   the  main  differences  between   their  position  and  other  accounts  of   self-­‐‑
consciousness.  
  
As   observed   by   Bermúdez   (1998:   10-­‐‑11),   within   philosophy   of   mind   self-­‐‑
consciousness  has  often  been  associated  with  the  ability  to  think  thoughts  that  
are   “immune   to   error   through  misidentification”   and   to   the   related   ability   to  
master  the  semantics  of  the  first-­‐‑person  pronoun.  Bermúdez  highlights  how  the  
origin   of   these   approaches   can   be   traced   back   to   a   distinction   introduced   by  
Wittgenstein   in   The   Blue   Book   (1958).   In   the   text   Wittgenstein   distinguishes  
between  two  possible  uses  of  the  word  “I”:  “the  use  as  subject”  and  “the  use  as  
object”.   The   use   of   “I”   as   object   is   typical   of   sentences   such   as   “my   arm   is  
broken”  or  “I  have  grown  six  inches”  (1958:  66),  namely  propositions  which,  as  
observed   by   Bermúdez,   can   be   analysed   in   terms   of   other   propositions.   In  
particular,   Bermúdez   argues   that   these   propositions   can   be   conceived   as   the  
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union  of  a  predicative  component  -­‐‑  “a  is  ϕ”-­‐‑  and  an  identification  component  -­‐‑  
“I   am   a”   (1998:   5).   The   fundamental   characteristic   of   these   uses   of   “I”   is   the  
possibility  for  the  utterer  to  incur  a  reference  error.  In  these  cases,   it   is   indeed  
possible  to  be  wrong  with  regard  to  the  identification  element,  for  example  by  
correctly  claiming  that  “a  is  ϕ”,  while  being  mistaken  as  to  the  fact  that  “I  am  
a”.  On  the  other  hand,  the  uses  of  “I”  as  subject,  for  example  in  the  proposition  
“I  have  a   toothache”,  do  not   involve  an   identification  component  and   thus   in  
these   cases   it   would   not   be   possible   for   the   utterer   to   mistakenly   refer   to  
himself.  As  observed  by  Wittgenstein:  
  
One  can  point   to   the  difference  between   these   two  categories  by  saying:  The  
cases  of   the   first  category   involve   the  recognition  of  a  particular  person,  and  
there   is   in   these  cases   the  possibility  of  an  error,  or  as   I  should  rather  put   it:  
The  possibility  of  an  error  has  been  provided  for…  It  is  possible  that,  say  in  an  
accident,   I   should   feel   a   pain   in  my   arm,   see   a   broken   arm   at  my   side,   and  
think  it  is  mine  when  really  it  is  my  neighbour’s.  And  I  could,  looking  into  a  
mirror,  mistake  a  bump  on  his  forehead  for  one  on  mine.  On  the  other  hand,  
there  is  no  question  of  recognizing  a  person  when  I  say  I  have  toothache.  To  
ask   “are   you   sure   that   it’s   you   who   have   pains?”   would   be   nonsensical.  
(Wittgenstein,  1958:  67,  cited  in  Bermûdez,  1998:  5)  
  
As  remarked  by  Bermúdez  (1998:  6),  sentences  where  “I”  is  used  as  subject  are  
consequently   considered   to   be   “immune   to   error   through   misidentification  
relative   to   the   first-­‐‑person   pronouns”   (Shoemaker,   1968:   556).   Following   a  
notation   introduced  by  Castañeda   (1966),   this  use  of   the   first-­‐‑person  pronoun  
and  the  corresponding  third-­‐‑person  one,  is  usually  marked  with  an  asterisk  (*).  
Drawing  on   these  distinctions,   some  accounts  of   self-­‐‑consciousness   claim   that  
mental   states   are   self-­‐‑conscious   if   their   contents   can   be   expressed   directly  
through  the  use  of  the  pronoun  I*  and  indirectly  through  the  pronoun  He*.  In  
other  terms,  only  the  mental  states  whose  contents  are  intended  by  the  utterer  
as  regarding  himself*  would  be  self-­‐‑conscious.    
  
A   clear   example   of   this   idea   is   provided   by   the   definition   of   “first   person  
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perspective”   given   by   Lynn   Baker   and   by   the   role   that   she   attributes   to   this  
notion   in   her   analysis   of   self-­‐‑consciousness   (2000).   In   Baker’s   opinion,   the  
capacity  to  think  about  oneself  as  oneself*,3  manifested  through  the  capacity  to  
entertain  I*  thoughts,4  not  only  allows  for  the  attribution  to  the  subject  of  a  first-­‐‑
person   perspective,   but   is   also   a   necessary   and   sufficient   condition   for   the  
attribution  of  self-­‐‑consciousness.  In  her  words:  
  
The   first-­‐‑person   perspective   is   a   necessary   condition   for   any   form   of   self-­‐‑
consciousness  and  a  sufficient  condition  for  one  form  of  self-­‐‑consciousness  as  
well.  For  a  conscious  being  with  a  first-­‐‑person  perspective  can  conceive  of  her  
thoughts,   attitudes,   feelings,   and   sensations   as   her   own*.  And   the   ability   to  
conceive   of   one’s   thoughts   as   one’s   own*   is   a   form   of   genuine   self-­‐‑
consciousness.   Every   other   form   of   self-­‐‑consciousness   that   I   know   of  
presupposes  self-­‐‑consciousness  in  this  basic  sense.  (Baker,  2000:  69)  
  
Accounts  of  self-­‐‑consciousness  such  as  Baker’s  identify  self-­‐‑consciousness  with  
the  capacity  to  think  I*  thoughts,  namely  thoughts  whose  first-­‐‑person  contents  
can  be  expressed  through  the  use  of  the  pronoun  “I”  immune  to  error  through  
misidentification.   In   order   to   explain   this   capacity,   then,   it   is   necessary   to  
explain   how   subjects   become   able   to  master   the   semantics   of   the   first   person  
pronoun   and   it   is   exactly   with   reference   to   this   point   that   a   number   of  
theoretical  difficulties  emerge.  
    
Such   an   approach,   for   instance,   would   deny   the   possession   of   self-­‐‑
consciousness   to   individuals   who   do   not   have   the   linguistic   and   conceptual  
abilities   necessary   to   competently   use   the   first-­‐‑person   pronoun.   However,  
evidence   from  developmental   psychology   suggests   that   even   at   pre-­‐‑linguistic  
                                                   
3 Baker  does  not  believe  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  uses  of  the  first-­‐‑person  pronoun  
which  are  necessarily  immune  to  error  through  misidentification.  However,  she  adopts  
Castañeda’s   notation   to   indicate   the   instances   of   self-­‐‑reference   in   which   the   utterer  
refers  to  himself  as  himself*.  
4  According  to  Baker,  I*  thoughts  are  thoughts  in  which  the  person  thinks  about  herself  
as  herself*,   that   is  without  making  use  of   third-­‐‑person  reference   tools  such  as  names,  
demonstratives  or  descriptions  (Baker,  2000:  65).  
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stages  children  possess  capacities  that  are  difficult  to  explain  without  assuming  
that   they   are   self-­‐‑conscious.   For   example,   through   a   series   of   experiments  
Meltzoff  and  Moore   (e.g.  1977;  1989;  1994)   showed   that   infants  and  newborns  
can  imitate  a  number  of  facial  gestures  in  a  way  which,  according  to  Gallagher,  
excludes  the  possibility  that  the  imitation  is  a  reflex  or  release  mechanism  (2005:  
72).5  In  order  for  the  toddler  to  perform  these  imitations,  he  should  already  be  
able  to  grasp  the  existence  of  both  differences  and  similarities  between  himself  
and  others  and,  as  such,  he  can  be  considered  to  be  in  possession  of  a  primitive,  
proprioceptive   and   pre-­‐‑reflective   form   of   self-­‐‑consciousness   (2005:   74).   As  
infants  of  this  age  do  not  master  language  and  concepts,  it  is  therefore  arguable  
that  there  is  an  experiential  sense  of  self  which  predates  the  development  of  the  
ability  to  use  the  first-­‐‑person  pronoun.6  
  
By  acknowledging  the  existence  of  a  pre-­‐‑reflective   level  of  self-­‐‑experience,   the  
phenomenological  account  recognises  that  subjects  who  are  not  able  to  refer  to  
themselves   linguistically   can   be   self-­‐‑aware   too.   Furthermore,   this   account  
provides  a  theoretical  framework  which  can  contribute  to  explain  the  origin  of  
the  ability  to  use  the  first-­‐‑person  pronoun  and  to  form  a  self-­‐‑concept.  Indeed,  it  
is   arguable   that   those   linguistic   and   conceptual   abilities   are   rooted   in   the  





                                                   
5 Infants,  for  instance,  are  capable  of  delayed  imitation  and  to  improve  the  accuracy  of  
their   performance   over   time.   In   addition,   Gallagher   observes   that   it   is   unlikely   that  
there  are  reflex  and  release  mechanisms  specific  enough  to  account  for  all  the  different  
forms  of  imitation  newborns  are  capable  of  (2000:  72).  
6  See  Bermúdez   (1998,  chapter  one)   for   the   illustration  of  other   theoretical  difficulties  
faced  by  the  accounts  which  consider  the  mastery  of  the  semantics  of   the  first-­‐‑person  
pronoun  necessary  for  the  development  of  self-­‐‑consciousness.   
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1.3.  Minimal  Self  and  Bodily  Experience  
  
So  far  I  have  illustrated  how,  in  Gallagher  and  Zahavi’s  account,  the  notion  of  
minimal  self  is  essentially  related  to  that  of  pre-­‐‑reflective  self-­‐‑consciousness  and  
I   have   provided   a   characterisation   of   what   is   meant   in   this   context   by   pre-­‐‑
reflectivity.  More  specifically,  I  have  shown  that  the  minimal  self  is  the  subject  
of   experience   of   which   we   have   a   non-­‐‑observational   and   non-­‐‑objectifying  
awareness   in   any   phenomenally   conscious   state.   This   form   of   self-­‐‑
consciousness,  in  addition,  is  considered  to  be  independent  of  the  possession  of  
linguistic   and   conceptual   abilities   and,   therefore,   such   an   account   makes   it  
possible   to   attribute   self-­‐‑awareness   also   to   subjects   who   do   not   master   the  
semantics  of  the  first-­‐‑person  pronoun  and  do  not  possess  a  self-­‐‑concept.  
  
According  to  Gallagher  and  Zahavi,  however,  minimal  selfhood  has  also  other  
characteristic  features.  In  this  regard,  for  instance,  it  is  argued  that  the  minimal  
self   is   both   embodied   and   embedded   in   the   environment   (2008:   204),   an   idea  
which   has   its   origins   in   the   phenomenological   account   of   intentionality.   As  
remarked   by   Legrand   (2011),   characteristic   of   this   account   is   the  
acknowledgement   that   the   subject   and   object   of   intentional   experience   are  
inseparable.   From   this   perspective,   Legrand   remarks,   in   order   for   a  world   to  
appear   to   a   conscious   subject,   the   subject   itself   must   be   in   the   world   and,  
because  of   this   reason,   it  must  be  embodied   (2011:   208-­‐‑209).  This  view   is  best  
understood   by   taking   into   consideration   the   insights   into   the   nature   of  
conscious  and  perceptual  experience  provided  by  Husserl  (1989)  and  Merleau-­‐‑
Ponty   (1962).   In  particular,  central   in   this  context   is   the  claim  that   the  body   is  
not  an  object  like  other  objects,  but  rather  is  that  by  virtue  of  which  we  can  have  
an  experience  of  objects  at  all  (Merleau-­‐‑Ponty,  1962:  92).  
  
According  to  Husserl,  any  spatio-­‐‑temporal  object  is  always  given  from  a  certain  
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perspective,   namely   it   is   always   located   in   a   coordinate   system   of  which   the  
subject   is   the  origin  (Husserl:  1989:  61-­‐‑62),  a  claim  which   is  at   the  core  also  of  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s  account:  
  
not  only  is  the  perspective  of  my  body  not  a  particular  case  of  that  of  objects,  
but   furthermore   the   presentation   of   objects   in   perspective   cannot   be  
understood   except   through   the   resistance   of   my   body   to   all   variation   of  
perspective.  If  objects  may  never  show  me  more  than  one  of  their  facets,  this  is  
because   I   am  myself   in   a   certain   place   from  which   I   see   them   and  which   I  
cannot  see.  (1962:  92)    
  
As   observed   by   Zahavi,   every   perspectival   appearance   “is   always   an  
appearance  of   something   for   someone”,   “it   always  has   its  genitive   and  dative”  
(Zahavi,   2003:   98).   This   makes   it   necessary   for   the   perceiving   subject   to   be  
located   in   the   spatial   framework   like   its   objects,   and   since   being   part   of   this  
framework  requires  the  possession  of  a  corporeal  nature,   it   is  claimed  that  the  
subject  of  perception  is  necessarily  an  embodied  subject  (Zahavi,  2003:  98).7    
  
This  view  draws  attention  to  the  subject  being  the  “zero  point”  of  an  egocentric  
space;   however,   as   observed   by   Zahavi,   Husserl’s   account   of   the   role   of  
embodied   subjectivity   in   perception   is   not   limited   to   the   consideration   of   the  
bodily   self   as   the   static   reference   point   of   a   system   of   spatio-­‐‑temporal  
coordinates.  On  the  contrary,  Husserl  accurately  investigates  the  role  of  bodily  
mobility  in  the  constitution  of  perceptual  reality  (Zahavi,  2003:  99).  
  
Husserl’s   analysis   of   bodily  movement   aims   to   explain   how   it   is   possible   for  
different  perceptual  appearances  to  be  recognised  as  facets  of  one  and  the  same  
object   (Zahavi,   2003:   99).   Bodily  mobility   is   characterised   for   the   subject   by   a  
number   of   kinaesthetic   sensations,   that   is   bodily   feelings   which   –   with   the  
exception  of  pathological   experience   –   are   always   associated  with  movement.  
                                                   
7 In  Husserl’s  words:  “[t]he  body  is,  in  the  first  place,  the  medium  of  all  perception;   it   is  
the  organ  of  perception  and  is  necessarily  involved  in  all  perception”  (1989:  61).  
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While   any   particular   perceptual   appearance   of   an   object   is   always   given   in  
relation  to  a  specific  bodily  position,  this  experience,  from  a  phenomenological  
point  of  view,  is  not  given  in  isolation.  The  profile  of  the  object  that  I  perceive  at  
any  given  moment  is  given  in  conjunction  with  the  profiles  of  the  object  that  are  
not  appearing  now  but   that  would  become  apparent   if   I  changed  my  position  
relative  to  the  object.  In  other  terms,  the  absent  profiles  of  the  perceptual  object  
are    “cointended”  (Zahavi,  2003:  100)  in  perceptual  experience  thanks  to  the  fact  
that  they  could  become  apparent  if  a  movement  or  a  series  of  movements  were  
performed.  As  Husserl  states:  
  
In  the  essence  of  the  apprehension  itself  there  resides  the  possibility  of  letting  
the  perception  disperse  into  “possible”  series  of  perceptions,  all  of  which  are  of  
the  following  type:  if  the  eye  turns  in  a  certain  way,  then  so  does  the  “image;”  
if   it   turns   differently   in   some   definite   fashion,   then   so   does   the   image   alter  
differently,  in  correspondence”.  (1989:  63)  
  
Kinaesthetic   experience,   therefore,   is   what   gives   continuity   to   perceptual  
experience   from   the   point   of   view   of   both   the   perceiving   subject   and   the  
perceived   object.   The  unity   of   the  perceptual   object   is   thus  dependent   on   the  
possibility   for   its   hidden  profiles   to   become   apparent   through   specific   bodily  
movements:  this  possibility  is  experienced  as  an  integral  part  of  our  perceptual  
field  and  is  underpinned  by  the  existence  of  a  kinaesthetic  system.    
  
A   phenomenological   analysis   of   the   structure   of   perceptual   experience   then  
shows  that   the  perceiver   is  necessarily  embodied  and  also  provides   important  
information   in   regards   to   the   characteristics   of   this   embodied   subject.   As  
illustrated  above,  perceptual  experience  depends  on  the  presence  of  a  dynamic  
subject,  namely  a  subject  who  has  the  ability  to  move  in  the  environment.  From  
this   perspective,   therefore,   the   perceiver   is   also   an   agent   and   perceptual  
experience   and   bodily   movement   are   essentially   entangled.   In   order   to  
understand   how   such   an   account   is   relevant   to   the   characterisation   of   the  
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structure   of   the   minimal   self   it   is   however   necessary   to   further   distinguish  
between  various  ways  in  which  the  body  can  be  experienced.    
  
A   key   phenomenological   distinction   in   this   regard   is   that   between   the  
subjective   body   (Leib)   and   the   objective   body   (Körper),   or,   in   other   terms,  
between   the   lived,   unthematised   body   and   the   observed,   thematised   one  
(Zahavi,  1999:  104).  By  drawing  attention  to  the  fact  that  originally  the  body  is  
not  given  as  one  among  other  perceptual  objects,  but  rather  as  that  by  virtue  of  
which  other   objects   can  be  perceived,  Husserl   and  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  provide   an  
account  of  the  body  as  it  is  subjectively  lived.  This  kind  of  bodily  experience  has  
a  non-­‐‑objectifying  and  non-­‐‑observational  character  and  can  thus  be  considered  
to  be  a  form  of  pre-­‐‑reflective  self-­‐‑consciousness.    
  
The  experience  of  the  body  as  a  subject,  as  it  is  an  experience  in  which  the  body  
is  not  an  object  of  perception,  but  that  through  which  perception  is  realised,  can  
be  characterised  as  an  experience  in  which  the  body  is  “transparent”  (Legrand,  
2011).   However,   as   noted   by   Legrand,   the   notion   of   transparency   can   have  
different  meanings  and  it  is  important  to  ascertain  which  is  the  one  that  is  most  
suited   to   the  phenomenological   account.  On   the  one  hand,  Legrand  observes,  
transparency  can  be  considered  a  synonym  of  “invisibility”:  from  this  point  of  
view,   the   transparent   body   not   only   would   not   be   the   object   of   thematic  
attention,  but   it  would  also  be  outside  of  the  experiential  realm  altogether.  As  
such,   rather   than   being   experienced   in   either   reflective   or   pre-­‐‑reflective   self-­‐‑
consciousness,   the   body   would   just   be   unconscious.   On   the   other   hand,  
transparency  can  be  considered  as  opposed  to  invisibility  and  the  term  can  be  
used  to  designate  a  form  of  experience  which  is  conscious,  but  not  thematically  
conscious.  From  this  perspective,  as  argued  by  Legrand,   the  experience  of   the  
body  as  a  subject  should  be  defined  as  transparent,  because  in  it  the  body  is  not  
an  object  of  observation,  but   is   conscious  and  “not   concealed”   (2011:   215).  As  
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highlighted   before,   this   is   predominantly   the   case   with   our   perceptual  
experience  of  the  external  world.  Although  our  attention  in  these  circumstances  
is   directed   to   what   we   perceive,   the   body   does   not   disappear   from   our  
experiential  field  and  it  is  present  not  as  an  intentional  object  but  rather  as  the  
framework  through  which  perception  is  structured.  
  
The  phenomenological  analysis  here  outlined  thus  shows  that  the  self  of  which  
we   are   pre-­‐‑reflectively   conscious   is   an   embodied   perceiver   and   agent,   thus  
making   it   possible   to   understand   two   other   fundamental   features   of   the  
minimal   self.   In   the   first   place,   the  minimal   self   is   not   a   “pure   identity   pole”  
(Gallagher   and   Zahavi,   2008:   200),   but   is   rather   a   bodily   self   essentially  
embedded  in  the  environment.  Secondly,  along  with  the  “sense  of  ownership”,  
also   the   “sense   of   agency”   is   an   essential   attribute   of   the   minimal   self.   As  
mentioned  above,  intrinsic  to  the  pre-­‐‑reflective  experience  we  have  of  our  body  
is  a  felt  sense  of  our  ability  to  act  and  Gallagher  and  Zahavi  (2008)8  emphasise  
how  actions  that  are  performed  intentionally  are  normally  accompanied  by  the  
sense  of   being   the   author   of   those   actions,   that   is   “the  one  who   is   causing  or  
generating”  them  (Gallagher,  2000:  15).  The  sense  of  agency  is  considered  to  be  
distinct  from  the  sense  of  ownership,  as  the  latter  is  defined  as  the  sense  that  “I  
am  the  one  who  is  undergoing  an  experience”,   that   I  am  the  subject   to  whom  
the  experience  belongs  (Gallagher,  2000:  15).  In  the  case  of  voluntary  actions,  for  
example   when   I   decide   to   open   the   window   to   let   some   air   in,   the   sense   of  
ownership   and   the   sense   of   agency   “coincide   and   are   indistinguishable”  
(Gallagher,   2000:   16).   However,   in   the   case   of   involuntary   movements,   for  
example  when   someone   pushes  me   or   in   reflex-­‐‑like  movements,   the   sense   of  
ownership  is  present,  but  the  sense  of  agency  is  absent.  The  sense  of  agency  is  
thus  different  from  the  sense  of  ownership,  but  it  is  maintained  that  they  both  
                                                   




operate  at  the  pre-­‐‑reflective  level.  This  is  not  to  deny  that  we  can  be  reflectively  
aware  of  being  an  agent  or  the  owner  of  our  experiences  and  that  we  are  able  to  
express   this  awareness   linguistically.  However,   as  observed  by  Gallagher  and  
Zahavi   (2008:   161),   “attributions”   of   ownership   and   agency   at   the   reflective  
level   necessarily   depend   on   a   prior   pre-­‐‑reflective   experience.   In   other   terms,  
according  to  this  position,  it  is  because  I  already  experience  myself  as  an  agent  
at  the  pre-­‐‑reflective  level  that  I  can  reflectively  conceive  of  myself  as  the  author  
of  my  own  actions.    
  
Because  of  its  pre-­‐‑reflective  character,  the  sense  of  agency  is  then  recognised  by  
various  authors  as  one  of  the  fundamental  characteristics  of  the  minimal  self.  In  
Fuchs’  opinion,  for  instance:  
  
Agency  as  self-­‐‑movement  of  the  body  is  the  necessary  complement  to  its  self-­‐‑
affection;   together   they   form   the  basic   self-­‐‑awareness   or   self-­‐‑referentiality   of  
embodied  consciousness.  (Fuchs,  2005:  96)  
  
Sense  of  ownership  and  sense  of  agency  are  thus  central  aspects  of  the  notion  of  
minimal   self.   However,   in   order   to   get   a   comprehensive   idea   of   the  
phenomenological   account   under   consideration,   it   is   important   to   briefly  
discuss   also   the   role   played   by   temporality   in   the   definition   of   minimal  
selfhood.  
  
1.4.  Minimal  Self  and  Time  
  
As  discussed   earlier,   the  minimal   self   is   identified  with   the  primitive   form  of  
self-­‐‑consciousness   which   accompanies   every   conscious   experience   and   it   is  
argued   that   this   form   of   self-­‐‑awareness   is   independent   of   the   possession   of  
linguistic   and   conceptual   abilities.   Zahavi   (2003;   2014)   also   explores   the  
relationship  between  pre-­‐‑reflective  self-­‐‑consciousness  and  time  and  claims,  on  
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the  basis  of  his  analysis  of  Husserl’s  account  of  time  consciousness  (1991),  that  
the  minimal  self  is  to  be  conceived  as  temporally  extended.    
  
Aiming  to  explain  how  it  is  possible  for  us  to  experience  objects  with  a  temporal  
duration,  Husserl  maintains   that   integral   to   the  experience  of   the  object   is  not  
only  the  consciousness  of   its  current  phase  -­‐‑  “primal  impression”  -­‐‑     but  also  a  
consciousness   of   its   previous   phase   –   which   he   calls   “retention”   –   and   an  
anticipation   of   its   future   phase   –   which   he   names   “protention”.   As   such,   an  
object  can  be  perceived  as  extended  in  time  because  the  present  awareness  we  
have  of   it   is   intertwined  with  a  consciousness  of   its  past  and  future  states.  An  
example   discussed   by   Husserl   in   this   regard   concerns   the   experience   we  
undergo  when  listening  to  a  melody.  It  is  observed  that  in  this  case  not  only  we  
are   conscious   of   the   note   that  we   are   currently   hearing,   but  we   also   retain   a  
certain  awareness  of  the  note  we  have  just  heard  and  we  anticipate  that  another  
note  will  come  next.   In  Husserl’s  view,   it   is  because   intentional  consciousness  
has  this  tripartite  structure  that  we  are  able  to  experience  temporally  extended  
objects.  However,   as   remarked   by   Zahavi   (2014:   64-­‐‑65),   this   account   explains  
not   only   the   way   in   which   we   experience   objects,   but   also   how   self-­‐‑
consciousness  is  structured.  Indeed,  according  to  this  position,  what  is  retained,  
given  and  anticipated  through  retention,  primal  impression  and  protention    are  
the   past,   present   and   future   phases   of   my   experience   of   the   object.   As   the  
awareness  of  our  experiencing  we  have  through  temporal  consciousness  is  non-­‐‑
objectifying   and   non-­‐‑observational,   it   can   be   attributed   a   pre-­‐‑reflective  
character  and,  as  such,  minimal  selfhood  can  be  considered   to  be  extended   in  
time  in  this  basic  sense.  In  Zahavi’s  words:  
  
Husserl’s   description   of   the   structure   of   inner   time-­‐‑consciousness   (primal  
impression   –   retention   –   protention)   might   be   seen   as   an   analysis   of   the  





The  phenomenological  analysis  of  the  temporal  structure  of  pre-­‐‑reflective  self-­‐‑
consciousness   thus   shows   that   the   minimal   self   is   temporally   extended.  
According   to   Gallagher   and   Zahavi’s   account,   time   is   central   also   to   the  
narrative   self;   however,   as   it   will   become   clear   in   the   next   few   sections,   the  
notion  of   temporality  which   is  most  relevant   to  narrativity  has   to  do  not  with  
the  micro-­‐‑structure  of   consciousness,  but   rather  with   the  historicity  of  human  
experience.    
  
2.  The  Narrative  Self  
2.1.  Narrative  Accounts  
  
In   the   first  part  of   this   chapter   I   illustrated   the  essential   connection  Gallagher  
and   Zahavi   establish   between   minimal   selfhood   and   pre-­‐‑reflective   self-­‐‑
consciousness.  From  this  perspective,   I  showed,   the  minimal  self   is  defined  as  
the   embodied   subject   which   is   experienced   in   a   non-­‐‑observational   and   non-­‐‑
objectifying  manner  in  any  instance  of  phenomenal  consciousness.  The  minimal  
level   of   self-­‐‑experience   is   considered   to   be   temporally   extended   and  
independent  of  the  possession  of  linguistic  and  conceptual  abilities  and  sense  of  
ownership   and   sense   of   agency   are   seen   as   fundamental   aspects   of   pre-­‐‑
reflective  self-­‐‑awareness.  
  
Although  the  minimal  self  is  considered  as  a  primitive  form  of  self-­‐‑experience,  
Gallagher   and  Zahavi   recognise   that   this   concept   does   not   exhaust   our   ideas  
regarding   the   nature   of   selfhood.  When  we   think   of   a   self,   they   suggest,   we  
think  of  something  more  than  a  mere  subject  of  experience  (Gallagher,  2000:  18;  
Zahavi,   2008:   107).   Rather,   what   we   often   have   in   mind   is   a   richer   notion,  





Various   philosophical   and   psychological   accounts   have   been   given   of   what  
narrative  selfhood  amounts  to.  At  the  core  of  many  of  these  approaches  is  the  
idea  that  the  emergence  of  a  self  depends  on  the  ability  to  engage  in  a  plurality  
of   personal   and   interpersonal   narrative   activities.   Moving   from   the  
acknowledgement   that   human   life   is   inherently   dynamic   and   that   individual  
experience   is   highly   heterogeneous,   these   accounts   tend   to   conceive   of  
narrativity  as  the  means  by  which  a  degree  of  coherence  can  be  given  to  diverse  
aspects   of   one’s   existence   and   a   unitary   self   can   be   constituted.   From   this  
perspective   then,  as  argued  by  MacIntyre,   the  unity  of   the  self  would  depend  
on  “the  unity  of  a  narrative  embodied  in  a  single  life”  (1984:  218).    
  
According  to  Dennett  (1988;  1991),  for  instance,  the  self  is  to  be  conceived  as  a  
“center  of  narrative  gravity”  which   is   created   through  our   linguistic  ability   to  
integrate   and  make   coherent   a  number  of  disparate   experiences  over   time.   In  
his  words:  
  
we   are   all   virtuoso   novelists,   who   find   ourselves   engaged   in   all   sorts   of  
behaviour,   and  we  always   try   to  put   the  best   ‘faces’  on   it  we  can.  We   try   to  
make  all  of  our  material  cohere  into  a  single  good  story.  And  that  story  is  our  
autobiography.   The   chief   fictional   character   at   the   centre   of   that  
autobiography  is  one’s  self.  (Dennett,  1988:  1029,  cited  in  Strawson,  2004:  435)  
  
In  Dennett’s  opinion,  the  notion  of  self  plays  a  useful  role  in  our  cognitive  life,  
but   this  does  not  make   the   self   a   real   entity;   on   the   contrary,   the   self   is   to  be  
considered  as  an  invention,  a  fictional  representation.9   In  addition,  contrary  to  
                                                   
9 As   observed   by   Menary   (2008),   whilst   Dennett   considers   the   self   as   an   abstract  
construction   and   denies   it   any   reality,   other   supporters   of   the   narrative   account   of  
selfhood  have  maintained   that   the   self   produced   through  narrativity   is   not   a   fiction,  
but  a  real  substance  possessing  causal  powers  (e.g.  Velleman,  2006).  Different  positions  
have  thus  been  taken  in  regards  to  the  ontological  status  of  the  narrative  self,  however,  
for   the  purpose  of   the  present  work,   it   is  not  necessary   to  discuss   these   conceptions.  
What  is  relevant  here  is  rather  to  provide  an  overview  of  some  of  the  ideas  at  the  basis  
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Gallagher  and  Zahavi,  Dennett  and  other  supporters  of  the  idea  that  narrativity  
and  selfhood  are  essentially  related  claim  that  no  self  is  in  existence  prior  to  the  
emergence  of  the  narrative  one.  According  to  Bruner  for  instance:  
  
there  is  no  such  thing  as  an  intuitively  obvious  and  essential  self  to  know,  one  
that   just   sits   there   ready   to   be   portrayed   in   words.   Rather,   we   constantly  
construct   and   reconstruct   our   selves   to  meet   the   needs   of   the   situations  we  
encounter  and  we  do  so  with   the  guidance  of  our  memories  of   the  past  and  
our  hopes  and  fears  for  the  future.  Telling  oneself  about  oneself  is  like  making  
up   a   story   about   who   and   what   we   are,   what’s   happened,   and   why   we’re  
doing  what  we’re  doing.  (Bruner,  2003:  64)  
  
Gallagher   and   Zahavi’s   approach   differ   from   the   accounts   put   forward   by  
Dennett   and   Bruner   because   it   admits   of   the   existence   of   a   minimal   self   in  
addition   to   a   narrative   self   and   maintains,   as   I   will   show   shortly,   that   a  
particular  relationship  holds  between  the  two.  Before  examining  in  more  detail  
this  position,  however,  it  is  important  to  briefly  consider  the  key  issues  debated  
by   narrative   accounts   of   selfhood.   In   this   regard,   a   useful   interpretative  
framework   is   provided   by   Schechtman   (2007:   159-­‐‑160),   who   suggests   to  
distinguish  the  various  narrative  accounts  on  the  basis  of  how  they  answer  the  
following  questions:   1)   “What   counts   as   a   life-­‐‑narrative?”   2)   “What   counts   as  
having   a  narrative?”  and  3)  “What  are   the  practical   implications  of  having   (or  
failing  to  have)  a  narrative?”  
  
As   far   as   the   first   question   is   concerned,   common   to   many   conceptions   of  
narrativity   is   the   claim   that   in   order   for   something   to   count   as   a   narrative   a  
temporal   structure   should   be   present.   This   is   indeed   the   essential   feature   of  
what   could   be   considered   a   “minimal”   definition   of   narrative.   According   to  
Lamarque  for  example  “at  least  two  events  must  be  depicted  in  a  narrative  and  
                                                                                                                                                     
of   the   claim   that   narrativity   and   selfhood   are   essentially   connected   and   this   can   be  
done   independently   of   the   consideration   of   the   particular   ontological   status   that   the  




there  must  be  some  more  or   less   loose,  albeit  non-­‐‑logical  relation  between  the  
events.  Crucially,  there  is  a  temporal  dimension  in  narrative”  (Lamarque,  2004:  
394).  From  this  perspective,  a  narrative  can  be  considered  just  as  a  “sequential  
list  of   events”  and   texts   such  as  police   reports,   reports  of  medical  procedures  
(Schechtman,  2007:  159-­‐‑160),  annals  and  historical  chronicles  would  qualify  as  
narratives  under  this  definition.  
  
More   demanding   approaches   maintain   that   a   sequence   of   events   can   be  
considered  a  narrative  when  an  explanation  of  how  they  relate  to  one  another  is  
present.  These  “explanatory  relationships”  will  show  “how  the  events  in  one’s  
history   lead   to  other  events   in   that  history”   (Schechtman,  2007:  160)  and  such  
relationships   may   be   given   different   characterisations.   According   to   Carroll  
(2001),   for   instance,   the   explanatory   power   of   narratives   depends   on   the   fact  
that   the  narrated  events  are  causally   related.  However,  other  scholars   suggest  
that,   although   causal   connections   are   presupposed   by   the   stories   we   craft,  
narrativity   conveys   a   distinct   form   of   understanding   or   explanation   (e.g.  
Goldie,  2012a;  Velleman,  2003).  
  
Goldie,  for  instance,  maintains  that  narrative  accounts  have  various  features  in  
common  with  causal  accounts  –  for  example  their  “idiographic”  nature  and  the  
fact   that   they   cannot   be   about   a   single   event   but   should   regard   sequences   of  
events   (2012a:   14)   –   but   he   rejects   the   identification   of   the   two   forms   of  
explanation.  What  is  distinctive  of  a  narrative,  in  his  opinion,  is  the  fact  that  the  
events   which   are   told   are   held   together   by   virtue   of   meaningful,   and   not  
necessarily  causal,   relationships.   I  will  provide  a  more  detailed  reconstruction  
of  Goldie’s   conception   of   narrativity   in  Chapter   4,   but   for   the   purpose   of   the  
present   section   it   is   important   to   stress   that   according   to  various   scholars   the  
events   in   a   narrative   are   intelligibly   connected   and   intelligibility   or  




According   to   Schechtman,   the   second   aspect   in   regard   to   which   narrative  
accounts  differ  is  the  characterisation  of  what  it  means  to  be  in  possession  of  a  
narrative.  Goldie,   for   example,   defines   a   narrative   as   “something   that   can   be  
told  or  narrated,  or  just  thought  through  in  narrative  thinking”  (2012a:  2),  thus  
suggesting   that   narrativity   is   dependent   upon   the   presence   of   someone  who  
recounts   the   story   either   implicitly   or   explicitly.10   Others,   on   the   contrary,  
extend  the  notion  of  narrative  far  beyond  this  definition,  claiming  that  in  order  
for   something   to   possess   a   narrative   structure   no   implicit   or   explicit   story-­‐‑
telling   is   needed.   From   this   perspective,   narrativity   is   something   that   can   be  
possessed  also  by  experience  itself  (e.g.  Carr,  1986;  Slors,  1998).    
  
Schechtman  claims   that   the   last  aspect   in   relation   to  which  narrative  accounts  
differ  concerns  the  implications  of  having  an  autobiographical  narrative.  On  the  
one   hand,   some   accounts   simply   claim   that   narratives   have   a   role   in   our  
cognitive  and  behavioural  functioning.  This  is  the  case  for  example  of  Dennett  
(1991)  who  claims  that  the  fictional  representation  he  identifies  the  self  with  has  
the  function  of  helping  the  organism  to  keep  track  of  its  activities.  As  observed  
by   Schechtman,   other   accounts   attribute   to   narrativity   a   deeper   role,   by  
conceiving  of  it  as  necessary  to  perform  some  activities  related  to  personhood  –  
such  as  acting  as  a  moral  agent  –  while  others  advance  the  even  stronger  claim  
that   they  are   fundamental   to  conduct  a  meaningful   life   (2007:  160).  This   is   for  
example   the   view   of   MacIntyre,   according   to   whom   the   search   for   what  
constitutes   a   good   life   confers   meaningfulness   on   human   existence   and   is  
dependent  upon  narrative  understanding.  In  his  words:    
  
The  unity  of  a  human  life  is  the  unity  of  a  narrative  quest.  Quests  sometimes  
                                                   
10 In   the   rest   of   this  work   I  will   use   the   expressions   “explicit”   and   “implicit”   story-­‐‑
telling   to   indicate   the   activities   in  which   someone   engages  when   telling   a   particular  
story  or  thinking  about  it.  I  will  also  use  “stories”  and  “narratives”  as  synonyms. 
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fail,  are  frustrated,  abandoned  or  dissipated  into  distractions;  and  human  lives  
may  in  all  these  ways  also  fail.  But  the  only  criteria  for  success  or  failure  in  a  
human  life  as  a  whole  are  the  criteria  of  success  or  failure  in  a  narrated  or  to-­‐‑
be-­‐‑narrated  quest.  (MacIntyre,  1984:  219)    
  
Gallagher  and  Zahavi’s  account  does  not  explicitly  treat  each  of  the  aspects  of  
the   debate   on   narrative   selfhood   highlighted   by   Schechtman.   However,   the  
work  of  Ricoeur,  which   is  one  of   the  main  sources   their  account  draws  upon,  
addresses   some   of   these   topics.   Therefore,   in   order   to   best   understand   the  
origins  and  main  features  of  the  notion  of  narrative  self  used  in  contemporary  
phenomenology,   in   the   next   section   I   will   provide   an   outline   of   Ricoeur’s  
conception  of  narrativity  and  selfhood.    
  
2.2.  Ricoeur’s  Work  and  Contemporary  Phenomenology  
  
Ricoeur’s   account   of   autobiographical   narrativity   is   fundamentally   related   to  
how  he  conceives  of  the  problem  of  personal  identity.  This  account  is  based  on  
the   distinction   between   two   forms   of   identity,   identity   as   sameness   (mêmeté)  
and  identity  as  selfhood  (ipséité),  and  on  a  specific  conception  of  the  relationship  
which   exists   between   the   two   when   the   individual   person   is   considered  
(Ricoeur,  1994).    
  
According  to  the  notion  of  mêmeté,  the  identical  is  that  which  can  be  identified  
as   the   same  over   time  because   it  undergoes   little  or  no  change.  The  notion  of  
ipséité,11   on   the   contrary,   indicates   a   form   of   identity   which   is   kept   through  
change:   the   identical,   from   this   perspective,   is   that   which   remains   the   same  
                                                   
11 Ricoeur’s  notion  of   ipseity   is  different   from  the  one  which   is  used  by  Henry  (1973)  
and  by  some  scholars  in  the  field  of  phenomenological  psychopathology  (e.g.  Sass  and  
Parnas,   2003).   Indeed,   while   the   latter,   as   previously   mentioned,   designates   a   pre-­‐‑
reflective   form   of   self-­‐‑experience,   in   Ricoeur’s   account   ipseity   indicates   a   form   of  




while   mutating.   According   to   Ricoeur,   personal   identity   can   only   be  
understood  in  terms  of  the  interaction  between  these  two  concepts.    
  
In   his   view,   identity   as   sameness   is   best   exemplified   by   character,   which   he  
describes   as   the   set   of   unchanging   features   whose   presence   allows   for   the  
identification  of  the  subject  as  one  and  the  same  in  different  circumstances  and  
times.   Identity   as   sameness   is   thus   manifested,   according   to   Ricoeur,   as   the  
perspective   the   subject   has   on   the   world,   the   particular   point   of   view   from  
which  he  has  access  to  ideas,  values  and  people.  Character  is  not  something  the  
subject  voluntarily  chooses:  on  the  contrary,  it  is  the  set  of  dispositions  he  finds  
himself   endowed   with   and   which   makes   him   recognisable   over   time   as   a  
certain  person  (1994:  121).    
  
The  notion  of  character   is  discussed  by  Ricoeur  in  various  works,  however,   in  
Oneself  as  Another  he  acknowledges  that  his  view  has  slightly  changed.  While  he  
originally   argued   in   favour   of   the   immutability   of   this   dimension,   later   he  
comes  to  recognize  that  character  can  undergo  a  certain  evolution.  In  particular,  
Ricoeur   claims   that,   due   to   our   character   dispositions,   we   are   inclined   to  
evaluate  particular   things  or  events   in  a  certain  way.   In  so  doing,  we  develop  
evaluative   preferences   which,   by   becoming   habitual,   can   become   part   of  
character  itself  –  what  Ricoeur  refers  to  as  “acquired  identifications”  -­‐‑  and  add  
to   the   number   of   dispositions   which   make   us   recognisable   over   time.   It   is  
through   this   process   of   inclusion   of   new   dispositional   elements   in   its   pre-­‐‑
existing  structure  that  character  can  evolve.  However,  the  evolution  of  character  
so   outlined   never   entails   a   radical   change,   a   subversion   of   our   pre-­‐‑existing  
nature,  and   this   leads  Ricoeur   to  claim   that   in   this  process   the   two  notions  of  
identity  –  identity  as  sameness  and  identity  as  selfhood  –  coincide  (1994:  121).  
  
Whilst  character  constitutes  a  form  of  permanence  in  time  where  immutability  
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of  traits  and  change  seem  to  be  reconciled,  Ricoeur  argues  that  there  is  another  
model   of  permanence   in   time  which  becomes   apparent   in   the   contexts  where  
change   overtakes   immutability,   thus   generating   a   situation   in   which,   rather  
than  being  maintained  through  change,  identity  is  maintained  despite  change.  This  
model   of   permanence   in   time   is   named   by  Ricoeur   “self-­‐‑constancy”   and   it   is  
exemplified,   for   instance,   by   the   ability   to   keep   faith   to   one’s   promises   even  
when  one’s  circumstances  are  different  from  those  in  which  the  promises  were  
made.  Over  time,  the  desires  and  opinions  which  have  motivated  the  person  to  
undertake   certain   commitments   might   undergo   radical   mutations   or   be   no  
longer   in   place;   however,   in   those   cases,   by   keeping   one’s   word,   stability   is  
conferred  on  the  self  and  the  threat  posed  to  identity  by  the  passage  of  time  is  
mitigated.  This  process  indeed  appears  “to  stand  as  a  challenge  to  time,  a  denial  
of   change   […]”   (1994:   124).  The   identity   so  achieved   is   thus  dependent  on  an  
effort  made  by  the  individual  to  guarantee  that  there  will  be  something  about  
himself   that  other  people  will  be  able  to  count  on  no  matter  how  his  personal  
situation   or   outlook   on   the   world   will   evolve.   By   committing   to   keep   one’s  
promises,   one   aims   to   not   let   people   down   and   as   such   the   notion   of   self-­‐‑
constancy   is   closely   related   to   that   of   personal   accountability   and   has   ethical  
relevance.    
  
Therefore,   apart   from   character,   Ricoeur   acknowledges   the   existence   of   a  
dimension  of  personal  identity  which  depends  on  our  ability  to  take  a  position  
in   regards   to   the   person   we   want   to   be.   Indeed,   he   claims   that   we   are   not  
passively  determined  by  character  and  that  we  have  the  possibility,  to  a  certain  
extent,  to  determine  who  we  are  and  to  take  responsibility  for  this.  According  to  
him,  this  possibility  depends  on  the  dialectic  between  permanence  and  change,  
identity   and   diversity,  which   is   at   the   core   of   our   temporal   existence   and   he  
claims   that   it   is   only   through   the   development   of   a   narrative   form   of   self-­‐‑
understanding  that  these  dimensions  can  be  reconciled  and  the  identity  of  the  
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person  built  and  maintained  over  time.  In  Ricoeur’s  view,  the  construction  of  an  
autobiographical  narrative  serves  a  very  important  function,  namely  it  is  a  way  
to   create   coherence   and   meaning   across   the   variety   of   events   and   changes  
experienced  in  one’s  life,  a  way  to  avoid  dispersion  and  define  a  stable  identity  
which  is  recognised  as  such  by  both  the  self  and  others.  According  to  him:  
  
Self-­‐‑sameness,  “self-­‐‑constancy,”  can  escape  the  dilemma  of  the  Same  and  the  
Other  to  the  extent  that  its  identity  rests  on  a  temporal  structure  that  conforms  
to   the   model   of   dynamic   identity   arising   from   the   poetic   composition   of   a  
narrative  text.  The  self  characterised  by  self-­‐‑sameness  may  then  be  said  to  be  
refigured  by  the  reflective  application  of  such  narrative  configurations.  Unlike  
the   abstract   identity   of   the   Same,   this   narrative   identity,   constitutive   of   self-­‐‑
constancy,   can   include   change,  mutability,  within   the   cohesion   of   a   lifetime.  
The  subject   then  appears  both  as  a  reader  and  the  writer  of   its  own   life   […].  
(1994:  246)  
  
Engaging  in  narrative  self-­‐‑understanding  is  thus  of  extreme  importance  for  the  
individual,   as   it   is   through   this  activity   that   the   subject   can   take  a  position   in  
regard   to   himself,   attributing   to   his   life   a  meaning   and   direction  which   have  
been  and  will  be  maintained  through  change.    
  
Ricoeur’s  conception  of  what  it  means  to  have  a  narrative  is  very  different  from  
that   of   “minimalist”   approaches.   Indeed,   as   far   as   the   structure   of   a   life  
narrative  is  concerned,  Ricoeur  suggests  that  this  structure  should  combine  the  
characteristics  of  both  historical  and  literary  narratives  (1994:  114).  Not  only  the  
autobiographical   narrative   should   list   the   sequence   of   events   in   our   life,   it  
should   also   present   those   events   as   playing   a   role   in   the   development   of   a  
unitary   and  meaningful   story.  Constructing  a  narrative   in   this   context   is   thus  
necessarily  a  personal  level  activity  and  a  conscious  process.    
  
Since   in   Ricoeur’s   account,   and   in   the   philosophical   literature   more   broadly,  
narrativity  is  often  related  to  the  notion  of  personal  identity,   it   is   important  to  
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clarify   the   sense   in  which   the   notion   is   used   in   this   context.   As   observed   by  
Schechtman   (1996),   the   debate   on   personal   identity   in   analytic   philosophy   of  
mind   revolves   around   the   “reidentification   question”,   namely   is   concerned  
with   the   conditions   that   make   it   possible   to   identify   someone   as   the   same  
person  over  time.  However,  when  personhood  is  at  issue,  also  another  question  
can  be  raised  and  this  has  to  do  with  the  characteristics  that  make  someone  the  
person   he   or   she   is.   This   is   defined   by   Schechtman   as   the   “characterization  
question”  and  is  described  in  the  following  terms:  
  
Most  simply  put,  this  question  asks  which  actions,  experiences,  beliefs,  values,  
desires,  character  traits,  and  so  on  […]  are  to  be  attributed  to  a  given  person.  
Reidentification   theorists   ask  what   it  means   to   say   that   a  person   at   t2   is   the  
same  person  as  a  person  at  t1;  characterization  theorists  ask  what  it  means  to  
say  that  a  particular  characteristic  is  that  of  a  given  person.  (1996:  73)  
  
According   to   this  perspective,   in  order   for   the   characterization  question   to  be  
adequately  answered  it  is  not  enough  to  identify  the  features  and  events  which  
are   part   of   the   person’s   history.   Rather,   what   is   fundamental   is   the  
determination  of  which  among  these  characteristics  truly  belong  to  the  person  
or,   in   other  words,  make   her   “who”   she   is.   Therefore,   in   order   to   be   able   to  
answer  the  characterization  question  it  is  necessary  to  understand  what  makes  
particular  aspects  of  the  person’s  history  central  to  her  identity  and  this  is  what  
Schechtman’s  and  other  accounts  of  narrative  selfhood  are  concerned  with.   In  
other   terms,   what   the   narrative   approach   seeks   to   explain,   is   not,   or   not  
primarily,   how   it   is   possible   for   us   to   recognise   that   someone   is   one   and   the  
same   person   at   two   different   points   in   time,   but   rather   what   is   essential   to  
someone  being  that  particular  person.    
  
The   notion   of   personal   identity   to  which  Gallagher   and  Zahavi   refer   in   their  
account   of   narrative   selfhood   is   the   one   with   which   the   characterization  
question   is   concerned.  A   key   feature   of   the   narrative   view   they   put   forward,  
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and   one   which   is   consonant   with   the   insights   developed   by   Ricoeur,   is   the  
acknowledgement  of   the  historical   structure  of   selfhood,  namely   the   idea   that  
the   self   is   not   a   static   entity,   but   rather   something   that   is   constituted   and  
evolves  over  time.  Gallagher  and  Zahavi  recognise  that  a  fundamental  aspect  of  
this   development   consists   in   the   endorsement   of   specific   values,   cares,   and  
beliefs   and   suggest   that   this   is   the  process   at   the  origin  of   the  narrative   self’s  
“individual  identity”  (Gallagher,  2000:  18)  or  “personality”  (Zahavi,  2007:  193).  
  
In   this   context,   the   narrative   self   is   considered   as   a   self  with   a   “story”   and   a  
“personal  character”12,  while  the  minimal  self  is  associated  only  with  a  “formal  
kind  of  individuation”,  as  it  is  viewed  as  unrelated  to  the  decisions,  events  and  
ideals   which   shape   an   individual   life   and   allow   to   distinguish   the   self   from  
others  in  a  more  substantial  way.  This  idea  is  highlighted  for  instance  by  Zahavi  
in  the  following  passage:  
  
  A   description   of  my   experiential   self   will   not   differ   in   any   significant   way  
from  a  description  of  your  experiential  self,  except,  of  course,  in  so  far  as  the  
first   is   a   description   of   me,   the   second   a   description   of   you.   By   contrast,   a  
more  tangible  kind  of  individuality  manifests  itself  in  my  personal  history,  in  
my  convictions  and  decisions.  It   is   through  such  acts  that  I  define  who  I  am,  
thereby   distinguishing   myself   from   others;   they   have   a   character   shaping  
effect.  (Zahavi,  2007:  193)  
  
As  they  consider  the  notion  of  “personal  identity”  or  “personality”  as  central  to  
the  understanding  of  what  a  narrative  self  is,  Gallagher  and  Zahavi  suggest  that  
it  might  be  appropriate  to  use  the  term  “self”  to  refer  to  the  experiential  subject  
                                                   
12 It  is  important  to  note  that  the  notion  of    “personal  character”  used  by  Gallagher  and  
Zahavi   is   different   from   the   one   adopted   by   Ricoeur.   While   in   Ricoeur’s   account  
“character”   indicates   a   series  of   features   that   the   subject  has  not   chosen  and   that   are  
considered  to  remain  stable  throughout  his  life,  Gallagher  and  Zahavi  use  the  term  to  
designate  the  identity  of  the  person  as  it  is  configured  through  her  position-­‐‑taking  and  
narrative   abilities.   As   such,   while   Ricoeur   associates   character   with   identity   as  




of   minimal   selfhood,   while   the   individual   who   is   constituted   through  
autobiographical  narrativity  can  be  referred  to  as  “person”:  
  
When  dealing  with  the  experiential  self,  one  might  retain  the  term  ‘self’,  since  
we   are   dealing   precisely   with   a   primitive   form   of   self-­‐‑givenness   or   self-­‐‑
referentiality.  By  contrast,  it  may  be  helpful  to  speak  not  of  the  self,  but  of  the  
person   as   a   narrative   construction.   After   all,   what   is   being   addressed   by   a  
narrative   account   is   the   nature   of   my   personal   character   or   personality;   a  
personality   that  evolves   through   time  and   is   shaped  by   the  values   I  endorse  
and   by  my  moral   and   intellectual   convictions   and   decisions.   (Zahavi,   2007:  
193)  
  
Gallagher  and  Zahavi,   then,  associate   the  narrative  self  with  personhood  and,  
although  they  do  not  provide  an  extensive  account  of  this  level  of  selfhood  and  
self-­‐‑consciousness,   as   highlighted   above,   they   suggest   that   individual   history  
and  the  endorsement  of  certain  values  are  fundamental  features  of  this  kind  of  
self.  This  characterisation  is  adopted  also  by  other  phenomenologically  oriented  
approaches   which   conceive   of   narrativity   and   personal   identity   as   closely  
connected.   Rosfort   and   Stanghellini   (2009),   for   example,   emphasise   that  
personhood   is   essentially   dependent   on   the   ability   to   take   an   “evaluative  
stance”  in  regard  to  one’s  own  experiences  and  to  make  decisions  about  what  
kind   of   person   one  wants   to   be.   Being   a   person,   in   other   terms,   requires   the  
capacity  to  exercise  one’s  will   in  order  to  give  a  particular  orientation  to  one’s  
existence  and  this  is  explicitly  contrasted  with  the  structure  of  the  minimal  level  
of  self-­‐‑experience:  
  
A  person   is   a   contextualised   self  with   intentional   attitudes,   characterised   by  
ontological  ambiguity  and  capable  of  position   taking,   that   is,   evaluation  and  




As   observed   earlier,   in   Ricoeur’s   account   a   central   role   is   attributed   to   the  
person’s   will.   In   particular,   Ricoeur   claims   that   fundamental   to   the  
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development  and  preservation  of  personal  identity  is  the  ability  to  be  faithful  to  
one’s   commitments   and   thus   to   guarantee   “self-­‐‑constancy”.   Contemporary  
phenomenological   accounts   of   the   narrative   self   retain   this   emphasis   on  
position   taking,   claiming   that   the  capacity   to   take  a   stance   in   regards   to  what  
are   the   experiences   and   values   that   are   part   of   one’s   personal   identity   is   a  
central  aspect  of  narrative  selfhood.  
  
The   emphasis   posed   on   the   role   of   evaluative   position-­‐‑taking   also   draws  
attention  to  the  fact  that  narrative  self-­‐‑understanding  has  a  reflective  character.  
In   contrast   to   the   primitive,   non-­‐‑observational   and   non-­‐‑objectifying   nature   of  
pre-­‐‑reflective   self-­‐‑awareness,   reflective   self-­‐‑consciousness   is   characterised   by  
Gallagher   and   Zahavi   as   an   explicit   and   objectifying   awareness   of   the   self.  
Cardinal  to  the  structure  of  any  form  of  reflection  is  the  distinction  between  the  
subject  of  reflection  and  the  object  reflected  upon  (Gallagher  and  Zahavi,  2008:  
61)  and  any  experience  where  the  subject  takes  itself  as  an  object  is  thus  a  form  
of  reflective  self-­‐‑consciousness.  The  ability  to  engage  in  autobiographical  story-­‐‑
telling  presupposes  the  capacity  to  think  about  oneself  and,  as  observed  earlier,  
to  take  a  stance  towards  the  features  of  the  self  that  are  so  conceived.  Therefore,  
it   appears   that   reflectivity   is   a   condition   of   possibility   for   narrativity   and  
personhood.  
  
Finally,   another   characteristic   of   the   narrative   self   to   which   Gallagher   and  
Zahavi  draw  attention  is  its  social  embeddedness.  In  this  regard,  widely  held  is  
the   idea   that   when   we   construct   a   narrative,   and   in   particular   an  
autobiographical   narrative,  we   are  not   the   only   authors   of   our   stories:   on   the  
contrary,   the  stories   that  others   tell  about  us  and  the  stories  which  are  part  of  
our  cultural  heritage  have  an  influence  on  both  the  form  and  the  contents  of  the  




life  narratives  obviously  reflect   the  prevailing   theories  about  “possible   lives”  
that  are  part  of  one’s   culture.   Indeed,  one   important  way  of   characterising  a  
culture  is  by  the  narrative  models  it  makes  available  for  describing  the  course  
of   a   life.   And   the   tool   kit   of   any   culture   is   replete   not   only  with   a   stock   of  
canonical   life   narratives   […],   but  with   combinable   formal   constituents   from  
which  its  members  can  construct  their  own  life  narratives  […].  (2004:  694)    
  
Our  social  and  cultural  interactions,  especially  the  ones  which  take  place  early  
in  our  life,  inevitably  shape,  through  the  examples,  rules  and  information  they  
provide,   the   way   in   which   we   build   our   autobiographical   narratives.   In  
addition,   our   story-­‐‑telling   never   starts   in   a   void   as   the   construction   of   an  
autobiography  usually  begins  when  we  have   already   listened   to   a  number  of  
stories  others  have  told  about  ourselves.    
  
The  notion  of  narrative  I  will  make  use  of  in  this  thesis  reflects  the  way  in  which  
narrative  self-­‐‑understanding  is  characterised  in  the  phenomenological  literature  
(Gallagher,   2000;   Gallagher   and   Zahavi,   2008;   Zahavi,   2007)   and   in   ‘non-­‐‑
minimalist’  accounts   such  as   the  one  developed  by  Goldie   (2012a)  and  briefly  
discussed  in  this  chapter.  In  the  first  place,  I  endorse  the  idea  that  in  order  for  
something   to   count   as   a   narrative,   an   intelligible   relationship   should   hold  
between  the  events  which  are  narrated,  and  I  agree  with  the  claim  that,  while  
causal   explanations   are   integral   to   the   structure   of   narratives,   in   this   context  
intelligibility   and   causality   need   not   be   identified   (Goldie,   2012a:14-­‐‑15).   As  
remarked   by   Goldie,   the   various   parts   of   a   narrative   can   indeed   be  
meaningfully   connected  without   being   causally   related.   Secondly,   in   contrast  
with   the   authors  who   suggest   that   narrativity   can   be   a   feature   of   experience  
itself  (e.g.  Carr,  1986;  Slors,  1998)  and  no  story-­‐‑telling  is  required  in  order  for  a  
narrative   to   be   produced,   I   maintain   that   the   production   of   a   narrative   is   a  
personal-­‐‑level   activity   and   that   the   constitution   of   a   narrative   requires   the  
presence   of   a   narrator.   From   this   perspective,   in   alignment   with   Goldie’s  
characterisation   (2012a:2),   I   consider   a   narrative   as   something   that   is   either  
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“told”  or  “thought  through”  and  I  use  the  terms  ‘explicit’  and  ‘implicit’  story-­‐‑
telling  to  refer  to  the  two  processes  respectively.    
  
In   this   thesis   I   will   focus   primarily   on   autobiographical   or   life   narratives,  
namely   narratives  which   are   about   one’s   own   story.   I   distinguish   these   from  
literary  narratives  which  have  as  their  subject  historical  or  fictional  characters.  
Although  autobiographical  narratives  themselves  can  have  a   literary  character  
and   be   in   the   form   of   published   or   unpublished   accounts,   in   this   work   I  
consider  as  life  narratives  also  the  stories  about  oneself  that,  as  put  by  Goldie,  
are   simply   “told”   or   “thought   through”.   As   such,   the   notion   of  
autobiographical   or   life   narrative   employed   here   includes   both   written  
autobiographies,   verbal   reports,   and   silent   accounts   of  more   or   less   extended  
parts   of   one’s   life.   Such   narratives   can   indeed   have   very   different   temporal  
profiles,  with  some  regarding  events  which  take  place  in  just  a  few  minutes  or  
hours,  and  others  spanning  years  or  even  an  entire   life   time.   I  can   tell  a  story  
about  what   happened   on   a   particular   afternoon   at  work   or   about   the  way   in  
which  my  life  has  unfolded  over  several  decades.  In  addition,  independently  of  
the  time  frame  along  which  its  plot  develops,  the  number  of  events  included  in  
a   life   narrative   is   highly   variable:   I   can   I   provide   a   very   detailed   account   of  
what   happened   over   the   last   24   hours   or   I   can   tell   the   story   of   my   life   by  
referring   only   to   a   very   few   important   events.   In   addition,   each   of   our   life  
stories   can   also   include   various   sub-­‐‑plots   and   these   can   comprise   other   sub-­‐‑
narratives  and  so  on  in  a  nested  structure  whose  limits  depend  only  on  the  type  
of  experience  in  question  and  the  individual’s  narrative  capacities.  For  example,  
someone’s   life   story   can   contain   the   narrative   of   his   employment   with   a  
particular  company,  a  sub-­‐‑plot  of  which  could  be  the  narrative  of  the  activities  
he   undertook   in   his   role   as   a   chief   executive   over   the   last   five   years.   When  
affectivity  is  at  issue,  analogous  dynamics  are  in  play:  the  story  of  one’s  love  for  
a  partner  can  encompass  the  narrative  of  the  blissful  mood  experienced  for  the  
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first   few   months   of   the   relationship,   which   in   turn   can   include   as   sub-­‐‑plots  
descriptions  of  various  other  emotions  undergone  during  those  months.    
  
Central   to   my   conception   of   narrativity   is   the   idea   that   autobiographical  
narratives   make   it   possible   for   us   to   conceive   of   various   parts   of   our   life   as  
joined   together   rather   than   as   separate   fragments.   By   establishing   intelligible  
connections  between  different  aspects  of  our  experience,  life  stories  portray  our  
existence   as   characterised,   at   least   to   a   certain   extent,   by   order   rather   than  
chaos.  Through  story-­‐‑telling  life  is  depicted  as  having  a  specific  “architecture”,  
a  notion  which  is  described  by  Pugmire  in  the  following  terms:  
  
[…]   a   life   will   usually   have   an   architecture.   To   be   sure,   a   chaotic   life   is  
imaginable   (and   to   an   extent   possible).   This   life   would   lack   pattern.   In   the  
limiting   case,   it   would   be   ‘one   damn   thing   after   another’,   episodes   arising  
unbidden  and  giving  way,   as  opposed   to  giving   rise,   to  others   in   a  more  or  
less   accidental   order.  Little   that  happens   there  happens  because  of  how   it   is  
involved  by   other   things   that   are   happening   or   have  happened,   leaving   it   a  
restless  shift  of  unconnected  and  senseless  events.  (Pugmire,  2005:  40)  
  
Narrativity  is  fundamental  to  the  ability  to  confer  meaningfulness  on  one’s  own  
life,  as  it  is  by  virtue  of  engaging  in  various  forms  of  implicit  and  explicit  story-­‐‑
telling  that  we  can  disclose  and  establish  connections  between  different  aspects  
and   events   of   our   history.   For   instance,   telling   a   story   about   the   frustration   I  
have  been  experiencing  at  work  over  the  last  few  months  makes  it  possible  for  
me   to   identify   certain   factors   as   triggers   for   this   feeling   -­‐‑   for   example  
particularly   heavy   workloads   or   the   fact   that   I   have   not   yet   received   the  
promotion  I  was  hoping  for   -­‐‑  and  other  events  as  consequences   -­‐‑   for  example  
my  increasing  tendency  to  look  at  job  advertisements  when  surfing  the  internet.  
Constructing  such  a  narrative  also  enables  me  to  relate  the  difficult  situation  I  
have   been   experiencing   at   work   to   other   events,   such   as   the   decision   I   have  
made  to  take  a  holiday  during  the  busiest  period  of  the  year  for  my  company,  
and  the  fact  that  recently  I  have  often  been  irritable  or  impatient  when  dealing  
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with   family   and   friends.   Telling   this   story   allows  me   to  make   better   sense   of  
what   has   been   happening   in   my   life,   gaining   awareness   of   how   deeply   my  
work   situation  has   influenced  my   thoughts,   feelings  and  behaviours,   and   this  
awareness  has  the  potential  to  influence  the  way  in  which  I  will  deal  with  this  
or  similar  situations  in  the  future.    
  
Autobiographical  narrativity  can  thus  have  a  radical  impact  on  our  experience  
and  this  claim  will  be   the  focus  of   the  analysis   I  will  develop  in  Chapter  4.   In  
particular,  I  will  highlight  various  ways  in  which  narrative  self-­‐‑understanding  
shapes   the   experiential   structure   of   emotions,   claiming   that   by  virtue   of   their  
being   incorporated   in   our   life   stories   emotions   come   to   be   experienced   as  
complex  and  meaningful  processes  and  that  narrativity  is  involved  in  multiple  
ways  in  our  ability  to  regulate  affective  experience.    
  
2.3.  A  Multidimensional  Account    
  
In  the  first  section  of  this  chapter  I  discussed  the  phenomenological  conception  
of   minimal   selfhood.   According   to   this   position,   the   minimal   self   is   to   be  
identified  with  pre-­‐‑reflective  self-­‐‑consciousness,  that  is  a  form  of  self-­‐‑awareness  
which   is   intrinsic   to   any   phenomenally   conscious   state.   In   this   context,   pre-­‐‑
reflective   self-­‐‑consciousness   is   conceived   as   an   immediate   and   primitive  
experience  of  the  self  as  an  embodied  perceiver  and  agent  and  is  considered  to  
be  independent  of  the  possession  of  a  self-­‐‑concept  and  linguistic  abilities.  
  
I   then   showed   that   Gallagher   and   Zahavi   also   admit   of   the   existence   of   a  
narrative  form  of  selfhood,  that  is  a  self  whose  emergence  is  dependent  on  the  
capacity   to   construct   a   coherent   life   story.   The   narrative   self   is   a   self   which  
possesses  an  individual  history  and  personal  identity,  identity  which  is  claimed  
to   be   constituted   through   the   reflective   endorsement   of   a   series   of   beliefs,  
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commitments  and  values.  Furthermore,  a  cardinal  role  in  the  constitution  of  the  
narrative   self   is   attributed   to   the   social   dimension,   as   the   narratives   through  
which  we  understand  ourselves  are  intersubjectively  and  culturally  shaped.    
  
Zahavi  (2010)  remarks  that  the  distinction  between  minimal  and  narrative  self  
should   be   comprised   within   a   multidimensional   account   of   selfhood.   In   his  
opinion,  minimal  and  narrative   self  are  aspects  of   the   same  phenomenon  and  
not   two   separate   entities   and,   as   such,  he   suggests   that  we   should   speak  of   a  
“multifaceted   self”   rather   than   “a  multiplicity   of   co-­‐‑existing   selves”   (2010:   6).  
Minimal   and   narrative   self,   then,   are   seen   as   complementary   but   distinct  
dimensions  and  this  becomes  particularly  clear  when  their  relationship  is  taken  
into  consideration.    
  
In   this   regard,   it   is  maintained   that   in   order   for   a   narrative   self   to   emerge,   a  
minimal   level   of   selfhood   should   already  be   established.  The  minimal   self,   in  
other  terms,  is  considered  to  be  a  condition  of  possibility  for  the  emergence  of  a  
narrative  self.  Experiential  selfhood,  according  to  Gallagher  and  Zahavi,  “must  
be   regarded   as   a   pre-­‐‑linguistic   presupposition   for   any   narrative   practices”   as  
“experiences  and  actions  must  already  be  given  as  mine  if  I  am  to  worry  about  
how  they  hang  together  or  make  up  a  coherent  life  story”    (2008:  205).    
  
However,  in  Gallagher  and  Zahavi’s  account  the  relationship  between  minimal  
and   narrative   self   is   asymmetrical,   as   “narrative   personhood   presupposes  
experiential  selfhood  (but  not  vice  versa)”  (2008:  205).  In  line  with  this  idea,  it  is  
suggested   that  disruptions  of  minimal   self-­‐‑experience  would  negatively  affect  
the  structure  of  narrative  self-­‐‑understanding,  but  it  is  accepted  that  there  might  
be  circumstances  in  which  the  latter  is  disturbed  and  the  former  is  unaffected,  
as   it   would   be   the   case,   for   example,   in   the   advanced   stages   of   Alzheimer’s  




The   approaches  which   conceive   of   the   self   exclusively   in   narrative   terms   are  
bound   to   claim   that   significant   disruptions   of   narrativity   can   result   in   the  
destruction   of   selfhood.   This   is   for   example   the   opinion   of   Bruner,   who  
endorses  the  idea  that  dysnarrativia,  namely  a  severe  disturbance  of  the  ability  
to   produce   and  understand   narratives,   is   “deadly   for   selfhood”   (2003:   86).   In  
contrast   to   this  position,   since   they  claim   that   there   is  a  minimal   form  of   self-­‐‑
experience  which   is   presupposed   by   the   narrative   self,  Gallagher   and  Zahavi  
suggest   that   even   when   narrative   abilities   are   severely   disrupted   the   first  
person   perspective,   and   thus   the   primitive   level   of   selfhood,   could   be   intact  
(2008:   208).   It   is   recognised   that   these   are   extreme   cases   and   that   “with   the  
possible   exception   of   certain   severe   pathologies   […]  we  will   never   encounter  
the  minimal  self  in  its  purity”  (Zahavi,  2010:  5).  However,  the  existence  of  such  
a   possibility,13   along   with   the   acknowledgment   that   the   relation   of  
“presupposition”   or   dependency   which   holds   between   the   minimal   and  
narrative   self   is   one-­‐‑directional,   highlights   an   important   aspect   of   Gallagher  
and  Zahavi’s  account  and  one  which  has  had  a  significant  impact  in  the  field  of  
philosophy  of  psychiatry.  
  
In  accounting  for  the  disturbances  of  the  self  characteristic  of  certain  psychiatric  
disorders,  various   scholars  have  differentiated  between  more  and   less   serious  
impairments  depending  on  whether  the  minimal  or  narrative  level  of  selfhood  
is   thought   to   be   affected.   In   particular,   studies   in   this   area   often   focus   on   a  
comparative   phenomenology   of   schizophrenia   and   depression   and,  while   the  
                                                   
13 This  is  explicitly  recognised  by  Gallagher  and  Zahavi  also  in  the  following  passage:  
“although   a   narrow   focus   on   the   experiential   core   self   might   be   said   to   involve   a  
certain  amount  of  abstraction,  there  is  no  reason  to  question  its  reality,  it  is  not  a  mere  
abstraction  […]  there  is  self-­‐‑experience  in  the  minimal  sense  defined  above  even  when  
one’s   capacity   to   weave   a   narrative   of   oneself   has   not   yet   developed   or   has   been  
diminished  or  lost  […]”  (2008:  206).  
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former   is   usually   characterised   as   involving  disruptions   of   the  minimal   self,14  
the  latter  is  considered  as  a  disturbance  of  narrative  self-­‐‑understanding  and,  as  
such,   a   less   dramatic   alteration   of   self-­‐‑consciousness   (e.g.   Radden,   2013;   Sass  
and  Pienkos,  2013a;  2013b).  
  
The   multidimensional   account   of   selfhood   put   forward   by   Gallagher   and  
Zahavi  considers  the  minimal  and  narrative  self  as  phenomena  that  are  usually  
integrated.  However,  in  so  far  as  it  admits  of  the  possibility  for  the  minimal  self  
to  exist  without  a  narrative  self  and  to  be  unaffected  by  disruptions  of  narrative  
understanding,  this  account  also  conceives  of  the  two  dimensions  as  essentially  
distinct,   an   idea  which,   as   I  will  highlight   in   the   following   section  and   in   the  




In   this   chapter   I   provided   a   reconstruction   of   the   account   of   minimal   and  
narrative   selfhood  developed  by  Gallagher   and  Zahavi.   I   showed   that  within  
this   perspective   the   minimal   self   is   identified   with   pre-­‐‑reflective   self-­‐‑
consciousness,   that   is   a   non-­‐‑objectifying   and   non-­‐‑observational   experience   of  
the  self   intrinsic   to  every  conscious  mental   state.  Endorsing  some  of   the   ideas  
advanced   by   phenomenologists   such   as   Henry   (1973)   and   Sartre   (1958),   this  
approach   suggests   that   selfhood,   self-­‐‑awareness,   and   phenomenal  
consciousness   are   fundamentally   connected   and   that   the   first-­‐‑personal  
givenness  of  our  experience  amounts  to  a  primitive  sense  of  self  independent  of  
the  possession  of  conceptual  and  linguistic  capacities  and  temporally  extended.    
  
                                                   
14   For   an   account   of   schizophrenia   that   characterises   the   disorder   as   involving  
disturbances   of   pre-­‐‑reflective   self-­‐‑consciousness   see   for   example   Parnas   and   Sass  
(2001);  Sass  (2000);  Sass  and  Parnas  (2003).  
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I  showed  that  embodiment  and  embeddedness   in   the  environment  are  central  
aspects   of   the   notion   of   minimal   self.   On   the   basis   of   Husserl’s   (1989)   and  
Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s  (1962)  analyses  of  the  structure  of  perceptual  experience,   it   is  
indeed  claimed  that  the  self  of  which  we  are  pre-­‐‑reflectively  aware  is  a  bodily  
subject   of   perception   and   action   and   that   this   awareness   fundamentally  
structures   our   experience   of   the  world.  As   such,   it   seems   that   cardinal   to   the  
minimal   self   is   what   phenomenologists   call   an   experience   of   the   body   as  
subject,  that  is  an  experience  of  the  body  not  as  an  object  among  other  objects,  
but  rather  as  that  by  means  of  which  any  other  object  can  be  given.  
  
Gallagher  and  Zahavi  claim  that,  apart  from  the  minimal  self,  also  another  form  
of   selfhood   can   be   identified   and,   further   developing   ideas   advanced   in  
phenomenology,  hermeneutics,  and  philosophy  of   the  cognitive  sciences,   they  
characterise   this  notion   in  narrative   terms.   In   the   second  part  of   the   chapter   I  
discussed  this  view  by  first  providing  an  outline  of  some  of  the  key  features  of  
narrative   theories   of   selfhood.   I   then   moved   to   illustrate   in   more   detail  
Ricoeur’s  conception  of  the  relationship  between  narrativity  and  the  self  (1988;  
1994),   as   this   is   one   of   the  main   reference   points   for   Gallagher   and   Zahavi’s  
account.    
  
I   showed   that   Ricoeur   conceives   of   narrativity   as   what   makes   it   possible   to  
integrate   permanence   and   change   in   one’s   personal   identity.   Central   to   this  
account  is  the  acknowledgment  that  human  life  unfolds  and  develops  over  time  
and  we   undergo   a   plurality   of   heterogeneous   experiences,   always   coming   in  
contact  with  new  values,   ideas,  and  situations.  Ricoeur  draws  attention   to   the  
power  we  have  to  both  shape  and  maintain  our  identity  by  taking  a  position  in  
regards  to  who  we  want  to  be  and  what  is  important  to  us,  and  argues  that  this  




I   observed   that   the   conception   of   narrativity   at   the   core   of  Ricoeur’s   position  
differs  from  minimalist  narrative  accounts  in  various  respects.  In  the  first  place,  
according   to   Ricoeur,   the   events   which   appear   in   a   life   story   should   be  
meaningfully   connected   and   should   be   depicted   as   playing   a   part   in   the  
development   of   a   unitary   individual.   Secondly,   autobiographical   narratives  
should   possess   features   of   both   non-­‐‑fictional   and   literary   narratives,   and   are  
thus  conceived  as  the  product  of  conscious,  personal  level  activities.  Finally,  in  
Ricoeur’s  view  narrativity   is  depicted  as  having  a  pivotal   role   in   the   subject’s  
life,  as  it  is  fundamental  to  its  becoming  a  person  and  a  moral  agent.  
  
In   line   with   Ricoeur’s   analysis,   Gallagher   and   Zahavi   endorse   the   idea   that  
narrativity   and   personhood   are   essentially   related.   Although   they   do   not  
engage  in  an  extensive  discussion  of  these  notions,  their  account  suggests  that  it  
is   by   endorsing   particular   values   and   commitments   and   by   making   certain  
decisions   that   our   “personal   character”   or   “personality”   is   constituted   and  
autobiographical  story-­‐‑telling  is  deemed  to  be  central  to  these  dynamics.  From  
this  perspective,  evaluative  position  taking,  that  is  the  ability  to  take  a  stance  in  
regards  to  what  are  the  features  of  the  person  we  want  to  be,  is  a  fundamental  
characteristic  of  the  narrative  self.    
  
Such  an  account  of  minimal  and  narrative  selfhood  is  coherent  with  a  number  
of  intuitions  as  to  what  the  nature  of  a  self  is.  In  the  first  place,  it  establishes  a  
connection   between   being   a   self   and   being   a   subject   of   experience,  
acknowledging  that  there  is  a  dimension  of  self-­‐‑consciousness  which  is  bodily  
and   independent   of   the   possession   of   language   and   concepts.   Secondly,   it  
recognises   that   historicity   and   personality   are   also   important   features   of   our  
conception  of   selfhood  and  attributes   to  narrativity   a   fundamental   role   in   the  
constitution  of   these  aspects.  By  drawing  attention   to   the  multidimensionality  
of  the  self,  this  approach  does  justice  to  the  complex  and  dynamic  character  of  
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self-­‐‑experience  and  provides  a   theoretical   framework  which  has  proved   to  be  
helpful   in   enhancing   our   understanding   of   the   various   forms   of   self-­‐‑
disturbances  characteristic  of  psychopathological  experience.    
  
The  account  drawn  by  Gallagher  and  Zahavi,  however,   leaves  some  questions  
open,  in  particular  in  regards  to  the  relationship  which  exists  between  minimal  
and  narrative  self.  More  specifically,  in  this  regard  two  points  can  be  raised.  In  
the  first  place,  while  the  phenomenological  approach  here  discussed  states  that  
a  minimal  self  should  be  present  in  order  for  a  narrative  self  to  emerge,  it  does  
not  take  a  position  as  to  whether  the  structure  of  the  former  has  an  impact  on  
the  structure  of  the  latter.  In  other  terms,  it  is  possible  to  ask  how,  if  at  all,  our  
pre-­‐‑reflective   bodily   self-­‐‑experience   shapes   life   narratives.   Are   the   stories  we  
tell   influenced  by  the  way  in  which  we  are  aware  of  ourselves  at   the  minimal  
level?  And   if   so,  which  are   the  mechanisms   through  which  pre-­‐‑reflective  self-­‐‑
consciousness  impacts  on  autobiographical  story-­‐‑telling?    
  
Secondly,  by  suggesting  that  disruptions  of  narrative  self-­‐‑understanding  would  
not  necessarily  affect  minimal  self-­‐‑experience,  Gallagher  and  Zahavi’s  account  
assumes   that   the   emergence   of   narrativity   does   not   generate   any   significant  
change   at   the   level   of  minimal   selfhood.   The   structure   of   the  minimal   self   is  
thus   conceived   to   be   independent   of   the   dynamics   which   characterise   the  
narrative   level  of   self-­‐‑awareness,   an  assumption  which   is   also   reflected   in   the  
position   taken   by   some   scholars   in   regards   to   the   disturbances   of   the   self  
characteristic  of  certain  psychiatric  disorders.  The  idea  that  the  emergence  of  a  
narrative  self  and  the  dynamics  characteristic  of  this  form  of  self-­‐‑consciousness  
would  not  change  the  structure  of  minimal  selfhood,  however,  is  controversial,  
as   it   might   be   suggested   that   by   telling   a   story   about   ourselves   we   can   also  




eventually  the  culturally  shaped  cognitive  and  linguistic  processes  that  guide  
the   self-­‐‑telling   of   life   narratives   achieve   the   power   to   structure   perceptual  
experience,   to   organize   memory,   to   segment   and   purpose-­‐‑build   the   very  
"ʺevents"ʺ   of   a   life.   In   the   end,  we   become   the   autobiographical   narratives   by  
which  we  "ʺtell  about"ʺ  our  lives.  (2004:  694)  
  
The  analysis  I  will  develop  in  the  rest  of  this  work  will  allow  me  to  address  the  
two   problematic   aspects   of   Gallagher   and   Zahavi’s   account   identified   in   this  
chapter   and   to   complement   and   refine   their   approach   in   various   respects.  
Zahavi  himself   recognises   that   the  distinction  between  minimal   and  narrative  
self   is  “in  need  of   refinement”  and  his  claim   is  motivated   in  particular  by   the  
acknowledgement   that   the   distinction   does   not   take   into   consideration   some  
specific   aspects   of   the   relationship   between   selfhood   and   intersubjectivity  
(Zahavi,   2010).   The  minimal   self,   Zahavi   observes,   is   considered   to   be   a   pre-­‐‑
social  dimension,  while  the  narrative  self  is  characterised  as  being  embedded  in  
the  social  world  by  virtue  of  the  role  played  by  language  in  its  formation.  In  his  
view,  such  an  account  is  incomplete  in  so  far  as  it  neglects  the  existence  of  pre-­‐‑
linguistic  forms  of  intersubjectivity  that  have  an  influence  on  the  constitution  of  
a   specific   dimension   of   selfhood.   In   particular,   Zahavi   is   concerned  with   the  
form  of  self-­‐‑consciousness  associated  with  experiencing  oneself  as  the  object  of  
another’s  attention  and   the  ability   to   take  another  person’s  perspective  on   the  
self.  Drawing  on  developmental  psychology,  he  suggests  that  this  form  of  self-­‐‑
awareness  predates  the  development  of  linguistic  capacities  and  allows  for  the  
identification  of  an  “interpersonal  self”  that  cannot  be  identified  with  either  the  
minimal  or  narrative  self  (2010:  6).  
  
Zahavi  is  right  in  claiming  that  intersubjectivity  is  central  to  selfhood  in  various  
ways  and  that,  in  so  far  as  it  does  not  provide  a  framework  to  account  for  this  
aspect,  the  distinction  between  minimal  and  narrative  self  cannot  be  considered  
to   be   satisfactory.   Having   identified   a   form   of   self-­‐‑consciousness   that   is  
different   from   both  minimal   self-­‐‑experience   and   narrative   understanding,   he  
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suggests   that   the   best  way   to   account   for   such   a   phenomenon   is   through   the  
introduction   of   an   additional   notion   of   self,   namely   the   “relational”   or  
“interpersonal”   self.   In   other   terms,   he   suggests   that   the   inadequacy   of   the  
account   of   minimal   and   narrative   self   can   be   made   up   for   by   further  
differentiating  between  various  dimensions  of  selfhood.  
  
In   this   work   I   am   not   concerned   specifically   with   the   investigation   of   how  
interpersonal  experience  shapes  our  sense  of  self,  but  I  agree  with  Zahavi  that  
the   distinction   between   minimal   and   narrative   self   is   in   need   of   refinement.  
However,   I  will  maintain   that   the  distinction  needs   to  be   refined   in  a  distinct  
and  more  radical  way  than  he  suggests.  Indeed,  as  it  will  become  clear  through  
the  analyses  developed  in  Chapter  3  and  4,  it  is  not  enough  to  complement  this  
account   through   the   introduction   of   another   notion   of   self,   but   rather   it   is  
necessary   to   question   some   of   the   assumptions   on   which   the   distinction  
between  minimal  and  narrative  self  is  currently  based.    
  
I  will  argue  that  our  understanding  of  the  nature  of  the  minimal  and  narrative  
self   and   of   their   relationship   can   be   improved   by   examining   the   structure   of  
affective  experience.   In  particular,  having   illustrated   in  Chapter  2   the   insights  
into   this   topic   which   have   been   put   forward   in   classical   and   contemporary  
phenomenology,   in   Chapter   3   and   4   I   will   show   how   a   phenomenological  
analysis  of  affectivity  can  be  helpful  in  addressing  the  questions  raised  here  in  
regard   to   Gallagher   and   Zahavi’s   account.   In   particular,   endorsing   the   idea  
according   to   which   emotions   are   best   characterised   as   pre-­‐‑reflective,  
experiential   forms   of   self-­‐‑consciousness,   in  Chapter   3   I  will   highlight   various  
ways   in   which   affective   experience   constitutively   shapes   autobiographical  
story-­‐‑telling,   thus   showing   that,   not   only   the   minimal   self   is   a   condition   of  
possibility  for  the  emergence  of  the  narrative  self,  but  also  that  the  structure  of  
the  narrative  self  essentially  depends  on  the  features  of  minimal  self-­‐‑experience.  
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On   the   other   hand,   by   drawing   attention   in   Chapter   4   to   how   narrativity  
impacts   on   the   experiential   structure   of   emotions,   I   will   claim   that   narrative  
self-­‐‑understanding   can   also   structure  minimal   self-­‐‑experience   in   a   number   of  
ways.   What   will   emerge   from   this   analysis   is   a   finer-­‐‑grained   account   of   the  
multidimensionality   of   selfhood   which   will   show   that   the   minimal   and  
narrative   self   are   mutually   constitutive   dimensions   and,   as   such,   are  






























In   this   chapter   I   examine   how   the   relationship   between   affectivity,   self-­‐‑
consciousness,   and   selfhood   has   been   conceived   in   classic   and   contemporary  
phenomenology,  suggesting  that  in  this  regard  two  main  claims  have  emerged.  
On  the  one  hand,  it  is  argued  that  the  bodily  feelings  implicated  in  the  structure  
of   both   intentional   and   non-­‐‑intentional   affective   states   are   forms   of   pre-­‐‑
reflective  self-­‐‑consciousness,  a  position  which  emphasises  their  being  involved  
in   the   constitution   of   the   minimal   self.   On   the   other   hand,   various  
phenomenologists   maintain   that   affective   experience   is   fundamentally  
connected   also   to   more   complex   forms   of   selfhood   and   self-­‐‑awareness.   In  
particular,   according   to   these   positions,   by   virtue   of   the   role   it   plays   in   the  
constitution  of  an  individual  evaluative  perspective,  affectivity  is  constitutive  of  
personal   identity15.   In   other   terms,   affective   experience   is   considered   to   be  
crucially   involved   in   the   formation   of   the   self   as   a   person.   The   scholars  who  
support   this   idea   are   not   explicitly   concerned   with   narrativity,   however   the  
concept   of   personhood   they   refer   to   is   analogous   to   the   one  which  Gallagher  
and  Zahavi   associate  with   the  notion  of  narrative   self.  Therefore,   I  will   argue  
that  the  conception  of  the  relationship  between  affectivity  and  selfhood  that  can  
be  drawn  on  the  basis  of  existing  phenomenological  accounts  is  two-­‐‑fold.  In  the  
first   place,   the   acknowledgment   that   affectivity   and   pre-­‐‑reflective   bodily  
consciousness  are  essentially  related  makes  it  possible  to  conceive  of  affectivity  
                                                   
15 The  notion  of  personal  identity  which  is  relevant  in  this  context  is  the  one  related  to  
Schechtman’s  “characterization  question”  (see  Chapter  1,  Section  2.2.  for  the  exposition  
of  this  notion). 
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as  a  dimension  of  minimal  selfhood.  Secondly,  as  it  is  also  claimed  that  affective  
experience  contributes  to  the  constitution  of  a  form  of  selfhood  akin  to  narrative  
self-­‐‑understanding,  it  is  arguable  that  affectivity  plays  a  central  role  also  in  the  
dynamics   through  which   the  narrative   self   emerges   from   the  minimal   self.   In  
addition,  I  will  show  that,  by  maintaining  that  what  we  can  be  pre-­‐‑reflectively  
conscious   of   is   not   only   the   self   as   an   embodied   subject   of   perception   and  
action,  but  also  the  self  as  a  person,  certain  phenomenological  approaches  point  
toward  the  existence  of  forms  of  self-­‐‑experience  where  minimal  self-­‐‑awareness  
is   shaped   by   linguistic   and   conceptual   forms   of   self-­‐‑consciousness,   thus  
suggesting   that   the   minimal   self   is   not   impervious   to   the   dynamics   which  
characterise  more  complex  forms  of  selfhood.  I  will  conclude  by  claiming  that  
the   accounts   of   affectivity   considered   in   this   chapter   have   the   merit   of  
unearthing   some   fundamental   aspects   of   the   relationship   between   affective  
experience  and  different  forms  of  selfhood,  but  are  incomplete  in  so  far  as  they  
do   not   consider   the   specific   role   played   in   this   context   by   autobiographical  
story-­‐‑telling.  
  
1.  Emotions  and  the  Minimal  Self  
  
Affectivity   has   been  widely   researched   from   a   phenomenological   perspective  
(e.g.   De   Monticelli,   2003;   2006;   Heidegger,   1962;   Scheler,   1973a;   Slaby,   2008;  
Ratcliffe,  2005;  2008).   In   this  context,  both  the  structure  of  affective  experience  
and   its   connection   with   other   dimensions   of   human   experience   have   been  
investigated   and,   despite   the   variety   of   their   contributions   in   this   area,  
phenomenological   accounts   agree   in   attributing   to   affectivity   a   fundamental  
role  in  our  cognitive  and  practical  life.  In  the  following  I  will  draw  attention  to  
some   of   the   insights   which   have   been   developed   in   the   phenomenological  
research   on   affectivity,   with   the   aim   of   showing   its   relevance   for   the  
understanding  of  selfhood  and  self-­‐‑consciousness.  In  order  to  do  so,  I  will  start  
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by   providing   an   outline   of   some   of   the   core   aspects   of   a   phenomenological  
theory  of  affectivity,   focusing   in  particular  on   the  way   in  which   intentionality  
and   feeling   are   conceived   and   on   the   distinction   between   intentional   and  
background  affective  states.    
  
1.1.  A  Phenomenological  Account  of  Affectivity  
  
Central   to   the   philosophical   debate   on   the   nature   of   emotions   has   been   the  
opposition  between   feeling  and  cognitive   theories,16   opposition  at   the  basis  of  
which  is  the  idea  that  intentionality  and  affect  are  radically  distinct  dimensions.  
The   accounts   which   emphasise   the   role   of   feelings   in   affective   experience  
attribute   to   emotions   a   specific   phenomenal   character   and   account   for   this  
feature  by  identifying  emotions  with  bodily  feelings  (e.g.  James,  1884).  In  doing  
so,  however,  supporters  of   this  approach  generally  consider  bodily  feelings  as  
objectless  sensations  and  it   is  difficult  for  them  to  explain  the  fact  that  at   least  
some  affective   states  are   intentional.  Cognitive   theories   (e.g.  Nussbaum,  2001;  
2004;   Solomon,   1973),   on   the   other   hand,   acknowledge   the   intentionality   of  
emotions,   but   identify   them  with   particular   thoughts,   beliefs,   or   judgements,  
thus  not  being  able  to  do  justice  to  their  characteristic  phenomenology.  
  
The   integration   of   intentionality   and   feeling   in   the   account   of   affective  
experience   is,   on   the   contrary,   at   the   core   of   various   phenomenological  
positions   (e.g.   De   Monticelli,   2003;   Scheler,   1973a;   Slaby,   2008)   and   of   other  
theories   in   contemporary   philosophy   of   emotions   (e.g.   Goldie,   2002;   Helm,  
2001;  2002).  According  to  this  position,  the  felt  aspect  and  the  intentionality  of  
affective   states   are  not  mutually   exclusive   and   are   instead   to   be   conceived   as  
two  facets  of  a  unitary  phenomenon.  In  other  terms,  central  to  these  positions  is  
the  acknowledgement  of  the  existence  of  intentional  feelings.    
                                                   




In   order   to   clarify   the   relationship   between   the   felt   aspect   and   world-­‐‑
directedness  of  certain   forms  of  affective  experience,  Ratcliffe  suggests   to   take  
into   consideration   the   phenomenology   of   touch,   in   which,   he   argues,   bodily  
feelings   and   the   experience   of   the   world   are   “inextricable”   (2005:   47).   He  
considers   for   instance   the  experience  we  undergo  when  we  pick  up  a  glass  of  
cold  water  or  a  snow  ball.  In  these  cases,  the  objects  we  are  touching  feel  cold,  
but   the   feelings   are   localised   in   our   body,   they   are   indeed  bodily   feelings.   In  
this  respect,  Ratcliffe  emphasises  that  a  feeling  can  be  in  the  body  while  at  the  
same  time  being  a  feeling  of  something  outside  the  body:  in  this  case,  the  body  
is  not  an  “object  of  perception”  but  rather  a  “vehicle  of  perception”  (2005:  48).  
  
A   phenomenological   theory   of   affects,   therefore,   overcomes   the   opposition  
between  intentionality  and  feeling  by  conceiving  of  them  as  inseparable  facets  
of   one   and   the   same   experience   and   it   can   thus   be   considered   an   example   of  
what  Slaby  calls  a  “unification  view”  (2008:  431).  As  he  explains:  
  
The   term   ‘affective   intentionality’   can,   among   other   things,   function   to  
highlight   this   important   fact   –   the   fact   that   in   emotional   experience,  
intentionality  and  phenomenality  stand  and  fall  together.  So  if  a  change  in  the  
content  of  an  emotion  (‘what  it  is  about’)  occurs,  this  will  inevitably  also  be  a  
change  in  the  way  we  feel  about  the  corresponding  situation  –  and  if  the  way  
an  emotion  feels  (its  qualitative  character)  has  changed,  you  can  be  sure  that  
its  intentional  content  has  also  changed.  (2008:  431)  
  
Characteristic  of  the  phenomenological  approach  is  thus  a  distinct  view  of  the  
structure  of  intentional  affective  states.  It  is  common  to  refer  to  these  states  with  
the  term  “emotion”  and  this  is  the  terminology  which  I  will  adopt  in  the  rest  of  
this   work,   considering   emotions   as   affective   responses   which   are   directed   at  
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particular   intentional   objects.17   However,   apart   from   intentional   affective  
responses,   other  kinds  of   affective   experience  have  been   identified  within   the  
phenomenological   tradition.   In   this   regard,   a   cardinal   contribution   to   the  
understanding  of   the   structure  and   role  of  non-­‐‑intentional   affective   states  has  
been  provided  by  Martin  Heidegger  in  his  analysis  of  moods.  
  
Heidegger   (1962)   draws   attention   to   a   series   of   affective   states   which   he  
considers  as  the  sources  of  our  being  “attuned”  or  “situated”  in  a  world  which  
manifests  itself  as  a  realm  of  practical  meanings  and  values.  These  states,  which  
he  names  “moods”  (Stimmungen),    rather  than  being  directed  to  specific  objects,  
people   or   states   of   affairs,   modulate   our   relation   with   the   environment   as   a  
whole   and  make   it   possible   for   things   to   “matter”   to  us   in   specific  ways.   For  
example,   Heidegger   observes   that   in   order   for   us   to   be   able   to   experience  
something   as   “threatening”,   we   need   to   be   in   a   particular   mood,   a   mood  
through   which   the   world   is   given   as   harbouring   the   possibility   for   us   to   be  
threatened   (1962:   176).   From   this   perspective,  moods   are   not   inner   or  merely  
phenomenal   states.   On   the   contrary,   they   are   attributed   a   disclosive   and  
structuring  function  with  regards  to  the  context  and  possibilities  that  constitute  
our   “Being-­‐‑in-­‐‑the-­‐‑world”   and   thus   they   act   as   the   “background   orientations”  
on   the   basis   of   which   we   can   encounter   things   that   are   salient   for   us   in  
particular  ways.    
  
Similar   considerations   are   present   in   Strasser’s   phenomenological   account   of  
affectivity  (1977).  Strasser  argues  that  all  our  experiential  life  is  grounded  on  an  
affective   experience  which   can   be   defined   as   “being-­‐‑in-­‐‑a-­‐‑mood”   (Zumutesein)  
and  which   can   take  different   forms  but   is   always  present   as   a  background   to  
our   intentional   acts   (Strasser,   1977:   182).   In   Strasser’s   view,   even   the  
                                                   
17 I  will  also  use  the  terms  “affect”,  “affectivity”  and  “affective  experience”  to  refer  to  
affective   states   in   general,   without   differentiating   between   intentional   and   non-­‐‑
intentional  states,  emotions,  feelings,  and  moods. 
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performance   of   technical   or   routine   activities   which   can   be   considered   to   be  
affectively  neutral  is  grounded  on  a  particular  feeling,  “a  quiet  and  sure  being-­‐‑
in-­‐‑a-­‐‑mood”  (1977:  184).  Moods  are  not  intentional  states  themselves,18  but  they  
make   it   possible   to   experience   specific   cognitive,   conative,   and   affective  
intentional  states.  Strasser  considers  for  example  the  structure  of  his  experience  
when  attending  a  performance  of  Othello.  He  observes  how  in  this  case  he  has  
particular   feelings   directed   to   the   characters   or   circumstances   that   are  
represented,  but  he  claims  that  these  intentional  feelings  stem  from  a  common  
background,  a  particular  “tragic  ‘being-­‐‑in-­‐‑a-­‐‑mood’”  (1977:  182).  
  
The   intuition   that   any   intentional   experience   is   rooted   in   a   particular  
background   affect   has   been   further   developed   by   Ratcliffe   (2005;   2008;   2010)  
who   claims   that   all   intentional   states   stem   from   and   presuppose   a   feeling   of  
being   situated   in   a   world   where   things   can   “matter”   to   us   in   specific   ways.  
Ratcliffe  maintains  that  this  sense  of  belonging  can  take  different  forms  which  
he  calls  “existential  feelings”.  These  feelings  are  directed  neither  to  oneself,  nor  
to   specific   entities   or   states   of   affairs.   On   the   contrary,   they   constitute   a  
background   sense   of   one’s   relatedness   to   the   world   which   shapes   all   our  
experiences   and   the   perception   of   the   theoretical   and   practical   possibilities  
which  are  available  to  us.  Existential  feelings  are  ways  “of  finding  oneself  in  the  
world”  (2005:  45)  and  are  not   to  be   identified  with  a  perception  of  our  spatial  
and  temporal   location,  but  rather  with  the  experiential  framework  in  virtue  of  
which  things  can  become  relevant  to  us  in  different  ways.  As  Ratcliffe  explains:    
  
The  world  can  sometimes  appear  unfamiliar,  unreal,  distant  or  close.  It  can  be  
something  that  one  feels  apart  from  or  at  one  with.  One  can  feel  in  control  of  
one’s   situation   or   overwhelmed   by   it.   One   can   feel   like   a   participant   in   the  
world  or  like  a  detached,  estranged  observer,  staring  at  objects  that  do  not  feel  
quite  ‘there’.  Such  relationships  structure  all  experiences.  Whenever  one  has  a  
                                                   
18 However,  according  to  certain  accounts,  moods  can  be  considered  to  be  intentional  
states  of  a  particular  kind  (e.g.  Goldie,  2002;  Solomon,  1973).    
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specific   experience  of  oneself,   another  person  or  an   inanimate  object  being  a  
certain   way,   the   experience   has,   as   a   background,   a   more   general   sense   of  
one’s  relationship  with  the  world.  (2005:  45)  
  
Ratcliffe   attributes   to   existential   feelings   the   same   role   that   Heidegger   and  
Strasser   attribute   to   moods,   emphasizing   that   they   structure   experience   by  
determining  “what  kinds  of  intentional  state  it  is  possible  to  have”  (2010:  604).  
Existential  feelings,  in  other  terms,  are  not  conceived  simply  as  non-­‐‑intentional  
states,   but   rather   they   are   attributed   a   “pre-­‐‑intentional”   character,   that   is   the  
ability  to  shape  the  range  of  intentional  states  that  we  can  entertain.    
  
Whilst  in  his  analysis  of  moods  Heidegger  is  not  concerned  with  the  role  played  
by  the  body  in  affectivity  (Ratcliffe,  2013a),  bodily  experience  is  fundamental  to  
Ratcliffe’s  account  of  existential  feelings.  Ratcliffe  indeed  claims  that  existential  
feelings   are   bodily   feelings   and   maintains   that   the   experience   of   the   body  
integral   to   them  has  a  characteristic  structure.  More  specifically,  as  previously  
observed  with  regards   to  emotions,   it   is  argued   that   in  existential   feelings   the  
body   is  not  given  as  a  perceptual  object,  but  rather  as   that   through  which   the  
world  and  our  relationship  with  it  are  experienced.  
  
This   characterisation   of   the   bodily   experience   associated  with   intentional   and  
non-­‐‑intentional   feelings   is   central   to   how   the   relationship   between   affectivity  
and   self-­‐‑consciousness   is   conceived   from   a   phenomenological   perspective.   In  
particular,  I  will  show  in  the  next  section  that  by  characterising  bodily  feelings  
in   these   terms,   various   phenomenologically   oriented   accounts   suggest   that   at  
least   certain   feelings   are   forms   of   pre-­‐‑reflective   self-­‐‑consciousness,   thus  
pointing   towards   the  existence  of  a   fundamental  connection  between  affective  






1.2.  Bodily  Feelings  and  Pre-­‐‑Reflective  Self-­‐‑Consciousness  
  
Various  scholars  have  investigated  the  relationship  between  affectivity  and  self-­‐‑
consciousness   from  a  phenomenological  perspective.   In   this   regard,  particular  
attention  has  been  given  to   the  bodily  feelings   implicated   in   the  experience  of  
emotions  and  other  affective  states.  In  the  following  I  will  illustrate  some  of  the  
insights  into  this  topic  developed  by  Giovanna  Colombetti  (2011)  and  Jan  Slaby  
(2008),   claiming   that   these   accounts   highlight   the   existence   of   a   fundamental  
connection  between  affectivity  and  minimal  selfhood.  
  
Colombetti   observes   that   sometimes   the   bodily   feelings   associated   with   the  
experience  of  emotions  have  a  prominent  position  in  our  experiential  field  and  
suggests  that  these  are  the  feelings  on  which  the  accounts  of  the  bodily  aspect  of  
affectivity   usually   focus.   When   we   experience   these   feelings,   she   notes,   the  
body  “comes  into  relief”,  it  is,  so  to  speak,  “in  the  foreground”  (2011:  295):    
  
in   many   emotion   experiences,   one’s   body   somehow   “stands   out”   from   the  
field   of   awareness   and   engrosses   one’s  mind—as  when   I   perceive  my   heart  
beating  very  fast  after  ducking  a  viper  suddenly  spotted  in  the  middle  of  the  
hiking  trail,  or  when  I  feel  a  knot  in  my  throat  as  I  am  to  report  the  death  of  a  
loved  one,   or  when   I   sense  my   stomach   contracting   as   I  walk   by   a  patch   of  
vomit  on  the  pavement.  (2011:    294)  
  
In   Colombetti’s   opinion,   foreground   bodily   feelings   can   be   either   localised   or  
diffuse  and  the   linguistic  expressions   through  which   they  are  described  mirror  
the   dynamical   and   kinetic   character   of   the   emotions   they   are   integral   to   (2011:  
295).   However,   Colombetti   emphasises   that   the   bodily   feelings   implicated   in  
emotion  experience  can  also  be  at  the  periphery  of  our  experiential  field.  These  
feelings  do  not  “stand  out”  as   foreground  bodily   feelings  do,  yet   they  are  not  
invisible:  they  are  experienced  in  a  more  “recessive”  way,  but  still  contribute  to  
 
69 
the   phenomenology   of   the   emotions   they   are   part   of.   From   this   perspective,  
background  bodily  feelings  are  conceived  as  the  means  by  which  the  contents  
of  affective  experience  can  be  given.  An  illustration  of  this  feature  is  provided  
by   Colombetti   through   the   analysis   of   the   experience   that   can   be   undergone  
when  travelling  to  the  airport  on  a  train  that  has  been  delayed.  In  this  case,  she  
argues,  our  focus  is  usually  on  the  objects  in  the  external  world  –  for  example  
the  train’s  speed  or  announcements  -­‐‑  but  this  experience  has  also  an  unpleasant  
feel  to  it,  “a  quality  of  urgency”,  which  in  her  opinion  depends  on  the  presence  
of  certain  background  bodily  feelings  (2011:  297).  
  
Colombetti   claims   that   although   background   and   foreground   bodily   feelings  
are  different  forms  of  bodily  experience,  the  body  is  in  both  cases  experienced  
as   a   subject   and   not   as   an   object.   In   other   terms,   the   distinction   between  
background   and   foreground   bodily   feelings   does   not   correspond   to   the   one  
between   pre-­‐‑reflective   and   reflective   self-­‐‑consciousness.   On   the   contrary,  
according  to  Colombetti,  both  types  of  feeling  are  forms  of  pre-­‐‑reflective  bodily  
experience.  In  her  words:  
  
background   bodily   feelings   are,   indeed,   best   characterized   as   pre-­‐‑reflective.  
They   are   not   attended,   they   are   not   reflected   upon;   they   are   experienced,  
although   only   insofar   as   they   contribute   to   the   specific   feel   of   an   emotion  
experience.  What  about  foreground  bodily  feelings  however?  Importantly,  as  I  
want   to  characterize   it,   the   foreground  is  not  attended  as  an  object—it   is  not  
observed   or   reified   in   any   way.   In   foreground   bodily   feelings,   my   body   is  
clearly   subjectively   lived.   It   comes   to   the   front   of   awareness,   it   can   even   be  
overwhelming  in  its  physical  presence,  but  it  does  so  in  a  non-­‐‑  mediated  and  
non-­‐‑reflective  way.  (2011:  304)  
  
According   to  Colombetti,   the  affective  body  can   thus  have  various  degrees  of  
experiential   conspicuousness  without   losing   its   subjectivity.   Both   background  
and   foreground   bodily   feelings   are   experiences   of   the   body   as   a   subject   and  
they   differ   in   virtue   of   possessing   different   degrees   of   “self-­‐‑   presentation”   or  




As   observed   by   Colombetti,   the   possibility   to   distinguish   between   various  
forms  of  pre-­‐‑reflective  bodily  self-­‐‑consciousness  is  acknowledged  also  by  other  
phenomenologists   (2011:   305-­‐‑306).   For   example,   comparing   the   experience   of  
expert   dancers   to   ordinary,   everyday   bodily   experience,   Legrand   (2007)  
distinguishes  two  forms  of  subjective  bodily  awareness.  She  argues  that  while  
the  body   is   “at   the   front”  of   the  dancers’   experience,   in   ordinary   situations   it  
recedes   into   the   background   and   it   is   the   world   which   is   rather   more  
conspicuous.   In  other   terms,  while   the  body  is  prominent   in   the  experience  of  
expert  dancers,  “normal  people  in  normal  circumstances  mostly  experience  the  
world  in  a  bodily  way”  (2007:  505-­‐‑506).  Legrand,  however,  remarks  that  in  both  
cases  the  body  is  experienced  as  a  subject.  
  
The  idea  that  the  bodily  feelings  associated  with  affective  experience  are  forms  
of   pre-­‐‑reflective   self-­‐‑consciousness   emerges   also   from   other   accounts   of   the  
relationship  between  affectivity  and  the  body.  Slaby  (2008),  for  example,  claims  
that  the  experience  of  the  body  integral  to  emotional  feelings  is  to  be  comprised  
under  the  notion  of  “body  schema”  and  maintains  that  this  should  be  conceived  
as  a  form  of  pre-­‐‑reflective  awareness.    
  
The  concept  of  body  schema  which  is  referred  to  in  Slaby’s  account  is  the  one  
developed  by  Gallagher  and  Zahavi  (e.g.  Gallagher,  2005;  Gallagher  and  Cole,  
1995;  Gallagher  and  Zahavi,  2008).19  From  this  perspective,  the  body  schema  is  
characterised  as  the  set  of  motor  skills  and  habits  which  underlie  our  ability  to  
move  and   to  keep  a  certain  posture.  A  phenomenological  analysis   shows   that  
movement  and  the  maintenance  of  posture  are  usually  realised  “automatically”,  
that  is  without  any  conscious  monitoring  being  necessary  on  our  part.  The  body  
                                                   
19 For  a  critical  overview  of  various  conceptions  of  “body  schema”  and  “body  image”  
see  Gallagher  (2005,  chapter  one).  
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schema  is  then  considered  to  be  what  makes  such  a  dynamic  functioning  of  the  
body  in   its  environment  possible  and,  according  to  Gallagher,   it   is  constituted  
by  three  main  sets  of  functions.  The  first  essential  aspect  of  the  body  schema  is  
the  processing  of  the  proprioceptive  information  provided  by  kinetic,  muscular,  
articular,  cutaneous  and  visual  sources,  as  well  as  the  information  coming  from  
vestibular  and  equilibrial  functions  (2005:  45).  The  second  aspect  consists  in  the  
innate  or   learned  motor  programs  which  make  it  possible   to  perform  habitual  
movements  such  as  those  involved  in  walking  or  writing  without  having  to  pay  
attention  to  them  (2005:  47-­‐‑48).  Finally,  the  third  component  of  the  body  schema  
is   identified  with   the   intermodal   abilities  which   allow   for   the   integration   and  
communication   of   information   supplied   by   different   sources,   for   example  
vision  and  proprioception  (2005:  51).    
  
The  body   image,   on   the  other  hand,   is  defined  as   the   set   of   intentional   states  
and  dispositions  whose  intentional  object  is  the  body.  In  this  regard,  Gallagher  
adopts   a   distinction   common   in   the   literature   according   to   which   the   body  
image   is   constituted   by   three   types   of   intentional   content   –   “body   percept”,  
“body  concept”  and  “body  affect”  –  and  argues  that  the  intentional  states  which  
constitute  the  body  schema  can  be  perceptual,  cognitive,  or  affective  (2005:  25).20  
    
What  is  the  relationship  between  body  schema  and  body  image  on  one  side  and  
pre-­‐‑reflective   and   reflective   self-­‐‑consciousness   on   the   other?  Does   the   former  
distinction   correspond   to   the   latter,   so   that   the   body   schema   can   be   said   to  
underpin   or   constitute   pre-­‐‑reflective   self-­‐‑consciousness  while   the   body   image  
should   be   associated   with   reflective   self-­‐‑consciousness?   In   order   for   this  
                                                   
20 The  distinction   between   body   schema   and   body   image   outlined   by  Gallagher   and  
Zahavi  seems  to  be  further  supported  by  the  existence  of  a  double  neuropsychological  
dissociation   in   patients   affected   by   deafferentation   and  unilateral   neglect   (Gallagher,  
2005:   43).   It   is   indeed   argued   that  while   deafferentation   involves   a   disruption   of   the  
body  schema  and  an  intact  body  image,  in  unilateral  neglect  it  is  the  body  image  that  is  
compromised  while  the  body  schema  is  unaffected.  
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correspondence  to  hold  it  would  be  necessary  for  the  body  schema  to  have  not  
only   a   functional   but   also   a   phenomenal   character.   However,   Gallagher  
explicitly  attributes  to  the  body  schema  a  non-­‐‑experiential  nature.  In  his  words:  
  
In   contrast   to   the   body   image,   a   body   schema   is   not   a   set   of   perceptions,  
beliefs   or   attitudes.   Rather   it   is   a   system   of   sensory-­‐‑motor   functions   that  
operate   below   the   level   of   self-­‐‑referential   intentionality.   It   involves   a   set   of  
tacit  performances  –  preconscious,  subpersonal  processes  that  play  a  dynamic  
role  in  governing  posture  and  movement.  (2005:  26)  
  
Although  proprioceptive  information  is  one  of  the  essential  components  of  the  
body  schema  and  it  constitutes  the  grounds  on  which  a  proprioceptive  sense  of  
self  can  be  developed,  Gallagher  claims  that  proprioceptive  information  should  
be  distinguished  from  proprioceptive  awareness.  Indeed,  while  the  first  one  is  
subpersonal,   the  second  one   is  a   form  of  pre-­‐‑reflective  self-­‐‑consciounsess.  The  
body  schema,  according  to  Gallagher,  has  a  “prenoetic”  function  (2005:  32),  that  
is  it  structures  our  conscious  experience  without  being  itself  the  object  of  such  
an  experience.  As  such,  the  body  schema  cannot  be  identified  with  any  form  of  
conscious  or  self-­‐‑conscious  experience.    
  
As  far  as  the  body  image  is  concerned,  on  the  contrary,  Gallagher  defines  it  as  
“a  system  of  perceptions,  attitudes,  and  beliefs  pertaining  to  one'ʹs  own  body”  
(2005:  24),  thus  suggesting  that  it  can  have  an  experiential  character.  In  order  for  
the   body   image   to   be   constituted,   a   “reflexive”   or   “self-­‐‑referential”  
intentionality  should  be  in  place  (2005:  25),  and,  as  such,  it  is  possible  to  claim  
that  with  the  notion  of  body  image  Gallagher  refers  to  a  form  of  reflective  self-­‐‑
consciousness.  However,  given   that  a   functional  but  not  a  phenomenal   role   is  
attributed   to   the   body   schema,   this   cannot   be   considered   as   a   form   of   pre-­‐‑
reflective  self-­‐‑awareness  (Legrand,  2007:  508).  
  
This   aspect   of   Gallagher’s   account   is   questioned   by   Slaby   (2008).   He   claims,  
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contrary   to   Gallagher,   that   at   least   some   aspects   of   the   body   schema   are  
potentially  accessible  to   introspection  and  suggests  that,  when  this   is   the  case,  
the  body  is  experienced  not  as  an  object,  but  rather  in  a  subjective  way.  On  this  
basis,  Slaby  argues  that  the  bodily  feelings  characteristic  of  affective  experience  
should   be   accounted   for   through   the   notion   of   body   schema.   This   claim   is  
motivated   by   the   acknowledgement   that,   as   previously   observed,   intrinsic   to  
the  bodily  feelings  in  question  is  an  experience  of  the  body  as  a  subject,  namely  
an  experience  of  the  body  as  that  through  which  the  world  or  other  intentional  
objects  can  be  given.    
  
By   characterising   the   bodily   experience   associated   with   affectivity   in   these  
terms,   Slaby  provides   an  account  of   emotional   feelings  which   is   analogous   to  
the  one  drawn  by  Colombetti,  conceiving  of  them  as  forms  of  pre-­‐‑reflective  self-­‐‑
consciousness.   Such   an   account,   however,   is   not   to   be   limited   to   intentional  
feelings,   since,   as   previously   mentioned,   also   the   experience   of   the   body  
intrinsic  to  existential  feelings  can  be  characterised  in  similar  terms.  Indeed,  in  
existential  feelings,  the  body  is  not  experienced  as  an  object,  but  rather  as  that  
through  which  our  relationship  with  the  world  is  configured  in  a  certain  way.    
  
Colombetti   and   Slaby   do   not   discuss   the   distinction   between   minimal   and  
narrative   self,   however,  due   to   the   role  played  by   the  notion  of  pre-­‐‑reflective  
self-­‐‑consciousness  in  their  accounts,  the  insights  they  develop  can  be  discussed  
also   in   relation   to   that   distinction.   As   remarked   in   Chapter   1,   Gallagher   and  
Zahavi   claim   that   minimal   selfhood   and   pre-­‐‑reflective   self-­‐‑awareness   are  
fundamentally  connected.  More  specifically,  they  argue  that  the  minimal  self  is  
the   self   of   which   we   are   pre-­‐‑reflectively   aware   in   any   form   of   conscious  
experience,  and  conceive  of  sense  of  ownership,  sense  of  agency,  embodiment  




Gallagher  and  Zahavi  do  not  attribute  a  specific  role  to  affective  experience  in  
their  account  of  minimal  selfhood;  however,  on  the  basis  also  of  the  approaches  
discussed   in   this   section,   it   is   possible   to   claim   that   affectivity   is   a   cardinal  
aspect  of  the  minimal  self.  As  previously  mentioned,  an  essential  feature  of  the  
minimal  self  is  that  it  is  a  bodily  self  of  which  we  have  a  non-­‐‑observational  and  
non-­‐‑objectifying  awareness  and  it   is  exactly  this  form  of  self-­‐‑experience  which  
is   shown   by   Colombetti   and   Slaby   to   be   integral   to   emotional   feelings.  
Colombetti   and   Slaby   indeed   suggest   that   the   bodily   feelings   intrinsic   to  
affective   experience   are   forms   of   pre-­‐‑reflective   self-­‐‑consciousness.   Through  
these   feelings,   in   other   terms,   the   body   is   experienced   not   as   an   object,   but  
rather  in  its  subjectivity.  As  such,  emotions  and  existential  feelings  appear  to  be  
a   constitutive   aspect   of   the   pre-­‐‑reflective   experience  we   have   of   ourselves   as  
bodily   selves.   Therefore,   the   minimal   self   is   to   be   conceived   not   only   as   an  
embodied  subject  of  perception  and  action,  but  also  as  an  affective  self.21    
  
The   claim   that   affectivity,   bodily   experience   and   self-­‐‑consciousness   are  
fundamentally  related  is  consonant  also  with  some  ideas  advanced  in  the  field  
of   cognitive   neuroscience.   Neurobiologist   Antonio   Damasio,   in   particular,  
provides   some   insights   into   the   structure   of   emotions   and   self-­‐‑consciousness  
that  have  important  features  in  common  with  the  phenomenological  account  I  
am  presenting.  Because  of  this  reason,  in  the  next  section  I  will  provide  a  brief  
overview  of  some  aspects  of  his  research.    
                                                   
21 As  I  argued,  the  phenomenological  accounts  discussed  in  this  section  point  towards  
the   existence   of   a   structural   connection   between   affectivity   and   minimal   selfhood,  
because   they   show   that   the   feelings   intrinsic   to   emotions   and   other   affects   are   pre-­‐‑
reflective  forms  of  bodily  consciousness.  However,  also  other  lines  of  argument  could  
be  pursued   in  order   to  defend  the  claim  that   the  minimal  self   is  an  affective  self.  For  
instance,  as  illustrated  in  Chapter  1,  agency  is  considered  to  be  a  cardinal  aspect  of  the  
minimal  self  and  it  is  arguable  that  affectivity  is  central  to  the  constitution  of  a  subject  
of   experience   capable   of   being   active   in   the   environment   in   various   ways.   In   this  
regard,   of   particular   relevance   from   a   phenomenological   perspective   is   the   work   of  
Patočka  (1998)  and  of  various  scholars  within  the  enactivist  tradition  (e.g.  Colombetti,  




Before  moving   to   Damasio’s   account,   it   is   finally   important   to   mention   that,  
although  Gallagher  and  Zahavi  do  not  emphasise  the  existence  of  a  connection  
between   affectivity   and   minimal   selfhood,   this   seems   to   be   widely  
acknowledged  in  phenomenological  psychopathology.  By  way  of  example,  it  is  
possible  to  consider  the  “Examination  of  Anomalous  Self-­‐‑Experience”  (EASE),  a  
symptom   checklist   devised   by   Parnas   et   al.   (2005)   for   the   individuation   of  
disturbances  of  minimal   self-­‐‑awareness.  On   the  basis  of  a   series  of   interviews  
with  patients  affected  by  schizophrenia  spectrum  disorders,  the  EASE  provides  
a   list   of   alterations   of   subjective   experience   and   groups   them   in   five   main  
domains:   “cognition   and   stream   of   consciousness”,   “self-­‐‑awareness   and  
presence”,   “bodily   experiences”,   “demarcation/transitivism”   and   “existential  
re-­‐‑orientation”.  Affectivity  does  not   constitute  a   separate   cluster  of   symptoms  
in   the   EASE;   however,   a   number   of   disruptions   of   self-­‐‑awareness   which   are  
listed  are  affective  or,  arguably,   involve  affective  experience.22  As  such,   in   line  
with   some   of   the   claims   advanced   in   this   section,   also   some   of   the   accounts  
which   make   use   of   the   notion   of   minimal   self   in   the   analysis   of  
psychopathological  experience  appear  to  consider  affectivity  as  a  fundamental  
dimension  of  minimal  selfhood.  
  
1.3.  Damasio’s  Account  of  Consciousness  and  Bodily  Feelings  
  
Central   to   Damasio’s   work   is   the   attempt   to   provide   an   account   of   the  
neurobiological  mechanisms  at  the  basis  of  conscious  and  affective  experience.  
                                                   
22 For   example:   “anxiety”;   “ontological   anxiety”;   “diminished   initiative”;  
“hypohedonia”;   “diminished   vitality”;   “passivity   mood”;   “feeling   of   centrality”;  
“feeling   as   if   the   subject’s   experiential   field   is   only   extant   reality”;   “’as   if’   feelings  of  
extraordinary  creative  power,  extraordinary  insight  into  hidden  dimensions  of  reality,  
or  extraordinary  insight  into  own  mind  or  the  mind  of  others”;  “‘as  if’  feeling  that  the  
experienced   world   is   not   truly   real,   existing,   as   if   it   was   only   somehow   apparent,  
illusory,  or  deceptive”.  (Parnas  et  al.,  2005:  257)  
 
76 
In   this   regard,  Damasio   claims   that   it   is   possible   to   distinguish   between   two  
forms  of  consciousness  which  he  associates  with  two  specific  forms  of  selfhood:  
the   “core   self”   and   the   “autobiographical   self”   (2000).  Damasio   suggests   that,  
although  distinguishable   in  principle,   these  dimensions  are  deeply   connected,  
and   only   their   adequate   development   and   integration   can   guarantee   human  
beings  a  normal  existence.  According  to  this  perspective,  “core  consciousness”  
is   the   simplest   form  of   consciousness   and   is   to   be   identified  with   a   “sense   of  
self”  experienced  “here”  and  “now”  (2000:  16).   In  this  respect,  departing  from  
the  theories  which  consider  consciousness  and  self-­‐‑consciousness  to  be  separate  
phenomena,   Damasio   suggests   that   the   two   should   be   identified,   thus  
emphasising  the  fact  that  conscious  experiences  are  always  lived  by  the  subject  
as  his  own  experiences.  In  his  words:    
  
If   ‘self-­‐‑consciousness’   is   taken   to  mean   ‘consciousness   with   a   sense   of   self’,  
then  all  human  consciousness  is  necessarily  covered  by  the  term  –  there  is  just  
no  other  kind  of  consciousness  as  far  as  I  can  see.  (2000:  19)  
  
Damasio  maintains  that  the  core  self   is  an  elementary  biological  phenomenon,  
present   also   in   other   species,   and   independent   of   conventional   memory,  
working  memory,   reasoning   and   language   (2000:   16).   From   a   neurobiological  
perspective,   the   emergence   of   core   consciousness   would   depend   on   the  
presence  of  what  Damasio   calls   a   “proto-­‐‑self”,   that   is   a   set   of  neural  patterns  
which   represent   the   various   aspects   of   the   structure   of   the   organisms   (2000:  
154).   In   particular,   in   Damasio’s   opinion,   core   consciousness   depends   on   the  
neurobiological   capacity   to   collect   and   connect   information   regarding   two  
specific   elements:   an   external   or   internal   object   and   the   body   itself.   More  
specifically,   consciousness   is  viewed  as   the  outcome  of   the   capacity   to  have  a  
neural   representation   of   how   a   particular   internal   or   external   event   has  
impacted   upon   one’s   bodily   conditions   (2000:   168-­‐‑171).   As   recognised   by  
Gallagher  and  Zahavi  (2008:  203),  the  concept  of  core  consciousness  is  similar  in  
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important  respects  to  the  phenomenological  notion  of  minimal  self.  Indeed,  as  it  
is  the  case  with  the  minimal  self,  also  the  core  self  is  essentially  related  to  a  form  
of   self-­‐‑consciousness   that   has   a   bodily   character   and   is   independent   of   the  
possession  of  linguistic  and  conceptual  abilities.    
  
The  “autobiographical  self”,  on  the  other  hand,  is  a  self  which  is  characterised  
by   a   degree   of   temporal   continuity   and   by   a   personal   history.   The  
autobiographical   self  depends  on   the  presence  of  “extended  consciousness”,  a  
“complex  biological  phenomenon”  which  would  reach  in  the  human  species  its  
highest   level  of  organisation   (2000:  16).   In  Damasio’s  opinion,  when  extended  
consciousness   is   present,   core   consciousness   is   still   operating   and   the  
experience  of  the  self  “here  and  now”  is  connected  to  the  past  and  the  predicted  
future,   the   dimensions   through   which   our   autobiography   usually   develops.  
Damasio  claims  that  conventional  and  working  memory  are  fundamental  to  the  
realisation  of  extended  consciousness  and  claims  that  in  humans  this  dimension  
is  “also  enhanced  by  language”  (2000:  16).  Damasio  is  not  explicitly  concerned  
with  the  role  played  by  story-­‐‑telling  in  the  constitution  of  the  autobiographical  
self.  However,   since   it   is   characterised  as  a   form  of  awareness  of   the  person’s  
history   and   is   connected   to   linguistic   abilities,   the   notion   of   extended  
consciousness  appears  to  have    important  aspects  in  common  with  the  notion  of  
narrative  self.23    
  
                                                   
23 This   idea  emerges  clearly  in  the  following  passage:  “[e]xtended  consciousness  goes  
beyond  the  here  and  now  of  core  consciousness,  both  backward  and  forward.  The  here  
and  now  is  still   there,  but   it   is   flanked  by  the  past,  as  much  past  as  you  may  need  to  
illuminate  the  now  effectively,  and,  just  as  importantly,  it  is  flanked  by  the  anticipated  
future.  The  scope  of  extended  consciousness,  at  its  zenith,  may  span  the  entire  life  of  an  
individual,  from  the  cradle  to  the  future,  and  it  can  place  the  world  beside  it.  On  any  
given  day,  if  only  you  let  it  fly,  extended  consciousness  can  make  you  a  character  in  an  




Damasio’s  account  of  consciousness  and  selfhood  is  thus  consonant  with  some  
of  the  claims  advanced  within  the  phenomenological  tradition.  In  particular,  it  
considers  conscious  experience  to  be  inseparable  from  self-­‐‑consciousness  and  it  
identifies  two  main  forms  of  self-­‐‑awareness  which  are  akin  to  the  minimal  and  
narrative   self   in   various   respects.   As   previously   mentioned,   however,   of  
particular   interest   for   the   purpose   of   the   present   study   are   also   some   of   the  
insights   developed   by   Damasio   in   regards   to   the   structure   of   affective  
experience   and,   in   particular,   his   notion   of   “primordial”   and   “background  
feelings”.    
  
According   to   Damasio,   emotions   and   feelings   are   particular   states   of   the  
organism  dependent  upon  the  relation  with  the  environment.  More  specifically,  
affective   states   are   some   of   the   regulatory   mechanisms   which,   with   various  
degrees  of  complexity,  contribute  to  survival  and  biological  wellbeing  (2000:  53-­‐‑
56).  From  this  perspective,  a   clear  distinction   is  drawn  between  emotions  and  
feelings.  On  the  one  hand,  emotions  are  identified  with  particular  sets  of  bodily  
changes  and   it   is   suggested   that   these  are  not  necessarily   felt  by   the   subject  –  
emotions,   in  other   terms,   can  be  unconscious.  On   the  other  hand,   feelings  are  
characterised   as   the   conscious   perception   of   the   bodily   changes   in   which  
emotions  consist  and  it  is  claimed  that  they  depend  on  the  organism’s  capacity  
to  construct  a  neural  representation  of  those  changes,  representation  which,  as  
previously  mentioned,  Damasio  names  “proto-­‐‑self”.  
  
Damasio  distinguishes  between  various  kinds  of  emotions  and  feelings,  but  in  
order   to   highlight   the   similarities   between   his   account   and   the  
phenomenological  approach,  the  notion  of  “primordial  feelings”  is  particularly  
relevant   (2012).  According   to   him,   these   are   feelings  which   possess   a   specific  
valence   –   namely   they   are   pleasant   or   painful   to   various   degrees   –   and   they  
give  us  a  sense  of  the  existence  of  the  body  independently  of  its  interaction  with  
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any  object.  In  his  words:    
  
They   provide   a   direct   experience   of   one’s   own   living   body,   wordless,  
unadorned,   and   connected   to   nothing   but   sheer   existence.   These   primordial  
feelings   reflect   the   current   state   of   the   body   along   varied   dimensions,   for  
example,  along  the  scale  that  ranges  from  pleasure  to  pain  […].  (2012:  21)  
  
Damasio   claims   that  primordial   feelings  are  dependent  upon   the  mechanisms  
which  constitute  the  proto-­‐‑self  and,  in  particular,  on  “interoceptive  maps”,  that  
is   the   neural   representations   of   the   viscera   and   internal  milieu   (2012:   190).  A  
particular  group  of  bodily  feelings  is  thus  associated  by  him  with  the  most  basic  
form   of   selfhood,   thus   drawing   attention   to   the   existence   of   a   primitive  
connection   between   affectivity,   the   body,   and   the   self.   As   previously  
mentioned,   however,   the   proto-­‐‑self   with   which   primordial   feelings   are  
associated  is  constituted  prior  to  the  emergence  of  core  consciousness  which  is  
in   Damasio’s   account   the   form   of   self-­‐‑consciousness   that   is   most   akin   to  
minimal  selfhood.  Therefore,  if  a  parallel  can  be  drawn  between  the  conception  
of   feelings   and   self-­‐‑awareness  put   forward  by  phenomenologists   and   the  one  
advanced  by  Damasio,   it   is  arguable   that   the  core  self,  and  not   just   the  proto-­‐‑
self,  should  be  involved.    
  
Of   particular   relevance   in   this   regard   is   Damasio’s   concept   of   “background  
feelings”,  namely  a  series  of  bodily  experiences  such  as  “tension”,  “relaxation”,  
“fatigue”,   “energy”,   “well-­‐‑being”   and   “malaise”   (2000:   52).   According   to  
Damasio,   these   feelings   are   the   felt   affective   responses   which   derive   from   a  
plurality   of   regulatory   physiological   mechanisms   operating   simultaneously  
(2003:   44).   In   other   terms,   these   states  would   amount   to   the   perceived   global  
effect  of  the  homeostatic  reactions  going  on  in  the  body  at  a  given  time  and  it  is  
for   this   reason   that   they   can   be   considered   as   the   expression   of   one’s   overall  
bodily  conditions.  In  Damasio’s  opinion,  in  order  for  background  feelings  to  be  
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experienced,   core   consciousness   must   be   present,   but   autobiographical  
consciousness   is   not   necessary.   As   such,   within   this   account,   background  
feelings  are  associated  with  the  most  basic  form  of  self-­‐‑awareness.    
  
Damasio’s  notion  of  background  feelings  has  much  in  common  with  a  form  of  
affective  experience  to  which  various  phenomenological  accounts  refer  with  the  
term   of   “vital   feelings”   (De  Monticelli,   2006;   Scheler,   1973a).   Scheler   and   De  
Monticelli   include   within   this   category   feelings   of   well-­‐‑being,   tiredness,  
freshness,  vigour  and   illness   (De  Monticelli,   2006:  70;  Scheler,   1973a:  338)  and  
suggest   that   they   are   related   to   the   significance   that   particular   events   in   the  
body  or  the  outside  environment  have  for  the  individual’s  biological  wellbeing  
(Scheler,  1973a:  341).  According  to  this  position,  vital  feelings  cannot  be  located  
in   specific   body   parts   and   do   not   possess   a   precise   extension   (1973a:   418).  
Instead   these   feelings   are   conceived   as   experiences   of   the   organism’s   global  
positive  or  negative  state  (De  Monticelli,  2003:  100).  
  
Scheler  and  De  Monticelli  do  not  explicitly  engage   in  a  discussion  of  whether  
these   feelings  have  a  pre-­‐‑reflective  or   reflective   character,  but,   on   the  basis  of  
some   features   of   their   accounts   and   of   a   phenomenological   analysis   of   these  
forms   of   affective   experience,   it   is   arguable   that   the   experience   of   the   body  
associated  with  vital   feelings  has   a  pre-­‐‑reflective   structure.   In   order   to   clarify  
this  point,   it   is  helpful   to  consider   that,  as  noted  by  Scheler   (1973a),  central   to  
vital  feelings  is  not  only  the  experience  of  particular  bodily  conditions,  but  also  
of  specific  features  of  the  environment.24  
  
Feeling  tired,  for  example,  does  not  amount  only  to  an  experience  of  the  body  
as  weary,  drowsy  or  drained,  but  also   to  a  particular  experience  of   the  world  
                                                   
24 For  instance  Scheler  claims:  “in  a  vital  feeling  we  are  given  the  peculiar  value-­‐‑content  
of  our  environment,   for  example,  the  freshness  of  a  forest,   the  living  power  of  growing  
trees”  (1973a:  340). 
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and   the   possibilities   it   comprises.   When   tired,   the   external   world   does   not  
appear   to  us   as   an   inviting  place   any  more.   Even   close   things   can   seem  very  
difficult  to  reach  and  they  lose  part  or  all  of  their  enticing  character:  rather  than  
stimulating  us  to  move  towards  them  and  to  make  use  of  them,  they  appear  as  
unappealing,  opaque  objects  which   it  would   take  a   certain  degree  of   effort   to  
interact   with.   A   particular   way   of   experiencing   both   my   body   and   the  
environment  thus  is  cardinal  to  the  phenomenology  of  tiredness,  but  this  does  
not  mean   that   the   body   is   here   given   as   a   perceptual   object.   Rather   than   an  
object  among  other  objects,  the  tired  body  is  indeed  usually  experienced  as  that  
through   which   other   things   can   appear   as   possessing   specific   characteristics  
and  therefore  the  bodily  consciousness  involved  in  this  and  other  vital  feelings  
appears  to  have  a  subjective  character.25    
  
It   should   now   be   clear   why   Damasio’s   account   of   self-­‐‑consciousness   and  
affectivity  is  consonant  with  the  phenomenological  position  in  various  ways.  In  
the   first   place,   Damasio   identifies   different   forms   of   selfhood   and   self-­‐‑
awareness,  distinguishing  in  particular  between  a  basic,  core  sense  of  self  and  a  
more   complex   form   of   autobiographical   understanding,   a   distinction   which  
echoes   the   one   between   minimal   and   narrative   selfhood.   Secondly,   Damasio  
considers   affectivity   as   a   constitutive   dimension   of   the   core   self   and   draws  
                                                   
25 In  Being  and  Nothingness  (1958)  Sartre  discusses  an  example  that  might  help  to  clarify  
the   phenomenology   of   tiredness.   He   considers   the   experience   undergone   when,  
reading  a  book   late  at  night,  his  eyes   start  hurting.  Sartre   remarks   that   the  pain  may  
manifest   itself   first   through   an   alteration   in   the   way   the   book   and   objects   in   the  
environment   appear,   thus   drawing   attention   to   the   fact   that   bodily   feelings   such   as  
those   involved   in   tiredness   are   the  means   by  which   certain   aspects   of   the  world   are  
manifested.  As  he  states:  “It   is  with  more  difficulty  that  the  words  are  detached  from  
the   undifferentiated   ground   which   they   constitute;   they   may   tremble,   quiver;   their  
meaning  may  be  derived  only  with  effort,   the  sentences  which  I  have  just  read  twice,  
three  times  may  be  given  as  “not  understood,”  as  “to  be  re-­‐‑read”  (1958:  332).  The  idea  
that   the   experience   of   the   body   associated   with   tiredness   in   this   example   has   a  
subjective  character  is  corroborated  also  by  the  claim,  advanced  by  Colombetti,  that  the  




attention  to  a  form  of  affective  experience,  background  feelings,  which  appears  
to   be   analogous   to   the   notion   of   “vital   feelings”   adopted   by   Scheler   and   De  
Monticelli.   A   phenomenological   analysis   of   these   feelings   suggests   that   the  
experience   of   the   body   integral   to   them   has   a   pre-­‐‑reflective   character,   thus  
further   corroborating   the   idea   that   there   are   important   similarities   between  
Damasio’s  core  self  and  the  minimal  self  and  that  affectivity   is  a   fundamental  
dimension  of  minimal  selfhood.  
  
2.  Emotions  and  the  Narrative  Self  
  
So  far  I  have  focused  on  the  relationship  between  affective  bodily  feelings  and  
self-­‐‑consciousness,   showing   that   these   feelings   are   characterised   as   forms   of  
pre-­‐‑reflective   self-­‐‑awareness   and   thus   are   to   be   viewed   as   aspects   of   the  
minimal  level  of  self-­‐‑experience.  In  the  philosophical  literature,  however,  there  
are  also  other  accounts  of  how  affectivity  and  selfhood  are  related.  In  particular,  
affective   states   are   often   depicted   as   having   a   strong   connection   with   the  
individual  history  and  personality,  which  would  suggest  that  a  relationship  of  
some   kind   exists   also   between   affectivity   and   narrative   self-­‐‑understanding.  
According  to  De  Sousa,  for  example,  affective  experiences  not  only  constitute  a  
significant  source  of  information  regarding  the  external  environment,  but,  they  
also  convey  a  certain  knowledge  about  the  subject  himself.  For  this  reason,  De  
Sousa  characterises  emotions  as  “Janus-­‐‑faced”  phenomena  (2007:  323),  namely  
phenomena  with   two   different   sides,   one   related   to   the  world   and   the   other  
related  to  the  self.    
  
I  highlighted  in  Chapter  1  that  the  notion  of  narrative  self  is  closely  connected  
to   that   of   personal   identity.   More   specifically,   I   showed   that   the   concept   of  
personal   identity   narrative   accounts   are   concerned   with   is   related   to   what  
Schechtman   calls   the   “characterization   question”   (1996),   namely   the   question  
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regarding   which   features   make   someone   the   person   that   she   is,   or,   in   other  
terms,   are   constitutive   of   her   personality.   As   such,   the   idea   that   there   is   a  
relationship  between  affectivity  and  personal   identity   is  highly  relevant   to  the  
investigation  of  the  structure  of  narrative  self-­‐‑understanding.    
  
The  role  played  by  affectivity   in   the  emergence  and  development  of  narrative  
selfhood   is   not   explicitly   explored   within   the   phenomenological   literature.  
However,   central   to   the   accounts   provided   by   phenomenologists   such   as  
Scheler  and  De  Monticelli  is  the  idea  that  affective  experience  is  fundamental  to  
the  constitution  of  personhood.  More  specifically,  as  I  will  show  in  the  next  two  
sections,   these   accounts   draw   attention   to   the   role   played   by   affective  
experience   in   the   constitution   of   the   individual’s   evaluative   perspective,  
suggesting  that  it  is  with  this  particular  perspective  that  personality  should  be  
identified.   Since   the   notion   of   personhood   and   that   of   narrative   self   have  
significant   features   in   common,   I   will   claim   in   the   following   that   these  
phenomenological   accounts   can   shed   light   also   on   some   aspects   of   the  
relationship  between  affectivity  and  narrative  self-­‐‑understanding.    
  
2.1.  Affectivity  and  Evaluation  
  
Both   classical   and   contemporary   phenomenologists   have   emphasised   the  
existence   of   a   specific   relationship   between   affectivity   and   personhood   and  
argued   that   such   a   relationship   depends   on   the   role   played   by   affects   in  
evaluative   experience.   According   to   Scheler   (1973a)   and   De  Monticelli   (2003;  
2006),26   for   instance,   affective   states   are   felt   evaluations   through   which   we  
                                                   
26 In  her  work  De  Monticelli   (e.g.  2003;  2006)  provides  an  account  of   the   relationship  
between   affectivity,   moral   experience,   and   personhood   that   draws   on   and   further  
develops  various   aspects   of   Scheler’s  work.  The   aspects   of   Scheler’s   account   that   are  
relevant   in   the   context   of   the   present   of   study,   however,   are   an   integral   part   of   De  
Monticelli’s   view   and,   therefore,   I   will   refer   to   the   work   of   both   scholars   as  
representative  of  a  unitary  phenomenological  position. 
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appraise   people,   events,   or   states   of   affairs   as   possessing   particular   value  
properties.   According   to   this   position,   the   evaluative   domain   is   accessed  
primarily  through  affectivity:  thanks  to  our  feelings  we  experience  contents  that  
couldn’t  be  adequately  experienced  through  the  exercise  of  cognitive  capacities  
only  (Scheler,  1973a:  255).  From  this  perspective,  feelings  can  be  identified  with  
appraisals  of  a  particular  kind,  they  are,  in  other  terms,  “feelings  of  values”  (De  
Monticelli,  2003:  71;  De  Monticelli,  2006:  59;  Scheler,  1973a:  257-­‐‑259).27  
  
A   number   of   contemporary   approaches  which   conceive   of   intentionality   and  
feeling   as   inseparable   aspects   of   at   least   certain   forms   of   affective   experience  
also  share  the  idea  that  affectivity  and  the  axiological  dimension  are  essentially  
connected.  Goldie,  for  example,  who  introduces  the  notion  of  “feeling  towards”  
to   designate   feelings   directed   to   specific   objects,   claims   that   these   play   a  
fundamental  role  in  our  experience  of  evaluative  properties.  According  to  this  
position,   emotions   do   not   simply   add   a   subjective   feel   to   perceptual   and  
cognitive   processes,   but   rather   provide   us   with   a   distinct   kind   access   to  
evaluative  contents  (Goldie,  2002:  36).  
  
Similarly,  Helm  (2001;  2002)  maintains  that  emotions  are  not  objectless  feelings  
but  felt  evaluative  states  which  allow  us  to  assess  the  particular  things,  people  
or  states  of  affairs  to  which  they  are  directed  in  terms  of  formal  objects,  that  is  
evaluative   qualities   which   distinguish   various   emotion   types.   For   instance,  
using  Helm’s  example,  if  I  am  angry  at  someone  for  throwing  a  baseball  at  my  
                                                   
27 The   existence   of   a   connection   between   affectivity   and  values   has   been   stressed   by  
various   theories   of   emotion   (for   a   critical   review   see   Deonna   and   Teroni,   2012).  
Cognitive  theories  (e.g.  Solomon,  1973),  for  example,  account  for  the  intentionality  and  
evaluative  character  of  emotions  by  identifying  emotions  with  evaluative  judgements.  
From  this  perspective,  while  it  is  acknowledged  that  feelings  might  be  present  when  an  
emotion  occurs,   the  appraisal  and   the   felt  aspect  of   the  emotion  are  considered   to  be  
distinct.   The   phenomenological   approaches   discussed   in   this   chapter,   however,  
conceive   of   evaluation   and   feeling   as   inseparable   aspects   of   the   emotion,   so   that   the  
feeling  is  seen  as  that  through  which  certain  value  properties  can  be  experienced.  
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Chinese  vase,  the  target  of  my  anger  is  the  other  person  and  the  formal  object  is  
offensiveness:  I  am  angry  because  I  evaluate  this  particular  action  as  offensive  
(2002:   15).   The   feeling   of   anger,   in   this   case,   is   that   through   which   the  
evaluation  is  realised.  
  
These   approaches   also   converge   in   the   recognition   of   the   existence   of   an  
essential  connection  between  emotion,  motivation,  and  action,  an  idea  which,  as  
I   will   illustrate   in   the   next   section,   is   also   important   to   understand   the  
relationship   between   affectivity   and   personhood.   Among   contemporary  
phenomenologists,   for   instance,   De   Monticelli   emphasises   the   existence   of   a  
relationship   between   affective   and   volitional   states,   claiming   that   integral   to  
emotions   –   which   she   characterises   as   episodic   involuntary   states   –   are   also  
particular  conative  and  action  tendencies  (2003:  126;  2006).    
  
This  view  is  held  also  by  Slaby,  who  remarks  that  despite  the  existence  of  some  
exceptions,   the   experience   of   an   emotion   usually   entails   the   presence   of   an  
inclination   to  act   in  a   certain  way.  He  accounts   for   this   feature  by   identifying  
motor   components   of   different   kinds   as   integral   to   the   bodily   feelings  
associated   with   emotions.   He   maintains   that   in   some   cases   these   motor  
components  might   be   “full-­‐‑blown   action   tendencies”   –   for   example  when  we  
feel   the   impulse   to   hit   someone   in   anger   –  while   in   other   cases   they   are   just  
tendencies   to   express   the   emotion.   In   addition,   Slaby   claims   that   the   motor  
aspects   of   emotions   can   also   be   “‘impossible   movement’   impulses”,   namely  
urges  that  we  wouldn’t  be  able  to  transform  in  concrete  actions  (2008:  439).    
  
It   is   thus   widely   acknowledged   that   emotions   move   or   incline   us   to   act   in  
particular   ways.   However,   the   phenomenological   approach   identifies   also  
another   sense   in   which   emotions   and   actions   are   connected.   De   Monticelli  
(2003),  for  example,  remarks  that  by  giving  access  to  values,  affective  states  can  
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provide  us  with  reasons  to  act  in  particular  ways.  According  to  this  perspective,  
by  virtue  of   the  evaluative  knowledge  they  convey,  emotions  provide  us  with  
information   that   could   serve   as   evidence   in   favour   of   particular   courses   of  
action.   In  other   terms,  affective  experience  would  not  only   incline  us   towards  
particular  behaviours,  but  would  also  give  us  reasons  to  make  certain  decisions  
and  undertake  certain  actions.  
  
Similarly,   Goldie   draws   attention   to   the   connection   between   emotions,  
evaluation,   and   motivation.   More   specifically,   he   argues   that   central   to   the  
structure  of  emotions  is  what  he  calls  the  “recognition-­‐‑response  tie”  (2002:  11).  
He   suggests   that   emotions   involve   the   acknowledgement   of   something   as  
possessing   a   particular   evaluative   property   and   a   number   of   responses  
including   characteristic   facial   expressions,   bodily   changes,   motivational  
responses  and  actions.  From  this  perspective,  both  recognition  and  response  are  
fundamental   to   the   emotion.   Indeed,   according   to   Goldie,   an   evaluative  
property   is   not   something   that   we   can   simply   acknowledge,   as   we   do   for  
example  with  the  presence  of  an  object  in  perceptual  experience.  Rather,  Goldie  
claims   that   a   particular   response   is   integral   to   what   it   means   to   recognise  
something  as  possessing  such  a  property  (2002:  30).  
  
Also  Helm   attributes   to   emotions   a   cardinal   role   in  motivation   and   practical  
rationality.   In   his   view,   through   emotions   certain   objects   are   perceived   as  
possessing  a  characteristic   import,  but   this   is  not  considered  a  matter  of  mere  
acknowledgement.  On  the  contrary,  he  argues  that  “[t]o  have  import  is  to  be  a  
worthy  object  of  attention  and  action”  (2002:  17).  In  other  terms,  intrinsic  to  the  
emotion   would   be   the   feeling   that   we   should   attend   to   its   object   and   act   in  
particular   ways   when   needed.   Emotions   as   felt   evaluations,   in   his   opinion,  




The  acknowledgment  of  the  existence  of  evaluative  feelings  which  are  capable  
to   motivate   us   in   particular   ways   is   thus   at   the   core   of   a   phenomenological  
account   of   affectivity   and   of   various   contemporary   theories   of   emotion.   As  
previously   mentioned,   such   a   conception   is   closely   related   to   how  
phenomenologists   such   as   Scheler   and  De  Monticelli   conceive   of   personhood  
and  in  the  next  section  I  will  provide  a  more  extensive  description  of  this  idea.  
  
2.2.  Affectivity  and  the  Constitution  of  Personhood  
  
In  section  2.1.  I  showed  that,  according  to  various  accounts,  affective  experience  
and   the   evaluative   dimension   are   essentially   connected.   However,   when  
evaluations  are  involved,  there  seems  to  be  a  high  level  of  variability  in  people’s  
responses  and  behaviours  and  the  recognition  of  this  fact  plays  a  fundamental  
role  in  Scheler’s  and  De  Monticelli’s  view  of  the  relationship  between  affectivity  
and  personhood.    
  
While  it  seems  difficult  to  deny  that  some  circumstances  tend  to  elicit  the  same  
emotional   reactions   in   the  majority   of   people  who   experience   them,   it   is   also  
evident   that  often  people  react  with  different  emotions   to   the  same  situations.  
For  example,  if  on  the  one  side  the  loss  of  a  loved  one  usually  generates  feelings  
of  sadness,  sorrow,  and  sometimes  anger,  on  the  other,  not  everybody  will  react  
with  the  same  emotions  for  instance  to  the  news  regarding  an  armed  conflict  in  
a   third  world   country.  While   some  people  might   feel  deeply  moved  by   these  
events,  others  might  be  rather  indifferent.  On  a  more  specific  level,  people  who  
are  affected  by   the  news  may  be   so   in  different  ways   -­‐‑   the  news  might  make  
them  feel  sad,  indignant  or  angry.  The  same  goes  for  those  who  are  not  touched  
by  the  events  –   they  might   find  the  news  boring  or  even  annoying  because  of  
their  repetitiveness,  or  they  might  feel   interested  in  their  political  or  economic  




Different  people   can   thus  have  different  affective  and  evaluative   responses   to  
the   same   situation.   Furthermore,   and   this   is   what   is   most   important   to  
understand   Scheler’s   position   –   not   all   people   are   equally   responsive   to   the  
same   evaluative   dimensions;   they   rather   possess   distinct   “affective  
sensitivities”,   namely   specific   evaluative   outlooks   on   reality.   For   instance,  
presumably  artists  are  very  sensitive   to  aesthetic  qualities,  while  scientists  are  
more  responsive  to  qualities  belonging  to  the  epistemic  dimension  and  religious  
people   to   those   pertaining   to   the   spiritual   domain.   This   does   not   mean   that  
someone  who  is  particularly  sensitive  to  one  evaluative  domain  is  insensitive  to  
others   or,   to   continue  with   the  previous   example,   that   an   artist   is   not   able   to  
appreciate  the  value  of  scientific  discoveries  or  is  totally  disinterested  in  matters  
of   religion   –   this   might   as   well   be   the   case   but   the   point   is   that   it   is   not  
necessarily  so.  What  these  examples  are  meant  to  illustrate  is  the  intuition  that,  
when  it  comes  to  the  evaluative  dimension  associated  with  affective  experience,  
people’s   attitudes  vary   a   lot   and   this  holds   true  when  both   individual  values  
and  categories  of  values  are  concerned.  Scheler  and  De  Monticelli  account   for  
this  phenomenon  by  emphasising  that  not  all  the  values  people  are  sensitive  to  
have   for   them   the   same  degree  of   importance:   there   are   things   that   they   care  
more  or   less  about,  “orders  of  priorities”  or  “preferences”   that  confer  on  their  
evaluative   outlook   a   specific   structure.   In   other   terms,   according   to   this  
position,  different  people  possess  distinct,  hierarchically  organised,  evaluative  
perspectives   in   the   constitution   of  which   affectivity   is   crucially   involved.   But  
which  are  exactly  the  dynamics  through  which  these  perspectives  emerge?    
  
So  far  I  have  drawn  attention  to  the  fact  that  emotions  allow  us  to  experience  a  
plurality   of   value   qualities,   but   it   seems   that   this   in   itself   is   not   enough   to  
constitute   an   order   of   priorities.   Individual   intentional   feelings   mark   certain  
objects,   people   or   events   as   important   to   us,   but   they   do   not   tell   us   how  
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important   these   things   are   compared   to   others.   The   feeling   of   enjoyment   I  
experience   when   I   visit   a   contemporary   art   gallery   signals   to   me   that   I   am  
experiencing   something   aesthetically   valuable   and   that   I   appreciate   it,   but   it  
does  not  express  whether  aesthetic  values,  or  the  aesthetic  value  of  a  particular  
work  of  art,   is  for  me  more  important  than  other  moral,  epistemic  or  religious  
values.  If  the  intentional  evaluative  feelings  with  which  emotions  are  identified  
are   not   sufficient   by   themselves   to   constitute   an   order   of   priorities,   there   is  
however  another  form  of  affective  experience  which,  according  to  Scheler,  plays  
a  cardinal   role   in   the  process:   the   feelings  of  “preferring”  and  “placing  after”,  
namely  feelings  through  which  a  particular  evaluative  property  is  experienced  
as  being  more  or  less  important  than  another.  As  explained  by  Scheler:  
  
It  is  necessary  to  distinguish  emotional  functions  from  the  experiences  that  are  
based  on  “preferring”  and  “placing  after.”  The  latter  constitute  a  higher  stage  in  
our  emotional  and   intentional   life,  and   in   them  we  comprehend  the  ranks  of  
values,  their  being  higher  and  lower.  (1973a:  260)  
  
According   to   this   position,   the   constitution   of   a   hierarchically   ordered  
evaluative  perspective   is   in   the   first  place  an  affective  process.   Indeed,  on   the  
one  hand,  through  the  intentional  feelings  intrinsic  to  emotions  we  experience  a  
variety   of   value  properties,  while   feelings   of   “preferring”   and   “placing   after”  
allow  us   to   attribute   to   these   properties   a   comparative  degree   of   importance.  
Scheler   remarks   that   the   felt   experiences   by   means   of   which   the   orders   of  
priorities  are  constituted  are  not  conative  states  (1973a:  260),  but  rather  feeling  
states,  thus  emphasising  that  they  are  not  the  product  of  an  act  of  the  will,  but  
are  rather  passive  phenomena.    
  
However,  the  phenomenological  perspective  I  am  discussing  does  not  conceive  
of   affectivity  as  an  entirely  passive  dimension.  Although  we  cannot  decide   to  
experience  a  particular  emotion  or  feeling  of  preference,  we  are  not  powerless  
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in  front  of  our  affective  inclinations.  On  the  contrary,  we  possess  the  capacity  to  
shape  and  orientate  our  emotional   life.  From  a  phenomenological  perspective,  
what   De   Sousa   calls   the   “antinomy   of   activity   and   passivity”,   namely   the  
apparent  tension  between  the  involuntary  character  of  affective  experience  and  
the   fact   that  an  “active  self”  seems   to  be   involved   in   this  experience   (1987:  2),  
can  be  resolved  by  recognising  that  although  we  cannot  control  which  emotions  
and  felt  preferences  we  will  experience,  once  these  feelings  are  present  we  can  
actively  influence  the  way  in  which  they  develop.  
  
As  we  have  seen,  emotions  can  motivate  both  our  cognitive  and  conative  states  
and  can  also  act  as  reasons  for  our  actions.  However,  De  Monticelli  emphasises  
that   we   have   the   capacity   to   take   a   position   in   regards   to   whether   affective  
states   can   act   as   such  motives   or   not   and   to   accept   or   reject   certain   orders   of  
priorities  (2003:  113-­‐‑115).  So,  in  so  far  as  we  can  have  an  impact  on  the  extent  to  
which   affective   states  motivate   our  mental   and   practical   life,  we   do   have   the  
possibility   to   actively   contribute   to   our   affective   experience   and   to   the  
constitution   of   our   own   evaluative   perspective.   In   other   terms,   although  
particular   affective   states   incline   us   to   entertain   specific   thoughts,   beliefs   or  
judgements,  to  experience  specific  desires  and  to  perform  particular  actions,  we  
always   have   the   possibility   to   “consent”   or   “dissent”   to   them   doing   so   (De  
Monticelli,  2003;  2006).  As  De  Monticelli  states:  
  
by  which   qualities   among   the   host   of   situations   and   things   are  we   struck   and,  
once  struck,  do  we  continue  to  allow  ourselves   to  be   touched?  To  what  depths  are  
we   touched   –   and   what   hold   do   we   allow   such   qualities   to   have   over   us?  
Throughout  all  of  this  there  is  a  living  set  of  yesses  and  nos  by  means  of  which  
we  discover  for  ourselves  the  order  of  our  value  preferences,  which  activates  
and   modifies   itself   throughout   life.   Not   directly   in   the   feeling,   but   in   the  
granting  or  withholding  of  consent  relative  to  this  feeling  and  to  the  needs  that  this  
feeling  presents  -­‐‑  and  to  the  degree  and  manner  in  which  the  spontaneity  of  a  
self  and  an  order  of  one’s  own  axiological  preferences,  otherwise  unknown  to  us,  is  




At   the   core   of   Scheler’s   and   De   Monticelli’s   account   is   then   the   idea   that  
affective   experience   is   central   to   the   constitution   of   an   individual   evaluative  
perspective   and   this   perspective   has   the   structure   of   a   particular   order   of  
preferences  which  possesses  a  motivational  role.  Through  affective  experience,  
in  other  terms,  we  determine  what  is  more  or  less  important  for  us  in  and  this  
process  has  both  a  passive  and  an  active  side.  As  a  result,  affective  sensitivity  
and  the  evaluative  outlook  with  which  this  experiential  dimension  is  entangled  
are  not  conceived  as  static  phenomena,  but  are  rather  thought  to  be  structured  
over  time  as  our  life  story  unfolds.    
  
Most  important  for  the  topic  of  this  chapter  is  the  fact  that  the  affectively  laden  
evaluative  perspective  Scheler  and  De  Monticelli  speak  of  is  at  the  core  of  their  
conception  of  personhood.  The  notion  of  person  which  is  at  issue  here  is  the  one  
which   I   showed   in   Chapter   1   to   be   the   focus   of   Ricoeur’s   analysis   and  
Schechtman’s  “characterization  question”.  In  particular,  I  highlighted  that  what  
is   of   interest   from   this   perspective   is   not  which   criteria   allow   to   identify   one  
individual  as  the  same  at  two  different  points  in  time,  but  rather  what  confers  
on  a  particular  person  her  individuality,  what  makes  her  the  person  that  she  is.  
According  to  Scheler  and  De  Monticelli,  personal  identity  in  this  sense  is  to  be  
identified   with   the   possession   of   an   individual   evaluative   outlook   (De  
Monticelli,  2003:  81),  a  dimension  which,  due  to  the  role  played  by  affectivity  in  
its  constitution,  they  call  “ordo  amoris”28.  From  this  perspective,  it  is  emphasised  
that  the  person’s  evaluative  order  of  priorities  constitutes  the  framework  which  
orientates  all  her  cognitive  and  practical  life,  determining  the  kind  of  things  she  
is  sensitive  to  and  the  actions  she  undertakes.  In  Scheler’s  words:  
  
Man  is  encased,  as  though  in  a  shell,  in  the  particular  ranking  of  the  simplest  
values   and   value-­‐‑qualities   which   represent   the   objective   side   of   his   ordo  
                                                   
28 According   to   the   translator   of   Scheler   (1973b),   the   Latin   “ordo   amoris”  means   “the  
order  or  ordering  of  love”  (Scheler,  1973b:  98).  
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amoris,   values   which   have   not   yet   been   shaped   into   things   and   goods.   He  
carries  this  shell  along  with  him  wherever  he  goes  and  cannot  escape  from  it  
no  matter  how  quickly  he  runs.  He  perceives  the  world  and  himself  through  
the  windows  of  this  shell,  and  perceives  no  more  of  the  world,  of  himself,  or  
of   anything  else  besides  what   these  windows   show  him,   in  accordance  with  
their  position,  size  and  colour.  (1973b:  100)  
  
Our  evaluative  perspective  thus  radically  shapes  the  way  in  which  we  act  and  
perceive  ourselves,  others  and  the  world  and  it  is  because  of  this  reason  that  it  
can  be  considered  to  be  at   the  core  of  personal   identity.  “Whoever  has  the  ordo  
amoris  of  a  man”,  claims  Scheler,  “has  the  man  himself”  (1973b:  100).  
  
How  are  the  ideas  discussed  in  this  section  relevant  to  the  understanding  of  the  
relationship   between   affective   experience   and   minimal   and   narrative   self?  
Scheler   and   De   Monticelli   are   not   explicitly   concerned   with   the   notion   of  
narrativity,   however   their   account   shows   that   affectivity   is   central   to   the  
constitution   of   personal   identity  which,   as   discussed   earlier,   is   considered   by  
Gallagher  and  Zahavi  to  be  a  fundamental  aspect  of  the  narrative  self.  The  form  
of   selfhood   which   is   the   focus   of   the   narrative   account   is   indeed   one   which  
possesses  an  “individual  identity”  (Gallagher,  2000:  18)  or  “personal  character”  
and  central   to   the  emergence  of  which   is   the  endorsement  of   certain  “values”  
and   “intellectual   convictions   and   decisions”   (Zahavi,   2007:   193).   As   such,  
Scheler  and  De  Monticelli’s  position   indirectly  draws  attention  to   the  fact   that  
affective  experience  is  at  the  core  of  the  dynamics  through  which  the  narrative  
self   is   constituted   and   I   believe   that   this   idea   can   pave   the   way   to   the  
clarification   of   one   of   the   aspects   of   the   distinction   between   minimal   and  
narrative  self  which  is  left  unexplored  by  Gallagher  and  Zahavi.  
  
As  highlighted   in  Chapter  1,   the  minimal   self   is   considered  by  Gallagher  and  
Zahavi   to  be  a  condition  of  possibility   for   the  emergence  of   the  narrative  self,  
thus  meaning  that   the   latter  can  be  constituted  only   if  a  minimal   form  of  self-­‐‑
awareness   is   already   in   place.  However,   from   this   perspective,   no   account   is  
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given   of   the   dynamics   through   which   the   narrative   self   emerges   from   the  
minimal  one.  In  other  terms,  no  indication  is  provided  as  to  how  narrative  self-­‐‑
understanding  can  develop  from  pre-­‐‑reflective  forms  of  self-­‐‑consciousness.    
  
At   the   beginning   of   this   chapter   I   showed   that,   according   to   various  
phenomenologically   oriented   accounts,   the   bodily   feelings   integral   to   both  
intentional   and   non-­‐‑intentional   affective   states   can   be   conceived   as   forms   of  
pre-­‐‑reflective  self-­‐‑consciousness,  thus  making  it  possible  to  associate  affectivity  
with  minimal   selfhood.   Since,   as   argued   above,   affective   experience   has   also  
been  shown  to  be  essentially  involved  in  the  constitution  of  some  fundamental  
features   of   personhood,   arguably   affectivity   is   key   to   the   dynamics   through  
which  narrative  self-­‐‑understanding  develops  from  minimal  self-­‐‑consciousness.    
  
As   noted   earlier,   however,   phenomenological   accounts   of   affectivity   and  
personhood   are   not   concerned  with   the   notion   of   narrativity.   As   such,  while  
they  identify  a  number  of  processes  through  which  affective  experience  shapes  
personal   identity,   they   do   not   take   into   consideration   the   influence   that  
affectivity  can  have  on  story-­‐‑telling  itself.  In  order  to  get  a  more  comprehensive  
understanding  of  the  relationship  between  minimal  and  narrative  self  also  this  
point  needs   to  be  addressed  and  I  will  devote  Chapter  3   to   the  exploration  of  
this  topic.    
  
2.3.  Affectivity  and  Consciousness  of  the  Self  as  a  Person  
  
So  far  I  have  illustrated  in  what  sense,  according  to  Scheler  and  De  Monticelli’s  
account,  affectivity  is  constitutive  of  personhood.  However,  according  to  these  
and   other   phenomenological   approaches,   affective   experience   not   only  
constitutes   but   also   discloses   personal   identity.   In   other   terms,   from   this  
perspective,  affectivity  not  only  shapes  our  personality,  but   is  also  cardinal   to  
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the  consciousness  we  have  of  ourselves  as  persons.  This   idea  has   implications  
for  our  understanding  of  the  relationship  between  affectivity  and  minimal  and  
narrative   self   and   is   closely   related   to   the   account   of   evaluative   experience  
previously  introduced.  
  
I  illustrated  earlier  in  this  chapter  how  various  authors  identify  emotions  with  
intentional  feelings  through  which  particular  objects,  people  or  states  of  affairs  
are   experienced   as   possessing   a   specific   value.   However,   according   to   some  
supporters   of   this   view,   emotions   not   only   allow   us   to   experience   their  
intentional   objects   as   significant   in   particular   ways,   but   they   also   reveal  
something  about  ourselves.  As  observed  by  Slaby  and  Stephan  (2008),  emotions  
assess   what   is   going   on   in   the   external   world   from   a   specific   point   of   view,  
namely  the  perspective  of  the  self.  In  emotional  experience,  they  argue,  we  feel  
in  a  certain  way  towards  something  and  we  have  a  sense  of  being  positively  or  
negatively   affected   by   it.   Intrinsic   to   affective   states,   then,   is   an   appraisal   of  
“how   things   are   going   for   us”   (2008:   507),   of   the   impact   a   particular   object,  
person  or  state  of  affairs  has  on  our  condition.    
  
Slaby   (2008)   emphasises   that   the   “outward-­‐‑directed”   and   the   “self-­‐‑directed”  
aspects  of  emotions  should  not  be  considered  as  separate.  On  the  contrary,  the  
two   aspects   are   inextricable   in   the   structure   of   affective   intentionality:   when  
experiencing   an   emotion,   I   perceive   something   as   possessing   a   particular  
evaluative   quality   by   feeling   myself   affected   in   a   particular   way.   In   Slaby’s  
words:  
  
While   afraid,   you   experience   something   as   dangerous   and   at   the   same   time  
‘you’   feel  vulnerable   in   the  relevant  aspect.  But  your  experience  of  danger   is  
not   separate   from,   but   rather   consists   in   your   feeling   thus   vulnerable.   […]  
Your   ‘minding’   and   something   else’s   ‘mattering’   are   constitutively  




According   to   this   position,   through   intentional   affective   states  we   experience  
ourselves  as  affected  in  different  ways  by  our  relationship  with  the  world  and  a  
connection  is  thus  established  between  affectivity  and  self-­‐‑awareness.  Slaby  and  
Stephan   claim   that  bodily   feelings  are   central   to   this   form  of   experience,   thus  
suggesting   that   what   is   at   issue   here   is   a   form   of   bodily   self-­‐‑consciousness.  
Indeed,   in   their   opinion:   “[t]he   felt   body   is   essentially   the   arena   in   which  
affective  self-­‐‑consciousness  manifests  itself”  (Slaby  and  Stephan,  2008:  509).  On  
the   basis   of   these   remarks,   it  would   seem   that   the   form  of   self-­‐‑consciousness  
Slaby  and  Stephan  refer  to  is  nothing  more  than  the  subjective  experience  of  the  
body  which   I   showed   in   section  1.2.   to  be  associated  with  various   intentional  
and  non-­‐‑intentional  feelings.  However,  despite  it  being  central  to  their  account,  
bodily   self-­‐‑awareness   does   not   exhaust   the   notion   of   self-­‐‑consciousness  
highlighted  by  Slaby  and  Stephan  and   this  becomes  particularly  visible   in   the  
way  they  conceive  of  existential  feelings.  
  
According  to  Slaby  and  Stephan,  the  connection  with  the  evaluative  dimension  
and  self-­‐‑awareness  is  a  fundamental  feature  not  only  of  intentional  feelings,  but  
also  of  Ratcliffe’s  “existential  feelings”.  More  specifically,  they  claim  that  these  
feelings   “can   be   described   as   various   forms   of   evaluative   awareness   of   one’s  
existential  situation”,  that  is  they  suggest  that  while  intentional  feelings  give  us  
a  sense  of  how  we  are  affected  by  particular  people,  objects  or  states  of  affairs,  
existential   feelings  provide  a  more  general  “sense  of  how  things  are  going  for  
oneself”  (Slaby  and  Stephan,  2008:  507).    
  
In   addition,   in   line   with   some   of   the   claims   advanced   by   Scheler   and   De  
Monticelli,   Slaby   and   Stephan   also   emphasise   that   existential   feelings  
fundamentally  contribute  to   the  constitution  of  our  personality.  As  previously  
discussed,   these   feelings   are   considered   to   be   the   grounds   of   particular  
intentional  states,  behaviours  and  attitudes,  thus  radically  shaping  our  relation  
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with  the  world,  and  it  is  for  this  reason  that  they  can  be  considered  to  express  
“what   we   are”,   our   personal   identity,   at   any   particular   time   (2008:   511).   As  
such,   Slaby   and   Stephan   conceive   of   existential   feelings   as   being   both  
constitutive  of  personhood  and  forms  of  self-­‐‑consciousness:  
  
These  feelings  are,  besides  being  candidates  for  what  makes  up  our  identity  as  
persons,  peculiar  forms  of  being  conscious  of  ourselves.  (2008:  512)  
  
According   to   this  perspective,   integral   to   existential   feelings   is   thus  a   form  of  
self-­‐‑awareness   which   involves   bodily   experience,   but   cannot   be   reduced   to  
consciousness  of  the  body.  What  Slaby  and  Stephan  draw  attention  to  is  indeed  
the  fact  that  it  is  the  self  as  a  person  that  is  experienced  through  these  feelings.29      
  
In   Chapter   1   I   showed   that   phenomenological   accounts   of   the   self   usually  
associate  personhood  with  reflectivity  and,  in  particular,  narrativity.  According  
to   Gallagher   and   Zahavi’s   account,   personal   identity   is   something   that   we  
constitute   and   become   aware   of   by   engaging   in   narrative   self-­‐‑understanding  
and  thus  depends  on  a  form  of  selfhood  and  self-­‐‑consciousness  more  complex  
than  the  minimal  one.    
  
Slaby   and   Stephan’s   account,   however,   seems   to   suggest   that  we   can   have   a  
pre-­‐‑reflective  awareness  of  the  self  as  a  person.  Indeed,  the  self-­‐‑directed  aspect  
of  existential  feelings  is  depicted  as  the  means  by  which  the  experience  of  one’s  
relationship  with  the  world  is  realised,  thus  suggesting  that  what  is  in  question  
here   is   an   experience   of   the   self   as   subject   rather   than   object.   As   such,   it   is  
                                                   
29 A  similar   idea   is   expressed  by  Rosfort   and  Stanghellini   in   their   characterisation  of  
moods:  “We  can  say  that  whereas  affects  point  forward  toward  a  specific  object,  moods  
point   inward   toward   my   being   the   person   I   am.   More   precisely,   moods   contain   a  
bipolar  intentionality  in  the  sense  that  they  often  materialize  in  a  certain  affect  owing  
to   an   explicit   object,   but   at   the   same   time   point   to   my   being   the   person   I   am,   and  
thereby  awake  questions,  doubts,  considerations,  evaluations  and  finally  deliberations  
about  my-­‐‑being-­‐‑this-­‐‑person”.  (2009:  260)  
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shown  that  at  least  certain  affective  states  are  to  be  conceived  as  forms  of  pre-­‐‑
reflective   personal   consciousness   and   this   is   very   relevant   for   the  
characterisation   of   the   relationship   between   affectivity   and   minimal   and  
narrative  self.  
  
The  form  of  self-­‐‑consciousness  that  Slaby  and  Stephan  associate  with  affective  
experience   has   a   pre-­‐‑reflective,   bodily   character,   and   therefore   their   account  
corroborates   the   idea  that  affectivity   is  closely  connected  to  minimal  selfhood.  
However,  this  account  also  shows  that  what  is  experienced  through  existential  
feelings   is  not  only  a  bodily  self,  but  also   the  self  as  a  person.   In  other   terms,  
Slaby   and   Stephan’s   account   appears   to   suggest   that   we   can   have   a   pre-­‐‑
reflective   experience   of   aspects   of   the   self   that   the   account   of   selfhood   put  
forward  by  Gallagher  and  Zahavi  associates  with   the  narrative  self  and,   in   so  
doing,  this  position  draws  attention  to  the  fact  that  narrative  understanding  has  
an  impact  on  minimal  self-­‐‑experience.    
  
This  idea  emerges  even  more  clearly  from  the  way  in  which  Slaby  and  Stephan  
characterise   the   relationship  between  affectivity  and   linguistic  and  conceptual  
abilities.  Calling  into  question  the  view  according  to  which  felt  experiences  and  
higher  cognitive  processes  are  separate  dimensions,  they  emphasise  that  certain  
existential  feelings  -­‐‑  such  as,  for  instance,  the  feeling  “of  being  a  true  American”  
or  “a  moral  failure”  (2008:  513)  –  are  conceptually  shaped:  
  
the   traditional   cliché   which   opposes   feelings   as   low   level,   non-­‐‑conceptual,  
bodily   states   on   the   one   hand   and   conceptually   sophisticated   attitudes   as  
high-­‐‑level,  cognitive,  disembodied,  and  language-­‐‑based  on  the  other  hand,  is  
misleading.   Instead,   even   the   most   intellectual,   most   conceptually   polished  
attitudes   can   enter   directly   into   the   way   we   feel   ourselves.   Feeling   and  
conceptual  thought  cannot  be  viewed  as  opposites.  (2008:  513)  
  
In  Chapter  1   I   showed   that,   according   to  Gallagher  and  Zahavi,  pre-­‐‑reflective  
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self-­‐‑consciousness  is  a  pre-­‐‑linguistic  and  pre-­‐‑conceptual  awareness  of  a  bodily  
self.   On   the   basis   of   the   characterisation   of   existential   feelings   provided   by  
Slaby  and  Stephan,  however,  it  is  arguable  that  the  notion  of  pre-­‐‑reflective  self-­‐‑
consciousness   can   be   extended   to   include   also   other   features.   Indeed,   their  
analysis  of  existential   feelings  show  that   there  can  be  a  non-­‐‑observational  and  
non-­‐‑objectifying  consciousness  of  the  self  as  a  person  and  such  consciousness  is  
in  some  cases  dependent  on  the  possession  of  specific  linguistic  and  conceptual  
abilities.    
  
Slaby  and  Stephan’s  account   thus   identifies   the  existence  of  affective   forms  of  
experience  where  both  minimal  and  more  complex  forms  of  self-­‐‑consciousness  
are   integrated.   This   approach   is   not   explicitly   concerned   with   narrativity;  
however,  by  taking  into  consideration  the  notion  of  consciousness  of  the  self  as  
a   person,   it   points   towards   a   phenomenon   that   has   been   argued   to   be  
essentially  related  to  narrative  self-­‐‑understanding.  As  such,  Slaby  and  Stephan  
indirectly  highlight  the  existence  of  experiences  where  minimal  self-­‐‑awareness  




In  this  chapter  I  examined  how  various  phenomenological  accounts  conceive  of  
the  relationship  between  affectivity,  self-­‐‑consciousness,  and  selfhood.   I  started  
by  showing  that,  according  to  various  approaches,   the  bodily  feelings  that  are  
integral   to   affective   experience   can   be   characterised   as   forms   of   pre-­‐‑reflective  
bodily  consciousness  (Colombetti,  2011;  Slaby,  2008).  As  such,  I  claimed,  these  
accounts  draw  attention  to  the  fact  that  affectivity  is  a  fundamental  dimension  
of  minimal  selfhood,  an  idea  which  is  consonant  also  with  some  of  the  insights  




I  then  showed  that  according  to  some  phenomenological  approaches  affectivity  
is   crucially   involved   also   in   more   complex   forms   of   self-­‐‑consciousness   and  
selfhood.  In  particular,  I  highlighted  that,  due  to  the  role  they  play  in  evaluative  
experience,  emotions  and  existential  feelings  are  considered  by  some  scholars  to  
be   constitutive   of   personal   identity.   Scheler   (1973a)   and   De  Monticelli   (2003;  
2006),  for  example,  claim  that  affective  experience  is  essentially  involved  in  the  
experience  of  a  plurality  of  evaluative  properties  and  in  the  dynamics  through  
which  one’s  cares  and  values  are  hierarchically  structured.  As  it  identifies  such  
an   evaluative   perspective   with   the   individual’s   personality,   this   account  
considers  affectivity  as  cardinal  to  the  constitution  of  the  self  as  a  person.    
  
The   approaches   which   emphasise   the   relationship   between   affectivity   and  
“personality”  or  “personhood”  are  not  explicitly  concerned  with  the  notion  of  
narrativity.   However,   I   remarked   that   narrativity   has   been   considered   by  
Gallagher  and  Zahavi  to  be  related  to  the  concept  of  person.  As  such,  I  claimed  
that   the   phenomenological   accounts  which   focus   on   the   relationship   between  
affectivity   and   personhood   are   relevant   also   to   the   understanding   of   the  
relationship   between   affectivity   and   narrative   selfhood.   In   particular,   on   the  
basis   of   these   accounts,   it   can   be   argued   that   some   of   the   dynamics   through  
which   the   narrative   self   emerges   from   the   minimal   self   have   an   affective  
character,   thus   contributing   to   the   clarification   of   one   of   the   aspects   of   the  
distinction  between  minimal  and  narrative  self  that  Gallagher  and  Zahavi  leave  
unexplored.    
  
Therefore,   I  maintained,   the  conception  of   the  relationship  between  affectivity  
and   selfhood   that   can   be   drawn   on   the   basis   of   existing   phenomenological  
accounts   is   two-­‐‑fold.   On   the   one   hand,   by   showing   that   the   bodily   feelings  
integral   to   intentional   and   non-­‐‑intentional   affective   states   are   forms   of   pre-­‐‑
reflective   bodily-­‐‑consciousness,   it   is   showed   that   affectivity   is   a   fundamental  
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dimension  of  minimal  selfhood.  On  the  other,  by  claiming  that  affective  states  
are   crucially   involved   in   the   dynamics   through   which   personhood   is  
constituted,   it   is   indirectly   suggested   that   affectivity   plays   a   key   role   in   the  
processes   through  which   the  narrative   self   emerges   from   the  minimal   self.   In  
addition,   I   claimed   that   Slaby   and   Stephan’s   account   of   existential   feelings  
shows   that   at   least   some   affective   states   are   at   the   same   time   forms   of  
consciousness   of   the   body   and   the   person,   thus   highlighting   the   fact   that  
different  kinds  of  self-­‐‑awareness  can  be  intertwined  in  affective  experience.    
  
In   the   rest   of   this   work   I   will   build   on   some   of   the   ideas   illustrated   in   this  
chapter   to   provide   a   more   extensive   account   of   the   relationship   between  
affectivity  and  selfhood  and  to  further  address  some  of  the  questions  raised  in  
Chapter  1   in  regards  to   the  distinction  between  minimal  and  narrative  self.   In  
the  first  place,  expanding  on  the  idea  that  affective  experience  is  fundamental  to  
the  constitution  of  personhood  and  that  narrative  understanding   is  essentially  
related   to   this   dimension,   in   Chapter   3   I   will   provide   an   account   of   various  
dynamics   through   which   affectivity   influences   autobiographical   story-­‐‑telling.  
More  specifically,  I  will  claim  that  affectivity  shapes  both  the  form  and  contents  
of   the   autobiographical   stories   we   craft,   thus   identifying   various   dynamics  
through  which  the  narrative  self  emerges  from  the  minimal  self.  Secondly,  I  will  
aim  to  shed  more  light  on  the  relationship  between  minimal  and  narrative  self  
by   examining   how   narrative   self-­‐‑understanding   in   turn   impacts   on   the  
structure   of   affective   experience.   In   Chapter   4   I   will   show   that   there   are  
different  ways   in  which  affectivity   is   constitutively   shaped  by  narrativity  and  
this  will  allow  me  to  corroborate  the  claim  that  minimal  and  narrative  levels  of  










The  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  explore  the  impact  that  affective  experience  has  on  
narrativity,  providing  various  insights  in  support  of  the  idea  that  emotions  play  
a   constitutive   role   in   the   emergence   and   development   of   our   life   stories.  
Contributions   to   the   analysis   of   this   topic   have   been   made   in   philosophy,  
psychology,   and   narrative   theory   and   I   will   start   by   providing   an   outline   of  
some  of  the  ideas  advanced  in  these  debates,  focusing  in  particular  on  the  claim  
that   emotions   are   fundamental   in   determining   both   the   form   and   contents   of  
literary   and   autobiographical   narratives.   I   will   then   move   to   examine   other  
ways  in  which  affectivity  impacts  on  narrativity.  First,  I  will  argue  that  affective  
experience  is  at  the  core  of  our  ability  to  narrate  a  self  that  possesses  a  degree  of  
continuity  and  I  will   identify  the  dynamics  through  which  this  can  happen  by  
relying   on   Schechtman’s   notion   of   “empathic   access”   (1996;   2001;   2007).  
Secondly,  I  will  suggest  that  the  existence  of  a  level  of  congruence  between  the  
emotions   that   are   experienced   and   the   emotions   that   are   narrated   is   at   the  
origin   of   the   sense   of   authenticity   that   is   associated   with   certain   forms   of  
autobiographical   story-­‐‑telling.   I   will   then   consider   more   specifically   the   role  
played  by  existential  feelings  in  the  constitution  of  narrativity.  In  this  regard,  I  
will   claim   that   existential   feelings   fundamentally   mould   our   narrative  








1.Narrative  Form  and  Content  
  
That   affectivity   is   involved   in   story-­‐‑telling   in   various   ways   is   a   fairly  
uncontroversial   claim.   Narratives   can   be   motivated   by   particular   affective  
experiences,  are  often  rich  in  emotional  descriptions,  and  can  generate  a  variety  
of  emotions  in  the  reader  or  audience.  The  acknowledgement  of  these  dynamics  
amounts   to  a   recognition   that  affectivity  contributes   to  or   influences  narrative  
processes  in  different  manners.  However,  it  is  possible  to  claim  that  affectivity  
not  only  makes  a  contribution  to,  but  is  also  constitutive  of  narrativity  or  some  of  
its  aspects.  In  particular,  it  can  be  argued  that  both  narrative  form  and  content  
are  shaped  by  affective  experience   in   this  deeper  sense  and   in   the   following   I  
will  examine  various  theoretical  accounts  of  these  dynamics.    
  
The   idea   that   emotions   constitutively   shape   the   structure   of   stories   is  widely  
discussed  by  Patrick  Colm  Hogan  in  his  book  Affective  Narratology  (2011).  More  
specifically,   Hogan   identifies   various   mechanisms   through   which   affectivity  
impacts   on   the  way   in  which  narratives   are   organised   in  different   parts  with  
distinct   temporal   profiles.   He   notes   that   stories   can   be   segmented   in  
“incidents”,   “events”,   and   “episodes”   and   claims   that   this   segmentation   is  
driven  by  affective  processes.    
  
By  means   of   example,   Hogan   considers   some   passages   from   the   novel  Anna  
Karenina  (Tolstoy,  2006).30  In  particular,  he  examines  the  section  in  which  one  of  
the   characters,   Stiva  Oblonsky,   discovers   that   his  wife  Dolly   is   aware   that   he  
has  been  having  an  affair.  The  events  that  are  discussed  by  Hogan  take  place  at  
the  couple’s  house  upon  Stiva’s  return  after  an  evening  spent  at  the  theatre.  He  
is  in  a  good  mood  and  carries  a  pear  as  a  present  for  Dolly.  However,  when  the  
                                                   
30 See  Hogan  (2011:  chapter  one).    
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couple  meets,  the  light-­‐‑heartedness  of  the  initial  situation  is  rapidly  replaced  by  
a  very  different  atmosphere.  Stiva  sees  that  Dolly  is  holding  a  letter  that  must  
have  revealed  to  her  his  adultery  and  her  expression  is  one  of  “horror,  despair  
and  fury”  (Hogan,  2011:  32).  Stiva  responds  to  this  and  his  wife’s  demands  for  
an  explanation  with  what  he  would   later   recall  as  a  “silly  smile”,  while  Dolly  
shudders   “as   though   in   physical   pain”   (2011:   29),   shouts   and   subsequently  
leaves  the  room.  
  
Considering   this   passage,  Hogan   observes   that   there   are   various   aspects   to   a  
temporally   extended   scene,   but   only   some   of   them   are   included   in   what   is  
recounted.  In  particular,  he  claims  that  the  most  basic  constituents  of  stories  are  
“incidents”,  namely  emotional  responses  which  are  triggered  by  circumstances  
that   somehow   contradict   the   character’s   expectations.   According   to   Hogan,  
incidents  are  part  of  broader  temporal  sequences  called  “events”  which  include  
depictions   of   the   causes   and   expressive   and   behavioural   outcomes   of   the  
emotion.  In  the  passage  previously  discussed,  the  causes  of  Stiva’s  emotion  are  
identified   by   focusing   on   the   letter   and   Dolly’s   expression,   while   the   “silly  
smile”   is   the   way   in   which   Stiva,   who   is   the   target   of   his   wife’s   reaction,  
responds  to  the  emotional  incident.  Hogan  observes  that  Stiva’s  response  gives  
rise  to  another  emotional  incident  which  concerns  Dolly  and  is  elaborated  into  a  
second  event:  at  the  sight  of  her  husband’s  smile,  Dolly  experiences  anger  and  
responds  by  shouting  and  leaving  the  room.  In  Hogan’s  opinion,  the  two  events  
here  described  constitute  an  “episode”,   that   is  a  more  extended  elaboration  of  
the   causes   and   effects   of   an   emotional   incident   which   is   concluded   by   a  
temporary   restoration   of   normalcy.   With   Dolly   leaving,   Stiva’s   everyday  
routine  can  continue,  but   it   is  clear   that   there  will  be   further  developments  of  
the   dynamics   generated   by   the   initial   incident.   This   is   what,   according   to  
Hogan,   makes   it   possible   to   distinguish   an   episode   from   a   story,   as   the  
conclusion   of   the   latter   involves   a   re-­‐‑establishment   of   normalcy  which   has   a  
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longer-­‐‑term  and  more  stable  character.  Hogan  emphasises  that  a  story  is  not  to  
be  identified  with  a  mere  sequence  of  episodes.  In  particular,  he  claims  that  the  
“story-­‐‑like”   character   of   such   a   sequence  depends   on   the   extent   to  which   the  
constitutive  episodes  are  “causally  or  emotionally  relatable”  (2011:  72).    
  
As   far   as   the   role   of   affectivity   is   concerned,   Hogan   maintains   that   emotion  
systems31   are   central   to   the   formation   of   stories   by   virtue   of   different  
mechanisms.   In   this   regard,  he  claims   that   the   ‘story-­‐‑likeness’  of   sequences  of  
episodes  depends  on  the  degree  to  which  they  meet  the  criteria  specified  by  two  
groups  of  “preference   rules”   (2011:  72).   In   the   first  place,   story-­‐‑like   sequences  
are  usually  concerned  with  a  small  number  of  characters  who  are   involved   in  
the  pursuit   of   goals   determined  by   emotion   systems.   Secondly,   as  mentioned  
above,   the   sequences   which   are   constitutive   of   stories   generally   involve   a  
departure  from  an  initial  situation  of  normalcy  and  its  restoration  at  the  end  of  
the  narrative  and  emotions  are  considered  to  mark  both  these  transitions  (2011:  
121-­‐‑122).        
  
Hogan   suggests   that   also   the   development   and   differentiation   of   narrative  
genres   is   to   be   related   to   affective  dynamics.   In  particular,   he   claims   that   the  
goals   around   which   story-­‐‑telling   is   typically   centred   are   related   to   the  
achievement  of  happiness.  In  this  regard,  he  identifies  three  main  prototypical  
structures   at   the   basis   of   three   distinct   literary   genres.32   The   first   happiness  
prototype   is  dependent  upon   the   satisfaction  of   the  needs  associated  with   the  
hunger   and   thirst   system.   The   goals   which   are   relevant   in   this   context   are  
                                                   
31 Hogan  conceives  of  emotions  as  complex  occurrences  which  involve  the  presence  of  
particular   eliciting   conditions,   expressive   outcomes,   physiological   and   actional  
responses,  and  a  specific  phenomenological  quality  (2011:  pp.  2-­‐‑3).   In  this  context,  no  
definition   is  provided  of  “emotion  system”.  However,  Hogan  draws  upon   the  use  of  
the  notion  which  is  made  in  affective  neuroscience  and,  as  such,   it   is  arguable  that   in  
his   account   “emotion   system”   designates   the   distinct   set   of   neurobiological  
mechanisms  which  underpin  the  experience  of  a  particular  emotion.  
32  See  Hogan  (2011:  chapter  three).  
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central  to  stories  in  which  the  protagonists  have  to  face  various  impediments  to  
achieving  abundance  of  food  and  drink,  such  as  droughts  and  famines.  Hogan  
suggests   that,   because   of   the   way   in   which   such   natural   events   might   be  
interpreted,   integral   to   these   stories   are   usually   “narratives   of   sin,   communal  
punishment,   sacrifice   and   restoration”   (2011:   182)   which   constitute   what   he  
calls   the   “sacrificial”   genre.   The   attachment   and   sexual   desire   systems   are  
fundamental   to   the   constitution   of   a   second   distinct   narrative   genre,   the  
“romantic”   plot,   while   the   emotion   system   associated   with   pride   and   anger  
contributes   to   the  emergence  of   the  “heroic”  genre.  Finally,   in  addition   to   the  
sacrificial,  romantic  and  heroic  plots,  Hogan  identifies  other  four  genres  whose  
constitution  he  considers  to  be  driven  by  affective  mechanisms  and  which  have  
both  a  cross-­‐‑cultural  and  trans-­‐‑historical  presence,  although  they  do  not  appear  
as   often   as   the   main   ones.   These   are   the   “attachment”,   “sexual   desire”,  
“revenge”  and  “criminal  investigation”  genres.33    
  
Hogan   is   concerned  with   the  dynamics   involved   in   the  production  of   literary  
narratives  and,  as  such,  what  his  account  draws  attention  to  is  the  experience  of  
writers   of   published   and  unpublished   stories.  However,   the   emotion   systems  
and  processes  which  according  to  him  shape  the  contents  of  literary  narratives  
and  the  way  in  which  these  are  constructed  are  a  fundamental  aspect  of  human  
experience34  more  in  general,  and  therefore  they  can  be  expected  to  play  a  role  
also  in  the  way  autobiographical,  non-­‐‑literary,  narratives  are  constructed.  
  
In   line   with   the   claims   advanced   by   Hogan,   it   must   indeed   be   noted   that  
emotions  are  central   to   the  stories  we   tell  about  ourselves   in  various  ways.   In  
the   first   place,  many   of   the   narratives  we   craft   are   about   our   affective   states,  
                                                   
33 For  a  more  extensive  description  of  these  genres  see  Hogan  (2011:  chapter  four).  
34 As  mentioned  before,  in  building  his  account  Hogan  draws  on  research  conducted  in  
the   field  of  affective  neuroscience.  Such   research  aims   to   identify   the  neurobiological  




namely   they   report   or   describe   emotions   that   we   experienced,   are   currently  
experiencing,  or  that  we  think  we  would  or  would  not  be  able  to  experience  if  
certain  events   took  place.  For   instance,   I   can   tell  a   story  about   the  anger   I   felt  
upon  discovering  that  a  close  friend  repeatedly  lied  to  me,  about  the  excitement  
and   joy   I   am   feeling   for   the   start   of   a   new   relationship,   or   about   the  
disappointment  I  would  experience  if  the  job  application  I  have  submitted  was  
rejected.   In   these   cases,   emotions   are   the   focus   of   my   autobiographical  
narratives   or,   in   other   terms,   the   autobiographical   narratives   I   craft   have  
specific   emotional   contents.   As   it   is   the   case   with   the   literary   narratives  
examined  by  Hogan   then,   also   life   stories   often   revolve   around   events  which  
have   generated   emotional   responses   and   further   elaborate   on   the   causes   and  
effects  of  those  responses.  Furthermore,  some  of  the  themes  which  are  central  to  
the   literary   genres  Hogan   identifies   are   fundamental   also   to   autobiographical  
story-­‐‑telling:   narratives   about   love,   sexual   desire,   or   attachment,   for   instance,  
appear   to   play   a   significant   role   in  most   people’s   narrative   repertoire,   as   do  
narratives  in  which  pride,  anger,  and  revenge  are  fundamentally  involved.35  In  
addition,  even  when  the  stories  we  tell  do  not  explicitly  engage  in  a  description  
of  our  emotions,  the  aspects  of  our  life  and  experience  that  they  recount  usually  
“matter”  to  us  in  specific  ways,  and  such  mattering  can  only  be  understood  by  
taking  affectivity  into  consideration.  Our  everyday  experience  is  extremely  rich  
and   multifaceted   and   it   would   be   impossible   for   our   autobiographical  
narratives  to  fully  reflect  such  a  degree  of  complexity.  Autobiographical  story-­‐‑
telling   is   therefore   an   inherently   selective   activity   and   the   experience   of  
particular   emotions   is   what   drives   our   ability   to   give   to   our   story-­‐‑telling   a  
particular  focus.  For  instance,  it  is  because  I  am  proud  of  the  success  achieved  in  
the  management  of  a  particular  project  at  work  that  I  tell  my  family  about  it,  or  
                                                   
35 However,  I  do  not  want  to  suggest  that  there  is  a  strict  correspondence  between  the  
narrative  genres  described  by  Hogan  and  the  types  of  autobiographical  narratives  that  
we   can   construct,   as   the   personal,   social,   and   cultural   factors   involved   might   be  
different  in  the  case  of  literary  and  non-­‐‑literary,  narratives.  
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it   is   because   I   feel   guilty   about   not   having   joined   a   friend’s   birthday   party   in  
order  to  finish  writing  a  report  that  I  keep  thinking  about  how  that  happened  
and  the  consequences  it  might  generate.  
  
The   idea   that   emotions   are   fundamental   to   the   constitution   and   selection   of  
narrative  content  is  explored  with  reference  specifically  to  the  autobiographical  
domain   by   Valerie  Hardcastle   (2003;   2008).   In   particular,   Hardcastle   remarks  
that   it   is   because   of   their   affective   connotations   that   some   experiences   are  
included   in   the   stories   we   tell   about   ourselves   while   others   are   excluded.  
Emotions,   in   other   terms,   ‘tag’   certain   events   as   significant   and   these   are   the  
ones  which  “make  it  into  our  stories”  (2003:  354):  
  
these  affective  reactions  […]  are  the  things  that  pick  out  what  in  our  world  is  
important   to   us,   what   we   remember,   and   what   we   tell   our   friends   and  
neighbors.   They   drive   our   story-­‐‑telling   and   then,   in   conjunction   with   our  
primitive   need   to   share   our  world  with   our   conspecifics,   guarantee   that  we  
narrate  a  self.  (2008:  89)  
  
Hardcastle   observes   that,   also   from   a   developmental   perspective,   the  way   in  
which   we   think   and   talk   about   the   world   is   centred   around   our   likes   and  
dislikes   and   these,   she   suggests,   are   dependent   upon   affective   experience.   In  
her  opinion,  the  same  dynamics  are  at  the  core  of  the  way  in  which  we  conceive  
of   ourselves   and   structure   our   autobiographical   narratives.  According   to   her,  
one  of   the  most   fundamental   forms  of  story-­‐‑telling  we  engage   in   involves   the  
expression  of  our  predilections  and  evaluations  and   she   considers   these   to  be  
rooted  primarily   in  affectivity,  an   idea  which  echoes  some  of   the   insights   into  
the  relationship  between  emotions  and  personhood  I  previously  discussed.  
  
In  Chapter   2   I   showed   that   according   to   various  phenomenologists   there   is   a  
fundamental   connection   between   affectivity   and   the   evaluative   dimension.  
More  specifically,  authors  such  as  Scheler  (1973a)  and  De  Monticelli  (2003;  2006)  
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claim   that   through   intentional   feelings   we   experience   a   plurality   of   value  
qualities  which  make  particular  objects,  people  or  states  of  affairs  salient  for  us  
in   a   variety   of   ways.   From   this   perspective,   emotions   allow   us   to   appraise  
things   and   events   as   relevant   to   a   plurality   of   interests   and   concerns   and  
arguably  it  is  because  they  possess  such  relevance  that  certain  things  and  events  
are  included  into  our  narratives.    
  
In  addition,  the  phenomenological  account  of  emotions  I  outlined  in  Chapter  2  
can   also   explain  why   affective   experience   is   central   not   only   to   the   ability   to  
construct  narratives  in  general,  but,  more  specifically,  to  the  capacity  to  produce  
autobiographical  narratives  or,   in  Hardcastle’s  terms,  to  “narrate  a  self”  (2008:  
89).  As   I   illustrated,  authors  such  as  Slaby  and  Stephan   (2008)  emphasise   that  
affectivity   involves  not  only  an  evaluative  experience  of  particular   features  of  
the  world,  but  also  an  experience  of  the  self.  In  other  terms,  a  particular  form  of  
self-­‐‑consciousness   is   considered   to   be   integral   to   any   form   of   affective  
experience   and   it   is   arguable   that   it   is   because   of   this   feature   that   emotions  
underlie  our  ability  to  craft  stories  about  ourselves.    
  
Finally,   it   is   important   to   note   that   emotions   can   shape   the   contents   of   our  
narratives  not  only  by  marking  certain  events  as  significant  or  relevant  for  the  
purposes   of   our   story-­‐‑telling,   but   also   by   becoming   narrative   contents  
themselves.   This   idea   is   central   for   instance   to   the   “dialectical   constructivist  
model”   (Angus  and  Greenberg,  2011),  an  approach  which  emphasises,   from  a  
psychological  perspective,  the  existence  of  a  fundamental  relationship  between  
affectivity,  narrativity,  and  selfhood.  Cardinal   to   this  account   is   the  claim  that  
the  sense  of  self   is  constituted  through  the  construction  of  coherent  narratives  
the   bases   and   focus   of   which   are   essentially   affective.   According   to   this  
position,   self-­‐‑awareness   is   closely   intertwined  with   the   story-­‐‑telling   activities  
through  which  our  emotions  are  narrated,  an  idea  which  is  in  deep  consonance  
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with  some  of  the  claims  advanced  in  this  thesis.  In  addition,  as  I  will  discuss  in  
Chapter  4,  this  approach  recognises  that  narratives  shape  affective  experience  in  
various  ways  and  can  significantly  contribute  to  emotional  regulation.    
  
2.Empathic  Access  and  the  Continuity  of  the  Narrative  Self  
  
A   further,   distinct   aspect   of   the   relationship   between   affectivity   and  
autobiographical   narrativity   emerges   in   the   account   of   narrative   selfhood  
provided  by  Schechtman  (1996;  2001;  2007).  Schechtman  is  concerned  with  the  
problem   of   how   personal   identity   can   survive   change   and   she   considers   this  
issue   to   have   been   unsatisfactorily   dealt   with   by   both   the   advocates   of   the  
psychological  continuity  criterion  and  the  supporters  of  the  narrative  approach  
(2001).  On   the   one   hand,   Schechtman  disagrees  with   the   idea,   in   her   opinion  
central   to   psychological   continuity   theories,   that   change   does   not   undermine  
identity  if  it  takes  place  gradually.  On  the  other  hand,  she  rejects  the  view  put  
forward  by  narrative  accounts  according  to  which  psychological  change  is  not  a  
threat   to   personal   identity   as   long   as   it   can   be   incorporated   in   a   coherent  
autobiographical   narrative.   In   Schechtman’s   opinion,   the   ability   to   tell   an  
intelligible   story   about   how   one   has   changed   over   time   is   not   enough   to  
guarantee  that  personal  identity  is  preserved,  since,  as  she  remarks,  “there  can  
be   intelligible   stories   of   how   someone   loses   his   or   her   identity”   (2001:   100).  
Although   she   acknowledges   that   both   approaches   draw   attention   to   aspects  
which   are   relevant   to   the   understanding   of   how   identity   can   be   preserved  
through   change,   Schechtman   maintains   that   both   psychological   continuity  
theories  and  narrative  accounts  neglect  the  factor  which  is  fundamental  to  the  
resolution  of  this  problem,  namely  the  dynamics  that  she  identifies  through  the  
notion  of  “empathic  access”.    
    
In  order  to  illustrate  this  notion,  Schechtman  uses  the  example  of  a  “party-­‐‑girl”  
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who  is  “carefree”  and  “wild”  in  her  youth  and  who  later  radically  changes  her  
lifestyle  to  undertake  the  responsibilities  related  to  the  management  of  a  career  
and  family  (2001:  97).  In  this  case,  Schechtman  suggests,  the  mature  woman  can  
take  different  attitudes  towards  her  past.  On  the  one  hand,  it  is  possible  that  she  
feels  alienated  from  the  feelings  and  motivations  of  her  light-­‐‑hearted  days:  she  
remembers   those   days,   but   she   does   not   understand   how   she   could   find  
enjoyment  and   fulfilment   in  such  a  way  of   life.  On   the  other  hand,  she  might  
still  have  some  access  to  the  emotions  and  inclinations  of  those  days,  but  these  
are  now  experienced  from  a  broader  perspective  and  are  outweighed  by  other  
affects,  values,  and  commitments.  Schechtman  characterises   the   latter  scenario  
as  one   in  which  a   form  of  empathy   towards  one’s  past   is  maintained  and  she  
considers   this   form  of  connection  with  one’s  previous  experience  as  necessary  
for   the   preservation   of   personal   identity   through   change.   According   to   this  
perspective,  in  addition  to  the  ability  to  recollect  the  emotions  and  passions  that  
animated  her  young  years,  the  woman,  in  order  to  be  the  same  person  she  was  
when  she  was  young,  should  still  have  a  connection  with  that  time  of  her  life,  a  
connection   which   is   characterised   in   experiential   terms.   In   particular,  
Schechtman  suggests  that  there  must  be  some  access  to  the  “phenomenology”  
of  the  past  states  and  that  it  should  be  possible  for  these  states  to  play  a  role  in  
the  person’s  decision-­‐‑making  processes  in  the  present.  As  she  explains:  
  
The   relation   that   the  not-­‐‑so-­‐‑serious  matron  has   to  her  past   is  more   than   just  
cognitive   recollection;   the   passions   that   belonged   to   the   party   girl   are   still  
there.   She   experiences   them   and   they   are   represented   in   the   decisions   she  
makes.   It   is   for   this   reason   that   this   woman’s   change   seems   like   ordinary  
maturation   and   development   rather   than   loss   of   identity.   The   alterations   in  
lifestyle   and   outlook  may   be   just   as   pronounced   as   those   in   the   case   of   the  
serious  matron,  but  these  alterations  are  the  result  of  an  expansion  of  beliefs,  
values,  desires  and  goals  rather  than  a  replacement.  (2001:  102)    
  
The  notion  of  empathic  access  thus  requires  more  than  the  ability  to  remember  
one’s  past  mental  states.  Schechtman  rather  seems  to  suggest  that  empathy  for  
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one’s  states  entails  that  these  are  not  entirely  over,  that  they  are  somehow  still  
part   of   the   person’s   experience,   but   in   a   different   way   than   in   the   past.   As  
shown  by  the  quotation  above,  she  suggests  that,   in  order  for  empathic  access  
to   be   present,   the   person’s   “beliefs,   values,   desires   and   goals”   are   not   to   be  
replaced,   but   expanded.   But   what   exactly   is   meant   in   this   context   by  
“expansion”?   I   think   that   it   is  possible   to   interpret   this  notion  as   a   change  or  
broadening   of   one’s   priorities   as   a   result   of   which   some   of   the   person’s  
cognitive,  affective  and  volitional  states  become  less  central  or  influential  in  the  
person’s   life,   but   they   do   not   for   this   reason   disappear.   Getting   back   to   the  
example   previously   discussed,   this   would   amount   to   saying   that   the  mature  
woman   still   has   some   of   the   beliefs   or   emotions   that   she   experienced   in   her  
twenties   –   for   example   she   might   think   or   feel   that   after-­‐‑hour   parties   are  
exciting  and  enjoyable  –  but  she  now  also  has  other  beliefs  and  emotions  –  for  
instance  regarding  work  or  family  responsibilities  –  which  are  more  important  
than  her  previous  attitudes.  As  such,  it  seems  that  integral  to  empathic  access  is  
the  presence  of  a  degree  of  continuity  in  the  person’s  experience:  although  the  
role   and   relative   importance   of   some   of   the   individual’s   mental   states   can  
change,  even  radically,  over  time,  the  person  still  has  some  sort  of  experiential  
connection  with  them.    
  
How   can   Schechtman’s   account   of   empathic   access   further   enhance   our  
understanding  of  the  relationship  between  affectivity  and  narrativity?  I  believe  
that   this   account  points   towards   another   fundamental  way   in  which   affective  
experience  constitutively  shapes  narrativity,  namely  its  ability  to  confer  on  the  
narrative  self  a  degree  of  continuity.  Schechtman  emphasises   that   in  order   for  
personal  identity  to  survive  change,  it  is  not  enough  to  be  able  to  tell  a  coherent  
story  about  how  that  change  happened.  What  is  necessary  is  also  the  presence  
of   a   particular   form   of   experiential   connection  with   one’s   past  mental   states.  
According  to  Schechtman,  the  “beliefs,  values,  desires  and  goals”  to  which  we  
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have  this  sort  of  access  are  still  somehow  part  of  our  experience:  we  are  familiar  
with  their  phenomenology  and  they  play  a  role  in  our  mental  and  practical  life.  
In  Chapter  2  I  showed  that,  according  to  various  phenomenological  accounts  of  
affectivity,   emotions   are   cardinal   to   the   constitution   of   our   values   and   the  
motivation   of   our   behaviour   and,   as   such,   it   is   arguable   that   they   are   also  
fundamental  to  the  dynamics  constitutive  of  empathic  access.  Indeed,  in  order  
for   there   to  be  a   level  of   continuity   in   the  person’s   experience  and  evaluative  
outlook,  it  is  necessary  that  at  least  some  of  her  emotions  persist  over  time  and  
are   not   replaced   by   different   affective   states.   As   suggested   by   Schechtman’s  
account,  the  centrality  of  these  emotions  to  the  person’s  life  can  change,  but  at  
least  some  of  them  need  to  have  a  long-­‐‑term  character  if  empathic  access  to  the  
person’s  cognitive  and  in  particular  evaluative  states  is  to  be  maintained.    
  
The  idea  which  emerges  from  these  observations  is  not  that   it   is   impossible  to  
tell   stories  which   include  only  or  mostly   short-­‐‑term  affective   experiences,   but  
rather  that,  in  order  for  autobiographical  narratives  to  be  constitutive  of  a  self  it  
is   necessary   that   some   of   the   emotions   included   in   them   have   a   long-­‐‑lasting  
nature.  However,   the   intuition   can   be   pushed   a   bit   further   to   suggest   that   if  
one’s  affective  life  radically  lacked  experiential  continuity,  that  is  if  it  amounted  
merely  to  a  series  of  transitory  affects,  also  the  ability  to  construct  life-­‐‑narratives  
would   be   disrupted.   I   will   provide   further   support   to   this   idea   through   the  
analysis  of  some  aspects  of  borderline  personality  disorder  in  Chapter  6.    
  
3.The  Authenticity  of  Autobiographical  Narratives  
  
So   far   I   have   focused   on   various   dynamics   through   which   emotions   shape  
autobiographical  story-­‐‑telling.  The  insights  I  discussed  and  developed  support  
the   idea   that   the  narrative  self   is  constituted  through  a  variety  of  processes   to  
which   affective   experience   is   fundamental.   However,   although   affectivity   is  
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constitutive  of  autobiographical  narrativity  in  various  ways,  it  is  not  always  the  
case   that   the   stories  we   craft   are   fully   reflective   of   our   emotions.  We   can   be  
inaccurate  or  mistaken  in  describing  our  feelings  and  I  wish  to  maintain  that  the  
presence  of  an  alignment  or  misalignment  between  the  affects  we  live  and  the  
affects  we  narrate   gives   rise   to  distinct   experiences.   In  particular,   I  will   claim  
that   the   sense   we   have   of   certain   narratives   as   being   more   or   less   authentic  
depends  on  their  congruence  with  our  affective  states.  
  
The  notion  of  authenticity  is  often  related  to  that  of  selfhood.  However,  the  way  
in  which  this  relationship  is  characterised  depends  on  the  particular  concept  of  
self   that   is   adopted.   For   example,   as   highlighted   by   Guignon   (2006)   in   his  
account  of  the  emergence  and  evolution  of  the  notion  of  authenticity  in  Western  
culture,  if  the  self  is  conceived  as  something  of  which  it  is  possible  to  have  some  
form  of  introspective  awareness,  authenticity  can  be  characterised  as  the  ability  
to  live  in  a  way  that  is  consonant  with  the  features  of  that  inner  self.  From  this  
perspective,   being   authentic   might   involve   engaging   in   a   process   of   self-­‐‑
discovery   that   requires   the   ability   to   distance   oneself   from   the   conventions  
imposed   by   society36   and   authenticity   can   ultimately   be   characterised   as   the  
ability  to  be  faithful  to  what  one  really  is.    
  
As  observed  by  Guignon,  authenticity  must  be  conceived  in  a  different  way  by  
narrative   accounts   of   selfhood.   As   highlighted   in   Chapter   1,   according   to  
various  approaches  within  this  framework,  selfhood  is  the  result  of  a  variety  of  
story-­‐‑telling  processes   in  which  the   individual  and  others  engage  and  there   is  
no  self  prior  to  the  development  of  autobiographical  narrativity.  It  might  seem  
that  in  this  context  the  notion  of  authenticity  is  no  longer  relevant,  as  there  is  no  
“true   self”   to  which   the   stories   need   to   conform,   that   is   no   form   of   selfhood  
                                                   
36 As   highlighted   by   Guignon   (2006),   this   is   the   case,   for   example,   for   the   idea   of  
authenticity  that  emerges  with  Romanticism.    
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which   precedes   the   emergence   of   the   narrative   one.   Guignon,   however,  
suggests   that  authenticity  can  play  a  role  also   in   the  approaches   that  consider  
selfhood  as  essentially  dependent  on  autobiographical  narrativity.  Drawing  on  
the  work  of  Nietzsche,  he  maintains  that  a  narrative  approach  can  account  for  
the  notion  of  authenticity  by  connecting  it  to  the  idea  that  one’s  life  story  should  
be  given  a  particular   form.  According   to   such  a  position,   authentic  narratives  
would  be  the  ones  which  possess  a  certain  structure,  for  example  those  which  
provide   a   coherent   and   unitary   depiction   of   the   subject’s   features   and  
experiences.  Authenticity  would  then  be  a  matter  of  shaping  one’s  life  stories  in  
accordance  with   “such   aesthetic   ideals   as   coherence,   unity,   cohesiveness   and  
style”  (Guignon,  2006:  133).    
  
According  to  Guignon,  narrative  accounts  of  selfhood  can  explain  authenticity  
also   in   other   ways.   In   particular,   in   his   opinion,   this   is   possible   for   the  
approaches  which  consider  the  identification  with  particular  ideals,  values  and  
commitments   as   an   essential   aspect   of   autobiographical   story-­‐‑telling.   As  
highlighted   in   Chapter   1,   accounts   such   as   the   one   put   forward   by   Ricoeur  
(1994)   conceive   of   evaluative   position-­‐‑taking   as   cardinal   to   narrative   self-­‐‑
understanding.  According  to  these  positions,  in  order  to  be  a  self  it  is  necessary  
to   be   able   to   take   a   stance   in   regard   to   the   person   one   wants   to   be   and  
narrativity   plays   a   fundamental   role   in   this   process.   Guignon   suggests   that  
these  approaches  can  identify  authenticity  with  the  ability  to  be  faithful  to  and  
act  in  accordance  with  the  self-­‐‑conception  that  one  has  endorsed.  In  his  words:  
  
To  be  authentic,  on  this  account,  is  to  take  a  wholehearted  stand  on  what  is  of  
crucial   importance   for   you,   to   understand   yourself   as   defined   by   the  
unconditional   commitments   you   undertake,   and,   as   much   as   possible,   to  
steadfastly  express  those  commitments  in  your  actions  throughout  the  course  
of  your  life.  (2006:  138)  
  
Although  he  recognises   that  narrative  accounts  of  selfhood  can  make  sense  of  
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authenticity   in   the   ways   here   illustrated,   Guignon   suggests   that   in   so   doing  
these  accounts  cannot  do   justice  to  one  of  the  main  ideas  originally  associated  
with  the  notion.  Being  authentic,  he  observes,  was   initially  thought  to  depend  
on   the  possibility   to  access  a  part  of  oneself  which  would  provide   the  person  
with  guidance  as  to  how  she  should  live.  However,  if  there  is  no  ‘real’  or  ‘true’  
self  that  we  can  get  in  touch  with  and  the  self  is  just  a  narrative  construction,  it  
is  no  longer  possible  to  discover  within  ourselves  the  way  in  which  “we  ought  
to   live”   (2006:   140).   Therefore,   according   to   Guignon,   if   the   self   is   just   the  
product   of   autobiographical   narrativity,   there   are   no   criteria,   except   for   the  
aesthetic  ones  previously  mentioned,  to  guide  our  story-­‐‑telling.  As  such,  we  can  
craft  a  plurality  of  different,  but  equally  acceptable  stories  about  ourselves  and  
which  one  we  choose  to  tell  is,  to  a  certain  extent,  arbitrary:  
  
The  narrativist  conception  of  authentic  existence  we  have  been  exploring  can  
leave  us  with  a  sense  of  the  absolute  contingency  of  all  life  stories.  For  if  any  
story   can   be   mine,   then   no   story   is   really   mine.   When   we   recognize   the  
multiplicity  of  stories  we  can  tell  and  the  ultimate  arbitrariness  of  every  choice  
of  storyline,  we  can  begin  to  sense  the  utter  groundlessness  of  any  attempt  at  
self-­‐‑formation.  (2006:  143)  
  
I   agree  with  Guignon   that   the   adoption  of   a  narrative   conception  of   selfhood  
can   lead   to   a  weakening   of   the   notion   of   authenticity   and   fail   to   provide   the  
individual   with   criteria   that   would   motivate   the   choice   of   a   life   story   over  
another.  However,  this  is  not  a  necessary  consequence  of  adopting  a  narrative  
view   of   the   self   and   Guignon’s   reading   relies   on   an   understanding   of  
authenticity   that   does   not   take   into   consideration   an   important   aspect   of   its  
phenomenology.  
  
As   far  as  narrative  self-­‐‑understanding   is   concerned,   the  notion  of  authenticity  
can  be  given  also  an  experiential  connotation.  Some  of  the  stories  we  tell  about  
ourselves   are   experienced   as   being   authentic   or   more   or   less   authentic   than  
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others,   but   this   does   not   seem   to   be   dependent   upon   the   stories’   formal  
characteristics   such   as   coherence.   Indeed,   equally   coherent   narratives   can  
significantly  differ  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  sense  of  authenticity  associated  
with  them.    
  
The  phenomenological   account   of   selfhood  on  which   I   focus   in   this  work,   by  
arguing   in   favour   of   the   existence   not   only   of   a   narrative,   but   also   of   an  
experiential   or   minimal   self,   provides   an   alternative   framework   for   the  
explanation  of  why  some  life  stories  are  accompanied  by  a  sense  of  authenticity  
while  others  are  not.  More  specifically,  it  is  arguable  that  authenticity  depends  
on   the   existence   of   a   specific   relationship   between   the   narrative   and  minimal  
self  and  I  wish  to  claim  that  affectivity  is  crucially  involved  in  such  relationship.    
  
In  order   to   clarify   this   idea,   I  will   start  by  considering  some  observations  put  
forward  by  Rosfort  and  Stanghellini  (2009)  in  their  analysis  of  the  relationship  
between  affectivity   and  personhood.  Key   to   the   issue   I  want   to  discuss   is   the  
distinction   they   make   between   experiencing   an   emotion   at   the   pre-­‐‑reflective  
level  and  reflecting  on  one’s  affective  experience.  As  mentioned   in  Chapter  1,  
Rosfort   and   Stanghellini   emphasise   that   characteristic   of   personhood   is   the  
ability  to  take  an  evaluative  position  in  regard  to  one’s  own  experience  and  to  
endorse   certain   features   as   part   of   one’s   personal   identity.  As   this   is   the   case  
also  in  the  domain  of  affectivity,  Rosfort  and  Stanghellini  draw  attention  to  the  
fact  that  while  all  emotions  are  experienced  pre-­‐‑reflectively  as  belonging  to  the  
self,  not  all  of  them  are  actively  endorsed  as  aspects  of  the  kind  of  person  one  
wants  to  be.  In  their  words:  
  
Feeling  that  it  is  indeed  me  who  is  now  having  an  emotion  while  performing  a  
certain   action   is   not   at   all   the   same   as   acknowledging   that   action   or   this  
particular   emotion   is   an   essential   part   of   my   identity   (as   one   of   my  
characteristics).   […]   There   are   feelings   that   are   egodystonic,   as   in   the   case   of  
phobias,   that   is,   they  are  prereflectively   felt   as  one’s  own  by   the  person   (the  
 
117 
sense   of   ownership   is   there),   but   reflectively   they   are   not   acknowledged   as  
part  of  one’s  personal  identity.  (2009:  253)  
  
For  the  purpose  of  the  present  chapter,  what  is  of  particular  interest  in  Rosfort  
and   Stanghellini’s   position   is   the   suggestion   they   make   that   there   can   be   a  
discrepancy   between   emotions   as   they   are   experienced   at   the   pre-­‐‑reflective  
level   and   the   way   they   are   dealt   with   at   the   narrative   level.   Rosfort   and  
Stanghellini  are  interested  in  particular  in  a  specific  form  of  activity  performed  
by   the   narrative   self,   namely   the   endorsement   of   some   affective   states   as  
integral   to   one’s   personality.   In   this   context,   as   shown   by   the   passage   above,  
emotions  that  are  experienced  but  are  not  reflectively  endorsed  are  defined  as  
“egodystonic”.    
  
I   agree   with   Rosfort   and   Stanghellini   that   one   of   the   characteristics   of   the  
narrative  self  is  the  ability  to  engage  in  evaluative  position-­‐‑taking  and  that  the  
consideration   of   these   dynamics   with   regards   specifically   to   affectivity   is   of  
particular  interest.  However,  I  believe  that  it  is  possible  to  extend  the  notion  of  
“egodystonic”  emotions  in  order  to  take  into  account  other  forms  of  dissonance  
between  affective  states  at  the  pre-­‐‑reflective  and  narrative  level.  While  the  kind  
of  narrative  endorsement  described  earlier  is  certainly  one  of  the  actions  which  
can   be   performed   through   the   construction   of   one’s   life-­‐‑story,   not   every  
instance   of   autobiographical   story-­‐‑telling   involves   it.   In   other   terms,   it   is  
possible   to   tell   stories   about   our   emotions  without   taking   any   position   as   to  
whether  they  are  the  emotions  of  the  person  we  want  to  be.  For  example,  in  a  
number   of   circumstances   we   might   simply   be   interested   in   reporting   or  
describing  the  emotions  we  experience  without  taking  any  stance  as  to  whether  
they  are  emotions  that  we  would  like  to  undergo.  Also  in  these  cases  however,  
there  might  be  a  lack  of  correspondence  between  the  experienced  emotions  and  
the  emotions  that  we  narrate,  as  we  can,  for  instance,  misdescribe  our  feelings  




It   is   arguable   that   there   is   a   phenomenological   difference   between   life-­‐‑stories  
which   contain   emotions   that   are   egodystonic   in   one   of   the   two   senses  
highlighted  here   and   life-­‐‑stories   that   are   fully   or   for   the  most   part   congruent  
with  the  experienced  affects.  If  the  emotions  we  feel  are  generally  different  from  
or   in  conflict  with   the  emotions   that  we  associate  with   the  person  we  want   to  
be,  our   life  narratives  are   likely   to  be  experienced  as   inauthentic.  An  example  
can  be  helpful  to  clarify  this  point.  I  consider  arts  and  culture  to  play  a  central  
role  in  my  life  and  in  the  definition  of  my  personality.  I  conceive  of  every  form  
of   artistic   and   cultural   expression  as  highly  valuable  and   I   approve  of  myself  
experiencing  emotions  associated  with  the  appreciation  of  works  of  art,  music,  
literature  and  other   forms  of  creative  activity.  These  are  aspects  of   the  way   in  
which  I  think  of  myself  and  describe  myself  to  others,  they  are,  in  other  terms,  
integral   features   of   my   narrative   self-­‐‑conception.   In   order   to   illustrate   the  
impact  of  affective  experience  on  the  phenomenology  of  autobiographical  story-­‐‑
telling,  let’s  now  compare  two  possible  situations.  In  the  first  one,  the  emotions  
I  experience  are  most  of   the  time  congruent  with  the  emotions  of   the  person  I  
conceive  myself  to  be.  For  instance,  I  almost  always  feel  interested  and  excited  
when   I   hear   that   a   good   art   exhibition   or   musical   performance   has   been  
organised  in  the  town  where  I  live  and  I  deeply  enjoy  attending  these  events.  In  
the   other   scenario,   on   the   contrary,   I   rarely   experience   emotions   that   are  
consonant   with   my   narrative   self-­‐‑understanding.37   The   idea   of   attending  
cultural   and   artistic   events   leaves  me   rather   indifferent   and  when   I   have   the  
chance  to  spend  some  time  reading  literary  works  or  learning  about  fine  arts  I  
do  not  really  feel  enthusiastic  or  curious.  Arguably,  the  autobiographical  story-­‐‑
telling  through  which  I  conceive  of  myself  as  someone  who  cares  about  arts  and  
                                                   
37 In  this  scenario,  it  is  not  the  case  that  I  am  deliberately  lying  and  describing  myself  
as  a  different  person  than  I  really  am.  I  believe  that  if  I  was  voluntarily  being  deceitful,  
the   phenomenology   of   autobiographical   story-­‐‑telling  would   differ   from   the   one   that  
characterises  the  two  case  scenarios  I  am  discussing.  
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culture  would  have  a  very  different  phenomenology  in  the  two  case  scenarios.  
When   there   is   a   correspondence   between   the   emotions   I   experience   and   the  
affectivity  of   the  person   I   conceive  myself   to  be,   the   stories   I   craft   feel   true   to  
myself,   they   feel   authentic.   On   the   contrary,   when   I   do   not   experience   the  
emotions  that  the  person  I  think  I  am  should  experience,  the  narratives  through  
which   those   aspects   of  myself   are   conceived   feel   different,   they   do   not   seem  
quite  right  or,  in  other  terms,  I  have  a  sense  that  they  are  not  authentic.38  
  
The   example   considered   so   far   regards   only   one   of   the   two   senses   in   which  
emotions   can   be   egodystonic,   namely   the   one   identified   by   Rosfort   and  
Stanghellini.   As   I   previously   argued,   although   evaluative   position-­‐‑taking   is  
central  to  the  narrative  self,  we  do  not  take  a  stance  in  regard  to  every  aspect  of  
our  affective  experience:  not  all  our  emotions  are  either  rejected  or  endorsed  as  
features  of   the  person  we  want   to  be.  However,   I   suggested   that  also   in  cases  
that   do   not   involve   this   particular   form   of   narrative   activity   there   can   be   a  
discrepancy   between   affective   experience   and   the   experience   that   is   narrated.  
For   instance,   we   might   have   experienced   a   certain   emotion   on   a   particular  
occasion,   but  when   narrating   that   event  we  do   not  make   any   reference   to   its  
affective  aspects,  or  we  can  describe   it  as   involving  an  emotion  different   from  
the  one  that  we  experienced.  The  phenomenology  of  our  self-­‐‑narratives  would  
not  be  impacted  by  isolated  episodes  of  this  kind.  However,  if  the  misalignment  
between   the   experienced   and   narrated   emotions   is   widespread,   that   is   if  
extensive  parts  of  our  affective  experience  are  not  included  in  our  life  stories  or  
                                                   
38   The   role   played   by   affectivity   in   signalling   that   a   particular   autobiographical  
narrative   is   not   reflective   of   our   experience   is   recognised   also   by   Rosfort   and  
Stanghellini.   In  their  words:  “I  can  tell  a  wrong  story  about  myself  and  therefore   live  
according   to   this   story,   but   my   mood   (and   its   expression   in   certain   affects)   may  




are   misdescribed,   the   sense   of   authenticity   associated   with   the   stories  
themselves  would  be  weakened.39    
  
4.Existential  Feelings  and  Narrative  Repertoire  
  
In  Chapter  2  I   illustrated  how,  on  phenomenological  grounds,   it   is  possible   to  
distinguish  between  different  kinds  of  affective  experience.  I  discussed  various  
accounts  which  argue  in  favour  of  the  existence  not  only  of  intentional  feelings,  
but  also  of  particular  kinds  of  non-­‐‑intentional,  background  affective  states  and  I  
focused   in   particular   on   Ratcliffe’s   notion   of   existential   feelings   (2005;   2008).  
These  are  conceived  as  bodily  feelings  which  are  not  directed  to  specific  objects,  
people   or   states   of   affairs   and  ground  our   sense   of   being   situated   in   a  world  
which  is  significant  in  particular  ways  and  harbours  certain  possibilities.    
  
Ratcliffe   (forthcoming)   maintains   that   our   ability   to   engage   in   narrative  
activities  presupposes  existential  feelings  and  suggests  that  these  can  influence  
both   the   form   and   contents   of   the   stories   we   craft.   More   specifically,  
considering   certain   aspects   of   the   affective   experience   characteristic   of  
depression,   he  draws   attention   to  how   the   sense  of  possibilities   implicated   in  
existential  feelings  impacts  on  the  way  in  which  the  narrative  is  structured.  In  
his   opinion,   typical   of   depression   is   the   experienced   loss   of   certain   kinds   of  
possibilities  and,  in  particular,  the  sense  that  things  could  never  be  different.  As  
a   result   of   this,   he   suggests,   the   depressed   person   is   unable   to   conceive   of  
alternative  self-­‐‑interpretations  and  her  autobiographical  stories  lack  “narrative  
                                                   
39 There   are   various   dynamics  which   could   be   responsible   for   the  weakening   of   the  
sense  of  authenticity  in  these  cases.  Most  importantly,  it  is  arguable  that,  given  the  role  
played  by   emotions   in   our   cognitive   and  practical   life,   if   autobiographical   narratives  
extensively  failed  to  adequately  portray  our  affective  experience,  also  their  explanatory  
power  and  coherence  would  be  diminished.  Narratives   that  are  not  aligned  with  our  
affective  dynamics  would  be  less  effective  in  making  sense  of  our  beliefs,  decisions  and  
actions  and  would  more  likely  be  inconsistent  with  the  other  stories  that  we  and  others  
tell  about  ourselves.    
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openness”.  In  addition,  on  the  basis  of  an  examination  of  first-­‐‑person  accounts  
of   grief,   Ratcliffe   maintains   that   certain   alterations   of   existential   feelings   -­‐‑  
involving   for   example   disruptions   of   the   way   in   which   temporality   is  
experienced   -­‐‑   can   even   make   it   impossible   to   engage   in   the   construction   of  
autobiographical  narratives.  
  
Further   elaborating   on   Ratcliffe’s   observations,   it   is   possible   to   suggest   that  
existential   feelings   play   a   distinct   role   in   the   constitution   of   autobiographical  
narrativity   and   this   depends   on   their   “pre-­‐‑intentional”   character   (Ratcliffe,  
2010),  namely  the  fact  that  they  determine  the  kinds  of  intentional  states  that  it  
is  possible  for  us  to  experience.  At  a  very  general  level,  this  idea  can  be  fleshed  
out   by   observing   that   depending   on  what   cognitive,   affective,   and   volitional  
states   existential   feelings   allow   us   to   undergo,   the   stories   we   craft   will   have  
different   contents   and   different   structures.   However,   as   I   will   show   in   the  
following,   when   the   pre-­‐‑intentionality   of   existential   feelings   is   taken   into  
account  also  a  stronger  claim  can  be  made,  namely  that  these  feelings  determine  
the   range   of   stories   that   we   have   the   ability   to   conceive,   thus   fundamentally  
shaping  our  narrative  repertoire.      
  
There  are  various  ways  in  which  existential  feelings  can  exert  such  an  influence  
on   narrativity   and   one   of   these   becomes   apparent   when   taking   into  
consideration  the  way  in  which  we  attribute  agentive  abilities  to  characters  and  
external   forces   and   events   in   our   life   stories.  An   important   part   of   our   story-­‐‑
telling  consists   indeed   in  explaining  events  by  making  causal  attributions  and  
in  many  cases  central  to  these  explanations  is  the  recognition  that  someone  has  
performed  a  certain  action  or  originated  a  particular  state  of  affairs.  Agency  and  
narrativity   are   thus   closely   connected   and   I  want   to   suggest   that   the  way   in  
which  we  conceive  of  actions  and  the  ability  to  act  in  our  life  stories  is  deeply  




It   is   arguable   that   some   of   the   background   orientations   that   shape   our  
experience  are  related  to  what   I  shall   term  a  “sense  of  effectiveness”,   that   is  a  
sense  of  oneself  as  more  or  less  capable  of  affecting  the  external  world  through  
one’s  actions,  a  sense  of  being  able  to  bring  about  effects  and  influence  events.  
This   sense   of   effectiveness   comes   in   degrees   and   its   two   extremes   can   be  
characterised,  on  the  one  hand,  as  the  feeling  of  not  having  any  possibility  at  all  
to   have   an   impact   on   the   external   world   and,   on   the   other,   as   the   sense   of  
possessing  unlimited  power  to  influence  the  course  of  events.40    
  
Can  the  sense  of  effectiveness  be  identified  with  the  sense  of  agency?  I  believe  
that   this   is  not   the   case.  As  discussed   in  Chapter  1,   from  a  phenomenological  
perspective   the   sense   of   agency   is   characterised   as   the   sense   of   being   the  
initiator   or   source   of   one’s   own   actions   and   this   experiential   structure   is  
attributed   a   pre-­‐‑reflective   character.   According   to   the   phenomenological  
account,  the  sense  of  agency  is  something  that  is  experienced  upon  performing  
a   particular   action,   while   the   sense   of   effectiveness   can   be   experienced  
independently   of   whether   one   is   acting   or   not.   While   the   former   can   be  
characterised  as  the  feeling  of  being  the  author  of  one’s  own  actions,  the  latter  is  
best   conceived   as   an   experiential   sense   of   our   capacity   to   reach   or   of   having  
reached   our   desired   outcomes   and,   as   such,   it   can   be   suggested   that   it   is  
presupposed  by  our  ability  to  engage  in  purposeful  action.    
  
The  notion  of  sense  of  effectiveness   is  more  akin  to  what  Slaby  calls  “sense  of  
ability”   (2012).  This   is   a  bodily   feeling  “of  one’s   capacity   to   act  or   to   come   to  
grips  and  cope  with  what  affects  one”,  an  “embodied  sense  of  capability”,  that  
grounds  and  orientates  our  interactions  with  the  world  (2012:  152).  The  sense  of  
                                                   
40 Arguably  these  extremes  are  only  experienced  in  psychopathological  conditions  and  
our  everyday  predicament  is  somewhere  in-­‐‑between  the  two. 
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ability  is  thus  conceived  by  Slaby  as  possessing  both  a  bodily  character  and  the  
power  to  structure  our  experience  of  the  world  and,  as  such,  is  considered  to  be  
related  to  the  notion  of  existential  feelings.  In  his  words:  
  
the   conception   of   existential   feelings   resonates   well   with   the   basic   idea  
developed  here:  A  person’s  felt  relatedness  to  the  world  is  nothing  other  than  
the   fundamental   sense  of   ability   at   the  base  of  his   or  her  perspective  on   the  
world  -­‐‑  a     sense  of  ability  that   is  at  any  time  bound  up  with  aspects  of  one’s  
concrete  situation.  This  embodied,  modifiable  sense  of  “I  can”  and  “I  cannot”  
shapes  the  way  the  world,  others,  and  oneself  are  apprehended.  (2012:  153)  
  
I  believe  that  the  sense  of  effectiveness  significantly  influences  the  way  in  which  
we   characterise   ourselves   and   others   as   agents   in   our   stories.   If   we   feel  
powerless  and  unable  to  have  an  impact  on  the  outside  world  or  we  don’t  have  
any   felt   sense  of  having  had   such  an   impact,  we  will   be  more   inclined   to   tell  
stories  in  which  we  exhibit  only  a  limited  degree  of  agency  and  rather  suffer  the  
consequences  of  the  actions  of  others  or  external  forces  and  events.  On  the  other  
hand,  a  strong  sense  of  effectiveness  will  motivate  narratives  in  which  central  to  
the  characterisation  of  the  self  is  its  being  the  initiator  of  actions  and  these  will  
be  depicted  as  one  of  the  key  drivers  of  the  plot.    
  
Another   aspect   of   the   role   played   by   existential   feelings   in   influencing   our  
narrative   repertoire   has   to   do   with   the   impact   they   have   on   our   evaluative  
perspective.   I   illustrated   in   Chapter   2   how   central   to   a   phenomenological   as  
well   as   other   theories   of   affects   is   the   idea   that   emotions   are   intentional  
evaluative   feelings,   that   is   feelings   through   which   we   come   to   experience   a  
plurality   of   value   properties.   The   connection   between   affectivity   and   the  
evaluative   dimension,   however,   is   not   limited   to   affective   states   that   have   an  
intentional  character.  As  previously  mentioned,  Slaby  and  Stephan  (2008)  have  
argued   that   evaluations   can   be   considered   to   be   integral   also   to   existential  
feelings.  While  in  the  case  of  emotions  the  appraisals  are  directed  to  particular  
things,  people,  or  states  of  affairs,  it  is  claimed  that  what  is  appraised  through  
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existential   feelings   is,   more   generally,   one’s   relationship   with   the   world.   For  
example,   central   to   an   existential   feeling   of   fear   is   an   assessment   of   one’s  
situation  as  entailing  the  possibility  of  being  damaged  or  harmed  in  some  way.  
However,   it   is   arguable   that,   due   to   their   pre-­‐‑intentional   character   (Ratcliffe,  
2010),   these   background   orientations   not   only   include   an   evaluation   of   one’s  
standing  in  the  world,  but  they  also  constrain  the  kinds  of  evaluative  states  that  
one   is  capable  of  entertaining.  When   fear  acquires  an  existential  character,   for  
example,   it   becomes   very   difficult   for   the   individual   to   appraise   particular  
circumstances   as   safe   or   other   people   as   trustworthy.   From   this   perspective,  
existential   feelings   can   be   considered   to   impact   on   autobiographical   story-­‐‑
telling  also  by  way  of  their  determining  the  range  of  evaluations  that  the  person  
can  make.  In  this  regard,  the  evaluative  judgements  which  appear  in  one’s  life-­‐‑
stories  are  rooted  in  affectivity  in  two  senses.  On  the  one  hand,  they  might  be  
motivated   by   the   experience   of   particular   emotions,   as   it   is   the   case,   for  
instance,  when  I  judge  a  dog  to  be  dangerous  on  the  basis  of  the  fear  its  violent  
barking   has   triggered.   On   the   other,   these   evaluations   can   only   be   made  
because   I   already   find  myself   in   a  world  where   feeling   fearful   is   a  possibility  
and   such   a   possibility   depends   on   the   presence   of   a   particular   background  
orientation.  
  
In  order   to  best  understand   the   influence   that  existential   feelings  can  have  on  
narrative  self-­‐‑understanding,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  evaluations  which  
are  integral  to  them  can  also  have  a  focus  on  the  self.  As  I  will  show  through  the  
analysis   of   some   forms   of   psychopathological   experience   in  Chapter   5   and   6,  
self-­‐‑evaluative   emotions   such   as   guilt   and   shame   can   sometimes   lose   their  
directionality   and   become   pervasive,   all-­‐‑encompassing   orientations   that  
globally  structure  one’s  standing  in  the  world.  When  this  happens,   it  becomes  
difficult   for   the  person  to  entertain  cognitive  and  affective  states   incompatible  
with   the   evaluations   integral   to   the   existential   feeling.   For   example,   an  
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existential   feeling   of   shame,   intrinsic   to   which   is   an   appraisal   of   the   self   as  
inadequate  or  unable  to  live  up  to  certain  standards,  would  negatively  affect  the  
individual’s   ability   to   feel   pride   and   to   think   of   himself   as   someone   who   is  
capable   of   accomplishing   something   of   value.   Because   of   this   feature,   self-­‐‑
evaluative  existential  feelings  can  affect  autobiographical  narrativity  in  various  
ways.  In  the  first  place,  they  can  impact  on  the  contents  the  subject  chooses  to  
narrate.   It   is   arguable   that   someone  whose   background   affective   orientations  
involve  negative  self-­‐‑evaluations  will  be  more  inclined  to  tell  stories  of  failure  
rather  than  stories  of  success  or  to  interpret  the  narrated  events  in  these  terms.  
Conversely,   someone  whose   background  mood   is   one   of   pride,  will   be  more  
likely   to   narrate   achievements   rather   than   defeats.   Secondly,   self-­‐‑evaluative  
existential  feelings  have  an  impact  on  the  causal  attributions  through  which  the  
person  explains   the  events   in   the   stories.  For   instance,  as   I  will   show   in  more  
detail  in  Chapter  5  with  regard  to  the  experience  of  depressed  patients,  people  
who   experience   existential   forms   of   guilt   tend   to   account   for   bad   events   by  




In  this  chapter  I  examined  various  ways  in  which  affectivity  is  involved  in  the  
constitution   of   narratives   and,   in   particular,   of   autobiographical   narratives.   I  
started  with  an  exploration  of  the  role  played  by  affective  experience  in  shaping  
the   form   and   contents   of   the   stories   we   craft.   Drawing   on   Hogan’s   account  
(2011),   I   started   by   suggesting   that   emotions   are   central   to   the   dynamics  
through   which   both   literary   and   autobiographical   narratives   are   temporally  
structured   and   revolve   around   specific   themes.   With   regards   to   narrative  
content,   following  Hardcastle   (2003;   2008),   I   also   suggested   that,   due   to   their  
evaluative   character,   emotions   allow   us   to   select   the   events   and   experiences  
which  are  to  be  included  in  our  life  stories.  In  addition,  I  maintained  that   it   is  
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because  of   the   connection  which   exists   between   affective   experience   and   self-­‐‑
awareness   that   we   engage   in   story-­‐‑telling   activities   that   have   a   specific  
autobiographical  character.  
  
Drawing  on  Schechtman’s  notion  of  empathic  access   (1996;  2001;  2007),   I   then  
suggested   that   emotions   are   key   to   guarantee   the   continuity   of   the   narrative  
self.   Schechtman   challenges   the   way   in   which   personal   identity   has   been  
accounted   for   by   other   narrative   approaches,   claiming   that   in   order   for  
someone’s   identity   to   be   preserved   through   change,   it   is   not   enough   for   the  
person  to  be  able  to  tell  a  coherent  story  about  her  life.  What  is  necessary,  in  her  
opinion,  is  also  that  the  individual  can  still  experience  some  of  her  past  “beliefs,  
values,  desires  and  goals”  (2001:  102)  and  that  these  play  a  role  in  her  decision  
making  processes.  Given   the   centrality  of   affectivity   to   the   constitution  of   the  
person’s  evaluative  perspective  and  its  motivational  character,  I  suggested  that  
it   is   particularly   important   for   the   individual   to   retain   empathic   access   to   his  
past  emotions  and,  as  such,  that  a  degree  of  continuity  in  the  person’s  affective  
experience  is  fundamental  to  the  continuity  of  the  narrative  self.    
  
I  then  moved  to  consider  the  relationship  between  affective  experience  and  the  
sense  of  authenticity  associated  with  some  of  our  narratives.  I  claimed  that  our  
life  stories  can  be  experienced  as  being  more  or  less  authentic  and  I  suggested  
that   this  depends  on   the  degree  of  correspondence  between  the  emotions   that  
are   felt   and   the   emotions   that   are   narrated.   More   specifically,   further  
elaborating   on   the   conception   of   “egodystonic”   emotions   put   forward   by  
Rosfort  and  Stanghellini  (2009),  I  drew  attention  to  the  existence  of  two  possible  
forms  of  misalignment  between  emotions  at  the  experiential  and  narrative  level.  
On  the  one  hand,   the  emotions  we  experience  might  differ   from  the  emotions  
that  have  been  endorsed   through  evaluative  position   taking  as   features  of   the  
person   we   conceive   ourselves   to   be.   On   the   other,   there   can   be   a   lack   of  
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correspondence  between  narrative  self-­‐‑understanding  and  affective  experience  
when  we   do   not   include   in   our   stories   the   emotional   aspects   of   the   narrated  
events   or   we   misdescribe   them.   On   this   basis,   I   argued   that   stories   which  
extensively  omit,  misidentify  or  are  in  contrast  with  the  person’s  affective  states  
are  more  likely  to  be  experienced  as  inauthentic.    
  
Finally,  I  claimed  that  existential  feelings  play  a  distinct  role  in  the  emergence  
and   development   of   autobiographical   narratives.   As   illustrated   in   Chapter   2,  
Ratcliffe   argues   that   existential   feelings   have   a   “pre-­‐‑intentional”   character  
(2010),  namely  they  determine  which  kinds  of  intentional  states  it  is  possible  for  
us  to  entertain.  I  argued  that  because  of  this  feature  existential  feelings  have  a  
fundamental   influence   on   the   constitution   of   our   life   stories,   determining   the  
range   of   narratives   that   we   have   the   capacity   to   produce.   In   particular,   I  
suggested  that  the  way  in  which  we  attribute  agentive  abilities  to  the  characters  
in   our   stories   depends   on   the   felt   sense  we   have   of   our   capacity   to   have   an  
impact   on   the   external  world   through   our   own   actions.   I   suggested   that   this  
“sense   of   effectiveness”   is   different   from   what   Gallagher   and   Zahavi    
(Gallagher,   2000;   Gallagher   and   Zahavi,   2008)   designate   with   the   notion   of  
“sense  of  agency”  and  is  rather  akin  to  Slaby’s  “sense  of  ability”  (2012),  namely  
a   particular   bodily   feeling   which   is   considered   to   play   an   existential   role   in  
shaping   our   relationship  with   the  world.   I   then   claimed   that   another  way   in  
which  existential   feelings  shape  our  narrative  repertoire   is  by  determining  the  
sets   of   evaluative   states   that   we   can   entertain.   As   discussed   in   Chapter   1,  
evaluations   are   integral   not   only   to   emotions,   but   also   to   existential   feelings  
(Slaby  and  Stephan,  2008).  As  such,  when  one  of  these  feelings  is  experienced,  it  
is  very  difficult  for  the  subject  to  entertain  evaluative  states  that  are  in  conflict  
with  the  appraisal  intrinsic  to  it  and  thus  the  way  in  which  we  evaluate  people,  
events,  and  states  of  affairs  in  our  autobiographical  narratives  is  fundamentally  




By   identifying  various  mechanisms  through  which  affectivity  shapes   the   form  
and   contents   of   life   narratives,   in   this   chapter   I   have   started   to   clarify   some  
aspects   of   the   relationship   between   minimal   and   narrative   self.   More  
specifically,   by  drawing   attention   to   the   fact   that   affective   experience  moulds  
autobiographical   narrativity   in  multiple  ways,   I   showed   that   the   structure   of  
narrative  self-­‐‑understanding  is  heavily  dependent  upon  pre-­‐‑reflective  forms  of  
self-­‐‑experience  and  that  affectivity  plays  a  central  role  in  the  dynamics  through  
which  a  narrative  self  emerges  from  a  minimal  self.  In  Chapter  4  I  will  continue  
my   exploration   of   the   relationship   between   affectivity   and   narrativity   by  
examining   how   the   former   is   impacted   upon   by   the   emergence   of   the   latter.  
This  analysis  will  allow  me  to  claim  that  not  only  the  minimal  self  structures  the  
narrative   self,   but   also   that   narrative   self-­‐‑understanding   constitutively   shapes  
minimal   selfhood,   so   that,   from   a   phenomenological   perspective,   the   two  


















Having   examined   in  Chapter   3   the   role   played   by   affective   experience   in   the  
emergence  of  autobiographical  narrativity,   in   this  chapter   I  aim  to  provide  an  
account  of  how  narratives  impact  on  the  experiential  structure  of  emotions.  As  
previously   illustrated,   various   scholars   claim   that   emotions   contribute   to  
determine   both   the   form   and   contents   of   the   stories   we   tell.   Some   of   these  
accounts   also   recognise   that   narratives   can   have   an   impact   on   affective  
experience  itself,  for  example  by  generating  certain  emotions  in  the  story-­‐‑teller  
or   in   the   audience.41   Although   this   is   certainly   an   important   aspect   of   the  
relationship  between  narrativity  and  affectivity,  in  this  chapter  I  will  argue  that  
there   is   also   another,   more   radical,   sense   in   which   narrativity   influences  
affectivity.   In   particular,   I   will   claim   that   the   structure   of   emotions   is   not  
independent   of   narrative   self-­‐‑understanding,   but   is   rather   shaped   by  
autobiographical   story-­‐‑telling   in  various  ways.  Narratives,   in  other   terms,  not  
only  express  and  trigger  emotions,  but  can  also  be  constitutive  of   them.42   I  will  
start   to   illustrate   this   idea   by   drawing   on   the   insights   into   the   relationship  
between   emotions   and   language   advanced   by   Colombetti   (2009)   and   other  
                                                   
41 Hogan   (2011:   237-­‐‑251),   for   example,   identifies   two  main  ways   in  which   narratives  
can   influence   affective   experience.   In   the   first   place,   he   claims   that   stories   can   cause  
emotion   episodes   and   suggests   that   these   episodes   in   turn,   by   becoming   emotional  
memories,   can   further   influence   the   person’s   affective   responses.   Secondly,   he  
maintains  that  narratives,  by  virtue  of  the  particular  way  in  which  they  depict  fictional  
characters,  can  also  enhance  or  restrain  our  ability  to  empathise  with  other  people.  
42  My   focus   in   this  work   is   specifically   on   the  way   in  which   narrativity   structurally  
shapes  affective  experience.  However,  narratives  have  been  argued  to  be  integral  also  
to  other  processes  at  the  core  of  our  mental  and  practical  life.  For  instance,  it  has  been  
suggested   that   they   “scaffold”   intelligent   behaviour   in   various  ways   (Herman,   2013)  




scholars.   I  will   then  move   to   consider   the  view  put   forward  by  Goldie   (2002;  
2012a)  according  to  which  it  is  by  virtue  of  their  being  incorporated  in  specific  
narratives   that   emotions   can   be   organised   and   experienced   as   complex   and  
meaningful   processes.   I  will   suggest   that   this   is   another   fundamental  way   in  
which  narrativity  constitutively  shapes  affectivity  and  I  will  argue  that  Goldie’s  
conception   provides   a   theoretical   framework   capable   of   accounting   for   the  
interpersonal   and   cultural   variability   of   emotions,   as  well   as   for   the   changes  
that  they  undergo  during  development.  Finally,  I  will  maintain  that  narrativity  
moulds  affectivity  also  by  virtue  of   its  being   involved   in  various  mechanisms  
through   which   affective   experience   is   regulated   at   the   personal   and  
interpersonal  level.  
  
1.  Affective  Experience  and  Language  
  
We  can  talk  about  our  emotions  and  this  is  indeed  a  very  significant  part  of  all  
the  story-­‐‑telling  we  engage  in.  Many  of  the  stories  we  routinely  tell,  especially  
to  the  people  we  are  closest  to,  concern  the  emotional  experiences  we  undergo.  
For  example,  when  meeting  one’s  partner  or  a  friend  for  dinner  after  a  full  day  
at  work  many  of  the  episodes  we  recount  are  likely  to  have  an  affective  content:  
we  were  annoyed   at   the   traffic  on  our  way   to  work,  angry   at  our  colleague   for  
not   having   completed   the   presentation   in   time   for   the   client  meeting,   stressed  
when  discussing  the  new  project  with  the  boss,  but  excited  and  proud  when  the  
possibility  of  a  promotion  was  hinted  at.  Eventually,  we  were  relieved  when  we  
left  work  and  finally  relaxed  on  our  way  to  the  restaurant.  This  example  draws  
attention  to  the  fact  that  often  language  is  used  to  communicate  or  describe  our  
affective   experience   and   reporting   is   indeed   recognised   as   one   of   the   main  
functions  played  by  language  in  the  expression  of  emotions  (Colombetti,  2009).  
However,   various   scholars   maintain   that   language   can   also   have   a   more  
profound   impact  on  our   experience  and,   in  particular,   on  our   affective   states.  
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From   this  perspective,   it   is   suggested   that   often  by  naming  or  describing  our  
feelings,   we   do   not   just   report   what   we   are   experiencing,   but   we   rather  
contribute  to  structure  the  experience  itself.  Therefore,  there  is  a  sense  in  which  
my  affective  experience  wouldn’t  be   the  particular  experience   it   is   if   it  wasn’t  
given  a   linguistic  expression  and   language   in   these  cases  can  be  seen  not  as  a  
mere  accompaniment  to  the  emotion  but  rather  as  integral  to  it.  
  
The   idea   that   language   can   play   a   constitutive   role   in   our   experience   is  
defended   also   by  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   in   the  Phenomenology   of   Perception   (1962).   In  
this  work,  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty  rejects  both  empiricist  and  intellectualist  conceptions  
of  language  and,  in  particular,  the  way  in  which  these  approaches  account  for  
the   relationship   between   speech   and   thought.   According   to   him,   while  
empiricism  conceives  of  words  as  possessing  causes  –  as  they  are  produced  by  
particular   stimuli   –   but   characterises   them   as   deprived   of   meaning,  
intellectualism  views  words  as  the  vehicle  for  the  communication  of  meanings  
which   are   already   constituted.   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   disagrees   with   both   positions,  
arguing  that  speech  and  thought  should  not  be  considered  as  independent  from  
one  another,  as  if  the  former  simply  transmitted  or  signalled  the  presence  of  the  
latter  like  “smoke  betrays  fire”  (Merleay-­‐‑Ponty,  1962:  182).  On  the  contrary,  he  
claims   that   speech   is   that   through  which   thought   is   accomplished:   language,  
from   this   perspective,   can   be   said   to   constitute,   rather   than   simply  manifest,  
meaning.43   In   this   context,   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   likens   the   relationship   between  
linguistic   gesture   and  meaning   to   the   one  which   exists   between   an   angry   or  
threatening   gesture   and   the   corresponding   feeling,   as,   in   his   opinion,   the  
                                                   
43 In   addition,   since   thoughts   cannot   be   considered   to   be   fully   formed   prior   to   their  
expression,  Merleau-­‐‑Ponty   claims   that   the   subject   only   becomes   aware   of   them  once  
they  are  given  a  formulation:  “the  thinking  subject  himself  is  in  a  kind  of  ignorance  of  
his   thoughts   so   long  as  he  has  not   formulated   them   for  himself,   or   even   spoken  and  
written  them,  as  is  shown  by  the  example  of  many  writers  who  begin  a  book  without  
knowing  exactly  what  they  are  going  to  put  into  it”  (1962:  177).  It   is  thus  argued  that  
through  linguistic  expression  the  subject  achieves  a  different  form  of  awareness  of  the  
affective  experience  he  is  undergoing.  
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gesture  is  not  distinct  from  the  feeling,  but  rather  is  the  feeling  itself  (1962:  164).  
The   role  played  by   language   in   the   constitution   of   affectivity   is   not   explicitly  
discussed   by   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty;   however,   his   insights   are   consistent   with   the  
observations  previously  made  in  regard  to  the  relationship  between  feeling  and  
language   and   it   is   arguable   that   also   linguistic   “gestures”   do   not   simply  
manifest  but  rather  constitute  our  emotions.  
    
A   position   which   is   congruent   with   Merleau-­‐‑Ponty’s   approach   and   has   a  
specific   focus   on   emotions   is   advanced   by   Susan  Campbell   in   Interpreting   the  
Personal  (1997).  Central  to  this  work  is  the  rejection  of  what  Campbell  considers  
to   be   a   predominant   assumption   in   theory   of   emotion   and   a   core   tenet   of  
cognitive   and   perceptual   approaches,   namely   the   idea   that   feelings   are  
completely   individuated   before   they   are   expressed.   From   this   perspective,  
individuation   is   the   process   through   which   feelings   are   constituted   as   “the  
particulars   they   are”   so   as   to   allow   for   their   recognition   and   identification  
(Campbell,   1997:   49)   and   expression   is   considered   to   be   essential   to   such   a  
process.   In   other   terms,   expression,   rather   than   simply  manifesting   a   feeling  
that   was   fully   formed   before   its   manifestation,   is   fundamental   to   the  
constitution   of   the   feeling   itself.   As   such,   expression   is   central   to   the   very  
articulation   of   affective   experience   and   to   our   ability   to   entertain   a   variety   of  
sometimes  highly  distinctive  feelings44.   In  Campbell’s  words:  “[t]he  richer  and  
more  discriminating  our  ways  of  expression,  the  richer  and  more  nuanced  our  
affective   lives”   (1997:   50).   Campbell’s   account   admits   of   the   existence   of  
different   forms   of   expression   or   “expressive   resources”,   including   language,  
action   or   involuntary   but   controllable   behaviour.   However,   she   does   not  
specifically   discuss   the   distinct   roles   that   the   linguistic   expression   of   feelings  
                                                   
44 Endorsing  some  of  the  key  claims  of   the  expressionist   theories  of  art,  Campbell  argues  that  
there  are  a  number  of  feelings  which,  due  to  their   level  of  specificity,  cannot  be  accounted  for  




can  play.  In  order  to  best  understand  the  relationship  between  narrativity  and  
affective   experience   it   is   thus   useful   to   further   explore   the   different   kinds   of  
impact  that  language  can  have  on  emotions.  
  
Colombetti   (2009)   identifies   various  ways   in  which   language   and   feelings   are  
connected.   In   the   first   place,   as   previously   mentioned,   she   recognises   that  
language  is  often  used  to  report  the  emotions  that  we  are  experiencing.  In  these  
cases,  linguistic  expression  has  a  communicative  function  and  does  not  change  
the  nature  of   the   affective   experience   that   is  undergone   (Colombetti,   2009:   6).  
However,   Colombetti   claims   that   there   are   a   number   of   dynamics   through  
which   language,   rather   than   merely   communicating   emotions,   can   have   the  
effect   of   modifying   their   structure.   For   example,   she   suggests   that   by   being  
verbalised   affective   experience   can   become  more   precise   and   fully   articulate.  
According   to   her,   what   prior   to   linguistic   expression   is   a   pre-­‐‑reflective   and  
rather  vague  bodily  feeling,   through  verbalisation  can  become  a  more  definite  
experience   and   acquire   a   “sense   of   fulfilment”   (Colombetti,   2009:   10).   In  
addition,  Colombetti  maintains  that,  due  to  the  increased  emotional  awareness  
we  can  reach   through   linguistic  expression,  we  might  allow  ourselves   to   fully  
experience   the   emotion   and   to   “indulge”   in   it,   thus   suggesting   that   language  
can  have  not  only  a  clarifying,  but  also  an  enhancing  effect  on  affectivity.  In  this  
regard,  she  claims  that  language  can  enhance  affectivity  also  by  inducing  new  
and  unexpected  affective  experiences,  as  it  is  the  case,  in  her  opinion,  with  the  
various   techniques   involving   the   association   of   words   adopted   by   Surrealist  
writers    (2009:  11-­‐‑13).    
  
It   seems   that   the   various   aspects   of   the   relationship   between   language   and  
emotions  described  by  Colombetti  do  not  necessarily  require  the  presence  of  a  
narrative.  The  form  of  linguistic  expression  at  issue  in  these  cases  can  indeed  be  
as   simple   as   the   formulation   of   a   statement   through   which   we   name   the  
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emotion  and  no  implicit  or  explicit  story-­‐‑telling  seems  to  be  needed  in  order  to  
do   so.   However,   it   must   be   noted   that   often   we   express   and   communicate  
emotions  by  positioning  them  within  broader  life  stories  and  in  this  sense  it  is  
arguable   that  narrativity   is   involved   in   the  processes   through  which   language  
moulds  affective  experience.  In  addition,  as  I  will  show  shortly,  narrativity  can  
be   considered   to   be   involved   also   in   other   two   aspects   of   the   relationship  
between   emotions   and   language   discussed   by   Colombetti.   One   of   these   is  
connected   to   the   development   and   diffusion   of   emotion   labels   and  
classifications.  In  regard  to  this  point,  building  in  particular  on  the  work  of  the  
philosopher  Ian  Hacking,  Colombetti  argues  that  the  categorisations  of  affective  
experience   which   language   makes   possible   have   “looping   effects”   on   the  
experience  itself.    
  
The   notion   of   “looping   effects”   is   discussed   by  Hacking   in   the   context   of   his  
analysis  of  the  structure  and  effects  of  classifications,  and,   in  particular,  of   the  
notion  of   “interactive  kind”   (1996;   1999).   In  his  opinion,  while   certain  objects,  
for  instance  in  the  field  of  natural  sciences,  are  unaffected  by  the  way  in  which  
they   are   classified   -­‐‑   that   is   they   are,   in  Hacking’s   terms   “indifferent   kinds”   -­‐‑  
others  have  a  dynamic  relationship  with  the  classification  systems  within  which  
they   are   comprised.  More   specifically,   according   to  Hacking,   certain   forms  of  
classification   can   interact  with   the  way   in  which   the   classified   objects   behave  
and  this,  in  turn,  can  modify  the  classification  itself.  Among  these  kinds,  which  
he   qualifies   as   “interactive”,   Hacking   includes   kinds   of   people   and   their  
behaviours   (1999:   104),   which   he   refers   to   as   “human   kinds”   (1996:   351).   An  
example  which  he  discusses  at  length  in  order  to  illustrate  his  position  is  that  of  
child  abuse  (1991;  1996;  1999).  Hacking  explores  the  emergence  and  evolution  of  
this   concept   and   argues   that   the   constitution   of   this   notion   not   only   had   a  
strong  influence  on  social,  political,  and  moral  practices,  but  also  had  an  impact  




Events  in  a  life  can  now  be  seen  as  events  of  a  new  kind,  a  kind  that  may  not  
have   been   conceptualized   when   the   event   was   experienced   or   the   act  
performed.   What   we   experience   becomes   recollected   anew,   and   thought   in  
terms  that  could  not  have  been  thought  at  the  time.  Experiences  are  not  only  
redescribed;  they  are  re-­‐‑felt.  (1999:  130)  
  
Interactive   kinds   such   as   child   abuse,   in   other   terms,   can   change   the  way   in  
which  people  think  and  feel  about  themselves  as  new  experiential  possibilities  
come   to   be   described   and   a   number   of   related   “explanations”   and  
“expectations”   emerge.   In   addition,   according   to  Hacking,   one   of   the   reasons  
why  classifications  can  shape  people’s  behaviours  is  that  they  often  possess  an  
evaluative  character.  Drawing  attention  for  example  to  the  fact  that  central  to  a  
number   of   classifications   in   the   social   sciences   is   the   notion   of   deviant  
behaviour,  Hacking   claims   that   the   evaluations   associated  with   certain   kinds  
can   change   people’s   sense   of   self-­‐‑worth,   potentially   generating   rebellious   or  
passive   behaviours   as   a   result   (1999).   These   observations   highlight   another  
central  feature  of  Hacking’s  concept  of  interactive  kind:  not  only  certain  forms  
of  classification  can  influence  the  configuration  of  people’s  experience,  but,  as  a  
result,  people  can  start  to  behave  differently,  thus  leading  to  an  evolution  of  the  
classification   itself.   In   addition,   even   if   the   person   is   not   aware   of   the  
classification  or  does  not  care  about  it,  knowing  that  she  is  classified  in  a  certain  
way   will   have   an   effect   on   how   other   people   behave   towards   her,   thus  
potentially   influencing   the   person’s   behaviour   by   generating   a   change   in   her  
social   environment   (1996:   368).   In   sum,   interactive   kinds   are   characterised   by  
the  presence  of  multiple  looping  effects:  on  the  one  hand,  the  classification  has  
an   impact   on   the   individual’s   self-­‐‑conception   and   self-­‐‑experience   and,   on   the  
other,  due   to  his   or   others’   awareness   of   the   classification,   the   individual   can  
modify  his  behaviour  and  effect  a  change  in  the  classification  itself.    
  
As   previously   highlighted,   Colombetti   suggests   that   the   consideration   of   the  
 
136 
notion   of   looping   effect   can   enhance   our   understanding   of   the   relationship  
between   emotions   and   language.  More   specifically,   she   suggests   that   looping  
effects   can   be   generated   by   the   emergence   and   diffusion   of   emotion   “labels”  
and  related  “descriptions”  (2009:  13),  thus  generating  changes  in  people’s  self-­‐‑
experience  and  behaviour  which  in  turn  can  modify  the  labels  and  descriptions  
themselves.  Although  Colombetti  is  not  concerned  specifically  with  narrativity,  
it   is  arguable   that   story-­‐‑telling  plays  an   important   role   in  at   least   some  of   the  
dynamics   she   identifies.   More   specifically,   narratives   seem   to   be   central   not  
only  to  the  expression  and  communication  of  emotions,  but  also  to  the  way  in  
which  emotion  classifications  are  constituted.    
  
Culture  and  interpersonal  relationships,  as  it  will  be  discussed  in  more  details  
in   the   next   few   sections,   play   a   fundamental   role   in   determining   our  
understanding  of  emotions.  Social   interactions,  especially   the  ones  which   take  
place   early   in   our   life,   inevitably   shape,   through   the   examples,   evaluations,  
rules  and  information  they  provide,  our  affective  experience.  De  Sousa  (1987),  
for   instance,   emphasising   the   role   of   education   in   the   constitution   of   our  
emotional  repertoire,  draws  attention  to  how  family  and  the  broader  social  and  
cultural   dimension   provide   children   with   an   understanding   of   the   type   of  
circumstances   –  which   he   calls   “paradigm   scenarios”   –   in  which   a   particular  
emotion   is   usually   experienced.   These   are   examples   of  what   an   emotion   of   a  
certain  type  would  typically  look  like  in  light  of  which  the  child  will   interpret  
and  organise  his  own  experience.  From  a  developmental  perspective,  a  cardinal  
role   in   this   process   is   played   by   the   conversations   children   have   with   their  
parents   and   caregivers   (e.g.  Fivush,   1994)   and  arguably   story-­‐‑telling   is   a  very  
important   way   in   which   this   affective   vocabulary   is   constituted.   It   is   by  
listening  to  narratives  regarding  how  certain  emotions  are  triggered  in  others,  
what  kind  of  experiences  they  entail  and  what  kind  of  consequences  they  bring  
about,   that   we   become   able   to   name   emotions   and   to   conceive   of   them   as  
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involving   certain   characteristic   elements.  As   such,  narrativity   is   at   the   core  of  
the  processes  through  which  we  gradually  become  able  to  identify  emotions  on  
the  basis  of  how  they  are  conceived  in  our  social  and  cultural  environment.  In  
addition,   emotion   labels   and   descriptions   are   disseminated   also   through  
various   mediums   such   as   literary   works,   songs   and   films   and   this   further  
proves   the  centrality  of  narrativity   to   the  dynamics  which  are  at   the  origin  of  
looping  effects  in  the  affective  domain.  
  
Finally,   the   impact   that   labelling   can   have   on   people’s   affective   experience   is  
further  illustrated  by  another  aspect  of  the  relationship  between  language  and  
emotions  identified  by  Colombetti.  She  observes  that  through  language  we  can  
“condense”  complex  experiences   in   relatively   simple  expressions.  By  being  so  
labelled,  she  argues,  certain  affects  are  made  “accessible”   to  people,  who  thus  
become  more  aware  of  the  existence  of  particular  experiential  possibilities  and  
more  likely  to  undergo  certain  emotions  (2009:  17-­‐‑20).  
  
The  insights  developed  by  Colombetti  and  the  other  scholars  discussed  in  this  
section   show   that,   although   language   is   often   used   to   report   our   feelings,  
linguistic  expression  can  also  shape  the  structure  of  emotions  in  various  ways.  
Language,  in  other  terms,  plays  not  only  an  expressive,  but  also  a  constitutive  
role  in  affective  experience.  A  similar  idea  emerges  also  from  Ratcliffe’s  account  
of   the   relationship   between   existential   feelings   and   narrative   (forthcoming).  
Ratcliffe  recognises   that,  at   least   in  certain  cases,  existential   feelings  cannot  be  
“separated”   from   the   way   in   which   they   are   expressed   linguistically   and,   in  
particular,  from  the  self-­‐‑narratives  in  which  they  are  incorporated.  As  such,  in  
his  opinion,  existential  feelings  are,  at  least  sometimes,  “inextricable”  aspects  of  
the   narrated   experiences.   Ratcliffe’s   and   the   other   accounts   discussed   in   this  
section   thus   suggest   that   affectivity   and   narrativity   are,   from   a  
phenomenological   perspective,   deeply   entangled.   In   the   rest   of   this   chapter   I  
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will   further   develop   this   idea   by   illustrating   other   two   fundamental  ways   in  
which  story-­‐‑telling  moulds  the  structure  of  affective  experience.  
  
2.  Narrativity  and  the  Process  Structure  of  Emotions  
  
The   idea   that   narrativity   structures   and   confers   meaningfulness   on   affective  
experience  is  at  the  core  of  Goldie’s  account  of  emotions.  This  approach  moves  
from   the   acknowledgment   that   the   theories   which   conceive   of   emotions   as  
single  mental  states  or  events  do  not  do  justice  to  some  fundamental  intuitions  
we  have  about  the  nature  of  affective  experience  (Goldie,  2011).  By  identifying  
emotions  with  individual  affective,  cognitive  or  volitional  states,  these  theories  
would   provide   a   static   characterisation   of   emotions   which   ignores   their  
intrinsically   “dynamic”   and  “complex”  nature   (Goldie,   2002:   12).  An  example  
which  Goldie  uses  to  clarify  his  view  is  the  emotion  of  grief  (2011).  He  observes  
that  while  grieving  certainly  involves  a  specific  feeling,  this  is  not  all  there  is  to  
this   experience.   Grief,   he   suggests,   involves   a   plurality   of   other   elements  
unfolding   over   time   and   thus   should   be   seen   as   a   complex   and   temporally  
extended   experience.   We   have   the   intuition   that   grief   is   not   reducible   to   a  
momentary  sensation,  but  it  is  something  more  structured  intrinsic  to  which  is  
also   a   particular  duration:   it   does   not   seem  possible   to  us   that   grief   could   be  
experienced  just  for  a  few  seconds  (Goldie,  2011:  120).  According  to  Goldie,  and  
in   line  with  some  of   the  accounts  outlined   in  Chapter  2,  grief  –  but  also  other  
emotions  -­‐‑  are  best  conceived  as  “processes”  or  “patterns”  which  develop  over  
time  and  include  a  plurality  of  different  elements.    
  
Although  he  recognises  that  feelings  play  an  important  role  in  our  experience  of  
emotions,   Goldie   emphasises   that   cardinal   to   that   experience   are   also   other  
mental   and  bodily   states.   In  particular,   as  mentioned   in  Chapter   2,   he   argues  
that   central   to   the   structure   of   emotions   is   what   he   names   the   “recognition-­‐‑
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response   tie”   (2002:   11).   According   to   him,   each   emotion   involves   the  
recognition  of  something  as  possessing  a  particular  evaluative  property  and  a  
number   of   responses   including   characteristic   expressions,   bodily   changes,  
motivational  responses  and  actions  (2002:  33).  For  instance,  the  fear  experienced  
when   facing   a   ferocious   animal   would   be   characterised   by   the  
acknowledgement  of  the  animal  as  dangerous  and  by  a  number  of  reactions  to  
that  danger,   such   as   the   feeling  of   fear,   a   specific  profile   of   bodily   activation,  
and  action  tendencies  such  as  the  impulse  to  run  away.    
  
Why   is   the   relationship   between   recognition   and   response   considered   a   tie?  
Why   in   order   for   there   to   be   an   emotion   we   need   both   recognition   and  
response?  To  answer  this  question  it  is  necessary  to  consider  in  more  detail  the  
structure   of   the   evaluative   properties   involved   in   the   emotional   process.  
According   to   Goldie,   an   evaluative   property   is   not   something   that   we   can  
simply   acknowledge,   as  we  do   for   example  with   the  presence   of   an   object   in  
perceptual  experience.  Rather,  Goldie  conceives  of  an  evaluative  property  as  “a  
property  whose  recognition  merits  a  certain  sort  of   response”   (2002:  30).  From  
this   perspective,   the   response   does   not   simply   follow   the   recognition,   but   is  
rather   integral   to   what   it   means   to   recognise   something   as   possessing   a  
particular  evaluative  property.  
  
In   Goldie’s   opinion,   the   structure   of   the   recognition-­‐‑response   tie   is  
paradigmatic  because  it  indicates  the  components  that  emotions  of  a  particular  
kind  typically  have.  However,  Goldie  also  draws  attention  to   the  fact   that  not  
all   the  components  of  a  particular  emotion  should  be   in  place   in  order  for   the  
experience  to  count  as  an  instance  of  that  emotion.  As  long  as  other  elements  of  
the  process  are  unfolding,  the  experience  can  still  be  considered  as  an  instance  
of   a   specific   emotion   even   if   a   certain   element   at   one   time   is  missing.   If,   for  
example,   particular   feelings   of   attachment   or   tenderness   are   considered   to   be  
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paradigmatic   to   the   emotion   of   love,   failing   to   experience   them   on   certain  
occasions   wouldn’t   necessarily   mean   that   the   emotion   is   no   longer   present.  
However,  if  these  failures  were  consistently  experienced  over  a  long  period  of  
time,  it  would  be  legitimate  to  doubt  that  the  emotion  is  still  in  place.    
  
What  is  the  specific  role  played  by  narrativity  in  this  account?  Goldie  suggests  
that  the  narrative  is  what  holds  together  the  various  components  of  the  emotion  
(2002:   11),   namely   that   by   virtue   of   which   the   various   feelings,   thoughts,  
perceptions   and   bodily   changes   which   make   up   the   recognition-­‐‑response   tie  
can  be  seen  not  as  isolated  events  or  mental  states  but  rather  as  parts  of  one  and  
the  same  process.  The  tie,  in  other  terms,  is  established  through  a  narrative.  In  
Goldie’s  words:  
  
it   is   the  notion  of  narrative  structure  which  ties   together  and  makes  sense  of  
the   individual   elements   of   emotional   experience   –   thought,   feeling,   bodily  
change,  expression,  and  so  forth  –  as  part  of  a  structured  episode  […].  (2002:  4-­‐‑
5)  
  
the  parts  of  the  process  “can  be  seen  to  ‘hang  together  into  a  coherent  whole’  
[…]  through  the  coherence  of  a  narrative  of  the  process.  (2011:  124)  
  
According   to   this   perspective,   the   narrative   is   what   connects   the   different  
elements   in   a   meaningful   whole.   However,   in   order   to   get   a   comprehensive  
understanding   of   these   claims   it   is   important   to   further   clarify   what   Goldie  
means  by  “narrative”,  a  notion  which  he  returns  to  throughout  his  work.  In  The  
Emotions   (2002),   for   instance,   he   emphasises   that   affective   experience   is  
embedded   in   one’s   life   story   and   that   it   is   only   in   light   of   this   story   that  
emotions  are  intelligible:  
  
To   make   sense   of   one'ʹs   emotional   life,   including   its   surprises,   it   is   thus  
necessary   to   see   it   as   part   of   a   larger   unfolding   narrative,   not   merely   as   a  
series   of   discrete   episodes   taken   out   of,   and   considered   in   abstraction   from,  
the  narrative  in  which  they  are  embedded.  A  true  narrative,  as  I  understand  it,  
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is  not  simply  an  interpretive  framework,  placed,  so  to  speak,  over  a  person'ʹs  
life;  it  is,  rather,  what  that  life  is.  (2002:  5)  
  
On   the   basis   of   these   claims,   we   might   be   inclined   to   think   that   Goldie  
conceives   of   emotions   as   some   of   the   events   which   can   be   included   in   our  
autobiographical  narratives.  This  interpretation  is  certainly  correct,  but  Goldie’s  
account   seems   to   involve   also   a   stronger   claim.   In   various   other   passages   he  
indeed  suggests  that  emotions  not  only  are  part  of  one’s  life  stories,  but  are  also  
narrative  in  their  own  right:  apart  from  their  constituting  significant  aspects  of  
one’s   autobiography,   emotions   are   thus   attributed   a   specific   “narrative  
structure”.  
  
Goldie  provides  various   characterisations  of   the  notion  of  narrative   structure.  
Central   to   the   way   he   conceives   of   it   in   his   early   work   is   the   “recognition-­‐‑
response  tie”.  For  example  he  claims:    
  
For   each   sort  of   emotional   experience   there  will   be  a  paradigmatic  narrative  
structure   -­‐‑  paradigmatic   recognitional   thoughts,   and  paradigmatic   responses  
involving   motivational   thoughts   and   feelings,   as   well   as   bodily   changes,  
expressive  activity,  action,  and  so  forth  […].  (2002:  33)    
  
However,   a   more   extensive   analysis   of   the   notion   of   narrative   structure   is  
developed   in   Goldie’s   latest   work,   where   he   provides   the   following  
characterisation:  
  
A  narrative  or  story  is  something  that  can  be  told  or  narrated,  or  just  thought  
through  in  narrative  thinking.  It’s  more  than  just  a  bare  annal  or  chronicle  or  
list   of   a   sequence   of   events,   but   a   representation   of   those   events   which   is  
shaped,   organized,   and   coloured,   presenting   those   events   and   the   people  
involved   in   them,   from   a   certain   perspective   or   perspectives,   and   thereby  
giving   narrative   structure   –   coherence,   meaningfulness,   and   evaluative   and  
emotional  import  –  to  what  is  related.  (2012a:  2)    
  
Is  the  more  recent  account  of  the  notion  of  narrative  structure  different  from  the  
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one   given   by   Goldie   in   his   previous   work?   Are   the   two   in   potential  
contradiction?  I  do  not  think  that  this  is  the  case.  By  initially  conceiving  of  the  
notion   of   “narrative   structure”   in   terms   of   “recognition-­‐‑response   tie”,   Goldie  
draws   attention   to   what   he   considers   to   be   the   contents   of   the   emotional  
narrative,   that   is   the  various   components  which   are   related   to  one   another   in  
the  emotional  process.  In  this  context,  by  making  use  of  the  concept  of  “tie”  he  
emphasises  that  the  various  components  are  related  to  one  another,  but  he  does  
not  provide  a  detailed  characterisation  of  this  relationship.  On  the  other  hand,  
the  account  put   forward   in  Goldie’s  most   recent  work   focuses  on   the   features  
that  the  connection  between  these  components  should  possess  in  order  for  them  
to  be   attributed   a  narrative   structure.  These   features,   as   stated   in   the  passage  
quoted   above,   are   coherence,   meaningfulness,   and   evaluative   and   emotional  
import.   In   order   to   understand   the   implications   that   this   notion   of   narrative  
structure  has  for  the  characterisation  of  emotions  as  processes,  it  is  necessary  to  
at  least  briefly  examine  these  key  notions.  
  
The   idea  of   coherence   refers   to   the   fact   that   the  narrated  events   should  “hold  
together  in  some  way”  (2012a:  14),  that  is  they  should  not  be  merely  juxtaposed,  
as  it  is  the  case  in  annals  and  chronicles45,  but  should  rather  be  connected  to  one  
another.  The  second  defining   feature  of  narrative  structure   is  meaningfulness,  
which  refers  to  the  type  of  relationship  which  holds  between  the  events  in  the  
story.  What  does  it  mean  exactly  for  the  events  in  the  story  to  be  meaningfully  
related?   Does   it   mean   that   a   causal   explanation   of   the   various   events   is  
provided?  This  is  not  necessarily  the  case.  Although  it  is  often  emphasised  that  
causal   and   narrative   accounts   have   various   characteristics   in   common   -­‐‑   for  
example   their  being  concerned  with  particular  events      -­‐‑  and   it   is   claimed   that  
causal   explanations   often   have   a   central   role   in   narrative   accounts   (Goldie,  
                                                   




2012a:  14-­‐‑15)  -­‐‑  the  latter  are  considered  to  be  distinct  from  the  former.  From  this  
perspective,   narrative   explanations   allow   us   to   see   the   events   in   a   story   as  
intelligibly   related   even   if   they   are   not   bound   to   one   another   by   causal  
relationships.  In  order  to  clarify  these  claims,  we  can  consider  an  example  of  a  
narrative  of  grief  discussed  by  Goldie.  The  passage  is  taken  from  C.S.  Lewis’  A  
Grief  Observed,  and  describes  some  aspects  of  the  experience  of  grief  undergone  
by  the  narrator  following  the  death  of  “H”46:  
  
It’s  not  true  that  I’m  always  thinking  of  H.  Work  and  conversation  make  that  
impossible.   But   the   times   when   I’m   not   are   perhaps   my   worst.   For   then,  
though   I  have   forgotten   the   reason,   there   is   spread  over   everything  a  vague  
sense  of  wrongness,  of  something  amiss.  Like  in  those  dreams  where  nothing  
terrible  occurs  –  nothing   that  would  sound  even  remarkable   if  you   told   it  at  
breakfast-­‐‑time  –  but  the  atmosphere,  the  taste,  of  the  whole  thing  is  deadly.  So  
with   this.   I   see   the   rowan   berries   reddening   and   don’t   know   for   a  moment  
why  they,  of  all   things,  should  be  depressing.   I  hear  a  clock  strike  and  some  
quality  it  always  had  before  has  gone  out  of  the  sound.  What’s  wrong  with  the  
world  to  make  it  so  flat,  shabby,  worn-­‐‑out  looking?  Then  I  remember”  (Lewis,  
1961:  50,  cited  in  Goldie,  2011:  136).  
  
What   does   this   narrative   tell   us   about   the   narrator’s   experience?   In   the   first  
place,   the   text  characterises  grieving  not  as  a  single  mental  state  or  event,  but  
rather   as   a   process,   something   which   takes   place   over   a   period   of   time.  
Secondly,  a  number  of  different  experiences  are  reported:  the  rowan  berries  are  
depressing,   the   clock’s   sound   has   lost   its   usual   quality   and   the   world,   more  
generally,   has   acquired   a   deadly   look.  What   do   all   these   experiences   have   in  
common?   How   are   they   related   to   one   another?   The   various   experiences  
described   in   the   passage   are   understood   to   be  meaningfully   related,   but   this  
relationship  does  not  have  a  causal  character:  there  is  indeed  no  connection  in  
terms   of   cause   and   effect   between   the  way   the   narrator   perceives   the   berries  
and   the   strange  way   in  which   the   clock   sounds   to  him.  Rather,   a  meaningful  
relation   is   established  by  virtue   of   both   events   being  depicted   as  parts   of   the  
                                                   




process   of   grieving.   They   are   all   aspects   of   the   story   of   the   particular   loss  
experienced   by   the   narrator,   they   are   all   characterised   as   connected   to   his  
current   situation   as   one   in  which   something   valuable   is   forever  missing.   The  
narrative   ties   together   the   events   in   the   emotional   process,   so   that   they   no  
longer  appear  as  isolated,  but  rather  as  aspects  of  a  unitary  affective  experience.  
This  idea  is  related  to  the  third  characteristic  of  a  narrative  structure  discussed  
by  Goldie,  namely  that  the  events  which  are  narrated  must  have  evaluative  and  
emotional  import.  This  feature  refers  to  the  fact  that  a  fundamental  way  to  make  
sense  of  the  events  in  a  story  is  by  appealing  to  how  “[t]hings  matter  to  people”  
(Goldie,   2012a:   23)   and   this   is   achieved   by   referring   to   their   emotions   and  
evaluations.   In   this   context,   Goldie   is   concerned   with   the   analysis   of   the  
structure  of  narratives  in  general  and  not  specifically  with  affective  narratives.  
However,   it   is   easy   to   see   how   his   insights   apply   also   to   the   sphere   of  
affectivity:  an  emotional  narrative,  as  previously  illustrated,  presents  a  number  
of   events   as   integral   to   the  process   through  which  we  both  acknowledge  and  
respond   to   something   as   possessing   a   certain   import   (i.e.   something   being   a  
loss,  an  offence,  a  stroke  of   luck,  etc.).  Finally,  according  to  Goldie  a  narrative  
can  be  meaningful  in  two  different  ways  which  are  nevertheless  related.  On  the  
one   hand,   a   narrative   is   meaningful   from   an   internal   perspective   when   it  
reveals   how   the  mental   states   and   actions   of   the   characters  made   sense   from  
their   point   of   view   at   the   time   of   the   narrated   events.   On   the   other   hand,   a  
narrative   is   meaningful   from   an   external   perspective   when   it   reveals   how   it  
made   sense   from   the   point   of   view   of   the   external   narrator   to   construct   the  
narrative  in  the  way  he  did.    
  
Although,  as  previously  mentioned,  there  is  a  substantial  continuity  in  the  way  
the  narrative  structure  of  emotions  is  characterised  throughout  Goldie’s  work,  
in  the  more  recent  accounts  more  emphasis  is  posed  on  story-­‐‑telling  activities.  
Goldie   explicitly   claims   that   what   gives   coherence,   meaningfulness   and  
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evaluative  and  emotional  import  to  a  sequence  of  events,  thereby  conferring  on  
them  a  narrative  structure,  is  a  story  which  is  either  told  or  thought  through.  As  
such,   it   is  made   clear   that   it   is   by   virtue   of   their   being   part   of   an   implicit   or  
explicit   narrative   that   the   various   emotion   components   are   connected   to   one  
another   and   experienced   as   a   whole.   From   this   perspective,   grief   is   not   an  
emotion   that   is   first   experienced   and   then   reported,   but   is   rather   fully  
constituted  through  narration.  An  implication  of  this  account  is  that  if  there  was  
no  narrative,  there  would  be  no  emotion  as  a  complex  and  structured  process,  
but   just   isolated   mental   states   and   events.   In   other   terms,   given   that   this  
approach  conceives  of  narratives  as  what  hold   together   the  various  emotional  
constituents  by  conferring  on  them  meaningfulness,  coherence,  and  evaluative  
and  emotional  import,  the  absence  of  implicit  or  explicit  story-­‐‑telling  regarding  
the  various  components  would  make  it  difficult  to  see  them  as  parts  of  the  same  
emotion.   If   there   wasn’t   a   narrative,   it   wouldn’t   be   possible   to   grieve   in   a  
certain  way   or,  more   precisely,   to   experience   the   various   elements  which   are  
associated   with   grieving   as   belonging   together,   as   making   up   a   unitary  
experience.  As  such,  narrativity  is  constitutive  of  at  least  certain  emotions  in  the  
sense   that   it   is  what   confers  on   them   their  process   structure  and  allows  us   to  
experience   them   as   unitary   phenomena.   Such   a   view  not   only  does   justice   to  
our   intuitions  regarding  the  complexity  and  temporality  of  emotions,  but,  as  I  
will   illustrate   in   the   next   two   sections,   also   provides   a   framework   capable   of  
accounting  for  the  cultural  and  developmental  variability  of  emotions.  
  
2.1.  Cultural  Differences  
  
Goldie   claims   that   the   notion   of   paradigmatic   narrative   structure   makes   it  
possible  to  account  for  the  similarities  and  differences  in  the  way  emotions  are  
conceived,   expressed,   and   experienced   across   different   cultures   (2002:   84).  
According   to   this   position,   there   is   a   level   of   variability   in   the   narratives  
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associated  with  a  particular  emotion  which  reflects  the  specificity  and  interests  
of   the   individual,   group,   or   society   in   which   the   story   is   crafted.   Different  
cultures,   in   other   terms,   can   have   different   conceptions   of   which   are   the  
constituents  of  a  specific  emotional  process  and  of  how  these  unfold  over  time.  
  
In  this  regard,  much  attention  has  been  given,  for  instance,  to  the  existence  of  a  
number  of  cultural  variations  in  the  experience  of  shame  and  guilt.   In  a  study  
which   examines   an   extensive   body   of   anthropological   and   psychological  
contributions  to  the  subject,  Wong  and  Tsai  (2007)  suggest  that  the  elicitors  and  
the  behavioural  consequences47  of  shame  are  different   in  Western  and  Eastern  
cultures.  These  differences,  according  to  the  research  they  draw  upon,  are  due  
to   the  distinct  ways   in  which   selfhood   is   conceived   in   the   two  cultures.  More  
specifically,   the  western  “individualistic”  conception  of   the  self  which  stresses  
its   autonomy   and   agency   is   contrasted   with   the   eastern   “collectivistic”   view  
according   to   which   the   self   is   essentially   defined   by   its   interpersonal  
relationships   and   its   belonging   to   a   particular   community.   It   is   argued   that  
these  different  conceptions  are  at  the  origin  of  the  fact  that  in  western  cultures  
shame  is  usually  induced  by  a  transgression  committed  by  the  individual,  while  
in  eastern  cultures  shame  can  be  triggered  also  by  actions  performed  by  others  
(2007:  216).  Furthermore,  people  with  a  “collectivistic”  conception  of  the  self  are  
more   likely   to   experience   shame   in  public   than   in  private,  while   the  opposite  
tendency  would  be  typical  of  people  with  a  “western”  view  (2007:  216).  Wong  
and   Tsai   also   emphasise   how   these   cultural   models   have   an   impact   on   the  
behaviours   that   are   associated   with   the   experience   of   shame,   which,   for  
instance,   seems   to  enhance  pro-­‐‑social  behaviour   in  eastern  but  not   in  western  
countries.  For  example,  Wong  and  Tsai  draw  attention  to  a  study  conducted  by  
Bagozzi   et   al.   (2003)  which  examined   the  behaviours  displayed  by  Dutch  and  
                                                   




Philippino  salespeople  when  experiencing  shame  and  identified  some  striking  
differences.   In   particular,   it   was   observed   that   while   in   the   Netherlands  
salespeople  who  feel  shame  tend  to  detach  themselves  from  the  situation  and  to  
pay   less   attention   to   the   customers   and   their   tasks,   the   experience   of   shame  
would   prompt   salespeople   in   the   Philippines   to   focus   more   on   building   the  
relationship   with   their   customers   and   to   improve   the   quality   of   the   service  
provided.  
  
As   shown   by   these   examples,   certain   feelings,   thoughts,   expressions   or  
behaviours  can  be  considered  typical  of  a  particular  emotion  in  one  culture  but  
not  in  another:  the  constituents  of  the  “recognition-­‐‑response  tie”  and  the  way  in  
which   they  unfold  –   in  other   terms,   the  narrative   structures  of  emotions   -­‐‑  are  
subject  to  variation  at  the  cross-­‐‑cultural  level.    
  
However,  if  this  is  the  case,  what  makes  it  possible  to  consider  emotions  with  a  
different   narrative   structure   as   instances   of   the   same   affective   experience?   If  
their  components  are  different,  how  can  we  consider   two  emotional  processes  
as   variants   of   the   same   emotion   and  not   as  distinct   emotions?  The   answer   to  
this   question   provided   by   Goldie   (2002)   relies   on   the   acknowledgement   that  
similarity  and  difference  in  this  context  are  not  a  matter  of  “all  or  nothing”,  but  
rather  a  question  of  degrees.  While   some  of   the   components  of   the  emotional  
process  will  vary  across  cultures,  others  will  be  the  same  and  it  is  by  virtue  of  
their   sharing   a  number  of   significant   aspects   that   two  different   stories   can  be  
conceived  as  narratives  of  the  same  emotion.  In  Goldie’s  words:  
  
there   is   a   significant   amount   in   common   between   different   cultures'ʹ  
conceptions   of   certain   emotions   (that   is,   in   their   paradigmatic   narrative  
structure),   and   […]   there   is   much   in   common   between   certain   elements   of  
emotional  experience  and  expression.  Taking  for  example  anger  and  its  close  
‘relations’   across   other   cultures,   the  precise  paradigmatic   narrative   structure  
may   vary   across   cultures,   depending   on   precisely   how   the   emotion   is  
conceived  of,  but  underlying   that  diversity  will  be  a  notable  commonality   in  
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the  elements  which  comprise  the  narrative  structure.  (2002:  94)  
  
Despite  their  differences,  some  stories  are  then  similar  enough  to  be  considered  
as   narratives   of   the   same   emotion.   Goldie   stresses   how   the   attempt   to  
understand   the   origin   of   the   commonalities   between   different   emotional  
narratives  can  benefit  from  the  insights  provided  by  evolutionary  explanations.  
Certain  aspects  of  the  emotional  process,  he  suggests,  have  remained  the  same  
over   time   and   on   a   cross-­‐‑cultural   level   because   of   their   adaptive   value.  
However,   despite   the   existence   of   a   solid   body   of   research   documenting   the  
universality  of  certain  bodily,  and,  in  particular,  expressive  aspects  of  emotional  
experience,   Goldie   claims   that   it   would   be   wrong   to   consider   emotions   as  
possessing   an   invariable   biological   “core”   and   a   “surface”   which   is   open   to  
cultural   influence.   This   idea,   which   he   names   the   “avocado   pear  
misconception”   (2002:   85),   is   in  his   opinion   incorrect   because   it  does  not   take  
into   consideration   the   “plasticity”   or   “developmental   openness”   of   our  
biological   and   psychological   capabilities   (2002:   98).   These   capabilities,   he  
claims,   are   not   static   and   can   be   deeply   influenced   by   the   environment   and  
culture.   By   defending   this   idea,   however,   Goldie   is   not   advocating   a   social  
constructionist   approach   to   emotional   experience   (2002:   92).   Indeed,   he  
acknowledges  the  constraints  posed  by  biology  and  evolution  on  the  variability  
of  emotions,  but  he  maintains  that  affective  experience  is  more  plastic  and  open  
to  cultural  influences  than  usually  claimed  by  the  approaches  which  emphasise  
the   universality   of   facial   expressions   of   emotions   and   their   neurobiological  
underpinnings.  
  
These  observations  are  thus  related  to  the  critical  assessment  of  an  idea  widely  
spread   in   the   field   of   affective   science,   namely   that  while   some   emotions   are  
culturally   variable,   others   are   universal   (Goldie,   2002:   99-­‐‑100).   From   this  
perspective,   it   could   be   suggested   that   the   claims   regarding   the   variability   of  
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the  narrative  structure  of  emotions  across  cultures  cannot  be  generalised  to  all  
emotions,  and,  in  particular,  to  “basic”  emotions  such  as  anger,  fear,  happiness,  
surprise,   disgust   and   sadness.   Emotions   such   as   shame,   pride   and   guilt,   for  
example,   are   frequently   characterised   as   self-­‐‑evaluative   emotions   which   are  
thought   to   be   dependent   on   the   possession   of   specific   cognitive   abilities   (e.g.  
Lewis,  1992)  and  would  be  more  easily  shaped  by  social  and  cultural  influences.  
Basic   emotions,   on   the   other  hand,   as   it   is   the   case   for   example   in  Damasio’s  
account   (e.g.   2000),   are   seen   as   innate   affective   responses   which   are  
independent  of  the  possession  of  higher  cognitive  abilities  and  are  universally  
characterised   by   the   same   physical   manifestations.   However,   a   number   of  
anthropological   and   cross-­‐‑cultural   studies   document   the   existence   of  
differences  also  in  the  way  in  which  basic  emotions  are  experienced  in  different  
cultures.   Catherine   Lutz   (1988),   for   instance,   in   her   famous   analysis   of   the  
emotions   experienced   by   the   inhabitants   of   the   Micronesian   atoll   of   Ifaluk,  
provides   some   insights   into   how   the   experience   of   fear   can   be   culturally  
shaped.   Lutz   notices   that   the   elicitors   of   the   emotion,   what   is   recognised   as  
deserving   a   reaction   of   fear,   are   very   different   in   Ifaluk   and   in   the  Western  
world.  While   among   Europeans   traffic   situations,   interactions   with   strangers  
and   the  possibility  of   failure  are   the  most  common  triggers  of   fear   (Scherer  et  
al.,   1986),   people   on   Ifaluk   associate   fear   with   circumstances   such   as   the  
appearance  of  something  unexpected,  the  perceived  presence  of  spirits  and  the  
prospect  of  others  experiencing  justifiable  anger  against  the  self.  
    
A   brief   examination   of   the   connection   between   fear   and   justifiable   anger   can  
help   to   clarify   the   structure  of   this  emotion  and   the   role   it  plays   in   the   life  of  
people  on  the  island,  as  well  as  highlighting  its  distinctive  narrative  structure.  
Lutz   (1988)   explains   that   in   this   context   being   fearful   is   often   associated  with  
the   recognition   that   an   action  with   the   potential   of   causing   anger   in   another  
person  has  been  committed  and  this  has  to  do  in  particular  with  the  violation  of  
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taboos,  hierarchy,  and  norms  regarding  interactions  with  people  of  the  opposite  
sex  (Lutz,  1988:  201).  In  these  cases,  people  identify  fear  with  the  recognition  of  
the  illegitimacy  of  particular  actions  and  for  this  reason  the  experience  of  fear  is  
seen  as   the  grounds   for   the  attribution  of  a  positive  moral  attribute.  By  being  
fearful,  the  individual  acknowledges  as  dangerous  the  behaviours  which  break  
the   customs   and   norms   on   which   the   society   on   Ifaluk   is   based   and   thus  
displays  commitment  to  its  preservation.  
  
In  terms  of  the  behaviours  which  are  associated  with  fear,  Lutz  (1988)  observers  
that  for  people  on  Ifaluk  the  most  typical  reaction  is  flight.  While  this  behaviour  
is  certainly  characteristic  also  of  Western  experiences  of  fear,  it  seems  that  in  the  
Western   world   the   scope   of   possible   actions   deriving   from   this   emotion   is  
wider.   Here,   danger   is   not   necessarily   seen   as   something   which   must   be  
escaped,   but   could   also   be   viewed   as   a   situation   which   must   be   faced   with  
courage.   In   addition,   danger   is   not   always   conceived   as   something   to   be  
avoided,   but   can   rather   be   seen   as   a   challenge   that   can   be   actively   pursued  
(think  for  example  of  the  popularity  of  extreme  sports).    
  
Cross-­‐‑cultural  differences  in  the  narrative  structure  of  fear  are  also  manifest  in  
the   different   scenarios   through   which   children   are   familiarised   with   these  
emotions.  The  education  of  children  in  the  Western  countries  usually  involves  
the  experience  of  “vicarious”  fear  through  the  identification  with  characters  of  
fairy   tales   and   other   stories   and   is   aimed   at   providing   children  with   tools   to  
overcome  the  emotion.  This  is  very  different  from  the  approach  which  is  taken  
by   the   people   living   on   Ifaluk:   on   the   atoll   the   children   are   put   in   situations  
where  real  fear  is  induced  and  approval  is  shown  by  the  other  members  of  the  
community  for  these  reactions.  Lutz  describes  the  process  as  follows:  
  
The  rehearsal  of   the  scenario  of  danger  begins   in  parent-­‐‑child   interactions   in  
which  a  special  spirit,  the  tarita  (Lutz,  1983),  is  called  to  frighten  children.  It  is  
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particularly  when  a  child  has  misbehaved  that  a  woman  of  the  household  will  
slip   away   and   return   to   the   edge   of   the   yard   area   disguised   in   cloths   in  
impersonation   of   this   bush-­‐‑dwelling   spirit.   There   she   will   motion   the   child  
toward  her,  all   the  while  making  eating  gestures,   thereby  evoking  the   image  
of  the  tarita  as  an  eater  of  children.  At  this,  the  child  usually  leaps  in  panic  into  
the  arms  of  the  nearest  adult  who,  after  calling  the  tarita   to  “come  to  get  this  
child   who   has   misbehaved”,   often   ends   up   holding   the   child   in   amused  
approval  of  its  reaction.  (1988:  206)  
  
Conceiving   of   emotions   in   terms   of   narrative   structure   makes   it   possible   to  
account   for   the   fact   that  also  within   the  same  culture   there  might  be  different  
forms  of  the  same  emotion.  Wong  and  Tsai  (2007),  for  instance,  report  that  the  
Chinese  language  possesses  over  100  terms  for  shame,  but  various  cultures  also  
distinguish   different   forms   of   basic   emotions.   In   the   Ifaluk   language,   for  
instance,  there  are  two  terms  to  indicate  fear:  rus  and  metagu.  While  the  former  
is   typically  used  to  designate  a  panic-­‐‑like  reaction  which   is  experienced  when  
faced  with  an  unexpected  physical  threat,  the  latter  refers  to  the  feeling  which  
arises  when  faced  with  an  unusual  situation  or  the  “justifiable  anger”  of  others  
(Lutz,  1988:  186).  The  difference   in   the  narrative  structure  of   the   two  forms  of  
fear  regards  also  the  motivations  and  actions  which  are  associated  with  the  two  
emotions.  Rus  immobilises  people  and  makes  them  unable  to  talk  or  to  walk.  In  
addition,  it  is  often  described  as  being  characterised  by  specific  bodily  feelings,  
such  as  “shaking  in  the  region  just  under  the  breastbone”  as  if  something  was  
coming  up  “from  one’s  gut  into  the  chest,  stopping  there  suddenly”.  Metagu,  on  
the  other  hand,   is   less  physical   in  character  and  associated  more  with  anxious  
rumination  over  the  danger  and  its  consequences  (1988:  187).    
  
Goldie  accounts  for  the  fact  that  one  culture  can  distinguish  between  different  
forms  of   the  same  emotion  by  maintaining  that  emotional  narratives  can  have  
different  degrees  of  specificity:  the  more  detailed  the  narratives  associated  with  
affective  experience,   the  more  numerous  the  emotional  categories  present   in  a  
particular  culture.  He  considers  for  instance  the  case  of  the  Pintupi  Aboriginal  
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group   whose   language   includes   at   least   15   terms   for   fear,   among   which   the  
word   “nginyiwarrarringu”   indicates   a   sudden   fear  which   leads   the  person   to  
stand  up  to  determine  what  provoked  it  (Goldie,  2002:  91).  In  Goldie’s  words:  
  
the  fifteen  different  sorts  of  fear  picked  out  in  the  Pintupi  language  will  each  
have   a   distinct   paradigmatic   narrative   structure  which   is   considerably  more  
specific  than  our  narrative  structure  for  fear:  ‘nginyiwarrarringu’,  presumably,  
will   involve   something   like   ‘standing   up   to   see   what   caused   it’   as  
paradigmatic   action   out   of   the   emotion   […].   And,   within   our   own   culture,  
there  will  be  distinct  paradigmatic  narrative  structures  for  our  distinct  sorts  of  
fear:  dread,  terror,  alarm,  and  so  forth.  (2002:  94)  
  
Goldie’s   insights   into   the   role   played   by   narrativity   in   structuring   affective  
experience  can  thus  explain  not  only  how  the  same  emotion  can  take  different  
forms  in  different  cultures,  but  also  how  there  can  be  various  forms  of  the  same  
emotion  within  one  culture.  I  will  suggest  in  the  next  section  that  this  approach  





The  affective  experience  of   children   is  different   from   that  of  adults   in  various  
respects.  For  example,  emotions  in  childhood  seem  to  be  relatively  short-­‐‑lived:  
it  is  noticeable  how  rapidly  children  can  shift  between  different,  and  sometimes  
opposite,  emotions.  Does  this  mean  that  contrary  to  the  affective  experience  of  
adults,  the  emotions  experienced  during  childhood  are  not  narrative  processes?  
In  order  to  answer  this  question  it  is  helpful  to  think  of  narrativity  as  a  matter  of  
degrees.  From  this  perspective,  children’s  emotions,  at  least  from  a  certain  stage  
onwards,  could  still  involve  a  number  of  meaningfully  related  components,  but  





Narrativity,  as  highlighted   in  Chapter  1,   is  a   reflective  activity  which  requires  
the   possession   of   linguistic   and   conceptual   abilities   that   might   emerge  
gradually  and  not  be  present  at  all  stages  of  childhood.  For  example,  it  has  been  
claimed   that   the   capacity   to   construct   stories   where   events   are   organised  
around   the   emergence   of   a   problem   and   its   subsequent   resolution   usually  
appears  at  five  years  of  age,  but  a  performance  comparable  to  that  of  adults  is  
reached  only  between  the  age  of  nine  and  eleven  (Habermas  and  Bluck,  2000).  It  
is  arguable  that  through  the  various  phases  of  development,  the  child  acquires  
a   number   of   abilities   that  make   it   possible   for   the   narrative   skills   to   become  
more  complex  and  this  determines  a  change  in  the  structure  of  emotions.  This  
idea,  which  is  compatible  with  the  framework  delineated  by  Goldie  in  so  far  as  
he   conceives   of   narratives   as   dynamic   rather   than   static   phenomena,   is   also  
consonant   with   the   insights   provided   by   developmental   psychology.   An  
interesting   example   in   this   regard   is   provided   by   the   work   of   Mascolo   and  
Fisher  (1995).  
  
Similar  to  Goldie’s  account,  Mascolo  and  Fisher  move  from  the  assumption  that  
emotions   such   as   pride,   shame,   and   guilt   are   constituted   by   a   number   of  
characteristic  elements  –  appraisals,  bodily  experiences,  and  action  tendencies  –  
which  unfold  in  typical  ways.  These  emotions,  in  other  terms,  are  characterised  
by   specific   sequences   of   events   or   “scripts”.   Let’s   consider   for   example   the  
emotion  of  pride.  According  to  Mascolo  and  Fisher,  central  to  this  emotion  is  an  
appraisal   of   the   self   as   responsible   for   generating   an   outcome   or   for   being   a  
person  that  is  socially  valued.  With  regard  to  physiological  reactions  and  bodily  
feelings,   pride   would   be   marked   by   an   increased   heart   rate   and   skin  
conductance  and  by  an  experience  of   the  body  as  “taller,   stronger  or  bigger”.  
Finally,   pride   is   considered   to   be   distinguished   by   specific   action   tendencies  
such  as   the   inclination  to  call  attention  to  oneself,   the  adoption  of  a  particular  
posture   and   the   display   of   specific   gestures   and   expressions   such   as   a   broad  
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smile   (1995:   57).   According   to   Mascolo   and   Fischer,   however,   this   script   is  
characteristic   only   of   “mature”   forms   of   pride   and   is   the   result   of   a  
developmental   process   during   which   increasingly   complex   instances   of   the  
emotion  are  experienced  by  the  child.    
  
They  claim  that  the  first  occurrences  of  a  pride-­‐‑like  reaction  appear  between  18  
and   24   months   of   age   when   the   child   becomes   able   to   perform   goal-­‐‑related  
actions   and   to   attribute   the   results   to   himself.   This  would  be   for   instance   the  
case  of  a  child  who  throws  a  ball  and  indicates  to  his  mum  that  it   is  him  who  
did  the  throwing  by  using  expressions  such  as  “  ‘I  throw,’  ‘Me  throw,’  or  ‘Robin  
[child’s  name]   throw’”  (1995:  75).  According  to   this  account,   the  experience  of  
pride   becomes   more   complex   at   2-­‐‑3   years   of   age   when   the   child   not   only  
attributes   the  outcome  of  a  particular  action   to  himself  but  also  evaluates   this  
outcome  as  good.  For   instance,   in   the  scenario  previously  discussed,   the  child  
would  express  satisfaction  not  only  for  the  action,  but  also  for  its  positive  result,  
displaying   excitement   and   using   expressions   such   as   “Throw   ball   far”   or   “I  
throw  good”  (1995:  75).  Mascolo  and  Fischer  suggest  that  a  further  stage  in  the  
development   of   pride   takes   place   around   4-­‐‑5   years   of   age   when   the   child  
becomes  able  to  judge  his  performance  as  being  better  than  others’  and  acquires  
the  ability  to  attribute  to  himself  a  valued  trait  following  an  assessment  of  how  
he  has  performed  across  a  number  of  situations.  Through  the  subsequent  stages  
of  pride  development  the  child  widens  the  scope  of  his  positive  evaluations  and  
eventually   becomes   able   to   be   proud   of   himself   because   of   his   possession   of  
some  particular  personality  characteristics.  The  last  stage  of  this  developmental  
trajectory   consists   in   the   ability   to   experience   pride   in   relation   to   the  
characteristics   of   another   person   whose   identity   the   subject   considers   to   be  
related  to  his  own.  
  
According   to   Mascolo   and   Fischer,   similar   stages   can   be   identified   in   the  
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development   of   shame   and   guilt   and   it   is   arguable   that   also   the   structure   of  
other   emotions  undergoes   significant   changes  as   the   child’s   cognitive  abilities  
develop.  But  what  exactly  does  change   in   the  experience  of  pride   through  the  
various   steps   highlighted   above?   In   the   first   place,   while   the   appraisals  
associated  with  the  emotion  are  focused  in  the  beginning  on  very  specific  and  
circumscribed  events  or  actions,  as  the  child  grows  up  the  evaluations  become  
more  abstract  and  general.  A  related  element  which  seems   to  change   through  
development   is   the   role  played  by   intersubjectivity   in   the   emotion.  While   the  
first  occurrences  of  pride  do  not  presuppose  the  acknowledgement  of  any  other  
individual  or   standard  against  which   the  child  assesses  his  own  performance,  
gradually  his  evaluations  acquire  a  stronger  comparative  nature.  In  addition,  at  
the   more   mature   stages   of   development,   another   person   or   some   of   her  
characteristics  can  become  the  object  of  pride.  All   these   features  are  related  to  
the  recognitional  aspects  of  pride.  What  the  analysis  conducted  by  Mascolo  and  
Fischer   shows   then   is   that   the   type  of   situations,  actions,  and   traits  which  are  
recognised  as  potential  objects  of  pride  and   the  evaluations  associated  with   it  
are   not   set   once   and   for   all,   but   gradually   develop   over   the   years.   In   other  
terms,   this   analysis   shows   that   throughout   development   the   processes   with  
which  emotions  are  identified  become  more  articulate  and  the  complexity  of  the  
cognitive  states  which  are  embedded  in  the  process  increases.    
  
Although   the   analysis   discussed   so   far   is   only   concerned   with   how   the  
appraisals   characteristic   of   a   particular   emotion   develop   over   time,   it   is  
arguable   that   also   other   components   of   the   emotional   process   are   subject   to  
change.     Let’s  consider   for  example  the  behaviours   typical  of  pride.  While   the  
action  tendencies  which  are  experienced  when  feeling  proud  might  not  be  very  
different  in  childhood  and  adulthood,  the  behaviours  which  are  displayed  may  
vary  a  lot.  While  it  might  be  common  for  a  child  to  explicitly  show  his  pride,  for  
example   by   screaming   joyfully   or   jumping   around,   and   to   insistently   try   to  
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draw  other  people’s  attention  to  his  achievements,  adults  who  are  feeling  proud  
do  not  usually  behave  in  this  way.  Although  the  emotion  can  still  have  buoyant  
manifestations  (think  for  example  of  winners’  reactions  at  sport  competitions),  
pride   in   adulthood   is   generally   characterised   by   quieter   and  more   composed  
forms   of   expression.   This   feature   -­‐‑   which   may   depend   also   on   social   and  
cultural  factors,  as  in  certain  groups  overt  displays  of  pride  can  be  considered  
negatively   -­‐‑   shows   that   not   only   the   “recognitional”,   but   also   the   “response”  
aspects  of   the  narrative   structure  of   emotions   can   change  over   time.  As   such,  
the   narrative   structure   of   the   emotion   experienced   by   an   adult   can   be   quite  
different  from  the  one  experienced  by  a  child.  This  is  exemplified  for  example  
by   the   following   account   given   by   Todd   Duncan   of   the   experience   he  
underwent   when   attending   a   performance   of   Marian   Anderson,   an   African-­‐‑
American  soprano:  
  
Well,  my  feelings  were  so  deep  that  I  have  never  forgotten  it,  and  I  don’t  think  
that  until  I  leave  this  earth  I  will  ever  forget.  It  was  the  same  feeling  I  had  in  “I  
Have  a  Dream”  –  when  we  heard   that  “I  Have  a  Dream”  speech.   It  was   the  
same   feeling.  Number   one,   I   have   never   been   so   proud   to   be   an  American.  
Number   two,   I’ve   never   been   so   proud   to   be   an  American  Negro.  Number  
three,   I’ve  never  had  such  pride   in  seeing   this  Negro  woman  stand  up   there  
with  this  great  royal  dignity  and  sing.  (Marian  Anderson  1991,  cited  in  Mascolo  
and  Fischer,  1995:  64)  
  
As   observed   by   Mascolo   and   Fischer,   the   experience   of   pride   described   by  
Duncan   in   this   passage   differs   significantly   from   the   pride   that   could   be  
experienced   by   a   toddler   when   praised   by   his   parents   because   he   has  
accomplished   a   particular   task.   In   the   first   place,   the   emotion   undergone   by  
Duncan  cannot  be  understood  independently  of  a  certain  sense  of  belonging  to  
a   particular   nation   and   to   a   particular   ethnic   group.   It   would   be   difficult   to  
experience   the  same  pride   if   there  wasn’t  at   least  a  minimal  understanding  of  
what   it  means  to  be  American  and  an  African-­‐‑American.  The  narrative  of   this  
form  of  pride   is  conceptually  rich  and  culturally  embedded.  This   is   indeed  an  
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instance  of  pride  which  is  likely  to  be  deeply  interwoven  with  the  knowledge  of  
the  history  of  the  American  nation  and  of  the  ethnic  group  Duncan  belongs  to,  
as  well  as  being  rooted  in  a  number  of  personal  experiences  undergone  over  the  
years.   Arguably,   the   cognitive   and   experiential   repertoire   of   a   child   are   not  
developed  enough  to  allow  him  to  experience  such  an  emotion.  
  
A   conception   of   emotions   as   narrative   processes   is   compatible   with   the  
observation  that  in  the  course  of  development  the  same  emotion  can  undergo  a  
number  of  changes  and  acquire  an  increasingly  complex  structure.  However,  if  
the  components  of  the  emotional  process  change  over  time,  how  is  it  possible  to  
claim  that  what  we  encounter  at  different  stages  of  the  developmental  trajectory  
are   not   different   kinds   of   emotions,   but   rather   different   forms   of   the   same  
emotion  (i.e.  more  or  less  mature  forms  of  pride)?  In  other  terms,  why  should  
we   conceive   of   processes  whose   constituents   are   different   as   instances   of   the  
same   emotion?  This   question   can   be   answered   by  making  use   of   the   insights  
developed  by  Goldie   in  his   analysis   of   cultural   differences   and   similarities   in  
the   experience   of   emotions.   As   previously   outlined,   Goldie   claims   that   the  
narrative  structure  of  a  particular  emotion  can  be  different  in  different  cultures:  
the  components  of   the   recognition-­‐‑response   tie,   the  way   they   typically  unfold  
and   the  degree  of   specificity  of   the  narrative  are  not   fixed  and  can  vary  quite  
significantly   across   different   times   and   places.   However,   Goldie’s   approach  
suggests   that,   despite   the   variations,   it   is   thanks   to   the   persistence   of   some  
commonalities   between   the   various   narratives   that   we   could   recognise   two  
different   processes   as   occurrences   of   the   same   emotion.   The   developmental  
problem   can   be   approached   in   the   same   way   by   arguing   that   while   the  
narrative  structure  of  emotions  undergoes  a  number  of  changes  over  the  years,  
the   existence   of   a   number   of   similarities   between   the   emotional   processes   at  
different   stages   of   development   is   what   makes   it   possible   for   us   to   identify  




3.   Narratives  and  the  Regulation  of  Emotions  
  
So  far  I  have  highlighted  various  aspects  of  the  role  played  by  narrativity  in  the  
constitution  of  affectivity.  More  specifically,  I  have  illustrated  various  dynamics  
through  which  language  influences  affective  experience  and  I  have  claimed  that  
narratives   are   fundamental   to   configure   emotions   as   unitary   and  meaningful  
processes.  I  now  want  to  explore  another  way  in  which  story-­‐‑telling  can  shape  
affective  experience,  namely  its  influence  on  emotional  regulation.    
  
Narratives   are   involved   in   the   regulation   of   affective   experience   in   various  
ways.  In  the  first  place,  narrativity  can  enhance  our  ability  to  regulate  emotions  
by  virtue  of  the  role  it  plays  in  the  communication  of  experience.  As  previously  
highlighted,  story-­‐‑telling  is  a  fundamental  form  of  emotional  expression  and  it  
is  key  to  make  our  experience  accessible  to  others,   thus  making  it  possible  for  
people   to  benefit   from   interpersonal   support  when   they  are   facing  distressing  
emotions   (Greenberg   and   Angus,   2004).   However,   there   are   also   other  
dynamics   through  which  narratives   can   foster   our   ability   to  manage   affective  
experience.  
  
By   thinking   or   telling   a   story   about   our   emotions  we   take   a   reflective   stance  
towards  our  experience  and,  as  highlighted   in  Chapter  2,   reflectivity  makes   it  
possible   to   engage   in   different   forms   of   position-­‐‑taking.   Through   emotional  
narratives  not  only  we  can  conceive  of  various  events  as  belonging  to  the  same  
experiential  structure,  but  we  can  also  take  an  evaluative  position  towards  this  
experience.  We  can  attribute  a  value  to  the  emotion  we  are  undergoing  and  this  
will  have  an  impact  on  the  way  in  which  the  emotion  develops.  Emotions  that  
we  are  happy  about  or   that  we  approve  of   are  more   likely   to  be   indulged   in,  
while   those   which   are   disapproved   of   can   be   contrasted   or   mitigated   in   a  
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number  of  ways.  Thanks   to  affective  story-­‐‑telling  not  only   I   can  acknowledge  
my  experiencing  a  particular  emotion,  but  I  can  also  evaluate  that  experience  as  
good,   bad,   appropriate,   inappropriate,   well-­‐‑timed,   inopportune   etc.48   These  
evaluations  can  then  be  grounds  to  a  plurality  of  actions  which  are  potentially  
relevant   to   affective   regulation.   For   example,   by   considering   a   particular  
emotion  as  exaggerated  or  unwarranted,  I  can  dispose  myself  to  take  measures  
to  moderate  and  control  that  emotion.    
  
Story-­‐‑telling  can  contribute  to  emotional  regulation  also  because  it  allows  us  to  
see   emotions   not   as   isolated   experiences   but   rather   as   part   of   a   broader   life-­‐‑
story.  As  noted  earlier,  Goldie  emphasises  how  emotions  are  best  understood  in  
light  of  the  plurality  of  narratives  which  constitute  our  autobiography  and  it  is  
arguable  that  positioning  the  emotional  process  within  this  broader  framework  
not  only  helps  us  to  make  better  sense  of   the  emotions,  but  also  enhances  our  
regulation   abilities.  Why   is   this   possible?  Why  would   an   isolated   emotion   be  
more  difficult   to  regulate  than  an  emotion  which  is  conceived  of  as  part  of  an  
autobiographical  narrative?    
  
A  number   of   relevant   insights   in   this   regard   are   provided   by   the   therapeutic  
approach   known   as   Emotion-­‐‑Focused   Therapy   (EFT)   which   I   introduced   in  
Chapter   3.   This   approach   remarks   that   through   story-­‐‑telling   emotions   can   be  
contextualised,   that   is   they   can  be   situated   in   a  particular   space   and   time.  As  
such,   narrativity  makes   it   possible   to   circumscribe   emotional   reactions  whose  
boundaries  at  the  experiential  level  might  be  blurred  and  to  give  the  person  the  
sense  that  distressing  emotions  are  episodes  that  could  eventually  be  overcome.  
By   attributing   to   an   emotion   a   “clear   beginning”   and   organising   the   events  
along  an  “unfolding  plotline”   (Angus   and  Greenberg,   2011:   70),  we  make   the  
                                                   
48 As  highlighted   in  Chapter  2,   the  ability   to   take  an  evaluative  stance   towards  one’s  
own  affective   experience  and   thus   influence   its  development   is  discussed  also  by  De  
Monticelli  (2003;  2006).    
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emotion   itself   not   only   more   intelligible,   but   also   more   manageable.  
Commenting  on  the  experience  of  a  client,  Angus  and  Greenberg  describe  these  
dynamics  as  follows:      
  
like  any  well-­‐‑formed  narrative,   the  specification  of  an  experiential  beginning  
point  also  means  that  an  ending  point  cannot  be  too  far  off,  offering  the  hope  
of   escaping   the   feeling   of   being   stuck   in   her   negative   emotional   experience.  
For   the   client,   there   is   now   a   reason   for   her   feelings   that   convey   important  
information   about   herself   and   her   ex-­‐‑husband,   which   enhances   a   sense   of  
control   and   personal   agency   that   undercuts   the   experiential   stuckness   of   an  
undifferentiated  emotional  state.  (2011:  71)  
  
By  providing  a  narrative  of  emotions  we  can  thus  delimit  the  experience  itself  
and  increase  our  sense  of  having  a  degree  of  control  over  the  affective  states  we  
undergo.  However,   it   is   important   to  note   that  only  narratives  of   a  particular  
kind  can  have  such  an  impact  on  affectivity.  More  specifically,  in  order  for  it  to  
exert   the   regulative   function  discussed   above,   the   emotional   narrative   should  
circumscribe  the  affective  experience,  situating  it  in  a  particular  space  and  time.  
As  I  will  illustrate  with  regard  to  the  case  of  depression  in  Chapter  5,  narratives  
which  do  not  provide  such  spatial  and  temporal  boundaries  and  which,  on  the  
contrary,  depict  emotions  as   inescapable  or  endless  predicaments  are   likely   to  
exacerbate  affective  experience  and  to  confer  on  it  an  overwhelming  character.  
  
Story-­‐‑telling  of  a  certain  kind  can  thus  have  a  positive  influence  on  our  ability  
to   regulate   emotional   processes   because   it   enhances   our   sense   of   control.  
Another   reason  why   this   is   the  case  has   to  do  with   the   fact   that  emotions  are  
usually  perceived  as  passive  phenomena,  something  by  which  we  are  affected  
rather  than  experiences  in  which  we  voluntarily  engage.  Even  when  we  actively  
pursue   the   experience   of   a   particular   emotion,   when   we   strive   to   be   happy,  
cheerful,  or  light-­‐‑hearted,  the  emergence  of  the  emotion  is  experienced  in  itself  
as  being   independent  of  our  voluntary  control.   I  can  put  myself   in  a  situation  
which  is   likely  to  trigger  the  emotion  I  am  seeking  –  for   instance  I  can  have  a  
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drink,  call  a   friend,  or  watch  a  comedy  –  but   the  affective  experience  remains  
somehow   independent   of   my   decision   and   I   can   still   fail   to   experience   the  
emotion  despite  my  attempts  to  trigger  it.  Because  of  passivity  being  intrinsic  to  
the   experiential   structure   of   affectivity,   especially   when   emotions   are  
particularly   intense,  we  might   feel   unable   to   control   them.  Due   to   a   sense   of  
powerlessness   we   might   engage   in   fewer   attempts   to   regulate   the   emotions,  
which  can  then  acquire  greater  intensity  and,  in  a  circular  way,  further  increase  
our   feelings   of   passivity.   Through   this   mechanism   affective   experience   can  
become   rapidly   overwhelming,   that   is   something  we   feel  we   have   no   power  
whatsoever  to  control.  Story-­‐‑telling  can  contrast  these  dynamics  also  by  virtue  
of   its   being   an   active   process:   thinking   or   narrating   a   story   is   an   activity  we  
engage  in  and  not  an  experience  we  passively  undergo  and,  as  such,  it  enhances  
our  sense  of  having  a  degree  of  control  over  the  events.  This  increased  sense  of  
control,   in  its  turn,   inclines  us  to  be  more  proactive  in  regulating  our  affective  
experience,  which   results   in   less   overwhelming   emotions   and   in   an   increased  
sense  of  empowerment.    
  
These   dynamics   seem   to   be   central   to   the   process   through   which   people  
affected  by  post-­‐‑traumatic  stress  disorder  (PTSD)  come  to  master  the  traumatic  
experiences  they  have  undergone.  Characteristic  of  the  disorder  is  the  presence  
of   intrusive   memories   of   the   distressing   events   and   it   is   reported   that   by  
constructing   narratives   of   these   events,   also   the   ability   to   control   one’s  
memories   is   enhanced.   These   dynamics   are   described   by   Susan  Brison   in   her  
memoir  of  the  illness  in  the  following  terms:  
  
Whereas  traumatic  memories  (especially  perceptual  and  emotional  flashbacks)  
feel  as  though  they  are  passively  endured,  narratives  are  the  result  of  certain  
obvious   choices   (e.g.,   how  much   to   tell   to   whom,   in   what   order,   etc.).   […]  
[O]ne  can  control  certain  aspects  of  the  narrative  and  that  control,  repeatedly  
exercised,   leads   to   greater   control   over   the   memories   themselves,   making  
them  less  intrusive  and  giving  them  the  kind  of  meaning  that  enables  them  to  




In   Brison’s   opinion,   thanks   to   narrativity,   the   individual   who   has   been  
objectified  (2003:  73)  due  to  the  violence  perpetrated  by  others,  can  restore  his  
sense  of  empowerment  and  find  a  way  to  re-­‐‑establish  interpersonal  connection  
(2003:  68).  Brison’s  account,  therefore,  corroborates  the  idea  that  it  is  because  it  
is   an   activity   in  which  we   engage   voluntarily   that   story-­‐‑telling   contributes   to  





In   this   chapter   I   examined   the   impact   that   narrativity   has   on   affectivity,  
claiming   that   narratives   can  not   only   express   or   trigger   certain   emotions,   but  
also   shape   their   experiential   structure   in   various   ways.   Drawing   on  
Colombetti’s  account  of  the  relationship  between  emotions  and  language  (2009),  
I   started   by   highlighting   different   dynamics   through   which   linguistic   and  
narrative  expression  can  be  constitutive  of  affective  experience.  I  then  moved  to  
illustrate   Goldie’s   account   of   emotions   as   narrative   processes   (2002;   2012a),  
suggesting  that  the  account  identifies  another  fundamental  way  in  which  story-­‐‑
telling   structures   our   emotions.   More   specifically,   Goldie   maintains   that  
emotions   are   constituted   by   a   number   of   different   components  which   unfold  
over   time   in   characteristic   ways   and   suggests   that   what   holds   the   various  
components  of  the  process  together  and  makes  it  possible  to  experience  them  as  
a   unitary   and   meaningful   whole   is   the   presence   of   an   implicit   or   explicit  
emotional   narrative.   In   other   terms,   according   to   Goldie,   emotions   are  
“complex”   and   “dynamic”   occurrences   the   very   structure   of   which   is  
narratively   shaped.   Following   Goldie,   I   remarked   that   such   an   account   can  
explain   both   the   commonalities   and   differences   in   the   experience   and  
conception  of  emotions  across  cultures.  In  addition,  I  argued  that  this  position  
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also  provides  a   framework   to  explain   some  of   the   transformations  undergone  
by   emotions   during   development.   Finally,   I  maintained   that   narratives   shape  
emotions  also  because  they  are  central  to  various  affective  regulation  dynamics.  
In   the   first   place,   by   narrating   our   emotions   we   can   communicate   them   to  
others,   thus  making   it   possible   to   ask   for   and   receive   support  when   needed.  
Secondly,  by  engaging  in  narrative  forms  of  self-­‐‑understanding,  we  can  take  an  
evaluative   stance   towards   our   affective   experience,   thus   exerting   a   degree   of  
control   on   the   way   in   which   it   develops.   Finally,   by   making   it   possible   to  
conceive   of   emotions   as   circumscribed   in   space   and   time,   certain   affective  
narratives   allow  us   to   experience   emotions   as  more  manageable   and   enhance  
our  sense  of  being  in  control.  Furthermore,  the  act  of  narrating  itself,  in  so  far  as  
it  has  a  voluntary  character  -­‐‑  as  opposed  to  the  passive  nature  of  affective  states  
-­‐‑   contributes   to  strengthen  our  sense  of  being  able   to  cope  with   the  situations  
we  face.    
  
The   analysis   conducted   in   this   chapter   is   relevant   to   the  understanding  of   an  
important   aspect   of   the   relationship   between   minimal   and   narrative   self.   In  
Chapter   1   I   claimed   that   integral   to   the   account   of   selfhood   put   forward   by  
Gallagher  and  Zahavi  is  the  claim  that  minimal  self-­‐‑experience  is  impervious  to  
the  dynamics  which   take  place   at   the  narrative   level,   so   that   it   is   argued   that  
disruptions  of    narrative  self-­‐‑understanding  could  leave  the  minimal  self  intact.  
However,   the  account   I  provided  of   the   role  played  by  narrativity   in   shaping  
the  experiential  structure  of  emotions  shows  that  there  are  at  least  certain  forms  
of  minimal   self-­‐‑experience   to   the  constitution  of  which  narrative  activities  are  
cardinal.  Since  affectivity  is  a  fundamental  dimension  of  minimal  selfhood  and  
narrativity   structurally   shapes   it   in   various   ways,   it   seems   that,   from   a  
phenomenological   perspective,   minimal   self-­‐‑consciousness   cannot   be  
considered  to  be   independent  of  narrative  self-­‐‑understanding,  but   the  two  are  




I  will   continue  my  analysis   in  Chapter  5  and  6  by  examining   the   relationship  
between   affectivity   and   narrativity   in   depression   and   borderline   personality  
disorder.  Drawing  on  the  insights  developed  so  far  in  this  work,  I  will  provide  
an  account  of  some  aspects  of  these  illnesses  which  extends  our  understanding  
of   their   phenomenology   in   various   respects.   As   I   will   show,   many   of   the  
dynamics  discussed  in  Chapter  3  and  4  are  exemplified  by  the  alteration  of  self-­‐‑
consciousness  experienced  by  people  affected  by  depression  and  BPD  and  the  
exploration   of   the   experiential   structures   characteristic   of   these  disorders  will  
further  corroborate  and  refine  the  account  of  the  relationship  between  affective  





















The   aim   of   this   chapter   is   to   provide   a   phenomenological   analysis   of   some  
features  of  depression  by  taking  into  account  the  insights  developed  in  Chapter  
3   and   4.   More   specifically,   I   will   focus   on   the   structure   of   affectivity   and  
narrativity  and  on  the  dynamics  through  which  they  influence  each  other  in  the  
disorder.  Considering  in  particular  the  position  developed  by  Stanghellini  and  
Englebert   (Englebert   and   Stanghellini,   forthcoming;   Stanghellini,   2004),   I   will  
start  by  observing  that  contemporary  phenomenological  accounts  of  depression  
tend   to   conceive   of   the  disorder   as   a  disturbance   of   narrative   selfhood.   I  will  
argue  that  while  these  approaches  correctly  identify  some  of  the  disruptions  of  
narrativity   typical   of   depression   and   their   connection   with   the   person’s  
emotions   and   moods,   they   do   not   do   justice   to   various   other   aspects   of   the  
relationship   between   affectivity   and   narrative   understanding   in   the   illness.   I  
will  then  move  to  develop  a  more  extended  account  of  this  relationship.  First,  I  
will   claim   that,   due   to   the   loss   of   feeling   characteristic   of   the   disorder,   the  
autobiographical  narratives  with  which  the  patients  used  to  identify  before  the  
onset   of   depression   become   deprived   of   emotional   resonance.   As   such,   the  
sense  of  authenticity  previously  associated  with  these  life  stories  is  disrupted,  a  
process   that   results   in   the   weakening   or   abandonment   of   the   narratives  
themselves.  I  will  then  move  to  show  that  these  autobiographical  narratives  are  
replaced  by  new  stories  which  possess  a  specific  structure  and  I  will  argue  that  
this   is   dependent   upon   the   particular   configuration   of   affective   experience  
typical  of   the  disorder.   In  particular,   I  will   take   into  consideration  the  specific  
“explanatory  style”  (Seligman,  2006)  often  adopted  by  depressed  patients  and  I  
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will  argue  that  it  originates  in  the  existential  feelings  of  guilt,  hopelessness,  and  
isolation  often   associated  with   the   illness   and   in  particular   forms  of   temporal  
and   spatial   experience.   Finally,   I   will   briefly   consider   how   the   narratives  
constructed   by   the   depressed   person   influence   her   affective   experience,  
showing  in  particular   that   they  exacerbate  feelings  of  helplessness  and  lack  of  
control  and  inhibit  the  person’s  ability  to  appraise  her  own  emotions.  
  
1.  Depression  as  a  Disturbance  of  Narrative  Identity  
  
The  phenomenology  of  depression  has  been  researched  by  a  number  of  authors  
in   both   philosophy   and   psychiatry.   Common   to   various   accounts   is   the   idea  
that  depression  involves  disturbances  of  selfhood  and  self-­‐‑consciousness,  but  it  
is  also  maintained  that  these  disturbances  are  not  as  severe  as  those  which  are  
present  in  other  disorders  such  as  schizophrenia  (e.g.  Sass  and  Pienkos,  2013a;  
2013b).   In   this   context,   it   is   often   claimed   that   depression   is   characterised   by  
disturbances  of  the  narrative  self.    
  
This  is  for  example  the  opinion  of  Stanghellini  (2004)  who  provides  an  account  
of   the   disruptions   of   selfhood   typical   of   depression   by   drawing   on   Ricoeur’s  
account  of  narrative  identity.  As  illustrated  in  Chapter  1,  this  account  is  centred  
on   the   notions   of  mêmeté   and   ipséité,   with   the   former   conceived   as   a   form   of  
identity  that  consists  in  permanence  and  immutability  over  time,  and  the  latter  
seen  as  a  form  of  identity  which  incorporates  change.  From  this  perspective,  it  
is   argued   that   the   emergence   of   a   narrative   self   involves   a   dialectic   between  
idem   and   ipse,   between   remaining   the   same   and   becoming   different   and   the  
construction  of  a  coherent  autobiographical  narrative  is  viewed  as  the  means  by  
which  this  process  takes  place.    
  
According   to   Stanghellini,   it   is   the   dialectic   between   idem   and   ipse   that   is  
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disrupted   in   the   experience   of   the   depressed   person   (2004:   146-­‐‑147).   More  
specifically,   he   suggests   that   depression   is   characterised   by   the   inability   to  
integrate   change   in   one’s   own   identity,   so   that   patients   are   stuck   with   a  
conception  of  themselves  that  is  inflexible  and  unable  to  evolve.  Englebert  and  
Stanghellini   (forthcoming)   remark   that   autobiographical   narrativity   involves  
two  fundamental  aspects:  on  the  one  hand,  the  ability  to  report  one’s  story  and,  
on  the  other,  to  develop  this  story  in  a  creative  way.  According  to  them,  it  is  the  
creative  aspect  of  narrative  identity  that  is  altered  in  depression.49  
  
In  order  to  best  understand  this  view  it  is  helpful  to  mention  that  according  to  
Stanghellini  there  is  a  series  of  features  that  determines  a  person’s  vulnerability  
to   depression.   In   particular,   relying   on   various   insights   provided   within  
European   and   Japanese   psychopathology,   he   maintains   that   people   who   are  
affected  by  the  disorder  often  possess  specific  personality  traits  –  constitutive  of  
the   so-­‐‑called   “typus  melancholicus”   (Stanghellini,   2004:   103-­‐‑109;   Stanghellini   et  
al.,   2006)   –   and   it   is   through   the   analysis   of   these   traits   that   the   dynamics  
associated  with  the  disruption  of  narrative  identity  become  clear.  
  
Stanghellini   (2004)   suggests   that   a  mark   of   vulnerability   to   depression   is   the  
tendency   to   strongly   identify   with   one’s   social   roles   and   to   avoid   any  
experience   or   conflict  which   could   challenge   this   identification.   According   to  
this   position,   because   of   a   fragile   sense   of   personal   identity,   the   typus  
melancholicus   would   be   inclined   to   endorse   a   self-­‐‑conception   centred   on  
particular   social,   cultural   or   professional   values   and   to   significantly   strive   to  
conform  to  them.    
  
                                                   
49 Englebert   and   Stanghellini   (forthcoming)   consider   this   experiential   structure   to   be  
characteristic   of   melancholia   and   contrast   it   with   the   one   which   in   their   opinion   is  
typical  of  mania.  According  to  them,  while  the  melancholic  person  is  unable  to  renew  
her  narrative  identity,  in  manic  experience  the  creative  dimension  is  predominant  and  
what  is  lost  is  the  ability  to  retain  a  stable  sense  of  one’s  history.  
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Depression,   in   Stanghellini’s   view,   is   characterised   by   a   disruption   of   the  
person’s  ability  to  continue  to  identify  with  the  roles  she  previously  endorsed:  
the  depressed  person  experiences  an  estrangement  from  the  values  she  used  to  
identify   with   and   comes   to   doubt   her   commitment   to   those   values   and   her  
ability  to  live  up  to  them  (2004:  142).  The  depressed  patient,  however,  is  unable  
to   evolve   her   past   self-­‐‑conception   by   integrating   new   elements   into   it   and   is  
thus   stuck   with   an   old   view   of   herself   from   which   she   feels   increasingly  
detached.   Stanghellini   emphasises   that   involved   in   this   predicament   is   also   a  
particular   alteration   of   affective   experience,   namely   the   loss   of   feeling   or  
anhedonia  often  conceived  as  a  central   feature  of   the  syndrome  (APA,  2013).50  
In  depression  the  experience  not  only  of  pleasure,  but  also  of  a  range  of  other  
emotions   is   significantly   diminished   and   arguably   this   negatively   impacts   on  
the  person’s  ability  to  feel  truly  committed  to  the  ideals,  people,  and  values  at  
the  core  of  her  self-­‐‑image  (2004:  137).    
  
In   addition,   Englebert   and   Stanghellini   (forthcoming)   also   draw   attention   to  
another  way  in  which  the  loss  of  feeling  experienced  by  depressed  patients  can  
affect   narrative   self-­‐‑understanding.   Affectivity   is   closely   connected   to  
motivation   and   they   suggest   that   it   is   because   of   the   flattening   of   affective  
experience   that   the   depressed   person   is   unable   to   renew   her   self-­‐‑conception.  
Affectivity,   in   other   terms,   is   conceived   as   what   motivates   the   person   to   be  
creative   in   constructing   her   life   story   and   therefore   losing   the   ability   to  
experience  emotions  is  seen  as  detrimental  to  the  capacity  to  integrate  change  in  
one’s  own  self-­‐‑narrative.    
  
                                                   
50 Stanghellini  remarks  that  the  affective  flattening  which  is  typical  of  depression  has  a  
characteristic  phenomenology,  as  the  loss  of  feeling  is  experienced  as  rather  unpleasant  
or   painful   by   the   depressed   person.   As   such,   he   suggests   that   this   aspect   of   the  
depressive  experience  is  best  accounted  for  through  the  notion  of  “feeling  of   the   loss  of  
feelings”  (2004:  135).  
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I  will  provide  a  more  extensive  analysis  of  the  depressive  loss  of  feeling  and  of  
its   influence   on   narrative   self-­‐‑understanding   in   the   next   section.   What   is  
important   to   highlight   here   is   the   particular   alteration   of   narrative   selfhood  
that,   in  Stanghellini’s  view,   is   typical  of  depression.  According  to  him,  people  
who   are   vulnerable   to   the   disorder   usually   have   a   very   rigid   conception   of  
themselves,  showing  the  tendency  to  over-­‐‑identify  with  particular  roles  and  to  
avoid   any   challenge   to   those   identifications.   With   the   onset   of   the   illness,  
however,  the  person  becomes  indifferent  to  the  commitments  in  which  her  self-­‐‑
image   consisted   and,   rather   than   taking   this   as   an   opportunity   to   further  
develop   and   change   certain   aspects   of   her   self-­‐‑understanding,   she   considers  
herself  culpable  for  no  longer  being  able  to  be  the  person  she  once  was.    
  
Englebert   and   Stanghellini   (forthcoming;   Stanghellini,   2004)   provide   an  
accurate  account  of  some  fundamental  features  of  narrative  self-­‐‑understanding  
in   depression.   In   particular,   as   I   will   further   illustrate   later,   the   idea   that   in  
depression   there   is  a  disruption   in   the  continuity  of  one’s   self-­‐‑conception  and  
that   this   is   dependent   on   a   particular   alteration   of   affective   experience   is  
consonant  with   some   of   the   insights   into   the   relationship   between   affectivity  
and   narrativity   that   I   developed   in   previous   chapters.   However,   there   are   at  
least  two  aspects  of  this  position  which  can  be  challenged.  In  the  first  place,  the  
notion   of   typus   melancholicus   on   which   the   account   relies   seems   to   be  
problematic.  While  the  personality  traits  comprised  by  this  notion  might  play  a  
role   in   the   emergence   of   some   forms   of   depression,   the   idea   that   over-­‐‑
identification   with   social   roles   and   a   fragile   personal   identity   are   features  
common   to   most   depressed   people   appears   as   an   unjustified   generalisation.  
First-­‐‑person  accounts  (e.g.  Brampton,  2009;  Plath,  2005;  Solomon,  2002;  Styron,  
2001;  Thompson,  1996)  suggest  that,  although  some  of  the  self-­‐‑conceptions  held  
by  patients  before  the  onset  of  the  illness  might  be  influenced  by  social  models  
and  norms  to  various  degrees,  it  is  not  necessarily  the  case  that  people  who  will  
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develop   depression   rigidly   identify   with   particular   social,   cultural,   or  
professional   roles.   In   other   terms,   while   it   is   true   that   depression   makes   it  
difficult  for  the  individual  to  recognise  himself  as  the  same  person  he  thought  
himself  to  be,  the  self-­‐‑image  from  which  he  is  detached  is  not  always  a  highly  
conventional  or  impersonal  one.    
  
The  other  reason  why  Stanghellini’s  account  is  problematic  is  that  it  does  ignore  
other   important   features   of   the   structure   of   narrative   self-­‐‑understanding   in  
depression.  While  it  is  accurate  in  claiming  that  central  to  the  experience  of  the  
depressed  person  is  an  estrangement  from  the  conception  of  herself  held  before  
the   illness,   this   account   does   not   devote   much   attention   to   the   fact   that  
depression   is   characterised  by   the   emergence  of  new   self-­‐‑narratives,   the   form  
and  content  of  which  possess  specific  characteristics.  In  the  rest  of  this  chapter,  
my  aim  will  be  not  only  to  provide  a  more  detailed  account  of  the  mechanisms  
through   which   patients   become   detached   from   the   view   of   themselves   they  
endorsed  prior  to  the  illness,  but  also  to  show  how  this  is  accompanied  by  the  
emergence   of   new   forms   of   narrative   understanding   whose   features   are  
constitutively   shaped   by   some   of   the   affective   dynamics   at   the   core   of   the  
disorder.    
  
2.  “Unemotional”  Narratives    
  
In  Chapter  4  I  argued  that  it  is  by  virtue  of  their  being  congruent  with  a  specific  
set   of   the   subject’s   affective   states   that   narratives   can   be   experienced   as  
authentic.   In   the   following,   further   developing   Stanghellini’s   intuitions  
regarding  the  relationship  between  loss  of  feeling  and  narrative  disruptions  in  
depression   (2004),   I   will   claim   that   typical   of   the   disorder   is   the   loss   of  
congruence   between   some   of   the   subject’s   life   stories   and   his   affective  
experience,  which   results   in   the  weakening   or   even   abandonment   of   some   of  
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the  stories  central  to  the  subject’s  autobiographical  accounts  prior  to  the  illness.  
  
According   to   the  DSM-­‐‑5   (APA,  2013),   a  decreased  ability   to   feel  pleasure  and  
interest   in   all   or   almost   all   the   activities   the   person   normally   engages   in  
constitutes  one  of  the  diagnostic  criteria  for  a  major  depressive  episode.  Integral  
to  depression  is  thus  not  only  the  presence  of  affective  states  which  in  ordinary  
experience   would   be   absent   or   have   a   different   form,   but   also   the   loss   of  
feelings  which  are  ordinarily  present.  A  description  of  this  condition  is  offered  
for  instance  by  Solomon  in  the  following  passage:  
  
a   loss   of   feeling,   a   numbness,   had   infected   all  my   human   relations.   I   didn’t  
care   about   love;   about   my   work;   about   family;   about   friends.   My   writing  
slowed,   then   stopped.   […]   I   felt   none   of   my   habitual   yearning   for  
physical/emotional   intimacy   and   was   not   attracted   either   to   people   in   the  
streets   or   to   those   I   knew   and   had   loved;   in   erotic   circumstances,  my  mind  
kept  drifting  off   to   shopping   lists   and  work   I  needed   to  do.  This  gave  me  a  
feeling  that  I  was  losing  my  self,  and  that  scared  me.  (Solomon,  2002:  45)  
  
What   the   first-­‐‑person   reports   of   depressed   patients   highlight   is   a   diminished  
affective  responsiveness  to  the  external  world:  people  and  situations  that  used  
to  elicit  emotional  reactions  no  longer  do  so  and  the  diminished  ability  to  feel  
becomes   noticeable   to   the   patients.   In   addition,   as   it   is   the   case   in   Solomon’s  
description,   in   first-­‐‑person   accounts   of   the   illness   the   loss   of   feeling   is   often  
related  to  the  experience  of  losing  oneself.  This  is  described  also  by  Brampton  in  
the  following  terms:  
  
I  was  lost  and  that  loss  was  catastrophic.  Who  are  you  when  you  are  no  longer  
who   you   are?   What   do   you   do   with   a   self   that   is   no   longer   your   self?  
(Brampton,  2009:  94)  
  
But  what  exactly  does  a  loss  of  self  entail?  And  how  is  it  related  to  the  patient’s  
loss  of  feeling?  In  order  to  answer  these  questions  it  is  useful  to  consider  some  
of  the  observations  put  forward  by  Goldie  in  regard  to  the  relationship  between  
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the  loss  of  affect  and  intellectual  activity  (2012b),  as  although  Goldie’s  focus  is  
not  on  selfhood,  some  of  his  ideas  could  be  employed  to  account  for  the  effect  
that  a  decreased  ability  to  feel  has  on  the  narrative  self.    
  
The  affects  that  Goldie  considers  in  this  context  are  emotional  dispositions.  He  
claims   that   these   dispositions   can   have   a   general   or  more   specific   focus,   but  
common   to   them   is   the   fact   that   they   “involve   caring   about   whatever   the  
particular   matter   of   the   intellect   might   be”   (2012b:   123).   According   to   him,  
when  these  affects  are  present,  we  are  “disposed”  to  experience  also  a  series  of  
other  emotions   in  particular  circumstances.  For  example,   if   I   care  about  being  
an  active  and  successful  member  of  the  academic  community,  I  will  most  likely  
experience   disappointment   or   sadness   when   I   do   not   get   the   opportunity   to  
give   a   presentation   at   the   most   important   annual   conference   in   my   field.   If  
invited  to  give  a  lecture  or  to  speak  at  a  workshop,  I  would  be  glad  and  excited,  
and  would   feel   proud   if  my   presentation  went  well   or   ashamed   if   it  weren’t  
satisfactory.   Goldie   draws   attention   to   the   fact   that   sometimes   the   responses  
which  would  normally  be  engendered  by  the  disposition  fail  to  take  place  and  
he  explores  what  are  the  implications  of  this  condition  for  our  caring  attitudes.  
Despite  the  value  I  attribute  to  giving  a  significant  contribution  to  my  research  
area,  for  instance,  it  might  happen  that  I  fail  to  feel  any  negative  emotion  when  
my  grant  proposal  is  rejected  or  to  experience  positive  feelings  when  one  of  my  
papers   is   published.   Does   this   mean   that   I   no   longer   care   about   being   an  
academic?   Goldie   observes   that   in   these   cases   we   might   find   it   difficult   to  
determine  whether   the   disposition   is   no   longer   present   or   its   “expression”   is  
just   “temporarily   blocked”   (2012b:   123).   For   example,   it   might   be   that   it   is  
because  I  have  other  serious  concerns  on  my  mind  that  I  do  not  experience  the  
emotions  that  my  disposition  would  normally  give  rise  to,  while  the  disposition  
is,   so   to   speak,   still   intact.  However,  Goldie   emphasises   that   the   loss  of   affect  
can  also   lead  us   to  change  our  commitments  and  values.  He  considers   in   this  
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regard   an   example   taken   from   the   autobiography   of   John   Stuart  Mill   (1873).  
Mill,  who  up  until   that  point   in  his   life  had  convincingly  endorsed  Bentham’s  
and  his  father’s  doctrines,  reports  to  be  experiencing  a  crisis,  which  he  describes  
in  terms  of  a  loss  of  feeling  related  to  the  pursuit  of  specific  philosophical  ideas  
and  of   intellectual   activity  more  generally.  Although,   as  previously  observed,  
sometimes   the   loss   of   affect   is   not   related   to   the   loss   of   the   underlying  
dispositions,  Goldie  remarks  that   in  Mill’s  case  the   loss  of   feeling  is  overcome  
not   by   a   revival   of   the   forms   of   caring   which   were   in   place   previously,   but  
rather   through   the   adoption   of   a   new   set   of   values   (2012b:   124).  As   noted   in  
Chapter  2,  Goldie’s  analysis  of  emotions  is  driven  by  the  idea  that  feelings,  or  at  
least   certain   feelings,   do  not   simply   add   a   subjective   coloration   to   our   beliefs  
and  evaluations,  but  rather  are  constitutive  of  a  particular  way  of  believing  and  
evaluating.  As  such,  a  loss  of  affect  would  also  necessarily  have  an  effect  on  our  
cognitive  and  evaluative  processes  and  this  explains  why  the  disappearance  of  
certain  emotional  dispositions  can  impact  on  the  set  of  beliefs  and  values  held  
by  the  person.  
  
Goldie’s  account   focuses  on   the  effects   that  a  disruption  of  affect  can  have  on  
intellectual  life.  However,  some  of  the  dynamics  he  highlights  are  also  typical  of  
the  way  in  which  autobiographical  narrativity  is  affected  by  the  loss  of  feeling  
in   depression.   I   argued   earlier   that   affectivity   confers   authenticity   on   our   life  
stories.   More   specifically,   I   claimed   that,   in   order   to   be   perceived   as   truly  
representative  of  who  we  are,   the   stories  we   tell  must  be   congruent  with  our  
affective   states.   If   such   correspondence   between   the   contents   of   an  
autobiographical  narrative  and  affective  experience   is  consistently   lacking,   the  
fact   that   the   narrative   really   tells   something   about   ourselves   can   be   put   into  
question.  The  loss  of  affect  in  depression  entails  that  the  feelings  which  would  
normally  be  present  are  no  longer  experienced  and  therefore  the  narratives  are  
left  without  their  usual  affective  counterparts.  Stripped  of  the  range  of  feelings  
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which  would  normally  motivate  and  support  them,  the  narratives  are  no  longer  
perceived   as   authentic   expressions   of   the   self   and,   given   the   role   played   by  
these  stories   in   the  constitution  of   selfhood,   the   loss  of   feeling  can   lead   to   the  
experience  of  losing  oneself.  Yet,  despite  the  fact  that  they  are  not  accompanied  
by  congruent  affects,  these  stories  are  still  accessible  to  the  individual  and  they  
are   still   part   of   his   narrative   repertoire.   The   person,   in   other   terms,   still  
recognises   those   stories   as   his   own,   but   also   experiences   a   misalignment  
between   the   self  which   is   associated  with  affectivity  and  narrative  activity.   In  
other   terms,   in   these   cases   the   depressed   person   is   aware   of   the   lack   of  
correspondence  between  the  experience  of  the  self  as  it  is  narrated  and  her  own  
feelings.   Consider   for   example   the   following   passage   from   Thompson’s  
memoir:  
  
  I   knew   I   was   not   happy.   But   I   had   to   be   happy:   here   was   this   wonderful  
person  who  said  he  loved  me,  who  wanted  to  give  me  everything  in  his   life,  
including   his   children,  who   asked   only   that   I   share  my   life  with   him.  How  
could  I  not  be  happy?  (Thompson,  1996:  126)  
  
In  this  passage,  Thompson  shows  awareness  of  her  story:  she  is  a  person  who  is  
wholeheartedly  loved  by  someone  and  who  should  find  this  situation  fulfilling  
and  enjoyable.  She  can  still  grasp  this  narrative  as  pertaining  to  her  condition,  
but  she  also  notices  that  her  emotions  are  not  the  ones  that  should  be  associated  
with  that  particular  narrative.  Another  example  of  this  dynamic  is  provided  by  
Sylvia  Plath  in  The  Bell  Jar:  
  
I  was  supposed  to  be  having  the  time  of  my  life.  
I  was  supposed  to  be  the  envy  of  thousands  of  other  college  girls  just  like  me  
all  over  America  […].  
And   when   my   picture   came   out   in   the   magazine   the   twelve   of   us   were  
working  on  […]  everybody  would  think  I  must  be  having  a  real  whirl.  Look  at  
what  can  happen   in   this  country,   they’d  say.  A  girl   lives   in  some  out-­‐‑of-­‐‑the-­‐‑
way   town   for  nineteen  years,   so  poor   she   can’t   afford  a  magazine,   and   then  
she  gets  a  scholarship  to  college  and  wins  a  prize  here  and  a  prize  there  and  
ends  up  steering  New  York  like  her  own  private  car.  
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Only  I  wasn’t  steering  anything,  not  even  myself.  (2005:  2)  
  
As   shown   by   this   passage,   the   narratives   which   are   affected   by   the   loss   of  
feeling   in   depression   are   not   necessarily   crafted   by   the   patient.   It   is   indeed  
possible  to  experience  a  loss  of  feeling  not  only  in  relation  to  the  stories  that  we  
have  been  telling  about  ourselves,  but  also  in  regard  to  the  ones  that  we  think  
others   would   identify   us   with.   In   any   case,   the   distinction   between   the   two  
types  of  stories  is  not  always  neat,  since,  as  I  stressed  previously,  our  personal  
narratives  are  deeply  intertwined  from  the  very  beginning  with  the  scripts  that  
are  provided  by  the  social  and  cultural  environment.  In  addition,  it  may  be  the  
case  that  it  is  exactly  by  virtue  of  their  being  socially  and  culturally  shared  that  
the  life  stories  of  the  depressed  patient  can  persist  for  a  certain  period  of  time  
despite   the   fact   that   they   are   no   longer   supported   by   a   congruent   affective  
experience.   From   this   perspective,   the   fact   that   one’s   stories   are  
intersubjectively  negotiated  confers  on  them  a  degree  of  resistance  to  change,  so  
that   we   might   go   on   telling   them   even   when   they   no   longer   feel   authentic  
because  they  are  the  stories  that  people  we  are  more  or  less  close  to  take  to  be  
true   of   ourselves.   However,   if   the   lack   of   affective   resonance   is   persistent,   it  
ultimately  affects  the  ability  of  the  person  to  identity  with  and  uphold  her  life  
narratives.  
  
The  loss  of  feeling  can  have  such  a  radical  impact  on  the  person’s  narrative  self-­‐‑
understanding  because   it  affects  not  only   the  person’s   current  experience,  but  
also  her  ability  to  empathically  access  her  previous  mental  states.  I  illustrated  in  
Chapter  3  how  Schechtman’s  notion  of  “empathic  access”  (1996;  2001;  2007)  can  
be   interpreted   as  designating   a   level   of   continuity   in   the  person’s   experience.  
Emphatic  access  is  indeed  conceived  as  a  phenomenological  connection  to  one’s  
previous  mental  states,  a  connection  that  presupposes  that  these  are  still  part  of  
one’s   mental   life,   although   their   role   and   degree   of   importance   can   be   quite  
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different  from  what  it  was  in  the  past.  Due  to  the  role  it  plays  in  the  constitution  
of  the  person’s  evaluative  perspective  and  in  the  motivation  of  her  behaviour,  I  
claimed   that   affectivity   is   key   in   this   context   and   I   maintained   that   at   least  
certain   emotions   should   persist   over   time   in   order   for   the   person   to   retain  
empathic   access   to   her   past.   As   such,   it   is   arguable   that   the   loss   of   feeling  
negatively   impacts   on   the   depressed   person’s   ability   to   retain   such   an  
experiential   connection   to  her  previous  mental   states,   thus   further  weakening  
the  continuity  of  her  narrative  self.  
    
It   should   now   be   clearer   why   depressed   people   who   perceive   a   lack   of  
congruence   between   their   narratives   and   affects   often   report   an   alteration   of  
self-­‐‑experience   which   can   be   described   as   a   “loss   of   self”.   Once   they   are   no  
longer   sustained   by   an   adequate   range   of   feelings,   the   authenticity   of   one’s  
autobiographical  narratives  can  be  put  into  question  and  the  depressed  patient  
then  wonders  whether  she  is  really  the  person  depicted  by  those  narratives.  In  
addition,  since  the  possibility  to  have  empathic  access  to  one’s  past  ensures  that  
the   self   we   narrate   has   a   degree   of   continuity,   the   inability   of   the   depressed  
patient   to   retain   this   form   of   access   to   her   previous   mental   states   makes   it  
difficult   for   her   to   identify   her   current   self   with   the   one   associated  with   her  
previous  narratives.    
  
This  does  not  mean  that  the  patient  is  no  longer  sure  to  be  numerically  the  same  
individual   who   underwent   the   experiences   and   performed   the   actions  
described   in  his   life   stories   –  his   sense  of  physical   continuity   is   indeed   intact.  
Rather,   his   questioning   concerns   the   type   of   person   he   is   and,   in   particular,  
whether   he   really   has   the   values   and   personality   depicted   in   his  
autobiographical  narratives.  This  form  of  doubting  is  expressed  for  example  in  




I   have  been  getting  on   and  off   aeroplanes  on  my  own   since   I  was   ten  years  
old.  I  am  fiercely  independent.   I  am  fierce.  Or  so  people  tell  me.  Used  to  tell  
me.  I  never  used  to  be  so  afraid.  When  I  was  one  of  his  editors,  I  used  to  stand  
up  against  Rupert  Murdoch,  arguing  with  him.  I  used  to  be  so  brave.  I  used  to  
be  somebody.  
I  am  still  somebody.  
Aren’t  I?  
But  who?  
I   am   somebody   who   can’t   leave   her   bedroom,   somebody   who   can’t   walk  
across  a  road  to  buy  a  newspaper.  (Brampton,  2009:  34-­‐‑35)  
  
The   loss  of   feeling  characteristic  of  depression  has  a   significant   impact  on   the  
structure  of  narrative  self-­‐‑experience;  however,  this  is  not  the  only  aspect  of  the  
relationship   between   affectivity   and   narrativity   in   the   illness.  Apart   from   the  
diminishment   or   disappearance   of   certain   affective   reactions,   the   depressed  
person   also   experiences   a   number   of   feelings   which   in   non-­‐‑pathological  
conditions  are  usually  absent  or  possess  a  different  form.  In  this  regard,  central  
to  depression  are  for  example  feelings  of  guilt,  hopelessness,  and  isolation  and  I  
will   show   in   the   next   section   how   they   give   rise   to   narratives   that   possess  
specific  characteristics.    
  
3.  The  Emergence  of  New  Narratives  
3.1.  Cognitive  Disturbances  and  Pessimistic  Explanatory  Style  
  
It   has   been   observed   that   the   autobiographical   narratives   constructed   by  
depressed   people   have   specific   features.   Angus   and   Greenberg,   for   example,  
claim  that  depressive  story-­‐‑telling  is  characterised  by  the  presence  of  the  “same  
old   stories”,   namely   “overgeneral   descriptions”   regarding   interpersonal  
dynamics  and  emotional  states  that  are  considered  to  be  maladaptive  (2011:  62).    
  
The  recurrence  of  certain  narratives  in  the  depressed  person’s  story-­‐‑telling  can  
be   related   to   the   repetition   of   the   same   thought   patterns   which   is   often  
described   as   a   central   feature   of   the   disorder   –   what   is   usually   known   as  
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“rumination”.51   This   aspect   of   the   illness   is   illustrated   by   Brampton   in   her  
memoir  as  follows:  
  
the  depressive’s  perspective  may  become  shrouded  with  an  excess  of  intensity  
and  negativity  or  what  we  depressives  know  as  ‘stinking  thinking’.  That’s  the  
sort  of  thought  process  that  keeps  us  dwelling  on  old  emotions  or  hurts  and,  
literally,  playing   the   same   track  over   and  over   again.   It   has   little   to  do  with  
reality  but  is  simply  a  malfunction  of  thinking.  It   is  that  sort  of  thinking  that  
therapy  seeks  to  correct.  (2009:  293)    
  
A  similar  experience  is  described  by  Thompson:  
  
I  worked,  or   tried  to  –  but   like  a  machine  whose  circuits  are  slowly  winking  
out,  my  brain  each  day  found  a  smaller  and  smaller  focus.  I  thought  the  same  
thoughts  over  and  over  again;  on  Tuesday,   I   re-­‐‑created   the  work  I  had  done  
on  Monday.  (1996:  132)  
  
Repetitiveness   thus   appears   to   be   an   important   characteristic   of   depressive  
thinking   and   story-­‐‑telling.   In   order   to   best   understand   the   structure   of  
autobiographical   narrativity   in   the   illness,   however,   it   is   not   enough   to  
highlight  that  certain  narratives  are  often  repeated.  What  is  important  is  indeed  
the   fact   that,   even  when   the  patient   is  not   telling  exactly   the   same  stories,  his  
narratives  have  significant  similarities  from  the  point  of  view  of  both  form  and  
content.    
  
A   deeper   understanding   of   the   structure   of   the   narratives   that   recur   in  
depression  can  be  achieved  by  considering  in  more  detail  some  of  the  cognitive  
dynamics  typical  of  the  syndrome.  It  has  indeed  been  widely  claimed  that  the  
illness   is   characterised   by   the   presence   of   specific   alterations   of   thought   and  
judgement.  This  idea  is  at  the  core  of  cognitive  theories  of  depression  (e.g.  Beck,  
1972),   which   emphasise   the   role   played   by   cognition   in   the   generation   of  
affective   experience.   Beck,   for   instance,   draws   attention   to   the   fact   that   the  
                                                   
51 Rumination   has   been   claimed   to   be   predictive   of   both   depressive   symptoms   and  
depressive  disorders  (Nolen-­‐‑Hoeksema,  2000).  
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cognitive   processes   of   the   depressed   person   focus   on   particular   contents   and  
display  a  particular  formal  structure  (1972).  As  far  as  contents  are  concerned,  he  
observes   that   depressive   thoughts   often   revolve   around   low   self-­‐‑evaluations,  
which  are   characterised  as  unrealistic   ratings  of   the  person’s   abilities   in   areas  
that   she   considers   to  be  very   important.   In  addition   to   low  self-­‐‑evaluations,   a  
significant   role   in   the   thoughts  of   some  depressed  patients   is  played  by  “self-­‐‑
criticism”  and  “self-­‐‑blame”  in  regard  to  the  person’s  alleged  failures  (1972:  232).  
Other   common   depressive   thoughts   focus   on   “ideas   of   deprivation”   such   as  
being  “alone,  unwanted  and  unlovable”,  problems  and  responsibilities  that  are  
considered   to   be   unmanageable,   “self   commands   and   injunctions”,   and   the  
desire   to   find  some   form  of  escape   from  one’s  problems  or   to  commit   suicide  
(1972:  232-­‐‑233).  Beck  suggests  that  depressive  cognitions  are  characterised  by  a  
distortion   of   reality   achieved   through   various   mechanisms.   In   this   regard,  
depressed   patients   show   a   tendency   to   draw   conclusions  without   possessing  
adequate  evidence  to  support  them  (“arbitrary  inference”)  (1972:  234),  interpret  
events   by   focusing   on   details   which   are   taken   out   of   context   (“selective  
abstraction”)  (1972:  234),  underestimate  or  exaggerate  the  importance  of  certain  
events   (“magnification   and  minimization”)   (1972:   235)   and   inaccurately   label  
the   events   that   they   experience   (“inexact   labelling”)   (1972:   235).   To   these  
features   Beck   adds   a   series   of   formal   characteristics   that   in   his   opinion   are  
typical   of   depressive   thinking.   According   to   him,   the   depressed   person  
experiences   the   thoughts   described   above   as   arising   automatically,   that   is   as  
disconnected   from   any   previous   thought   process.   In   addition,   the   thoughts  
appear   to   occur   involuntarily,   namely   despite   the   patient’s   resolution   not   to  
entertain  them.  Other  formal  characteristics  of  depressive  thinking  identified  by  
Beck   are   the   “plausibility”   that   the   patients   perceive   them   to   have   and   their  
tendency   to   recur   across   a   wide   range   of   situations   (“perseveration”)   (1972:  




Considering   the   way   in   which   the   depressed   person   thinks,   as   regards   both  
contents  and  form,  can  enhance  our  understanding  of  the  distinctive  character  
of   autobiographical   story-­‐‑telling   in   the   disorder.   Particularly   relevant   in   this  
context  is  the  centrality  to  depression  of  what  Seligman  (2006)  considers  to  be  a  
specific   “explanatory   style”,   that   is   a   way   of   understanding   the   causes   and  
implications   of   events   which   comprises   three   dimensions:   permanence,  
pervasiveness,   and  personalisation.   Seligman   suggests   that   assessing   people’s  
explanations  along   these  dimensions  makes   it  possible   to  distinguish  between  
“optimistic”   and   “pessimistic”   explanatory   styles   and   shows   that   the   latter   is  
typical   of   the   way   in   which   people   with   depression   interpret   events.      More  
specifically,  people  who  have  a  pessimistic   explanatory   style   tend   to   consider  
the  causes  of  bad  events  as  permanent  rather  than  temporary.  For  example,  they  
might  attribute  the  cause  of  an  unpleasant  interaction  with  their  boss  at  work  to  
the   fact   that  “the  boss   is  a  bastard”  rather   than   thinking   that  “the  boss   is   in  a  
bad  mood”  (Seligman,  2006:  44).  The  pervasiveness  dimension  is  related  to  the  
extent  to  which  the  explanation  of  a  bad  event  is  connected  to  other  dimensions  
of  a  person’s  life.  In  particular,  according  to  Seligman,  bad  events  can  be  given  
specific  or  universal  explanations:  for  example,  it  is  possible  to  explain  a  romantic  
rejection   by   thinking   of   oneself   as   being   repulsive   to   that   particular   person  
(specific)   or   as   being   repulsive   in   general   (universal)   (2006:   47).   When   bad  
events   are   given   universal   explanations   the   negative   feelings   associated  with  
them   can   spread   to   other   aspects   of   the   person’s   life.   In   contrast,   specific  
explanations   help   to   circumscribe   one’s   affective   reactions.   The   difference  
between   optimistic   and   pessimistic   explanatory   styles   in   this   regard   is  
described  by  Seligman  as  follows:  
  
Some  people  can  put  their  troubles  neatly  into  a  box  and  go  about  their  lives  
even  when  one  important  aspect  of  it  –  their  job,  for  example,  or  their  love  life  
–  is  suffering.  Others  bleed  all  over  everything.  They  catastrophize.  When  one  




Finally,   the   personalisation   dimension   has   to   do   with   the   factors   that   are  
identified  as   responsible   for   the  occurrence  of  particular   events.  According   to  
Seligman,   when   something   bad   happens,   people   who   have   a   pessimistic  
explanatory   style   tend   to   blame   themselves,   while   optimistic   people   in   these  
circumstances   are   more   inclined   to   attribute   responsibility   to   others   or   to  
external  factors.  For  example,  upon  losing  a  game  of  poker,  the  pessimist  might  
think   that   it   is   because   he   has   “no   talent”   at   that   game,   while   the   optimist  
would  tend  to  ascribe  the  failure  to  other,  non-­‐‑personal,  elements  such  as  bad  
luck  (2006:  50).    
  
Although   Seligman   is   not   concerned   with   story-­‐‑telling,   his   observations   can  
enhance  our  understanding  of  narrativity  in  depression  because  they  regard  the  
way   in   which   people   interpret   and   connect   various   events   in   their   life.  
According  to  the  characterisation  I  have  adopted  in  this  work,  the  events  which  
are  presented  in  a  narrative  are  not  merely   juxtaposed  to  one  another,  but  are  
rather   related   through   a   number   of   causal   and   meaningful   connections.   As  
such,   the   three   aspects   which   are   integral   to   the   notion   of   explanatory   style  
appear  to  be  very  relevant  to  story-­‐‑telling  in  so  far  as  they  concern  the  way  in  
which  people  relate  particular  events  to  certain  causes  and  other  dimensions  of  
their  life.    
    
3.2.  The  Affective  Roots  of  Depressive  Story-­‐‑Telling  
  
How   could   the   consideration   of   affectivity   be   helpful   in   explaining   the  
characteristics   of   depressive   cognition   and   narrativity   here   outlined?   In   the  
following   I  will   argue   that   the   recurrence  of   the   same   stories   in   the  narrative  
repertoire   of   depressed   people   and   their   tendency   to   conceive   of   negative  
events  as  personally  caused,  permanent,  and  possessing  pervasive  implications  
is  due   to  a   specific   transformation  of   affective   experience.   In  particular,   I  will  
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highlight  the  role  played  in  the  emergence  of  depressive  narratives  not  only  by  
the  presence  of  specific  emotions  –  characterised  as  intentional  affective  states  –  
but  also  of  particular  background  affective  orientations.  
  
The   element   of   personalisation   in   the   explanatory   style   of   people   affected   by  
depression  can  be  connected  to  the  role  played  in  the  illness  by  feelings  of  guilt,  
shame,   unworthiness,   hopelessness   and   helplessness.  Among   these,   however,  
the   experience   of   a   particular   form   of   guilt   is   arguably   fundamental   in  
determining   the   tendency  of  certain  patients   to  explain  bad  events  by  making  
personal  rather  than  external  causal  attributions.    
  
Guilt  is  a  self-­‐‑evaluative  emotion,  and,  in  particular,  it  is  often  characterised  as  
an   emotion  which   involves  moral   blameworthiness   (e.g.   Prinz,   2010;   Roberts,  
2003).   It   is   frequently   claimed   that   guilt,   in   contrast   for   example   to   shame,  
involves  an  appraisal  of  particular  acts  and  behaviours  and  not  an  evaluation  of  
the   self   as   a  whole.   In   addition,   guilt   is   also   considered   to  be   at   the  origin  of  
reparative   or   pro-­‐‑social   behaviours,   while   shame   is   associated   with  
concealment  tendencies  (e.g.  Lewis,  1971;  Lewis,  1992;  Tangney  et  al.,  2007).52  
  
Ratcliffe   (2010)   draws   attention   to   the   fact   that   sometimes,   rather   than   being  
experienced  in  connection  with  more  or  less  specific  deeds,  guilt  is  experienced  
as   a   feature   of   the   self:   this   is   the   difference   between   feeling   guilty   about  
something  and  simply  feeling  guilty.  In  addition,  he  also  distinguishes  between  
“contingent”   and   “irrevocable”   forms   of   guilt   and   further   remarks   that   the  
latter   is  usually  associated  with   feelings  of  guilt   that  are  not  about   something  
specific   (2010:   607).   In  his  opinion,  while   the   experience  of   contingent  guilt   is  
characterised   by   the   sense   that   things   could   be  different   and   that   guilt   is   not  
                                                   
52 See   Teroni   and   Deonna   (2008)   for   a   critical   discussion   of   various   accounts   of   the  
difference  between  shame  and  guilt.    
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one’s   only   possible   condition,   irrevocable   guilt   is   experienced   as   absolute,  
irreversible  and  irredeemable.  Ratcliffe  suggests   that   the   latter   form  of  guilt   is  
sometimes   present   in   severe   depression:   in   these   cases,   guilt   has   a   pre-­‐‑
intentional  character  and  radically  constrains  the  range  of  possibilities  that  the  
individual   can   experience.   Indeed,  when  guilt   is   experienced   as   characterised  
by   irrevocability,  any  particular  opportunity  of  reparation   is   ruled  out  and  all  
alternative  existential  conditions  appear  as  no  longer  attainable  by  the  subject.  
In  Ratcliffe’s  words:  
  
When  one  feels  that  one  has  become  guilty  due  to  some  deed,  the  recognition  
that   things   could   have   been   otherwise   remains   and   a   sense   of   contingency  
thus   attaches   to   the   guilt.   Similarly   one   might   feel   that   one’s   existence   is  
contingently   flawed,   that   there   is   hope   of   redemption.   Irrevocable   guilt,   in  
contrast,   involves   the   sense   that   being   guilty   is   part   of   one’s   essence;   one  
could  not  have  been  otherwise  and  could  therefore  never  be  otherwise.  (2010:  
607)  
  
In  addition,  Ratcliffe  suggests  that  existential  forms  of  guilt  also  restrict  the  set  
of  affective   states   that   can  be  undergone,  making   it  difficult   for   the   subject   to  
experience  certain  types  of  emotion.  As  existential  guilt  can  be  identified  with  
an   evaluation   of   the   self   as   morally   blameworthy,   it   is   arguable   that   affects  
which  are  in  conflict  with  such  an  evaluation,  such  as  pride  or  a  sense  of  self-­‐‑
worth  and   self-­‐‑esteem,  will  no   longer  be   accessible   to   the  person.  When  guilt  
acquires   an   existential   form,   particularly   when   it   is   felt   as   irrevocable,   the  
individual  can  only  experience  and  conceive  of  himself  as  culpable.  Because  of  
this   predicament,  when   she   has   to   provide   an   explanation   of   bad   events,   the  
person   who   feels   absolutely   and   irredeemably   guilty   is   more   inclined   to  
attribute  responsibility  to  herself  than  someone  who  is  not  in  the  grip  of  such  a  
feeling.    
  
On  a  more  general   level,   the   tendency  of   the  depressed  person   to  account   for  
the  causes  of  bad  events   in  personal   terms  can  be   further  explained  by  taking  
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into   consideration   another   phenomenon   typical   of   the   illness,   namely   “self-­‐‑
absorption”  (Brampton,  2009:  43).  This  can  be  described  as   the   tendency  to  be  
preoccupied   almost   exclusively   with   the   self   and   its   experiences,   so   that   the  
affects   and   thoughts   of   the  patients   become  predominantly   self-­‐‑directed.  This  
feature  of  depression  can  be  related  to  various  other  aspects  of  the  disorder.  On  
the  one  hand,  due  to  the  diminishment  or  loss  of  feeling,  the  external  world  is  
no  longer  perceived  by  depressed  patients  as  enticing,  but  is  rather  experienced  
as   “flat”,   as   if   it   was   looked   at   from   behind   glass,   and   this   arguably   can  
exacerbate  the  patients’  tendency  to  become  absorbed  in  their  own  mental  lives.  
On  the  other  hand,  typical  of  depression  are  also  disturbances  of  intersubjective  
experience  which  foster   the  feeling  of  being  detached  from  the  external  world  
and  can  result   in  a  sense  of   isolation,  “segregation”  and  “expulsion”  from  the  
social  dimension  (Fuchs,  2013:  226),  thus  further  drawing  the  person’s  attention  
‘inward’.   The   fact   of   being   primarily   concerned   with   themselves   rather   than  
being   engaged   in   various   interactions   with   others   and   the   external   world  
arguably  makes  it  easier  for  depressed  people  to  focus  on  the  self  when  looking  
for  the  causes  of  bad  events.  
  
The   tendency   of   depressed   patients   to   provide   permanent   as   opposed   to  
temporary   explanations   can   also   be   understood   in   relation   to   the   existential  
transformations  they  undergo.  In  particular,  feelings  of  hopelessness  can  play  a  
central   role   in   this   regard.   As   exemplified   by   the   following   passage   of  
Brampton’s  memoir,  characteristic  of  depression  is  indeed  the  loss  of  hope  that  
things  could  ever  be  different:  
  
For  two  years  I  had  seen  nothing,  no  chink  of  light,  no  sense  of  possibility  that  
I  would  ever  be  well  again.  I  was  not  interested  in  the  future,  I  was  interested  
(if   that’s   a   word   that   could   possibly   be   applied   to   my   furious,   nihilistic  
despair)   in  the  present,   in  the  unendurable  pain  I  felt,  which  was  a  pain  that  




The  loss  of  hope  and  the  structure  that  this  experience  has  in  depression  have  
been  investigated  from  a  phenomenological  perspective  by  Ratcliffe  too  (2013b).  
At   the   core   of   his   account   is   the   distinction   between   intentional   and   pre-­‐‑
intentional  forms  of  hope,  where  the  former  is  characterised  as  a  kind  of  hope  
with  a  more  or  less  specific  content  and  the  latter  is  conceived  as  an  existential  
feeling   that  makes   intentional   forms   of   hope   possible.  According   to   Ratcliffe,  
this  distinction   is   reflected   in   the  different   forms  of   hopelessness   that  we   can  
experience.   It   is   indeed   possible   to   distinguish   between   losing   some   or   all   of  
one’s   intentional  hopes  and   losing   the  “possibility  of  hoping”   itself,  which,   in  
Ratcliffe’s   opinion,  would   be   the   loss   of   hope   characteristic   of   at   least   certain  
cases   of   severe  depression.   In   these   cases,   the   loss   of   hope  does   not   regard   a  
specific  possibility  or   range  of  possibilities,   but   is   rather   to  be   identified  with  
the  “absence  of   the   capacity   to  hope   for  anything”   (2013b:   605),   an  existential  
change  that  amounts  to  a  radical  alteration  of  the  person’s  experience.    
  
The   loss   of   hope   characteristic   of   depression,   as   well   as   the   tendency   to  
interpret  events  in  permanent  terms  associated  with  it,  is  also  related  to  the  way  
in   which   time   is   experienced   in   the   disorder.   Depression   is   characterised   by  
significant  alterations  of   temporal  experience  and   these  have  been  extensively  
investigated  by  a  number  of  phenomenological  accounts  (e.g.  Binswanger,  2006;  
Fuchs,   2013;   Ratcliffe,   2012).   Providing   a   complete   overview   of   the   different  
features   of   temporal   experience   in  depression  would   exceed   the   scope  of   this  
chapter.  For  the  purpose  of  my  analysis,  however,  I  want  to  consider  an  aspect  
on   the   recognition   of   which   various   accounts   seem   to   converge.   It   is   often  
claimed   that   the  way   in  which   the  depressed  person  experiences   the   future   is  
deeply  altered.  In  particular,  in  depression  the  ability  to  conceive  of  the  future  
as  comprising  a  number  of  different  possibilities  is  lost  and  the  person’s  painful  
condition   acquires   a   seemingly   eternal   character   (Ratcliffe,   2010).   For   the  
depressed  person,  the  future  does  not  harbour  any  opportunity  for  change  and  
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is   thus   perceived   as   an   endless   repetition   of   the   present.   In   addition,   this  
condition   has   implications   for   the   way   in   which   the   past   is   experienced.   If  
nothing  new  can  happen  in  the  future,  the  meaning  of  one’s  past  is  fixed  and  it  
can  no  longer  be  undone.  As  such,  it  is  possible  to  claim  that  in  depression  past,  
present,  and  future  become  static  dimensions  and  no  possibility  to  escape  from  
the  person’s  painful  condition  is  given.  This  dynamic  is  described  by  Wyllie  in  
the  following  terms:    
  
Here  “now”  and  “yet-­‐‑to-­‐‑come”  are  no  longer  moving  apart  from  each  other  as  
is   their   being   because   they   are   bound   to   one   another   in   suffering.  With   the  
future  “closed,”  the  sufferer’s  experience  of  the  past  also  becomes  disordered  
because   the   past   can   no   longer   be   experienced   as   a   horizon   onto   the   open  
future.   The   past   itself   becomes   fixed   once   and   for   all   because   it   cannot   be  
abolished   by   any   future   living,   because   the   suffering   present   displaces   the  
past  and  future  and  deprives  the  lived  present  of  its  value.  (2005:  182-­‐‑183)  
  
Arguably   it   is   because   of   such   a   disruption   of   temporal   experience   that  
depressed  people   tend   to  explain  bad  events   in  permanent   terms.   Indeed,   the  
inability   to  perceive  their  current  situation  as   temporally  circumscribed,  along  
with  the  sense  that   the  past  cannot  be  given  any  new  meaning  and  the  future  
will   just   be   a   replica   of   their   present   condition,   lead   depressed   people   to  
attribute  a  permanent  character  to  the  negative  circumstances  they  face.  Such  an  
account   is   also   consonant  with   the   some   of   the   insights   into   the   relationship  
between  existential  feelings  and  narrative  developed  by  Ratcliffe  (forthcoming)  
and,  in  particular,  his  view  of  the  form  taken  by  this  relationship  in  depression.  
As   discussed   in  Chapter   3,   Ratcliffe   suggests   that   the   loss   of   certain   kinds   of  
possibilities  and  the  sense  that  things  could  never  be  different  negatively  affect  
the   ability   of   the   depressed   person   to   construct   narratives   where   alternative  
conceptions  of   the  self  and  its  circumstances  are  entertained.   It  seems  that   the  
tendency  of  depressed  patients  to  interpret  bad  events  in  permanent  terms  is  a  
particular   aspect   of   the   lack   of   “narrative   openness”   which,   according   to  
Ratcliffe,  often  marks  depressive  story-­‐‑telling.  In  other  terms,  due  to  the  radical  
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loss   of   hope   and   alteration   of   temporal   experience   they   undergo,   depressed  
patients   become   unable   to   conceive   of   their   situation   as   transient   and   thus  
produce  rigid,  unchanging  self-­‐‑narratives  where  their  predicament  is  depicted  
as  eternal.    
  
Further   insights   into   the   tendency   of   depressed   people   to   provide   not   only  
permanent   but   also   pervasive   explanations   can   be   gained   through   the  
examination  of  the  way  in  which  they  experience  space.  It  has  been  argued  that  
depression   is   characterised   by   an   alteration   not   only   of   temporal,   but   also   of  
spatial  experience.  As  far  as  the  experience  of  objects  is  concerned,  it  is  claimed  
that,  due   to   feelings  of  powerlessness   and   the   loss  of   emotional   saliences,   the  
depressed  person  tends  to  experience  things  as  being  far  away  and  difficult  to  
reach   (Sass   and  Pienkos,   2013b).  At   the   same   time,   however,   characteristic   of  
depression  is  often  also  a  sense  of  oppression,  of  being  confined  or  trapped,  so  
that  the  experiential  space  of  the  depressed  person  appears  to  be  both  restricted  
and   overwhelming   (Taylor-­‐‑Aiken,   2011).   Apart   from   these   features,   it   seems  
that   spatial   experience   in   depression   undergoes   also   another   transformation  
relative   to   the  way   in  which   boundaries   are   perceived   and   I   believe   that   the  
tendency  to  attribute  to  bad  events  a  pervasive  character  is  at  least  partly  rooted  
in  such  a  transformation.    
  
Within  the  field  of  phenomenological  psychopathology,  the  notion  of  space  has  
been  given  particular  attention  by  Binswanger  in  the  context  of  his  analysis  of  
schizophrenic  experience  (2001).  Although  depression  and  schizophrenia  differ  
in   a   number   of   fundamental   ways,   I   would   like   to   suggest   that   some   of   the  
observations  put   forward  by  Binswanger   can  be  helpful   in  accounting   for   the  
experience  of  depressed  patients  too.    
  
Considering  the  structure  of  delusional  experience  with  reference  to  the  case  of  
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Suzanne  Urban,  Binswanger  (2001)  suggests  that  the  schizophrenic  patient  has  
the  sense  that  everything  is  in  contact  with  the  self  and  everything  is  in  contact  
with   everything   else,   that   is   his   experience   of   causality   is   deeply   altered.   In  
particular,   it   is  claimed  that   in   the  world  as   it   is  experienced   in  schizophrenia  
causal  connections  are  ubiquitous  and  random  events  are  totally  absent.  These  
connections   can   be   either   physical   (optical,   acoustic,   tactile)   or   concern  
cognitive  dynamics  (Binswanger,  2001:  113):  for  the  schizophrenic  person  even  
thoughts  acquire  a  spatial  character  (Sass,  2000),  being  seen  as  something  which  
can  be  inserted  into  someone’s  head  by  an  external  force,  exactly  like  material  
objects   can   be   put   in   or   taken   out   of   a   container.   It   thus   seems   that   in  
schizophrenia   the  experience  of   the  demarcation  between  self,  others,  and   the  
external  world  is  radically  altered:  from  this  perspective,  everything  is  seen  as  
potentially   impacting   on   the   self,   because   boundaries   are   perceived   to   be  
extremely  loose  or  even  absent.  
  
In   his   account   Binswanger   is   concerned   with   the   experience   of   space   in  
schizophrenia.  However,  by  focusing  on  how  boundaries  between  self,  others,  
and  the  world  are  perceived  in  the  illness,  he  draws  attention  to  an  experiential  
dimension  that  is  crucial  to  the  understanding  also  of  the  depressive  condition.  
While,  unlike  the  schizophrenic  person,  the  depressed  patient  retains  a  sense  of  
there  being  a  clear  separation  between  herself  and  external  people  and  objects,  
arguably  she  has  an  altered  perception  of  the  boundaries  which  exist  between  
various   dimensions   of   her   life.   Although   there   is   a   fundamental   connection  
between   the  different  domains   in  which  our  everyday  existence  develops,  we  
ordinarily  experience  them  as  being,  at  least  to  a  certain  degree,  separated  and  
impermeable   to   each   other.   For   instance,   it   is   possible   to   be   unhappy   about  
one’s  current  professional  situation  while  being  completely  satisfied  about  the  
status  of  one’s  interpersonal  relationships,  or  being  frustrated  about  a  perceived  
lack   of   cultural   stimuli   while   feeling   perfectly   balanced   and   healthy   from   a  
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physical   perspective.   In   other   words,   although   there   can   be   a   reciprocal  
influence  between   the  various  dimensions  of  our   life,   the  positive  or  negative  
feelings   associated  with  one  of   them  do  not   automatically  give   rise   to   similar  
attitudes   in   the  others.  This  experiential   feature   seems   to  be  deeply  altered   in  
depression.   For   the   depressed   person   there   is   little   separation   between   the  
various   domains   of   her   existence:   these   domains   are,   so-­‐‑to-­‐‑speak,   highly  
permeable  to  each  other,  and  the  feelings  which  are  experienced  in  one  of  them  
rapidly   come   to   colour   all   the   others.  As   a   result   of   this   predicament,   people  
affected  by  depression  tend  to  interpret  negative  events  in  pervasive  terms  and  
the   effects   that   a   setback   concerning   a   particular   situation   or   sphere   of   the  
person’s   life   can   have   are  much  more   extensive   than   in   ordinary   experience.  
This   seems   to   be   the   condition   described   by   Thompson   in   the   following  
passage:  
  
The  trouble  was,  facts  had  no  boundaries;  they  unfolded  like  paper  accordions  
in  my  head,  offering  vistas  of  a  catastrophic  future.  My  parents  were  getting  
old;  that  meant  someday  they  would  get  sick  and  die.  I  had  made  a  C  on  my  
English  paper;   that  meant   I  was  stupid  and  would  not  get  a  decent   job  after  
college.   I  didn’t  have  a  date  for  Saturday  night;   that  meant  I  would  be  alone  
forever.  (1996:  42)  
  
As  observed  by  Thompson,   in   the  depressed  person’s   experience   the   sense  of  
there   being   “boundaries”   between   the   situations   she   experiences   and   other  
events   or   dimensions   of   her   life   is   weakened   and   this   is   what   grounds   the  
person’s  tendency  to  give  “pervasive”  explanations  and  to  “catastrophise”.  
  
I  have  highlighted  so  far  how  a  characteristic  aspect  of  depressive  experience  is  
the   recurrence  of  particular   cognitive  processes  and,  more  broadly,  of   specific  
autobiographical  narratives.  The  depressed  person,  I  argued,  has  the  tendency  
to  construct  life  stories  that  possess  specific  structural  and  experiential  features  
and   these   originate   in   particular   configurations   of   affective   experience.  
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Depressive   story-­‐‑telling   is   thus  characterised  not  only  by   the   repetition  of   the  
“same   old   stories”   (Angus   and   Greenberg,   2011),   but   also   by   a   certain  
fungibility   of   their   contents,   a   phenomenon   described   by   Binswanger   as  
“‘interchangeability  of  melancholic  contents’”  (2006:  33).53  One  of  the  examples  
Binswanger  provides  in  this  regard  concerns  the  accounts  given  by  patients  of  
the   causes   of   their   depression.   Relevant   in   this   context   is   the   case   of   David  
Bürge,  a  merchant  who  had  given  a  financial  guarantee  of  40,000  francs  and  had  
come   to   believe   that   he  wouldn’t   be   able   to   get   his  money   back.   Binswanger  
reports  that  David  was  convinced  that  his  depression  depended  on  the  financial  
loss   he   expected   to   incur,   and,   as   such,   was   persuaded   that   he   would   have  
never   been   able   to   recover.   However,   when   the   money   was   unexpectedly  
returned   to   David,   no   improvement   was   experienced.   On   the   contrary,   the  
patient  minimised  the  importance  of  the  guarantee  and  found  other  reasons  to  
be  depressed.  As  suggested  by  Binswanger,  depression  is  thus  related  more  to  a  
particular   way   of   experiencing   things,   rather   than   to   the   particular  
circumstances  the  depressed  person  finds  herself  in.  As  such,  there  is  a  sense  in  
which  depression   can  be   considered   to   be   independent   of  what   the  person   is  
depressed  about  and  should  rather  be   identified  with  a  particular  experiential  
structure   that   is   compatible   with   different   contents.   Therefore,   as   far   as  
narrativity  is  concerned,  a  characteristic  of  depression  is  not  only  that  there  are  
some   stories  which   recur   in   the   individual   narrative   repertoire,   but   also   that  
there   are   different   stories  which   can   all   be   traced   back   to   the   same   narrative  
“script”  or  “schema”.  One  of  these  frameworks  has  to  do  with  what  Binswanger  
calls   “melancholic   self-­‐‑accusation”   (2006:   32),   that   is   the   tendency   of   people  
affected  by   the  disturbance   to  blame  themselves   for  something   that   they  have  
done   or   failed   to   do.   Binswanger   observes   that   the   melancholic   person  
manifests  this  tendency  for  example  through  the  use  of  expressions  such  as  “I  
                                                   
53 My  translation.  
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should   have”   or   “I   shouldn’t   have”54   (2006:   33)   and   remarks   that   these  
expressions  usually  concern  something  that   the  patient   feels  guilty  about.  The  
melancholic   person,   he   notes,   often   blames   herself   for   some   deed   that   she  
would   be   responsible   for   towards   others,   society   or   in   the   religious   sphere  
(Binswanger,   2006:   38).   However,   despite   the   intensity   with   which   the  
depressed  person  can  focus  on  what  she  considers  the  reason  of  her  guilt,  once  
that  motive  is  no  longer  present,   the  guilt  does  not  recede  and  the  person  can  
start  accusing  herself  of  other  deeds  with  equal  fervour.  As  such,  it  seems  that  
typical  of  at  least  certain  forms  of  depression  is  a  “guilt  script”,  which  can  take  
from   time   to   time   the   form   of   different   plots,   but   which   remains   a   fairly  
constant  aspect  of  the  depressive  narrative  repertoire.  As  previously  discussed,  
it   is   arguable   that   it   is   because   guilt   sometimes   acquires   in   depression   an  
existential  form  that  narrative  scripts  of  self-­‐‑accusation  are  formed.  
  
The   account   provided   by   Binswanger   (2006)   is   consonant   with   the   idea   that  
affectivity   drives   narrativity   and,   more   specifically,   with   the   claim   that  
existential   feelings   determine   the   range   of   stories   that   it   is   possible   for   the  
individual  to  tell.  These  forms  of  affective  experience  provide  us  with  the  lenses  
through  which  events  are  interpreted,  the  framework  on  the  basis  of  which  our  
understanding  of  self  and  world  is  structured.  The  background  feelings  I  have  
been   describing,   in   other   terms,   radically   constrain   the   way   in   which   we  
understand  and  explain  what  happens  to  us,  so  that  we  can  only  give  of  events  
interpretations  that  are  compatible  with  this  framework.  
  
The  idea  that  affective  experience  fundamentally  shapes  the  way  the  depressed  
person   thinks   of   herself   is   central   also   to   Radden’s   account   of   the   disorder  
(2013).  In  particular,  Radden  emphasizes  that  depression  is  characterised  by  the  
presence  of  dysfunctional  moods  and  claims  that  these  moods  negatively  affect  
                                                   
54 My  translation.  
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the  person’s  reflective  abilities  and  her  capacity  to  engage  in  activities  that  are  
central  to  narrative  selfhood.  Radden’s  analysis  of  these  dynamics  is  centred  on  
the  notion  of  “epistemic  agency”,  which  she  conceives  as  the  ability  to  evaluate  
one’s  beliefs  and  either  reject  or  include  them  in  one’s  narrative  self-­‐‑conception.    
  
According   to   Radden,   moods   are   pervasive   affects   whose   objects   are   very  
general   and   are   usually   experienced   as   passive   affections.   In   addition,   she  
claims   that   the   moods   characteristic   of   depression   differ   from   the   moods   of  
non-­‐‑pathological   experience   in   various   respects:   they   are   intense,   revolve  
around   a   narrow   range   of   topics,   and   are   resistant   to   change.   She  maintains  
that,   contrary   to   what   happens   in   schizophrenia,   the   cognitive   states   of   the  
depressed   person   are   congruent   with   her   moods   and   this   guarantees   that   a  
certain  level  of  self-­‐‑integration  is  achieved.  However,  Radden  argues  that  there  
is  also  a  sense   in  which  moods   in  depression,  due   to   their  particular   features,  
make  it  difficult  to  maintain  an  integrated  self.  This  has  to  do  with  the  fact  that  
it   is   very   difficult   for   people   affected   by   the   disorder   to   critically   assess   the  
thoughts  and  attitudes  that  are  congruent  with  their  moods.  In  Radden’s  words:  
  
If   my   prevailing   moods   are   intense,   obdurate,   and   unremittingly   gloomy,  
pessimistic  and  fearful,   then  adopting  a  perspective  detached  enough  for  me  
to   assess   their   effects   on  my   judgements   and   responses  will   be   diminished.  
And   similarly,   if   my   moods   are   unwarrantedly   optimistic,   they   will   colour  
attempts  at   a  more   realistic   assessment  of  myself   and   the  world  around  me.  
Inasmuch  as  my  agency  is  thus  reduced  then  so  is  the  integrity  and  wholeness  
of  my  self.  (2013:  98)55  
  
Radden’s  account  draws  attention  to  the  constraining  role  played  by  affectivity  
in  the  experience  of  the  depressed  person  and  is  thus  consonant  with  the  idea  
                                                   
55 In  so  far  as  it  can  impair  the  person’s  ability  to  adequately  assess  her  situation  and  
features   of   the   external   world,   the   role   played   by   affectivity   in   depression   has   also  
ethical   relevance.   This   is   for   example   the   opinion   of   Biegler   (2011)   who   claims   that  
depression  can  constitute  a   threat   to   the  autonomy  of   the  person,   that   is  her  capacity  
for  self-­‐‑determination  and  intentional  action.  
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that   in  order  to  best  understand  the  depressive  predicament   it   is   fundamental  
to  consider  the  feelings  which  pre-­‐‑intentionally  structure  her  experiential  field.  
In  addition,  as  I  will  discuss  in  the  next  section,  this  account  identifies  some  of  
the  dynamics  which  make   it  difficult   for   the  depressed  person  to  regulate  her  
affective  experience.  
  
It   has   now   become   clear   that   the   relationship   between   affects   and  
autobiographical  story-­‐‑telling  in  depression  undergoes  two  distinct  alterations.  
On   the   one   hand,   the   life   stories  with  which   the   person   identified   before   the  
illness  become  devoid  of  affective  resonance  and,  as  a  result,  their  authenticity  
is  put  into  question.  On  the  other,  due  to  a  number  of  emotional  and  existential  
transformations,  new  stories  emerge.  As  the  new  stories  are  congruent  with  the  
emotions   and   background   feelings   that   dominate   the   depressed   person’s  
experience,   they   tend   to   be   perceived   by   the   individual   as   authentic   and   to  
replace   the   ones   that   are   no   longer   sustained   by   the   person’s   feelings.   These  
narratives  convey  a  very  negative  conception  of  the  self,  but,  due  to  their  being  
rooted   in   the  person’s   affective   experience,   are  difficult   to   shake   and  modify.    
Through   the   creation   of   new   life   stories,   a   level   of   coherence   between   the  
individual   affective  and  narrative  experience   is   restored  and,   as   suggested  by  
Thompson,  this  could  also  be  a  way  for  the  depressed  person  to  confer  a  degree  
of  organisation  on  his  mental  life  and  to  avoid  more  profound  disturbances:  
  
This   is   one   of   the   least   understood   aspects   of   depression,   this   tenacity  with  
which  severely  depressed  people   cling   to   the  very  perceptions   that  are  most  
distorted.  Doctors  can  attempt  to  reason  with  their  depressed  patients;  people  
who  have  never  been  depressed  can  simply  dismiss  this  behaviour  as  “crazy.”  
To  the  person  who  is  depressed,  it  seems  just  the  opposite:  it  is  a  way  to  keep  
from  going  crazy.  Perceptions  and  emotions  simply  have  to  match,  at  least  in  
some   rough   way;   there   is   something   in   the   human   brain   that   categorically  
rejects   the   preposterous   idea   that   it  might   be   home   to   emotions   that   simply  
erupt,  divorced  from  external  stimulus.  (1996:  145-­‐‑146)  
  
In  line  with  the  observations  I  developed  earlier,  this  passage  draws  attention  to  
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the   importance   of   the   existence   of   a   degree   of   congruence   between   one’s  
affective   experience   and   self-­‐‑conception,   congruence   which   in   depression   is  
regained   by   constructing   autobiographical   narratives   that   reflect   the   negative  
feelings  which  mark  the  illness.    
  
4.  How  Narratives  Impact  on  the  Structure  of  Emotions  
  
So   far   I   have   focused   on   various   alterations   of   narrative   self-­‐‑understanding  
characteristic   of   depression,   showing   how   they   originate   in   specific   forms   of  
affective  experience.  I  have  argued  that  depression  is  characterised  by  both  the  
weakening  or   abandonment  of   the   life   stories   endorsed  before   the   illness   and  
the   emergence   of   new   autobiographical   narratives,   suggesting   that   these  
phenomena   are   caused   respectively   by   a   loss   of   emotional   resonance   and   the  
development  of  particular  background  affective  orientations.  However,  in  order  
to   get   a   comprehensive   understanding   of   the   relationship   between   affectivity  
and  narrativity  in  depression,  it  is  necessary  to  take  into  consideration  also  how  
the   modifications   of   autobiographical   story-­‐‑telling   previously   considered  
impact  on  the  person’s  affective  states.    
  
In   Chapter   4   I   discussed   the   role   played   by   narrativity   in   affect   regulation.   I  
illustrated  how  one  of  the  ways  in  which  story-­‐‑telling  can  positively  impact  on  
affective   experience   is   by   enhancing   our   sense   of   being   in   control   of   our  
emotions.  This  claim  is  related  to  the  idea  that  by  narrating  our  feelings  we  can  
give   them   boundaries,   so   that   by   being   positioned   in   a   story   which   has   a  
beginning,  middle,  and  end,  they  are  delimited  and  come  to  be  experienced  as  
more  manageable.  I  noted  that,  while  this  account  identifies  a  fundamental  way  
in  which  narrative  activities  shape  affectivity,   it   is   important   to  recognise   that  
not  all  the  stories  we  can  tell  about  our  affective  experience  have  this  effect  and  
I  remarked  that  in  order  to  play  a  regulative  function  a  narrative  must  possess  
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some   specific   characteristics.   In  particular,   relying  on  Angus   and  Greenberg’s  
analysis   (2011),   I  maintained   that   the  story  should  circumscribe  out  emotions,  
situating  them  in  a  particular  space  and  time.  Stories  that  do  not  contextualise  
emotions,  but  rather  generalise  them  -­‐‑  as,  according  to  Angus  and  Greenberg,  is  
the  case  in  depression  -­‐‑  are  unlikely  to  be  able  to  contribute  to  the  regulation  of  
the   patient’s   experience.   On   the   contrary,   these   stories   negatively   affect   the  
person’s   capacity   to   regulate   her   emotions.   By   producing   narratives   of   her  
condition  which  stress  its  inescapability  or  by  depicting  her  life  story  as  one  in  
which  certain  things  have  “always”  or  “never”  been  a  certain  way,56  rather  than  
delimiting   negative   emotions,   the   depressed   person   expands   their   scope,  
increasing   her   feelings   of   lack   of   control   and   helplessness.   This   condition   is  
exemplified  in  the  following  excerpt  from  Thompson’s  memoir:  
  
My  emotions  –  my  life  –  seemed  out  of  my  control.  Slowly,  in  ways  invisible  
to  me   at   the   time,   the   depression  was   altering  my  personality,   as   if   a   slight  
deformity   in  my   spine  were  giving  me  a  permanent   limp.   […]   I  had  always  
been  anxious  to  win  others’  approval,  but  now  that  need  became  insatiable;  I  
had   always   been   capable   of   charm,   but   now   charm   became   a   naked  
willingness  to  manipulate  others  to  get  what  I  wanted.  (1996:  58-­‐‑59)  
  
The  narratives  produced  by  depressed  patients  can  thus  exacerbate  some  of  the  
negative  feelings  they  experience  and  their  sense  of  being  unable  to  cope  with  
the   circumstances   they   face.   In   addition,   the   alterations   of   autobiographical  
narrativity  experienced  by  the  depressed  person  hinder  her  capacity  to  regulate  
her  emotions  also  in  another  way.    
  
As   previously   discussed,   the   life   stories   which   emerge   after   the   onset   of  
depression  are  fundamentally  shaped  by  the  background  affective  orientations  
characteristic  of  the  illness.  Due  to  these  feelings’  pre-­‐‑intentional  character,  it  is  
                                                   
56 “Never”   and   “always”   are   some   of   the   linguistic   expressions  which,   according   to  




difficult   for   the   depressed   person   to   conceive   of   different   narratives   and  
therefore,  as  suggested  by  Radden  (2013),  to  take  an  evaluative  stance  in  regard  
to  her  own  affective  experience.  I  argued  in  Chapter  3  that  evaluative  position-­‐‑
taking  plays  an  important  role  in  the  regulation  of  affective  experience,  because  
by   appraising   our   emotions   as   more   or   less   appropriate,   justified,   pleasant,  
moral,   etc.,   we   might   be   able   to   influence   the   way   in   which   they   develop.  
However,  in  so  far  as  they  are  unable  to  conceive  of  narratives  alternative  to  the  
ones  which  are  rooted  in  their  existential  feelings,  it  is  arguable  that  depressed  





In   this   chapter   I   have   provided   an   analysis   of   the   relationship   which   exists  
between   affectivity   and   narrativity   in   depression.   Various   contemporary  
accounts   conceive   of   the   disorder   as   a   disturbance   of   narrative   selfhood   and,  
among   these,   I   have   considered   in   particular   the   account   put   forward   by  
Stanghellini   and   Englebert   (Englebert   and   Stanghellini,   forthcoming;  
Stanghellini,   2004).   In   accordance  with   the   core   tenets   of   Ricoeur’s   view,   this  
position   is   based   on   the   acknowledgement   that   there   are   two   essential  
components   to   narrative   self-­‐‑understanding:   on   the   one   hand,   the   ability   to  
report  one’s  history  and,  on   the  other,   the  capacity   to  be  creative   in  doing  so,  
that   is   to   be   able   to   integrate   stability   and   change   in   one’s   self-­‐‑conception.  
According  to  Stanghellini   (2004),  people  who  are  vulnerable   to  depression  are  
not   able   to   evolve   the   way   in   which   they   conceive   of   themselves   and   this  
condition  is  usually  characterised  by  a  rigid  over-­‐‑identification  with  particular  
social  and  professional  roles  and  by  the  attempt  to  avoid  any  challenge  to  such  
identifications.   Due   to   the   loss   of   feeling   typical   of   the   illness,   the   depressed  
person  is  no  longer  emotionally  drawn  to  the  ideals,  values,  and  commitments  
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with  which  she  used  to  identify  and  comes  to  consider  herself  culpable  for  this  
condition.  In  addition,  it  is  claimed  that  her  impoverished  emotional  experience  
also  prevents   the  depressed  person   from  engaging   in   the   construction  of  new  
life  stories  (Englebert  and  Stanghellini,  forthcoming).  The  depressive  self  is  thus  
characterised  as  one  which  clings  to  one  version  of  its  story  without  admitting  
of  any  possibility  to  creatively  modify  it  even  when  a  crisis  is  experienced.    
  
I   argued   that,   while   Stanghellini   and   Englebert   are   correct   in   claiming   that  
disturbances   of   narrative   self-­‐‑understanding   are   central   to   depression,   and   in  
suggesting   that   these   are   connected   to   particular   alterations   of   affective  
experience,   their   account   is   incomplete   because   it   ignores   one   fundamental  
feature   of   narrativity   in   the   disorder.  What   Stanghellini   and   Englebert   fail   to  
take  into  consideration  is  the  fact  that  depression  is  characterised  not  only  by  a  
disruption  of  the  life  stories  with  which  patients  identify  before  the  onset  of  the  
illness,  but  also  by  the  emergence  of  new  narratives  and  that  these  narratives,  in  
turn,  have  an  impact  on  the  structure  of  the  person’s  affective  experience.  
  
In  the  rest  of  the  chapter  I  aimed  to  extend  Stanghellini  and  Englebert’s  account  
by   developing   three   distinct   sets   of   observations.   In   the   first   place,   I   claimed  
that,   due   to   the   loss   of   feeling,   the   patient’s   life   narratives   are   no   longer  
accompanied  by  congruent  affective  states  and  thus  come  to  be  experienced  as  
inauthentic.   Because   of   this   reason,   the   role   played   by   the   narratives   in   the  
person’s   story-­‐‑telling   becomes   weaker,   which   can   ultimately   lead   to   their  
abandonment.   I   then   drew   attention   to   the   fact   that   cardinal   to   depression   is  
also  the  appearance  of  new  narratives  and  that  these  share  some  fundamental  
features.  Relying  on  the  insights  provided  by  cognitive  accounts  of  the  disorder,  
I   considered   in   particular   the   way   in   which   depressed   people   explain   the  
occurrence  of  bad  events.  I  argued  that  what  Seligman  (2006)  has  described  as  a  
pessimistic   explanatory   style   –   that   is   the   tendency   to   conceive   of   negative  
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events   in   personal,   pervasive   and   permanent   terms   –   originates   in   particular  
configurations   of   affective   experience.   More   specifically,   I   maintained   that  
existential  feelings  of  guilt,  isolation,  and  hopelessness,  along  with  a  particular  
way   of   experiencing   time   and   space,   are   at   the   origin   of   the   depressive  
explanatory   attitudes.   In   so   doing,   I   also   challenged   Englebert   and  
Stanghellini’s  account  of  the  relationship  between  affectivity  and  narrativity  in  
an  important  respect.  
  
Englebert   and   Stanghellini   (forthcoming)   argue   not   only   that   depression   is  
characterised  by  the  inability  to  renew  one’s  narrative  self-­‐‑conception,  but  also  
that  this  is  due  to  the  loss  of  feeling  characteristic  of  the  illness.  Because  of  her  
impoverished   emotional   experience,   it   is   claimed,   the   depressed   person   lacks  
the   motivation   to   engage   in   creative   forms   of   story-­‐‑telling.   My   analysis,  
however,   focused   also   on   other   aspects   of   affective   experience   in   depression,  
illustrating   the   role   they   play   in   the   generation   of   new   autobiographical  
narratives.   As   such,   my   account   shows   that   affectivity   does   not   arrest,   but  
rather  drives   the  development   of   the  person’s   narrative  understanding   in   the  
disorder.  
  
I  then  moved  to  consider  the  impact  that  the  narratives  crafted  by  the  depressed  
patients   have   on   their   affective   experience.   I   suggested   that,   because   of   their  
over-­‐‑general   character,   these   narratives   fail   to   contextualise   the   patients  
negative   experiences,   thus   exacerbating   the   sense   that   they  are  uncontrollable  
and  are  going  to  last  forever.  In  addition,  I  maintained  that,  due  to  the  way  in  
which  existential   feelings   constrain   their  narrative   repertoire,   it   is  difficult   for  
depressed  patients  to  take  an  evaluative  stance  in  regard  to  their  emotions  and  
to  control  their  development  accordingly.  
  
The   account   I   developed   in   this   chapter   has   various   implications.   In   the   first  
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place,  by  drawing  attention  to  the  existence  of  various  dynamics  through  which  
affectivity   and   story-­‐‑telling   influence   each   other   in   depression,   I   showed   that  
the   disorder   is   best   characterised   as   involving   disruptions   of   both   the  
experiential  and  narrative  level  of  self-­‐‑awareness  and  that  these  are  inextricably  
related.  Therefore,  the  idea  that,  in  contrast  to  other  psychiatric  illnesses  such  as  
schizophrenia,  depression  involves  disruptions  of  narrative  self-­‐‑understanding  
that   do   not   affect   the   integrity   of   minimal   selfhood   can   be   challenged.   As  
discussed  in  Chapter  2,  affectivity  is  a  fundamental  dimension  of  minimal  self-­‐‑
experience,  intrinsic  to  which  are  pre-­‐‑reflective  forms  of  bodily  and  evaluative  
self-­‐‑consciousness.   The   analysis   carried   out   in   the   present   chapter   illustrated  
how   affective   self-­‐‑awareness   shapes   and   in   turn   is   shaped   by   narrative   self-­‐‑
understanding,   thus   providing   an   example   of   how   the   two   dimensions   are  
phenomenologically  entangled.    
  
My   account   thus   puts   into   question   the   idea   that   one   of   the   aspects   which  
differentiates   depression   from   other   disturbances   of   the   self   such   as   those  
characteristic   of   schizophrenia   is   the   fact   that   depression   does   not   involve  
alterations   of  minimal   selfhood.  Does   this   entail   also   that   the   disturbances   of  
self-­‐‑experience   typical   of   depression   are   as   severe   as   the   ones   which  
characterise   schizophrenia?   I   do   not   think   that   this   is   the   case.   The   account   I  
develop   in   this   thesis   shows   that   disruptions   of   minimal   and   narrative   self-­‐‑
consciousness   are   inextricable,   but   is   compatible   with   the   idea   that   these  
disruptions   can   have   various   degrees   of   severity.   Therefore,   schizophrenia  
could   still   be   conceived   as   a   more   serious   alteration   of   self-­‐‑awareness   than  
depression,   but   this   conception   should   not   be   based   on   the   claim   that   only  
schizophrenia,  and  not  depression,  involves  a  disturbance  of  the  minimal  self.  
  
In  addition,  my  account  of  the  relationship  between  affectivity  and  narrativity  
in  depression  calls  into  question  some  of  the  claims  made  by  cognitive  accounts  
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of  the  disorder.  The  scholars  who  endorse  this  theoretical  perspective  recognise  
that  disturbances  of  affectivity  are  central  to  depression,  but  they  argue  that  the  
origins  of   these  disturbances  are   to  be   identified  with  particular  alterations  of  
cognition.   In   other   terms,   the   cognitive   approach   suggests   that   the  depressed  
person   experiences   affective   symptoms   which   originate   in   specific   thought  
processes,  thus  attributing  to  the  cognitive  dimension  a  primacy  over  affectivity  
in  the  generation  of  the  illness.    
  
The   analysis   I   developed   is   consistent   with   the   idea   that   the   way   we   think  
significantly  influences  they  way  we  feel,  as  I  have  highlighted  various  ways  in  
which  the  thoughts  that  make  up  the  depressed  person’s  self-­‐‑narratives  impact  
on  her  emotions.  However,  by  showing  how  both  the  form  and  content  of  these  
autobiographical  stories  are  shaped  by  the  person’s  affective  experience,  and  in  
particular   existential   feelings,   I   suggested   that   cognition   itself   is  moulded   by  
affectivity.  As  such,  while  my  account  supports  the  claim  that  there  are  various  
processes  through  which  thoughts  forge  feelings,   it  challenges  the  idea  that   in  
the  dynamics   that   characterise  depression  cognitive  processes  have  a  primary  
role.  On   the   contrary,   I   suggest   that   it   is   because   of   disturbances   of   affective  
















By   focusing  on  the  phenomenology  of  depression,   in  Chapter  5   I  provided  an  
illustration  of  some  of   the  dynamics   through  which  affectivity  and  narrativity  
constitutively  shape  each  other  and  are  at  the  origin  of  specific  disturbances  of  
self-­‐‑experience.  In  this  chapter  I  extend  my  analysis  of  the  relationship  between  
affective   experience   and  narrative   self-­‐‑understanding   in   psychiatric   illness   by  
providing   a   phenomenological   account   of   some   aspects   of   borderline  
personality  disorder   (BPD).   It  has  been  argued   from  various  perspectives   that  
disturbances   of   narrative   self-­‐‑understanding   are   central   to   the   illness.   Fuchs  
(2007),   for   instance,   has   suggested   that   people   affected   by   BPD   are   unable   to  
integrate   in   a   coherent  view  different   and   sometimes   contradictory  aspects  of  
self  and  other,  claiming  that  the  disorder  is  best  conceived  as  a  “fragmentation”  
of  narrative  selfhood.  I  will  suggest  that,  while  Fuchs’  approach  has  the  merit  of  
drawing  attention  to  some  of  the  dynamics  which  are  central  to  the  structure  of  
BPD,  his  account  can  be  expanded  in  various  respects.  In  the  first  place,  I  will  
claim   that   the   fragmentation   of   narrative   self-­‐‑understanding   characteristic   of  
the   disorder   is   best   understood   as   depending   on   a   specific   configuration   of  
affective   experience,   namely   the   frequent   alternation   of   existential   feelings   of  
shame   and   anger.   I  will  maintain   that,   because   of   this   particular   experiential  
structure,   the   borderline   person   is   unable   to   retain   “empathic   access”   to   her  
previous   emotions   and   evaluations   and   this   is   what   hinders   her   capacity   to  
construct  coherent  narratives.  I  will  then  move  to  consider  the  impact  that  this  
predicament   has   on   affectivity.   I   will   start   by   claiming   that   the   emotions   of  
borderline   patients   have   primarily   an   episodic   character   and   that   the   body  
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plays   a  predominant   role   in   both   their   experience   and   expression.   I  will   then  
show   various  ways   in  which   the   disruptions   of   narrativity   interfere  with   the  
patients’   ability   to   regulate   their   emotions.  Extending  existing  accounts  of   the  
illness  in  various  respects,  the  analysis  developed  in  this  chapter  will  focus  on  
different  ways  in  which  disruptions  of  affectivity  and  narrativity  in  the  disorder  
are  deeply  entangled,  thus  providing  an  additional  and  distinct  example  of  the  
inextricability  of  minimal  and  narrative  forms  of  self-­‐‑experience.  
  
1.  Disturbances  of  the  Narrative  Self  
  
Borderline   personality   disorder   is   a   complex   and   highly   debated   nosological  
construct.   The   DSM-­‐‑5   defines   BPD   as   a   “pervasive   pattern   of   instability   of  
interpersonal   relationships,   self-­‐‑image,   and   affects,   and   marked   impulsivity,  
beginning  by  early  adulthood  and  present  in  a  variety  of  contexts”  (APA,  2013:  
663).  According  to  the  DSM,  the  presence  of  at  least  five  out  of  nine  symptoms  
is  necessary  in  order  for  BPD  to  be  diagnosed.57  
  
As   far   as   the   aetiology   of   the   disturbance   is   concerned,   various   biological,  
psychological   and   sociocultural   aspects   have   been   identified   as   potential   risk  
factors   (Kravitz   and   Jackson,   2008).   In   particular,   the   experience   of   traumas,  
                                                   
57 The  symptoms  listed  by  the  DSM  are:  
“1)  Frantic  efforts  to  avoid  real  or  imagined  abandonment  […]  
2)   A   pattern   of   unstable   and   intense   interpersonal   relationships   characterized   by   alternating  
between  extremes  of  idealization  and  devaluation.  
3)  Identity  disturbance:  markedly  and  persistently  unstable  self-­‐‑image  or  sense  of  self  .  
4)   Impulsivity   in   at   least   two   areas   that   are   potentially   self-­‐‑damaging   (e.g.,   spending,   sex,  
substance  abuse,  reckless  driving,  binge  eating).  […]  
5)  Recurrent  suicidal  behavior,  gestures,  or  threats,  or  self-­‐‑mutilating  behavior.  
6)   Affective   instability   due   to   a  marked   reactivity   of  mood   (e.g.,   intense   episodic   dysphoria,  
irritability,  or  anxiety  usually  lasting  a  few  hours  and  only  rarely  more  than  a  few  days).  
7)  Chronic  feelings  of  emptiness.  
8)  Inappropriate,  intense  anger  or  difficulty  controlling  anger  (e.g.,  frequent  displays  of  temper,  
constant  anger,  recurrent  physical  fights).  




sexual   abuse,   and   adverse   interpersonal   circumstances   in   childhood   are   very  
common   among   people   affected   by   BPD.   The   importance   of   early   social  
relations  for  the  development  of  the  syndrome  has  been  particularly  stressed  by  
authors  in  the  field  of  Attachment  Theory  (e.g.  Fonagy  et  al.,  2002;  Gunderson,  
1996).  From  this  perspective,  it  is  claimed  that,  because  of  the  inadequate  styles  
of   parenting   and   caregiving   they   are   exposed   to,   borderline   patients   do   not  
experience   an   appropriate   level   of   emotional   attunement   and   interiorise  
distorted  models  of  self  and  others.  Having  often  experienced  traumatic  events  
and   abusive   relationships,   it   is  maintained   that   borderline   patients   develop   a  
deeply  devaluating  image  of  the  self  as  someone  whose  needs  and  desires  are  
not  worth   any   attention   and   are   instead   sources   of   intense   shame   (Cozolino,  
2006).   Some   scholars   have   also   argued   that   the   problematic   interpersonal  
experiences   undergone   by   borderline   patients   during   childhood   result   in   an  
impairment  of  their  mentalisation  ability,  that  is  the  capacity  to  understand  and  
predict   people’s   behaviours   through   the   attribution   of   mental   states   (e.g.  
Fonagy  and  Bateman,   2007).   In  particular,   as   remarked  by  Fuchs,   it   is   argued  
that   due   also   to   the   sometimes   contradictory   relation   between   their   parents’  
verbal   expressions   and   behaviours,   people   affected   by   BPD   did   not   learn   to  
correctly  label  and  understand  mental  states  and  the  lack  of  adequate  emotional  
mirroring  and  responses  on  the  part  of  their  parents  negatively  influenced  their  
affect  regulation  capacities  (2007:  383-­‐‑384).    
  
The   centrality   to   the   disorder   of   disturbances   of   narrative   self-­‐‑understanding  
has  been  stressed  by  various  scholars.  In  particular,  attention  has  been  drawn  to  
the  fact  that  the  stories  constructed  by  borderline  patients  are  anomalous  from  
the   point   of   view   of   both   their   form   and   content.   As   far   as   the   former   is  
concerned,   it   is   claimed   that   people   affected   by   BPD   have   difficulties  
constructing  coherent  life  stories  (Jørgensen,  2006).  In  order  to  best  understand  
this  point  it  is  helpful  to  consider  what  the  notion  of  coherence  amounts  to.  In  a  
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study  of  patients’  narratives  conducted  by  Adler  et  al.  (2012),  for  example,  the  
notion   is   characterised   as   comprising   four   dimensions:   orientation,   structure,  
affect,  and   integration   (2012:  506).  Orientation  regards   the  extent   to  which   the  
story  provides  the  reader  with  enough  background  information  to  understand  
the   context   of   the   narrative   and   structure   is   considered   to   depend   on   the  
existence   of   logical   connections   between   the   various   parts   of   the   story.   The  
affect   criterion   refers   to   the  degree   to  which  affective   language   is  used   in   the  
narrative  to  convey  an  evaluative  point  of  view,  while  integration  depends  on  
whether   the   episodes   are   related   to   a   broader   sense   of   self   or   the   reason   for  
engaging   in   story-­‐‑telling   is   expressed.   Having   assessed   the   patients’   stories  
along   these   four   dimensions  Adler   et   al.   found   that   borderline   patients   have  
lower  narrative  coherence  than  control  participants.  As  far  as  the  contents  of  the  
narratives  are  concerned,  the  study  also  reported  the  existence  of  anomalies  in  
regards   to   the   themes   of   “agency”   and   “communion   fulfilment”.   The   former  
refers  to  the  degree  of  impact  and  control  that  the  characters  have  on  their  own  
lives,   while   the   latter   regards   the   extent   to   which   the   individual’s   desire   to  
establish  connection  and  intimacy  is  met.  In  the  study  people  affected  by  BPD  
obtained  lower  scores  than  controls  in  both  areas.    
  
In   order   to   best   illustrate   the   disruptions   of   narrative   understanding  
characteristic   of   the   disorder,   it   is   important   to   take   into   consideration   the  
particular  way  in  which  self  and  others  are  evaluated  by  the  patients.  As  far  as  
their   interpersonal   relationships   are   concerned,   borderline   patients   tend   to  
oscillate  between  idealisation  and  devaluation  of  the  people  they  interact  with  
(APA,   2013:   663).   Typical   of   the   disorder   is   the   attitude   to   perceive   others   as  
totally  “good”  or  “bad”  and  the  tendency  to  shift  between  these  two  views.  In  
order   to   adequately  describe   this   feature,   often   referred   to   as   “splitting”,   it   is  
important  to  consider  the  recurrent  nature  of  this  experience  for  people  affected  
by   the   disorder.   Indeed,   this   is   not   simply   a   matter   of   having   an   overly  
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optimistic  view  of  another  person  which  is  subsequently  discovered  to  be  very  
different   from   reality,   as   it   might   be   the   case   in   a   number   of   our   ordinary  
interpersonal   interactions.   The   dynamic   typical   of   BPD   is   different   for   two  
reasons.   In   the  first  place,  borderline  patients  exaggerate  not  only   the  positive  
but   also   the  negative   characteristics   of   the  people   they   interact  with:   they   see  
others   as   completely   good   or   bad,   “as   either   a   wicked   witch   or   fairy  
grandmother,  a  saint  or  a  demon”  (Mason  and  Kreger,  2010:  26-­‐‑27).  Secondly,  
they   shift   back   and   forth   between   these   two   extremes   within   the   same  
relationship,  generating  deep  frustration  and  distress  in  the  people  who  interact  
with   them.   Splitting   seems   indeed   to   be   a   fairly   constant   aspect   of   the  
borderline   person’s   interpersonal   attitudes   and   the   emotional   rollercoaster  
experienced   by   others   as   a   consequence   might   eventually   drive   them   away,  
thus   making   the   interpersonal   world   of   the   borderline   patient   even   more  
unstable.   Characteristic   of   BPD   is   then   a   “black   and   white”   attitude   in   the  
evaluation   of   other   people   and   the   inability   to   integrate   in   one   view   their  
positive  and  negative  features.  In  this  regard,  it  has  been  observed  that  it  is  as  if  
the  borderline  person  had  no  memory  of   the  traits  of  others  emerged  through  
his  previous   experience   (Kreisman  and  Straus,   2010).  On   the   contrary,  people  
seem   to  be  evaluated  only  on   the  basis  of   the  most   recent   interaction   that   the  
borderline  individual  has  had  with  them.  In  Kreisman  and  Straus’  words:  
  
The   borderline   lacks   “object   constancy”,   the   ability   to   understand   others   as  
complex   human   beings   who   nonetheless   can   relate   in   consistent   ways.   The  
borderline   experiences   another   on   the   basis   of   his   most   recent   encounter,  
rather   than  on  a  broader-­‐‑based,  consistent  series  of   interactions.  Therefore,  a  
constant,   predictable   perception   of   another   person   never   emerges   –   the  
borderline,  as  if  affected  with  a  kind  of  targeted  amnesia,  continues  to  respond  
to  that  person  as  someone  new  on  each  occasion.  (Kreisman  and  Straus,  2010:  
38)  
  
A  high  level  of  instability,  which  often  takes  the  form  of  a  polarisation  between  
two  extremes,  is  typical  also  of  the  evaluative  attitude  the  borderline  person  has  
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towards  himself.  His   self-­‐‑image  changes  very  quickly  over   time  and   is  highly  
dependent   on   the  present  moment,   so   that   if   he   has  done   something   good,   a  
very  positive  self-­‐‑image  is  elaborated,  but  as  soon  as  something  considered  less  
positive   happens,   the   self-­‐‑evaluative   attitude   is   reversed   and   the   borderline  
person’s   conception   of   himself   shifts   to   the   negative   extreme.   BPD   is   thus  
characterised   by   the   lack   of   a   stable   view   of   self   and   others   as   multifaceted  
individuals   who   possess   both   good   and   bad   traits.   It   is   as   if   the   borderline  
person  continuously  had  to  prove  his  value  and  to  test  other  people’s  and  any  
mistake  or  failure  automatically  cancelled  the  awareness  of  previous  successes  
(Kreisman  and  Straus,  2010:  40-­‐‑41).  
  
The  inability  to  form  a  coherent  conception  of  self  and  others  is  the  focus  of  the  
account  of  the  disorder  provided  by  Fuchs  (2007).  In  his  opinion,  central  to  BPD  
is   a   disruption   of   the   capacity   to   integrate   different   and   sometimes  
contradictory   aspects   of   one’s   personality   and   experience   in   a   unique   and  
coherent   view   and   the   disorder   is   characterised   as   a   “fragmentation”   of  
narrative   selfhood   (2007:   381).   Endorsing   Ricoeur’s   account   (1994)   and  
Frankfurt’s  conception  of  the  person  as  an  individual  who  is  capable  of  holding  
second-­‐‑order   desires   which   have   first-­‐‑order   volitions   as   their   object   (1971),  
Fuchs  considers   the  ability   to  reflect  on  one’s  own  mental  states  and  to  take  a  
position   towards   them   as   a   fundamental   feature   of   the   narrative   self.   In   his  
opinion,  borderline  people  have  an  impaired  capacity  to  represent  and  evaluate  
their  mental  states  and  this  is  what  leads  to  the  disruption  of  narrative  selfhood  
characteristic  of  the  syndrome.  In  addition,  Fuchs  identifies  various  connections  
between   the   disturbances   of   the   narrative   self   and   the   alterations   of   affective  
experience   in  BPD.   In   the   first  place,  he  argues   that   the   impulsivity   typical  of  
the  syndrome  originates  in  the  fact  that  the  patients  are  not  able  to  form  second-­‐‑
order   volitions   with   regard   to   their   first-­‐‑order   affective   states.   Borderline  
people,  in  Fuchs’  opinion,  are  not  able  to  accord  or  deny  their  affects  the  power  
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to   influence   other   mental   processes   and   actions   (2007:   381).   As   a   result,  
emotions  unfold  uncontrollably  and   the  patients  do  not  play  an  active   role   in  
the   development   of   this   experience.   Fuchs   argues   that   the   inability   to   take   a  
higher   order   position   with   regard   to   one’s   affective   states   is   central   also   to  
another   feature   of   the   syndrome,   namely   the   volatility   and   polarisation   of  
evaluative  attitudes.  According  to  him,  this  is  due  to  the  patients’  incapacity  to  
monitor   the   “coherence”   and   “accuracy”   of   their   mental   states,   so   that   their  
evaluations  are  shaped  only  by  their  present  state  of  affect  (2007:  382).  
  
Fuchs’  account  of  BPD   is  consonant  with  some  of   the  claims  advanced   in   this  
thesis.   Indeed,  while  he  characterises   the  disorder  as  a  disruption  of  narrative  
self-­‐‑understanding,   Fuchs   also   claims   that   disturbances   of   affectivity   and  
narrativity  are  closely  related.   In  particular,  as  highlighted  above,  he  suggests  
that   the   inability   to   take  a  position   towards  one’s  affective  experience  plays  a  
role  in  the  fragmentation  of  narrative  selfhood.  Fuchs’  analysis,  however,  does  
not   take   into   consideration   some   fundamental   aspects   of   the   relationship  
between  affectivity  and  narrativity  in  the  illness  and  in  so  doing  leaves  some  of  
the  dynamics  which  are  key  to  the  structure  of  the  disorder  unexplained.  In  the  
following  I  will  extend  Fuchs’  account  by  providing  a  finer-­‐‑grained  analysis  of  
the  various  ways  in  which  the  fragmentation  of  narrative  selfhood  shapes  and  
is  shaped  by  affective  experience.    
  
2.  The  Affective  Origins  of  Narrative  Fragmentation    
2.1.  The  Disruption  of  Empathic  Access  
  
Fuchs   draws   attention   to   the   oscillating   emotional   experience   typical   of   BPD  
and   conceives   of   it   as   an   integral   aspect   of   the   fragmentation   of   narrative  
understanding   characteristic   of   the   disorder.   However,   in   order   to   best  
understand   the   relationship   between   affectivity   and   autobiographical  
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narrativity   in   the   illness,   it   is   not   enough   to   focus   on   the   fact   that   borderline  
patients   experience   rapidly   alternating   emotional   states.   These   frequent  
emotional  shifts  can  certainly  influence  the  person’s  narrative  ability  in  various  
ways.  Emotional  instability,  for  example,  can  negatively  impact  on  the  patient’s  
capacity   to   focus   or   to   take   a   reflective   stance   towards   his   experiences.  
However,  these  changes  cannot  by  themselves  explain  the  fact  that  patients  are  
unable   to   integrate   different   evaluations   of   self   and   other   in   a   coherent  
narrative.   Indeed,   even   if   one   was   to   move   very   quickly   from   an   emotion  
integral   to   which   is   a   positive   self-­‐‑evaluation   to   another   which   involves   a  
negative   self-­‐‑evaluation,   this   would   not   entail   that   the   individual   becomes  
unable  to  consider  the  previous  positive  self-­‐‑evaluation  once  the  shift  has  taken  
place.  The  specificity  of  the  borderline  person’s  predicament  in  this  regard  can  
be  best  understood  by  comparing  it  with  the  structure  of  ordinary  experience.  
With  reference  to  this  point,  it  is  helpful  to  consider  for  instance  what  happens  
when,   having   known   a   certain   person   for   a   long   time,   we   are   surprised   in  
hearing   a   particular   statement   or   witnessing   a   behaviour   that   appears   to   be  
somehow  out  of  character  given  what  we  know  and  believe  about  that  person.    
  
Let’s  consider  an  example.  I  am  walking  along  the  street  and  I  suddenly  notice  
a   car   coming   from   the  opposite  direction  and   running  well  beyond   the   speed  
limit.   I   realise   that  my   best   friend  Victoria   is   driving.  When   approaching   the  
zebra   crossing,   she   does   not   slow   down,   neglecting   a   number   of   pedestrians  
waiting   there   to  cross   the   road.  Subsequently,   she   takes  an  abrupt   turn   to   the  
right  without  signalling  her  intentions  with  the  appropriate  arrow  flash  lights.  
This   episode   generates   in   me   a   very   strong   reaction   involving   a   significant  
emotional   component.  Apart   from  an   intense   feeling   of   surprise  which   seizes  
me  when  I  realise  that   it   is  my  friend  who  is  driving  recklessly,  other  feelings  
such  as  dislike,  disapproval  or  even  contempt  can  be  experienced  as  I  observe  
her  disrespectful   and  dangerous   behaviour.   The   evaluations   intrinsic   to   these  
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feelings   are   in   deep   contradiction   with   my   idea   of   Victoria   as   a   very  
considerate,   kind   and   careful   person   and  with   the   admiration   that   I   have   for  
these  qualities  of  hers,  but  I  cannot  avoid  experiencing  very  negative  emotions  
when  I  witness  the  scene.  Despite  their  intensity,  however,  these  emotions  and  
related   evaluations   do   not   have   the   power   to   completely   subvert   how   I   felt  
previously   about   Victoria.   In   this   sense,   my   previous   feelings,   despite   their  
clashing  with  my   present   emotions,   show   a   certain   “resistance   to   change”   or  
inertia   which   pushes   me   to   look   for   an   interpretation   of   the   circumstances  
compatible   with   them.   In   other   terms,   I   do   not   easily   let   go   of   my   positive  
feelings   and   consideration   of   my   friend.   After   the   initial   puzzlement,   my  
reaction   is   indeed   to   try   to   find   a   reason   which   could   explain   my   friend’s  
behaviour  without  clashing  with  the  idea  I  have  of  her.  For  instance,  as  Victoria  
is  a  physician,  I  can  hypothesise  that  she  had  been  called  for  an  emergency  and  
that   she   was   driving   very   fast   in   order   to   try   to   reach   a   patient   as   soon   as  
possible.   Such   an   explanation  might  mitigate  my   feelings   of   puzzlement   and  
disappointment  and   is,   at   least   to  a   certain  extent,   compatible  with  how   I   felt  
about  Victoria  before  this  episode.    
  
What   I   have   described   in   this   example   is   what   often   happens   when   we  
experience   an   emotion  which   contradicts   our  previous   emotions:  we  perceive  
the  existence  of  a  conflict  and  rather  than  solving  it  by  immediately  embracing  
the  evaluation  associated  with  the  most  recent  feelings,  we  look  for  alternative  
interpretations  of  the  events  so  that  they  are  not  in  contradiction  with  our  prior  
beliefs  and  feelings.  This  does  not  mean  that  an  emotional  conflict  of  this  kind  is  
always  resolved  by  re-­‐‑establishing  the  emotions  and  evaluations  that  preceded  
it.   Witnessing   my   friend   reckless   driving   could   well   be   an   experience   that  
radically   changes   my   attitudes   towards   her,   to   the   point   of   damaging   our  
relationship   forever.   This   could   happen,   for   example,   if   I   do   not   find   any  
plausible   explanation   for   Victoria’s   behaviour   and   I   am   led   to   question   the  
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authenticity  of  the  kind  and  considerate  attitudes  she  displayed  in  the  past.  In  
this  case  the  conflict  would  be  solved  in  favour  of  the  most  recent  emotions  and  
evaluations  which  would  thus  have  the  power  to  discard  what  I  previously  felt  
and   thought   about   my   friend.   Finally,   it   is   also   important   to   note   that   this  
situation  has  another  possible  outcome  which  consists  neither   in  reconfirming  
the  positive  conception  I  had  of  my  friend  nor  in  substituting  it  with  a  negative  
one,   but   rather   in   integrating   the   two,   so   that,   for   example,   I   can   think   of  
Victoria   as   a   generally   considerate   person,   who,   however,   sometimes   can  
behave  disrespectfully  if  put  under  a  lot  of  pressure.  However,  no  matter  what  
the   conflict   ultimately   results   in,   in   these   circumstances   we   ordinarily   retain  
awareness  of  our  previous   experiences,   thus  meaning   that  no  matter  whether  
we  re-­‐‑confirm,  mitigate,  or  discard  our  initial  emotions  and  evaluations,  we  are  
still  able  to  conceive  of  them  as  parts  of  a  unitary  story.      
  
The   way   in   which   the   borderline   person   handles   these   situations   is   very  
different.   As   previously   highlighted,   people   affected   by   the   disorder   very  
readily   get   rid   of   their   evaluations   when   conflicting   evidence   arises.   When  
someone   they  previously  had   an   excellent   consideration  of  disappoints   them,  
borderline   patients   tend   to   immediately   embrace   the   opposite   emotions   and  
judgements,   to   the   point   that   it   is   questionable  whether   they   experience   any  
conflict  at  all.  Indeed,  in  order  for  conflict  to  arise  it  is  necessary  for  the  person  
to  be  at  least  to  a  certain  degree  simultaneously  aware  of  both  the  previous  and  
current   appraisals,   but   it   seems   that   borderline   patients   are   unable   to   retain  
thoughts   and   feelings   which   are   in   contradiction   with   the   present   ones.   But  
what  is  the  origin  of  this  inability?    
  
I   believe   that   this   question   can  be   answered   and   further   light   be   shed  on   the  
structure   of   evaluative   conflict   in   ordinary   and   pathological   experience   by  
making   use   of   some   of   the   ideas   advanced   by   Schechtman   in   her   account   of  
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narrative  selfhood  and,  in  particular,  of  the  notion  of  “empathic  access”  (1996;  
2001;  2007).  As  illustrated  in  Chapter  3,  Schechtman  claims  that  fundamental  to  
the  preservation  of  personal   identity  over   time   is  a   level  of  phenomenological  
continuity  between  one’s  present  and  past  and,  in  this  regard,  I  argued  that  the  
ability  to  retain  experiential  access  to  some  of  the  affective  and  evaluative  states  
previously   entertained   is   of   particular   importance.   As   discussed   earlier,   in  
order  for  someone’s  beliefs  and  emotions  to  be  accessed  in  this  way  it  must  be  
the  case  that  they  are  not  completely  over,  but  rather  still  play  a  certain,  albeit  
different,  role  in  the  person’s  mental  and  practical  life.    
  
The  dynamics  which  are  associated  with  the  notion  of  empathic  access  are  key  
to  understand  the  ability  to  experience  emotional  conflicts  of  the  type  discussed  
above.   In   the   example  previously   considered,   for   instance,   it   is   because   I   still  
have  access  to  emotions  of  respect  and  admiration  for  my  friend  that  I  do  not  
immediately  switch   to  a  negative  opinion  of  her  upon  witnessing  her  reckless  
driving.  Certainly  I  experience  new  emotions  involving  disapproval  and  moral  
condemnation,  but  in  order  for  me  to  be  able  to  engage  in  a  process  where  I  try  
to  understand  her  behaviour  and  consider  various  possible  explanations  for  it,  I  
need  to  at  least  temporarily  retain  some  of  the  positive  feelings  I  previously  had  
for   her.   If   that  was   not   the   case,   if   none   of  my   emotions   regarding  Victoria’s  
good  nature,  reliability,  and  altruism  were  still  present  and  somehow  accessible  
to  me,   I  would   instantly  embrace   the  affects  and   judgements   triggered  by   the  
driving  episode  and  would  not  be  puzzled  by  the  sudden  shift  in  my  evaluative  
attitude   towards   her.   It   is   arguable   that,   what   is   lost   in   BPD   is   exactly   this  
ability  to  access  one’s  previous  emotions  in  an  empathic  way  and  this   is  what  
determines   the   tendency  of   the  borderline  person   to  quickly  oscillate  between  
radically  different  views  of  self  and  other.  As  such  it  can  be  maintained  that  it  is  
not   the  ability   to   remember  past   emotions   that   is  disrupted   in   the   illness,  but  
rather  their  experiential  continuity,  as  if  there  was  no  inertia  in  the  affective  life  
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of   the   patients   and   new   emotions   always   completely   replaced   the   previous  
ones.    
  
Having  identified  a  disruption  of  empathic  access  as  central   to  BPD,   it   is  now  
important   to   understand   how   this   is   brought   about   and   how   this   condition  
differs  from  analogous  alterations  undergone  in  ordinary  experience.  It  can  be  
observed   that   not   all   cases   of   lack   of   empathic   access   to   one’s   past   are  
accompanied  by  a  fragmentation  of  autobiographical  story-­‐‑telling.  The  inability  
to  empathise  with  one’s  past  emotions,  beliefs,  values  or  choices  can  indeed  be  
relatively   common   also   in   ordinary,   non-­‐‑pathological   experience.   Like   the  
mature   woman   in   one   of   the   scenarios   discussed   by   Schechtman58,   we   are  
sometimes   unable   to   understand   how   we   were   able   to   feel,   think,   or   act   in  
certain  ways   in   the  past   and   this,   according   to   the  model   I   have   endorsed,   is  
due  to  the  fact  that  the  past  experiences  in  question  have  now  been  completely  
replaced  by  new  affects,  beliefs,  and  desires.  In  these  cases,  however,  although  
these  experiences  are  somehow  less  familiar  to  us  than  when  empathic  access  is  
present   and   it   might   be   difficult   to   include   them   in   our   autobiographical  
narratives,   the  overall  coherence  of   the  narrative  self   is  not  affected.      I  believe  
that  what  is  different  in  the  case  of  BPD  is  not  the  structure  of  this  process  –  the  
borderline  person  too  lacks  empathic  access  to  some  of  her  past  states  –  but  the  
extent  of  the  past  experience  which  is  so  inaccessible  to  her.  In  this  regard,  the  
difference   between   ordinary   and   pathological   experience   depends   on   how  
extensive   is   the   range   of   states   that   are   experientially   inaccessible   to   the  
individual.  In  particular,  I  will  suggest  in  the  next  section  that,  due  to  the  rapid  
and   frequent   alternation   of   existential   forms   of   anger   and   shame,   borderline  
patients   become   unable   to   access   a   wide   set   of   self-­‐‑   and   other-­‐‑directed  
emotions,  and  I  will  claim  that  it  is  this  condition  that  ultimately  generates  the  
fragmentation  of  narrative  selfhood  typical  of  the  disorder.    
                                                   
58 See  Chapter  3,  Section  2  for  the  discussion  of  this  example. 
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2.2.  The  Role  of  Existential  Anger  and  Shame  
  
Anger,  often   in   the   form  of   intense  outbursts  which  are  difficult   to   control,   is  
considered  as  one  of  the  key  features  of  BPD  and  is  one  of  the  diagnostic  criteria  
adopted  by   the  DSM-­‐‑5   (APA,  2013:  663).   In   the   following,   I  will  argue   that   in  
BPD   anger   becomes   an   existential   feeling,   radically   influencing   the   patients’  
moral  evaluations  and  deeply  constraining  the  range  of  mental  states  that  they  
can  experience.  
  
Anger  can  be  conceived  as  an  emotion  that  arises  when  we  feel  offended  by  a  
particular  event  or  behaviour  and  this  is  related  specifically  to  the  moral  sphere  
(Roberts,   2003).   As   observed   by   Prinz   (2010),   this   emotion   is   usually  
experienced  when   a   person,   either   the   self   or   another,   is   harmed   by   another  
person,   in   particular   when   the   act   is   performed   intentionally   or   depends   on  
negligence.  Prinz  argues  that  the  harm  in  question  can  be  physical  or  symbolic,  
direct   or   indirect,   but   all   forms   are   to   be   seen   as   responses   to   something  
perceived  as  a  transgression  against  the  person.    
  
What   is   typically   associated  with   the   borderline   syndrome,   then,   is   a   painful  
evaluation  of  others  as  acting  against  the  rights  or  value  of  the  self  or  something  
he   cares   about  without   any  acceptable   reason.  Anger  arises  when   the   subject,  
people,   things,   or   ideas   that   are   important   to   him   are   perceived   as   being  
inappropriately   treated   in   a   variety   of   possible  ways.  However,   it   seems   that  
anger  in  BPD  can  lose  its  directionality  and  become  a  general  attitude  (Pazzagli  
and   Rossi   Monti,   2000).   Rather   than   being   a   transient   and   circumscribed  
affective   experience,   it   is   recognised   that   in   the   experience   of   the   borderline  
person  anger  acquires  a  pervasive  character.  In  this  regard,  it  seems  that  people  
affected  by  BPD  are  not  simply  angry  at  someone  or  because  of  something,  but,  
on   the   contrary,   they   already   experience   anger   before   finding   any   particular  
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reason  for  it.  In  this  sense,  in  some  phases  of  the  borderline  patient’s  experience,  
anger  appears  more  as  an  existential  feeling  than  a  simple  emotion:  the  person’s  
whole  relationship  with  the  world  is  enveloped  by  this  feeling  and  this  is  why  it  
is  difficult  to  both  predict  and  regulate  the  outbursts  of  rage  characteristic  of  the  
disorder.  According  to  the  reports  of  people  who  are  in  close  relationships  with  
borderline   patients,   it   is   indeed   very  difficult   to   understand  what  will   be   the  
trigger   of   the   next   explosion   of   anger:   for   the   borderline   person,   any   reason  
could  be  a  good  reason  to  get  angry  and  once  the  emotion  is  elicited,  it  seems  
that  nothing  can  counteract  it.  As  observed  by  Kreisman  and  Straus:  
  
The  borderline’s  outbursts  of  rage  are  as  unpredictable  as  they  are  frightening.  
Violent   scenes   are   disproportionate   to   the   frustrations   that   trigger   them.  
Domestic   fracases   that  may   involve   chases  with   butcher   knives   and   thrown  
dishes   are   typical   of   borderline   rage.   The   anger   may   be   sparked   by   a  
particular  (and  often  trivial)  offence,  but  underneath  the  spark  lies  an  arsenal  
of  fear  from  the  threat  of  disappointment  and  abandonment.  (2010:  51)    
  
Rather   than   a   circumscribed   emotional   response,   anger   is   sometimes   the  
predominant  way  in  which  the  borderline  patient  finds  himself  in  the  world.  As  
the  moral   emotion   of   guilt   can   acquire   in   depression   an   existential   character  
and  radically  alter   the   individual  evaluative  perspective,  so   in  BPD  anger  acts  
in  some  cases  as  a  background  orientation  which  deeply  constrains  the  range  of  
intentional   states   that   can   be   experienced   by   the   person.   In   particular,   when  
anger  in  its  existential  form  is  present,  the  individual  experiences  a  narrowing  
of  his  evaluative  perspective,  as  he  can  no  longer  have  cognitive  and  affective  
states  which  are  incompatible  with  the  appraisal  integral  to  the  feeling  of  anger.  
Since,  as  previously  mentioned,  existential  anger  amounts   to  an  experience  of  
the  self  as  unfairly  treated,  offended  or  harmed,  the  individual  who  experiences  
this  feeling  is  no  longer  able  to  conceive  of  himself  as  potentially  wrong,  unjust,  
or   harmful   to   other   people   and   is   less   likely   to   feel   emotions   such   as   guilt,  




It  seems  that  in  BPD  not  only  anger,  but  also  feelings  of  shame  often  acquire  an  
existential   character   and   first   person   accounts   of   the   illness   show   that   often  
borderline  patients  oscillate  between  the  two  affects  (e.g.  Reiland,  2004).  Shame  
involves  a  sense  of  oneself  as  being  defective  or  inadequate  and  is  connected  to  
a   failure   to   live   up   to   one’s   ideals,   goals,   or   values,   although   this   is   not  
necessarily  dependent  upon  a  moral  transgression  as  in  guilt.  It   is  argued  that  
central   to   the   experience   of   shame   is   the   real   or   imagined   presence   of   an  
observer  and  that  typical  of  this  emotion  is  the  feeling  of  being  exposed  to  the  
gaze   of   others,   of   being   an   object   of   others’   awareness   (e.g.   Sartre,   1958).  
Existing   philosophical   and   psychological   accounts   of   shame   differ   in   many  
respects;   however,   some   influential   approaches   agree   that   a   fundamental  
characteristic  of  shame  is  the  fact  that  it  is  a  global  evaluation  of  the  self,  that  is  
an  evaluation  of  the  self  as  a  whole  rather  than  an  assessment  of  any  particular  
trait  or  behaviour   (e.g.  Lewis,  1971;  Lewis,  1992;  Taylor,  1985).   In  addition,  as  
far  as  action  tendencies  are  concerned,  shame  is  often  associated  with  the  desire  
to  hide  or  disappear.  
  
It  seems  that  in  BPD  shame  is  not  just  a  circumscribed  and  transient  emotion  –  
feeling   ashamed   in   relation   to   particular   things   in   particular   circumstances   –  
but   rather   a   more   pervasive   aspect   of   one’s   stance   towards   the   world.   The  
feeling  of  being  exposed  to  the  judgement  of  others  and  of  being  inadequate  not  
because   of   a   particular   reason   but   inherently   is   characteristic   of   borderline  
subjects   and   a   wide   variety   of   situations   seem   to   be   lived   in   light   of   this  
experience.  The  centrality  of  the  experience  of  shame  to  the  disorder  is  such  that  
it   has   been   hypothesised   that   all   its   characteristic   symptoms   could   be  
considered   as   different   but   closely   related   aspects   of   a   “chronic   shame  
response”   (Crowe,   2004:   327).   Arguably   the   all-­‐‑encompassing   character   of  
shame  in  the  disorder  is  the  reason  why  patients  often  feel  under  the  threat  of  
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being   abandoned   by   the   people   they   love   and   engage   in   “frantic   efforts”   to  
avoid   this   possibility   (APA,   2013:   663).   This   feeling   of   intrinsic   inadequacy   is  
also  what  makes  encounters  with  others  stressful  and   it   is  connected  with   the  
patients’  strongly  devaluating  self-­‐‑image.  In  the  words  of  a  patient:  
  
I  don’t  like  getting  too  close  to  people…  I  get  very  threatened.  I  like  to  keep  a  
distance.   I   think   that   if   they  got  up   too  close  and   found  out  what   I  was   like  
behind  the  facade…  I  don’t  even  know  what’s  behind  the  facade.  I  know  that  
they’ll  think  I’m  not  good  enough…  That  I’ll  never  be  good  enough.  (Crowe,  
2004:  331)  
  
As   it   is   the  case  with  anger,  also  when  shame  acquires  an  existential   form  the  
person’s  evaluative  and  experiential  perspective  is  significantly  constrained.  In  
particular,   as   intrinsic   to   shame   is   an   appraisal   of   the   self   as   defective,  
inadequate,   or   “never   good   enough”,   when   this   affect   takes   the   form   of   a  
background  orientation   it   is   very  difficult   for   the  person   to   experience   states,  
such   as   feelings   of   pride   or   self-­‐‑worth,   that   are   incompatible   with   that   self-­‐‑
appraisal.    
  
Prima  facie  existential  feelings  of  shame  and  anger  appear  to  have  very  different  
structures.  While  in  the  disorder  the  former  is  predominantly  self-­‐‑focused  and  
consists  in  an  evaluation  of  the  self  as  defective,  the  latter  is  usually  directed  to  
other  people  and  consists  in  a  perception  of  them  as  responsible  for  some  sort  
of  misdeed   or   offence.  However,   this   is   not   yet   an   exhaustive   account   of   the  
structure   of   the   two   affects.   As   far   as   shame   is   concerned,   integral   to   its  
structure   is   not   only   a   particular   self-­‐‑evaluation,   but   also   a   specific   way   of  
appraising   the   other.   I   previously   mentioned   that   the   presence   of   a   real   or  
imagined   observer   or   audience   is   recognised   from  various   perspectives   to   be  
cardinal  to  this  feeling.  However,  attention  is  not  usually  drawn  to  the  fact  that  
the  audience  or  observer  in  these  circumstances  is  not  perceived  as  neutral,  but  
is   rather   appraised   as   someone  who  does  not  have   the   same  weaknesses   and  
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deficiencies  of  the  person  he  observes.  For  similar  reasons,  also  the  account  of  
anger   that   I   have   provided   previously   is   incomplete.   I   emphasised   that  
constitutive   of   anger   is   an   evaluation   of   the   other   as   unjustifiably   offending,  
threatening   or   harming   the   self   or   something   he   cares   about.   From   this  
perspective,   anger   might   appear   to   be   an   other-­‐‑focused   emotion,   but   such   a  
view   does   not   do   justice   to   the   fact   that   others   are   so   evaluated   from   the  
perspective   of   a   self   which   does   not   share   their   faults   and   is   appraised   as  
righteous   instead.   As   such,   also   forms   of   anger   which   are   directed   to   others  
include  self-­‐‑evaluations.    
  
As   a   result,   it   is   arguable   that   shame   and   anger   have   important   structural  
similarities.   Indeed,   essential   to   the   configuration   of   both   feelings   is   the  
existence  of  a  relationship,  either  real  or  imagined,  between  self  and  other  and  
there  appears  to  be  a  level  of  symmetry  in  how  this  relationship  is  structured  in  
the  two  emotions.  While  in  shame  the  self  is  appraised  as  defective  in  the  eyes  
of  adequate  others,  in  anger  others  are  seen  as  defective  from  the  point  of  view  
of   an   adequate   self.   As   such,   as   far   as   the   configuration   of   the   relationship  
between  self  and  other  is  concerned,  anger  can  be  seen  as  the  reverse  of  shame.    
  
I   previously   observed   that,   when   shame   and   anger   acquire   an   existential  
character   it   is   very   difficult   for   the   person   to   entertain   affective,   cognitive   or  
volitional  states  that  are  in  contrast  with  the  evaluations  intrinsic  to  the  feeling  
he  is  experiencing.  When  in  the  grip  of  shame,  for  instance,  the  individual  will  
have   difficulties   experiencing   positive   forms   of   self-­‐‑appraisal   such   as   those  
integral   to   pride.   However,   in   light   of   what   I   claimed   in   regard   to   the  
evaluation  of  others  in  shame,  it  is  arguable  that,  when  this  is  experienced  as  an  
existential  feeling,  also  a  range  of  other-­‐‑directed  emotions  will  not  be  accessible.  
In  particular,  it  will  be  problematic  for  the  person  to  experience  emotions  which  
are  incompatible  with  an  evaluation  of  the  other  as  non-­‐‑defective,  for  example  
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contempt,   suspicion   and,   most   importantly   for   the   present   analysis,   anger.  
Similarly,   when   experiencing   existential   anger,   the   individual   will   find   it  
difficult  to  access  not  only  a  particular  set  of  other-­‐‑directed  emotions,  but  also  a  
specific  range  of  self-­‐‑focused  affects,  since,  as  outlined  above,  intrinsic  to  anger  
are  not  only  evaluations  of  others,  but  also  appraisals  of  the  self.  In  particular,  
given   that   integral   to   anger   is   an   evaluation   of   the   self   as   righteous,   when  
experienced  as  an  existential  feeling,  this  affect  will  hinder  the  person’s  ability  
to   experience   emotions   through   which   the   self   is   appraised   as   culpable   or  
defective,  for  example  guilt,  feelings  of  unworthiness,  and  shame.    
  
I  started  this  analysis  of  the  structure  of  shame  and  anger  in  BPD  with  the  aim  
of  explaining  why  the  lack  of  empathic  access  to  their  previous  experiences  has  
in  patients  affected  by  the  disorder  more  disruptive  effects,  to  the  point  that  it  
leads  to  a  fragmentation  of  narrative  understanding.  I  suggested  that,  as  far  as  
the   lack   of   empathic   access   is   concerned,   the   difference   between   normal   and  
pathological   cases   lies   in   the   range   of   experiences   that   are   inaccessible   to   the  
person   and   I   hypothesised   that   in   BPD   this   is   a   very   broad   range.   Having  
examined  how  existential  feelings  of  shame  and  anger  shape  the  experience  of  
the  borderline  person,  it  is  now  possible  to  understand  why  in  the  disorder  the  
lack  of  empathic  access  concerns  an  extensive  set  of  experiences.    
  
Constitutive  of  shame  and  anger,  I  claimed,  are  appraisals  of  self  and  other  that  
have  an  opposite  structure.  As  such,  when  the  borderline  patient  is  in  the  grip  
of  one  of  the  two  feelings,  he  is  unable  to  experience  the  emotions,  thoughts  and  
desires   which   are   compatible   with   the   opposite   feeling.   Consequently,   as   a  
result  of  the  frequent  oscillation  of  existential  forms  of  shame  and  anger,  many  
of  the  person’s  states  become  alternatively  inaccessible  and  lack  continuity,  thus  
making  it  impossible  to  be  empathised  with  at  different  moments  in  time.  This  
predicament   significantly   differs   from   what   happens   in   ordinary,   non-­‐‑
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pathological  experience.  Let’s  consider  an  example  in  order  to  clarify  this  point.  
During  a  social  gathering  I  tell  a  joke  which  I  consider  to  be  funny,  but  nobody  
laughs.  Immediately  I  feel  ashamed  and  this  feeling  has  a  more  or  less  specific  
focus:   I   can   be   ashamed   at   the   idea   of   having  made   a   fool   of  myself,   having  
appeared  awkward  or  not  having  been  able  to  understand  in  advance  that  the  
audience  probably  does  not  share  my  sense  of  humour.  In  any  case,  usually  my  
shame  would  be  fairly  closely  related  to  the  dynamics  of  the  episode  and  would  
not   concern   other   aspects   of  myself.   As   such,   it  would   be   difficult   for  me   to  
experience  emotions  which  are   in  contrast  with   the  circumscribed  evaluations  
regarding  my  making  a  fool  of  myself  or  appearing  awkward,  but  there  would  
still  be  a  wide  range  of  positive  self-­‐‑appraisals  which  would  be  accessible  to  me  
and  are  perfectly  compatible  with  my  infelicitous  performance.  For   instance,   I  
could   still   be   proud   of   my   work   as   a   researcher   or   of   the   assertiveness   I  
demonstrated  when  I  recently  had  a  difficult  conversation  with  my  boss.  More  
broadly,   I   could   still   be   able   to   think   of   myself   as   someone   who,   despite   a  
number  of  imperfections,  possesses  also  various  positive  characteristics.  This  is  
not   what   happens   in   the   borderline   case,   where,   due   to   anger   and   shame  
acquiring  an  existential  character,  the  felt  evaluations  of  self  and  other  come  to  
be   decoupled   from   specific   circumstances   and   characteristics   -­‐‑   although,   as   I  
argued  previously,  specific  circumstances  and  characteristics  become  “pretexts”  
thanks   to   which   the   background   orientations   are   expressed   as   particular  
emotions.   As   such,   due   to   their   generality,   the   range   of   states   that   become  
inaccessible  when  one  of   these  existential   feelings   is  present   is  wider   than   the  
range  of  states  which  are  inaccessible  when  a  more  focused,  intentional  feeling  
is  in  place.  In  addition,  while  the  feelings  that  alternate  in  ordinary  experience  
are  not  mutually  exclusive,  the  borderline  person  oscillates  between  existential  
orientations   that   are   the   opposite   of   one   another   and,   as   such,   make   it   very  





2.3.  Manipulation  and  No-­‐‑Win  Situations  
  
The  account  here  provided  of  the  narrative  fragmentation  characteristic  of  BPD  
can   be   helpful   also   in   enhancing   our   understanding   of   other   aspects   of   the  
disorder,   such   as   the   tendency   of   borderline   patients   to   adopt   manipulative  
behaviours   and   to   put   people   in   “no-­‐‑win”   situations.   The   notion   of  
manipulation   can   be   given   various   characterisations   and   there   are   some  
differences   in   the   way   in   which   it   is   conceived   in   clinical   and   non-­‐‑clinical  
contexts   (Nyquist   Potter,   2006).  However,  without   engaging  with   the   various  
aspects   of   this   debate,   I   will   here   adopt   a   general   definition,   considering  
manipulation  as  a  deceitful  attempt  to  reach  a  certain  goal  through  the  adoption  
of  particular  attitudes  and  behaviours.  The  notion  of  deceit  is  integral  to  that  of  
manipulation   in   that   the   goals   of   the   person  who   seeks   to  manipulate   others  
usually  remain  hidden  in  the  interaction,  namely  there  is  no  explicit  or  implicit  
understanding  of  them  on  the  part  of  the  manipulated  person.  In  this  regard,  it  
could  be  argued   that   it   is  exactly  because   the  aims  of   the  manipulator  remain  
unknown  to  the  people  he  manipulates  that  the  process  can  be  successful  and  
he  can   reach  his  objectives.   In  order   to   clarify   these  aspects,   let’s   consider   the  
following   example   provided   by   Rachel   Reiland   and   reported   by  Mason   and  
Kreger  (2010):  
  
Often   I   realize  my  motivation  only  after   the   incident   is  over.  Once,   I  was   so  
upset   that  my  husband  was   ignoring  me   at  Christmas   that,   right   in   front   of  
him,   I   began   destroying   all   the   gifts   he   had   just   given   me.   My   husband  
stopped  me  as   I  was  about   to   rip  apart   the  gift   I   loved  most:   a  book  of   love  
poetry.  When  I  saw  the  book,  it  dawned  on  me  that  I  never  would  have  ruined  
it.  I  was  more  interested  in  seeing  my  husband  try  to  stop  me.  […]  why  did  I  
do   it?   The   answer   was   ugly   and   harsh,   shameful   and   disgusting.  
Manipulation.  I  felt  deeply  ashamed.  (2010:  44)  
  
The  behaviour  of  Reiland  in  this  episode  is  deceitful  for  two  reasons.  In  the  first  
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place,  because  she  pretends  to  be  willing  to  do  something  (i.e.  tearing  apart  her  
favourite  present)  which  she  has  indeed  no  intention  to  do.  In  this  sense  at  least,  
pretending  is  akin  to  a  form  of  lying.  There  is  also  another  way  in  which  deceit  
is  central  to  the  episode  though  and  this  has  to  do  with  Reiland’s  goals  and  her  
husband’s  understanding  of  them.  In  describing  this  sequence,  Reiland  does  not  
explicitly   state  what   is   the  goal   she  wishes   to  achieve   through  her  behaviour,  
but  it  is  arguable  that  her  aim  is  either  to  attract  her  husband’s  attention  –  as  the  
dynamic  is  triggered  by  the  perception  of  him  ignoring  her  –  or  to  punish  him  
by  making  him  feel  sorry.  The  manipulative  character  of  the  episode  lies  in  the  
fact  that  the  actions  she  performs  in  order  to  achieve  her  goal  cannot  easily  be  
understood  by  her  husband  as  being  related  to  those  goals.    
  
Manipulation   can   be   conceived   as   the   attempt   to   control   other   people’s  
behaviour   so   that   it   conforms   to   a   particular   “scenario”   or   “script”   the  
manipulator  is  willing  to  enact.  In  these  cases,  it  is  as  if  the  person  had  already  a  
story  in  mind  which,  in  order  to  be  played  out,  requires  the  people  he  interacts  
with  to  behave  in  a  particular  way.  The  manipulative  behaviours  then  serve  to  
ensure   that  others  act   in  accordance  with   the   role   that   the  manipulator  wants  
them   to   play.   By  manipulating   them,   the   borderline   person   is   thus   trying   to  
force   others   to   behave   like   the   characters   of   a   narrative   he   has   crafted  
beforehand,  a  narrative  which  is  not  susceptible  to  be  changed  on  the  basis  of  
people’s   actual   responses.   I   showed   in   Chapter   3   that   the   structure   of  
autobiographical  narratives   is  not  only  the  outcome  of  a  plurality  of  cognitive  
processes,   but   is   rather   fundamentally   shaped   by   affective   dynamics   and,   in  
particular,  by  existential  feelings.  I  argued  that,  because  of  their  pre-­‐‑intentional  
character,   existential   feelings   can   constrain   the   person’s   narrative   repertoire,  
making   it   possible   for   her   to   conceive   only   of   stories   which   have   particular  
features.  On  this  basis,   it   is  arguable  that  the  existential  feelings  of  shame  and  
anger   experienced   by   the   borderline   person   make   it   difficult   for   her   to   pay  
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attention  and  potentially   endorse  views  of   the   situation   that   are   incompatible  
with   these   feelings.  When  existential   shame  or  anger   is   in  place,  all  emotions,  
beliefs  and  desires  which  are  incompatible  with  it  are  unlikely  to  be  accessible  
and   the   narratives   that   would   be   centred   on   these   states   unlikely   to   be  
produced.   The   existential   feeling   drives   the   construction   of   a   particular   story  
and  makes  the  narrator  unable  to  integrate  within  this  story  the  voice  of  others.  
Manipulation  can  thus  be  conceived  as   the   inability   to  shape  and  adjust  one’s  
narrative   by   taking   into   account   interpretations   of   the   events   which   would  
clash  with  the  story-­‐‑telling  that  is  driven  by  the  person’s  background  feelings.    
  
These   dynamics   are   further   exemplified   by   another   feature   often   associated  
with  the  behaviour  of  borderline  patients.  People  who  are  close  to  individuals  
affected  by  BPD  often   complain   that   the  borderline  person  puts   them   in   “no-­‐‑
win   situations”,   that   is   situations   in  which,   any   behaviour   they  might   adopt  
inevitably  lead  to  a  negative  reaction  (Mason  and  Kreger,  2010).  In  these  cases,  
it  is  as  if  the  person  affected  by  BPD  wanted  to  criticise  or  start  a  fight  with  the  
person  he   is   interacting  with  and  was   just   looking   for   an  excuse   to  do   so.  As  
such,   it   is  almost   impossible   to  escape   the  criticism  or  anger  of   the  borderline  
patient,   as   this   is   not  motivated   by   any   particular   behaviour   or   event,   but   is  
rather  dependent  on  the  attitude  of  the  patient  himself.  This  is  exemplified  by  
the  following  description  provided  by  a  family  member  of  a  borderline  patient:  
  
If   I   asked   her   about   her   unhappiness,   she   told   me   I   was   too   sensitive   and  
paranoid.   If   I   ignored   the  unhappiness,   she   said   I  didn’t   care   about  her.   If   I  
praised  her,  she  thought  I  was  up  to  something.  If  I  criticized  her,  I  was  trying  
to  hurt  her.  If  I  spent  time  talking  with  her  four-­‐‑year-­‐‑old,  she  wanted  to  know  
what  I  was  asking  him.  If  I  played  a  simple  game  with  him,  she  criticized  me  
if  I  won.  If  I  wanted  to  have  sex,  she  wanted  it  to  be  her  idea  –  later.  If  I  didn’t  
want   to   have   sex,   I   was   a   homosexual.   If   I   spent   time   alone,   I   was   up   to  
something.   If   I   spent   too  much   time  with  her,   I  was  needy.   If   I  wasn’t   thirty  
minutes   early,   I  was   late.   If   she  wasn’t   ready   and   I   sat  down   to   read,   I  was  




As   previously   argued,   when   the   existential   feeling   of   anger   takes   over,   the  
person  affected  by  BPD  experiences  herself  as  unjustly   threatened,  harmed  or  
offended   and,   since   this   is   the   orientation   that   structures   her  way   of   finding  
herself   in   the   world,   all   her   interpersonal   interactions   are   shaped   by   this  
experiential   framework.  As  such,   the  borderline  patient   is  not  receptive   to   the  
behaviour  and  the  motivations  of  the  people  around  her,  but  rather  “projects”  
on   to   them   the   image  of   the  other  as  harmful,   threatening  or  offensive  which  
originates   in  her   existential   feelings.   Every   interaction   is   thus   forced  within   a  
narrative  scheme  that,  because  of  its  generality  and  the  intensity  of  the  feelings  
that  accompany  it,  is  very  difficult  to  shake  or  escape.    
  
3.  The  Impact  of  Narrative  Fragmentation  on  Affective  Experience    
  
In   Chapter   4   I   described   various   ways   in   which   narrativity   can   shape   the  
experiential   structure   of   affectivity.   I   claimed   that   by   virtue   of   their   being  
included   in   particular   autobiographical   narratives   emotions   can   acquire   not  
only   a  more   definite   character,   but   also   be   experienced   as   complex   processes  
whose   components   are  meaningfully   connected.   In   addition,   I   suggested   that  
story-­‐‑telling  is  fundamental  to  the  regulation  of  emotions.  Narrativity  can  thus  
be   considered   to   play   a   fundamental   role   in   shaping   various   experiential  
dimensions   of   affectivity   and   when   disruptions   of   narrative   understanding  
occur,   also   these   dimensions   are   negatively   affected.   I   will   show   in   the  
following   that   these   dynamics   are   central   to   BPD,   as   the   fragmentation   of  
narrativity   typical  of   the  disorder  generates  various  alterations   in   the  process-­‐‑
structure   of   emotions   and   in   the   patients’   ability   to   regulate   their   affective  
experience.    
  
By  drawing  on  Colombetti’s  work   (2009),   I   previously  drew  attention   to  how  
language   can   confer   on   our   affective   experience   a  more   precise   character.   By  
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virtue  of  their  being  labelled  or  described,  emotions  can  acquire  a  higher  degree  
of  distinctiveness  and  thus  be  more  clearly  differentiated  from  other  affects  and  
bodily  experiences.  Arguably  the  disruptions  of  narrative  abilities  experienced  
by   borderline   patients   hinder   these   processes,   so   that   affective   states   in   the  
disorder   tend   to   be   less   clearly   individuated.   In   order   to   best   highlight   this  
point,   it   is   helpful   to   take   into   consideration   the   bodily   experience   associated  
with  affectivity.  
  
In   borderline   personality   disorder   the   experience   of   the   body   is   altered   in  
various  respects.  Some  borderline  patients,  for  example,  report  the  presence  of  
anomalous   physical   sensations,   such   as   unpleasant   feelings   of   excitement,  
energy,  or  arousal:  
  
I   had   this   energy   in   all   my   body,   not   a   pleasant   energy,   rather   an  
uncomfortable   feeling  of   excess.  A   sort   of   sexual   excitement,   but  not   exactly  
so.  Something  electric  moving  in  my  flesh.  A  current  or  heat!  (Stanghellini  and  
Rosfort,  2013:  155)  
  
Stanghellini  and  Rosfort  (2013)  emphasise  the  centrality  of  these  feelings  to  the  
experience   of   people   affected   by   BPD.   More   specifically,   they   claim   that   the  
affectivity   of   the   borderline   person   is   dominated   by   the   presence   of   a   bodily  
“vitality”  or   “force”,   namely   a   set   of   feelings  with  no   intentional   content   and  
irreducible   to   discrete   emotions   that   the   subject   is   unable   to   control.   In   this  
regard,  from  a  psychological  perspective  attention  has  been  drawn  to  the  notion  
of  tension,  characterised  as  the  “subjective  perception  of  aversive,  high  arousal”  
(Stiglmayr  et  al.,  2001:  111)  not  associated  by  the  patient  with  the  experience  of  
any   specific   emotion.   According   to   Stiglmayr   et   al.,   people   affected   by   BPD  
experience  states  of  aversive  tension  more  intensely  and  for  longer  periods  than  




It  is  arguable  that  these  generic  experiences  of  excitement  or  tension  are  related  
to   the   difficulty   to   identify   emotions   that   characterises   the   disorder.   In   an  
experimental  setting,  for  instance,  Levine  et  al.  (1997)  showed  that  compared  to  
healthy  controls  borderline  patients  have   lower   levels  of  emotional  awareness  
and  are  less  accurate  in  the  identification  of  facial  expressions  of  emotions.59  In  
line  with   these   observations,   it  might   be   possible   to   account   for   some   of   the  
symptoms  typical  of  BPD  through  the  notion  of  alexithymia  (Bagby  and  Taylor,  
1997b:  164).  This  notion  was  originally  introduced  with  regard  to  the  analysis  of  
psychosomatic  diseases  and  it  has  then  been  associated  with  various  psychiatric  
conditions  (Bagby  and  Taylor,  1997a).  It  is  claimed  that  one  of  the  key  features  
of  alexithymia  is  the  difficulty  to  identify  emotions  and  distinguish  them  from  
the  bodily   experience   associated  with   emotional   arousal   (1997a:   299)60   and,   as  
illustrated   so   far,   this   seems   to   be   a   core   aspect   of   the   affective   experience   of  
borderline  patients.  
  
This  feature  is  related  to  the  disturbances  of  narrative  abilities  that  characterise  
the  disorder.  As  previously  mentioned,  labelling  or  describing  emotions  has  the  
effect   of   clarifying   our   experience,   conferring   on   it   a   higher   degree   of  
distinctiveness.  As   the   ability   to   identify   and  narrate   emotions   is   impaired   in  
BPD,   the   patients’   feelings   are   blurred   and   their   experience   is   that   of   an  
indefinite  sense  of  arousal  rather  than  of  distinct  affective  states.    
  
These   dynamics   are   related   also   to   another   feature   of   affective   experience   in  
BPD,  namely  the  fact  that  the  expression  of  emotions  seems  to  have  primarily  a  
bodily  character.  As  due  to  the  disturbances  of  narrative  self-­‐‑understanding  the  
                                                   
59 The  study  also  showed  that   in  BPD  the  ability  to  coordinate  feelings  with  different  
valence  is  impaired  and  the  responses  to  negative  emotions  have  higher  intensity.  
60  According   to   Bagby   and   Taylor   (1997a:   29)   other   features   of   alexithymia   are:   “(ii)  
difficulty   describing   feelings   to   other   people;   (iii)   constricted   imaginal   processes,   as  




verbalization  of  emotions  is  often  problematic  for  borderline  patients,  the  body  
becomes   a   very   powerful   tool   of   affective   expression.   Fonagy   (Fonagy   et   al.,  
2002)   draws   attention   to   this   aspect   in   his   discussion   of   the   case   of   Emma,   a  
young   patient   he   supervised   during   a   six-­‐‑year   period   of   psychoanalytic  
treatment.  Emma  suffered  from  diabetes,  but  admittedly  often  manipulated  her  
dose  of   insulin  to  keep  her  weight  under  control,   to  the  point  that,  during  the  
year  before   the  beginning  of  her   treatment  with  Fonagy,   she  was  hospitalised  
eight   times   due   to   ketoacidosis61.   Based   on   his   observations   throughout   the  
therapeutic  process,  Fonagy  suggests  that,  while  Emma’s  ability  to  identify  and  
discuss   her   mental   states   was   impaired,   her   bodily   conditions   played   a  
significant  role  in  the  manifestation  of  her  affective  experience.  As  he  explains:  
  
Emma  would  communicate  anxiety  by  becoming  ketotic.  Her  bodily  states  of  
“highs”  and  “lows”  conveyed  her  mood  far  better  than  did  her  verbalizations.  
[…]  [S]he  enacted  with  her  body  in  the  session,  created  real  anxiety,  real  anger  
and  real  confusion,  rather  than  being  able  to  describe  these  as  current  internal  
states.  […]  Many  of  the  feelings  and  ideas  that  Emma  was  unable  to  represent  
as  thoughts  and  feelings  were  experienced  in  relation  to  her  body.  (Fonagy  et  
al.,  2002:  404)  
  
Closely  related  to  these  observations  is  the  idea  that  in  BPD  emotions  are  often  
“acted-­‐‑out”,   that   is   they   are   impulsively   expressed   through   behaviours   and  
actions.  In  order  to  exemplify  this  aspect,  it  is  helpful  to  consider  the  structure  
of   anger   in   the   disorder.   As   previously   mentioned,   the   angry   reactions   of  
borderline   patients   usually   take   the   form   of   intense   outbursts   which   are  
difficult   to   predict   and   can   develop   very   quickly   without   a   real   or   serious  
enough   reason   to   justify   them.   In   the   disorder   anger   often   takes   the   form   of  
sudden  explosions  followed  by  extreme  gestures  and  actions  and  arguably  this  
is   the   case   also   because,   rather   than   being   experienced   as   a   process   which  
involves  a  plurality  of  affective,  cognitive,  and  volitional  components,  anger  in  
BPD   involves   primarily   a   series   of   bodily   feelings   and   action   tendencies.  
                                                   
61 A  diabetic  complication  caused  by  the  lack  of  insulin.  
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Although  particularly  visible  in  the  case  of  anger,  this  is  not  a  characteristic  of  
this  emotion  alone,  but  rather  a  general   feature  of   the  affectivity  of  borderline  
patients  and  one   that  can  be  accounted   for   in   light  of   some  of   the  dynamics   I  
discussed  in  Chapter  4.  
  
Apart   from   drawing   attention   to   the   role   played   by   narratives   in   the  
individuation  and  differentiation  of  emotions,  I  have  also  argued  that  thanks  to  
narrativity   affective   experience   can   acquire   various   degrees   of   complexity.  
Relying   in   particular   on  Goldie’s  work,   I   claimed   that   it   is   by   virtue   of   their  
being  narrated  that  emotions  can  be  constituted  and  experienced  as  unitary  and  
meaningful   processes   comprising   a   plurality   of   different   components.   While  
from   this   perspective   bodily   feelings   are   seen   as   one   of   the   constituents   of  
emotional   experience,   it   is   also   emphasised   that   other   elements   –   such   as  
specific   thoughts,   perceptions   and   action   tendencies   –   are   integral   to   the  
structure   of   affective   experience.   As   the   narratives   are   the   means   by   which  
these   constituents   are   meaningfully   held   together,   it   is   to   be   expected   that  
disruptions   of   narrativity  will   be   detrimental   to   our   ability   to   constitute   and  
experience  emotions  as  complex  processes.  I  believe  that  the  centrality  of  bodily  
experience   to   the   affectivity  of   the  borderline  person   can  be  understood  as   at  
least   in   part   determined   by   these   dynamics.   Indeed,   if   it   is   not   possible   to  
constitute  emotions  as  comprising  a  plurality  of  different  elements  that  unfold  
over   time,   all   that   is   left   to   affective   experience   are   its   characteristic   bodily  
manifestations.  
  
Another  aspect  of  the  particular  role  played  by  the  body  in  the  affectivity  of  the  
borderline  patient   regards   the   centrality   of   self-­‐‑harm   to   the   syndrome.  About  
75%  of  people  affected  by  BPD  engage  in  self-­‐‑injurious  behaviours  (Gunderson,  
2001:   22),   with   cutting   being   the   most   frequent   (80%),   followed   by   bruising  
(24%),  burning,  (20%),  head  banging  (15%)  and  biting  (7%)  (Shearer,  1994,  cited  
 
228 
in   Gunderson,   2001:   22).   When   the   reasons   for   self-­‐‑harm   are   investigated,   it  
appears  that  often  these  behaviours  are  undertaken  to  express  feelings  that  the  
subject   perceives   he   does   not   have   other   resources   to   communicate.   The  
expressive   role   of   self-­‐‑injurious   behaviours   is   highlighted   for   instance   in   the  
following  first-­‐‑person  reports:  
  
I  want  to  cut.  I  want  to  see  pain,  for  it  is  the  most  physical  thing  to  show.  You  
cannot  show  pain  inside.  I  want  to  cut,  cut,  show,  show.  Get  it  out.  What  out?  
Just  pain.  (Gunderson,  2001:  22)    
  
When  I  cut,  I  don’t  have  to  try  to  explain  how  bad  I  am  feeling.  I  can  show  it.    
(Mason  and  Kreger,  2010:  35)  
  
Kreisman  and  Straus  observe  that,  although  over  time  self-­‐‑harm  can  become  a  
planned   procedure,   in   the   beginning   it   often   has   the   form   of   an   impulsive  
action   (2010:   46).   As   such,   it   is   arguable   that,   at   least   initially,   self-­‐‑mutilative  
behaviours   could   be   the   effect   of   the   action   tendencies   generated   by   specific  
negative   emotions   such   as   anger,   disgust,   or   shame.   However,   borderline  
patients   often   engage   in   self-­‐‑harm   intentionally   and   for   a   variety   of   reasons.  
Self-­‐‑harm  can  be  not  only  a  way  to  communicate  emotions,  but  also  to  generate  
them   and   thus   overcome   the   sense   of   emptiness   (APA,   2013:   663)   and  
numbness   that   often   characterise   their   experience.   In   addition,   self-­‐‑injurious  
behaviours  are  frequently  undertaken  in  the  attempt  to  regulate  one’s  affective  
experience.  A  study  conducted  by  Kleindiest  et  al.  (2008),  for  instance,  showed  
that  95%  of  patients  experienced  a  decrease  in  aversive  tension  following  non-­‐‑
suicidal  forms  of  self-­‐‑injury  and  feelings  of  relief  and  even  “calm  euphoria”  are  
sometimes  reported  after  these  episodes  (Kreisman  and  Straus,  2010:  48-­‐‑49).  In  
this   regard,   it   is   arguable   that   self-­‐‑injurious   behaviours   can   enhance   the  
individual  sense  of  self-­‐‑control  also  by  virtue  of  their  being  activities  in  which  
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the  subject  can  voluntarily  engage.  
  
The   difficulty   to   regulate   emotions   is   a   central   aspect   of   BPD   and   the  
disturbances  of  narrativity  are  cardinal  to  its  generation.  I  argued  in  Chapter  4  
that   by   narrating   emotions   we   can   give   them   specific   temporal   and   spatial  
boundaries,   thus  characterising  them  as  circumscribed  events  which  possess  a  
beginning,   middle,   and   end.   As   a   result,   the   affects   which   are   narrated   are  
experienced   as  more  manageable   and   the   act   of   narrating   itself   enhances   the  
person’s   sense   of   being   able   to   control   his   own   experience.   The   inability   to  
construct  coherent  affective  narratives  in  BPD  negatively  affects  these  dynamics  
in  various  ways.  
  
As   illustrated   earlier   in   this   chapter,   due   to   alternating   existential   feelings   of  
shame   and   anger,   it   is   very   difficult   for   borderline   patients   to   connect   in   a  
coherent  narrative  their  past  and  present  experiences.  As  a  result,  characteristic  
of  the  disorder  is  an  almost  exclusive  focus  on  the  “here”  and  “now”,  as  if  the  
person   lived  each  moment   in   isolation   from  what  preceded   it.  As   such,  when  
undergoing   a   particular   emotion,   it   is   difficult   for   the   borderline   patient   to  
understand   and   even   recall   that   he  might   have   felt   different,   and   sometimes  
opposite   emotions   at   different   times.   This   is   exemplified   by   the   description  
provided  by  Reiland  of  the  feelings  she  experienced  for  her  therapist:  
  
I   loved   him   so   much   at   that   moment   I   couldn’t   believe   how   I   could   have  
harboured  the  hateful  thoughts  that  had  prompted  the  note.  At  times  like  this  
I  could  not   imagine  how  I  could  have  hated  him  –  ever.   In   times  of  hatred  I  
sometimes   wished   I   could   summon   these   warm   feelings   of   love.   But   they  
always  seemed  to  elude  me.  (2004:  135)  
  
Affectivity   in   BPD   is   exclusively   present-­‐‑focused   and   impermeable   to   the  
influence   of   past   events,   beliefs,   desires,   and   emotions.  Due   to   their   being   so  
isolated,   emotions   lose   their   boundaries   and   are   experienced   as   if   they  were  
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never-­‐‑ending.   This   feature   is   apparent   in   another   passage   from   Reiland’s  
account:  
  
Every   strong   feeling  was  not   only   absolute,   but   eternal.   It   didn’t  matter   if   a  
person  close   to  me  had  occupied   the  pedestal   ten  minutes  ago  and  been   the  
object  of  my  abundant  love.  When  the  emotions  changed,  it  was  as  if  that  love  
had  never  existed  and  the  hatred  I  felt  today  would  be  the  way  I  felt  forever.  
(Reiland,  2004:  88-­‐‑89)  
  
The   narrative   disturbances   experienced   by   borderline   patients   and,   in  
particular,   the   difficulty   to   label   and   describe   emotions,   influence   affect  
regulation  also  in  other  ways.  Bagby  and  Taylor  (1997a)  have  drawn  attention  
to   various  mechanisms   through  which   alexithymia   can   lead   to   or   exacerbate  
emotional   dysregulation.  As  previously  mentioned,   the  difficulties   to   identify  
and  describe  emotions  experienced  by   the  borderline  person  are   connected   to  
the   disruption   of   her   narrative   abilities.   As   such,   examining   the   impact   that  
alexithymia  has  on  the  patients’  capacity  to  regulate  their  affective  experience  is  
relevant   to   the   understanding   of   how   narrativity   shapes   affectivity   in   the  
disorder.  According   to  Bagby  and  Taylor,   for   instance,  alexithymia  negatively  
affects  the  person’s  ability  to  communicate  her  affects  to  others  who,  therefore,  
cannot  be  sources  of  help  and  comfort   in  distressing  situations.  Secondly,  due  
to   the   poor   imaginative   capacities   that   are   usually   associated   with   this  
condition,   people   with   high   levels   of   alexithymia   have   fewer   resources   to  
modulate   their  negative  emotions.   In  addition,  Bagby  and  Taylor  suggest   that  
the  lack  of  emotional  awareness  makes  it  difficult  for  the  borderline  person  to  
empathise  with  others  and  thus  to  contribute  to  the  regulation  of  their  affective  
experience  (1997a:  30).  Arguably  this  makes  it  difficult  to  establish  balanced  and  
mutually   caring   interpersonal   relationships   from  which   the  borderline  person  
can  get  support  when  needed.    
  
An  important  aspect  of  emotional  dysregulation  is  affective  instability  and  this  
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too   is   strongly   related   to   the   narrative   impairments   previously   discussed.  
Affective   instability   is   one  of   the  diagnostic   criteria   for  BPD   identified  by   the  
DSM-­‐‑5  (APA,  2013)  and,  according  to  various  accounts,   is  a  core  aspect  of   the  
syndrome.  The  classification  adopted  by  the  WHO  (1992),  for  example,  includes  
BPD   within   the   group   of   emotionally   unstable   personality   disorders   (Ebner-­‐‑
Priemer  et  al.,  2007a).  
  
There  are  various  facets  to  the  notion  of  affective  instability.  On  the  one  hand,  
this  concept  refers  to  the  frequency  with  which  affective  states  change.  On  the  
other,   the  concept   is  also  related   to   the  “amplitude”  of   the  changes  which  are  
experienced,   namely   whether   these   changes   involve   large   or   small   valence  
variations   (Ebner-­‐‑Priemer   et   al.,   2007a;  Larsen,   1987).   It   is   argued   that  BPD   is  
characterised  by  alterations  along  both  dimensions,  with  people  reporting  both  
more  frequent  and  larger  changes  in  affective  experience.  As  far  as  frequency  is  
concerned,   it   is   claimed   that   typical   of   the   disorder   is   a   higher   variability   of  
both  positive  and  negative  moods  (Nica  and  Links,  2009)  and  it  has  been  shown  
that   borderline   patients   overall   report   more   emotions   than   controls   (Ebner-­‐‑
Priemer   et   al.,   2007b),   thus   suggesting   that   in   the   disorder   affective   states  
alternate  more   often   than   it   is   the   case  with   people  who   are   not   affected   by  
BPD.   With   reference   to   the   amplitude   of   affective   changes,   the   disorder   is  
characterised  by  large  oscillations.  In  this  regard,  for  example,  it  is  argued  that  
borderline   patients   often   shift   from   positive   to   negative   moods   and   that   the  
latter  are  usually  more  intense  than  in  healthy  controls  (Nica  and  Links,  2009).    
  
The  account  of  the  relationship  between  affectivity  and  narrativity  I  have  been  
developing  provides  a  theoretical  framework  which  can  explain  the  aspects  of  
affective  instability  just  outlined.  The  frequent  and  large  changes  of  moods  and  
emotions  can  be  accounted  for  by  referring  to  the  fact  that  affective  states  in  the  
syndrome  are  not  embedded  in  an  unfolding  autobiographical  story.  As  I  have  
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previously   shown,   characteristic   of   BPD   is   an   exclusive   focus   on   the   present  
and  the   inability   to  conceive  of  one’s  mental  states  within  a  broader   temporal  
framework.  As  such,  what  is  experienced  in  the  “here”  and  “now”  is  perceived  
as  absolute,  but   it  can  also  be  swept  away  very  easily  when  other  events   take  
place.   As   they   are   not   anchored  within   an   unfolding   narrative,   emotions   are  
experienced   as   absolute   and   “eternal”   by   the   borderline   person.   However,  
when   the   perceptions,   thoughts   or   impressions   that   sustain   them   change,  
emotions  can  fade  away  almost  immediately.    
  
As  highlighted  also  by  Fuchs  (2007),  reflective  and  position-­‐‑taking  abilities  are  
central   to   narrative   self-­‐‑understanding   and   the   disruption   of   these   abilities  
significantly   contributes   to   the   affective   instability   characteristic   of   the  
syndrome.   Borderline   patients   have   difficulties   to   take   an   observational   and  
evaluative  stance  towards  their  own  mental  states  and,  as  such,  it  is  problematic  
for   them   to   orientate   and   control   the   course   of   their   affective   experience.  
Because  of  these  dynamics,  people  affected  by  BPD  are  not  only  dominated  by  
their   impulses,   but   also   unable   to   undertake   long-­‐‑term   commitments.   In  
Chapter  1   I   showed   that   it   is  by  virtue  of  being   reflectively  endorsed   that   the  
values,  ideals,  and  goals  which  are  associated  with  our  affective  experience  can  
become   an   integral   part   of   our   personal   identity   and   acquire   a   long-­‐‑lasting  
character.  As  in  the  syndrome  these  dynamics  are  impaired,  the  commitments  
of   borderline   patients’   are   very   volatile,   as   demonstrated   for   example   by   the  
frequency  with  which  they  change  jobs,  ideas,  and  friends.  In  addition,  people  
affected  by  BPD  tend  to  show  different  characteristics  according  to  the  person  
they  interact  with  and  to  excessively  rely  on  the  social  context  in  defining  their  
identity  (Jørgensen,  2006),  as  well  as  over-­‐‑identifying  with  particular  groups  or  
roles   (Wilkinson-­‐‑Ryan   and  Westen,   2000).  An   example   of   this   is   provided   by  




I  have  a  chameleon-­‐‑like  ability  to  take  on  the  coloring  of  the  individual  I  am  
with.  But  the  act  is  done  more  to  fool  me  than  to  fool  them.  For  the  time  being,  
I   have   become   who   I’d   like   to   be.   I   am   not   some   kind   of   Machiavellian  
manipulator  with  nothing  better  to  do  than  ruin  lives.  The  process  isn’t  really  
conscious.   It’s  being  going  on  for  so   long  now  that   I  don’t  even  know  who  I  
really  am.  I  feel  unreal  –  like  a  phony.  If  I  had  any  true  control  over  it,  I  would  
simply  revert  back   to  “myself”  whenever   I   felt   threatened.  But   I  don’t  know  
who  that  is.  (2010:  32)  
  
The  difficulty  to  construct  coherent  narratives  characteristic  of  BPD  impacts  on  
the   structure   of   affective   experience   also   in   other   ways.   Through  
autobiographical   story-­‐‑telling  we   can   establish   connections   between   emotions  
and  other  mental  states  and  events,  thus  enhancing  the  intelligibility  of  affective  
experience.  When   narrativity   is   impaired,   the   ability   to   establish   meaningful  
relations  between  various  affective  states  and  other  aspects  of  the  person’s  life  
is  also  disrupted,   thus  resulting   in  emotions  becoming   less   intelligible   to  both  
self   and  others.   People   affected   by  BPD,   for   example,   struggle   to   identify   the  
causes  of  their  emotions  and  to  understand  the  role  they  play  in  their  life.  The  
remarks  of  a  patient  of    Stanghellini  reported  below  highlight  this  aspect:  
  
You  ask  me  what  I  feel  when  I  feel  like  this…I  want  to  be  polite  with  you…I  
don’t   know,   I   can’t   say.   I   hope   you   are   not   like   the   other   doc…She   saw  
something   ‘metaphysical’   in  my  mood.  Why  the  fuck  she  thought  so,   I  don’t  
know!  She   said   it  was   ‘ineffable’   and   ‘undefinable’.   She  may  be   right.  But   it  
doesn’t   help.   I   told   her   ‘I   just   feel   bad   and   I   can’t   tell   you   why’,   but   she  
wanted  me  to  tell  her  ‘the  story’  of  this  feeling.  What  an  asshole!  To  insist  like  
this!  It  made  me  feel  even  worse,  it  made  me  feel  stupid.  I  got  angry  at  her  and  
at  myself  too,  because  I  couldn’t  figure  out  ‘why’…  (Stanghellini  and  Rosfort,  
2013:  154-­‐‑155)  
  
The  disruptions  of   autobiographical  narrativity   experienced  by   the  borderline  
patient   thus   have   a   negative   impact   on   his   ability   to   comprehend   his   own  
emotions,  a  feature  which  further  contributes  to  the  impairment  of  the  person’s  







From   various   perspectives   it   has   been   argued   that   borderline   personality  
disorder   is   characterised  by  disturbances  of  narrative   identity.  Considering   in  
particular  the  inability  of  borderline  patients  to  form  a  coherent  view  of  self  and  
others   in   which   different   and   sometimes   contradictory   aspects   are   included,  
Fuchs   (2007)   has   suggested   that   the   disorder   is   best   understood   as   a  
“fragmentation”   of   narrative   selfhood.   In   addition,   according   to   him,  
disturbances   of   affective   experience   are   central   to   the   disorder   and   are  
connected  in  various  ways  to  the  disruptions  of  narrativity.    
  
In  line  with  some  of  the  intuitions  at  the  core  of  Fuchs’  approach,  in  this  chapter  
I  provided  an  account  of   the  various  dynamics   through  which  affectivity  and  
narrativity   influence   each   other   in   BPD.   In   the   first   place,   I   claimed   that   the  
unstable  and  polarised  way  in  which  the  borderline  person  evaluates  both  self  
and   others   originates   in   a   particular   configuration   of   affective   experience.   I  
maintained   that   borderline   patients   frequently   oscillate   between   existential  
feelings   of   shame   and   anger   and   that   intrinsic   to   these   feelings   are   self-­‐‑   and  
other-­‐‑evaluations  which  possess  an  opposite  structure.  More  specifically,  while  
in   shame   the   self   is   experienced   as   defective   in   front   of   a   righteous   other,   in  
anger  the  other  is  perceived  as  defective  in  the  eyes  of  a  righteous  self.  Due  to  
the   fact   that   in   the   disorder   shame   and   anger   have   the   form   of   background  
orientations,  when   the   person   is   in   the   grip   of   one   of   them,   it   becomes   very  
difficult   for   her   to   experience   the   affective   and   evaluative   states   that   are  
associated   with   the   opposite   affective   state.   This   predicament,   I   suggested,  
hinders   the   continuity   of   the   person’s   experience,   making   her   unable   to  
empathically   access   her   previous   states   and   to   coherently   connect   them  with  




I   subsequently  moved   to   consider   how   the   disruptions   of   self-­‐‑understanding  
characteristic   of   BPD   impact   on   the   structure   of   affectivity.   I  maintained   that  
due  to  the  disturbances  of  the  ability  to  identify  and  describe  the  affective  states  
they   undergo,   borderline   patients   tend   to   experience   feelings   of   tension   or  
excitement   rather   than   specific   emotions.   When   narrativity   is   impaired,   the  
body   acquires   a  more   central   role   in   affectivity,   and   I   argued   that   this   is   an  
important  feature  of  BPD,  where  both  the  experience  and  expression  of  affective  
states  have  predominantly  a  bodily  character.  In  addition,  I  suggested  that  also  
the   tendency  of  borderline  patients   to   engage   in   self-­‐‑injurious  behaviours   can  
be   related   to   the   “corporealization”62   of   affective   experience  which  marks   the  
illness.    
  
I  argued  in  Chapter  4  that  narrativity  shapes  affectivity  also  by  virtue  of  the  role  
it  plays   in  various  emotional   regulation  mechanisms.  Disruptions  of  narrative  
understanding   can   hinder   the   person’s   capacity   to   regulate   her   emotions   in  
different  ways   and   I   showed   in   this   chapter   that   this   is   a   cardinal   feature   of  
BPD.  For  example,  due   to   the   impaired  ability   to   identify  affective  states,   it   is  
more  difficult  for  bordeline  patients  to  communicate  their  emotions  and  to  get  
adequate   support   from   others.   In   addition,   the   fact   that   emotions   are   not  
integrated  in  coherent  autobiographical  narratives  increases  affective  instability  
                                                   
62 The  notion  of   corporealization   is  used  by  Fuchs   (2013)   to  describe   the   structure  of  
bodily   experience   characteristic   of   depression,   but   in   my   account   of   the   role   of   the  
body   in   the  affective  experience  of  borderline  patients   I  use   the   term  with  a  different  
meaning.   Fuchs’   analysis  moves   from   the   phenomenological   distinction   between   the  
“lived  body”  and  the  “corporeal  body”.  As  highlighted  in  Chapter  1,  the  former  notion  
refers  to  a  pre-­‐‑reflective  experience  of  the  body  as  the  affective  and  volitional  medium  
through  which  we   access   and   engage  with   the  world,  while   the   latter   designates   an  
experiential   structure   where   the   body   appears   as   an   object   of   observation   or  
manipulation.  In  Fuchs’  opinion,   in  depression  the  body  is  corporealized  in  the  sense  
that,   rather   than   being   experienced   as   the   vehicle   through   which   various   forms   of  
world-­‐‑directed   intentionality  are   realised,   it  becomes  a  heavy  and  static  object  which  
acts   as   an   obstacle   to   the   subject’s   activities.   In   the   conclusions   of   this   chapter,  
however,  I  use  the  term  corporealization  to  refer  to  the  role  played  by  the  body  in  the  
experience  and  expression  of  emotions  in  BPD,  without  taking  a  position  as  to  whether  
this  also  entails  a  change  of  the  type  identified  by  Fuchs  as  central  to  depression.    
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for   various   reasons.  On   the   one   hand,   as   they   are   not   connected   to   past   and  
future  experiences,   the   subject’s   affective   states  are   completely  determined  by  
what   happens   “here”   and   “now”   and   can   thus   rapidly   disappear   when   the  
circumstances  change.  On   the  other,  as  previously  shown,  central   to  narrative  
self-­‐‑understanding  are  reflective  and  position-­‐‑taking  abilities  which  allow  us  to  
exert  a  level  of  control  over  the  experiences  we  undergo  and,  as  such,  when  the  
ability   to   narrate   emotions   is   disrupted   also   the   capacity   to   control   them   is  
reduced.  
  
The  account  of  BPD  I  developed  has  implications  for  the  understanding  of  the  
relationship   between   minimal   and   narrative   self.   By   showing   that   in   the  
disorder  affectivity  constitutively  shapes  and  is  shaped  by  narrativity,  I  indeed  
provided   an   illustration   of   the   inextricability   of   the   two   dimensions.   In   the  
experience  of   the  borderline  person,  disruptions  of   the  minimal  and  narrative  
levels   of   self-­‐‑awareness   are   deeply   entangled   and   conceiving   of   either  
dimension  in  isolation  from  the  other  would  lead  to  an  abstract  understanding  
of  the  core  features  of  the  illness.    
  
In  addition,  the  idea  that  the  impairment  of  narrative  self-­‐‑understanding  has  an  
impact  on  minimal  self-­‐‑experience  seems  to  be  further  corroborated  by  the  fact  
that  borderline  patients   can  experience   significant   alterations  of   their   sense  of  
reality,  unity,  and  continuity,  dimensions  which,  as  detailed  also  by  the  EASE  
(Parnas  et  al.,  2005)  are  at   the  core  of  minimal  self-­‐‑awareness.  People  affected  
by   BPD   can   show   psychotic   symptoms   similar   to   those   experienced   by  
schizophrenic  and  depressed  patients,  with  depersonalisation  occurring  with  an  
incidence   of   30-­‐‑85%,   derealization   of   30-­‐‑92%   and  paranoid   experiences   of   32-­‐‑
100%  (Gunderson,  2001:  15).  A  radical  alteration  of   the  patient’s  pre-­‐‑reflective  




I  was  walking  along   the  mall  one  day  and   I  hadn’t  been   feeling  good.   I  was  
thinking  all  dismal  things.  The  thoughts  were  spiralling  me  down.  I  started  to  
feel   as   though   I  wasn’t   in  my  body.   I  was   just  watching   it  walking  along.   It  
was  really  crazy…  I  didn’t  know  what  to  do  or  how  to  get  back  to  normal.   I  
just  kept  walking  but  I  wasn’t  really   there.   I  really  freaked  out…  I  ended  up  
cutting  myself  really  bad  not  like  the  cuts  I  had  always  done…  I  was  bleeding  
everywhere.  That’s  the  first  time  I  ended  up  in  hospital.  (Crowe,  2004:  332)  
  
Both  BPD  and  depression  are  thus  best  understood  as  disturbances  of  selfhood  
in   which   minimal   and   narrative   aspects   are   inseparable.   However,   it   is  
important   to   note   that   the   structure   of   the   two   disorders   is   significantly  
different.  As  argued  in  Chapter  5,  depression  is  characterised  by  the  weakening  
or   abandonment   of   some   of   the   narratives   with   which   the   person   identified  
prior  to  the  illness  and  by  the  emergence  of  a  new  set  of  narratives  congruent  
with  the  person’s  affective  experience.  On  the  other  hand,  as  argued  by  Fuchs,  
central   to   BPD   is   a   fragmentation   of   narrative   self-­‐‑understanding,   that   is   a  
disrupted   ability   to   create   coherent   narratives  which   is   both   the   consequence  
and  the  origin  of  particular  affective  disturbances.  As  a  result,  the  relationship  
between   affectivity   and   narrativity   in   the   two   disorders   is   characterised   by  
different   dynamics.  However,   as   I   suggested,   both   exemplify   the   constitutive  













In  this  thesis  I  explored  from  a  phenomenological  perspective  the  relationship  
between  affectivity  and  narrativity  and   its   implications   for  our  understanding  
of   the   nature   of   selfhood.   A   number   of   phenomenologically   oriented  
approaches  endorse  the  idea  that  it  is  possible  to  distinguish  between  two  forms  
of  selfhood:  the  “minimal”  and  “narrative”  self.  This  work  challenged  some  of  
the  claims  which  are  central  to  this  account,  namely  the  idea  that  the  minimal  
and   narrative   sense   of   self   complement   each   other   but   are   fundamentally  
distinct  dimensions  and  that,  while  the  presence  of  a  minimal  self  is  a  condition  
of   possibility   for   the   emergence   of   a   narrative   self,   the   dynamics   which  
characterise   narrative   self-­‐‑understanding   do   not   have   a   structuring   effect   on  
minimal  self-­‐‑experience.  I  have  done  so  by  showing  that  at  least  certain  forms  
of  affective  experience  are  complex  phenomena  in  which  minimal  and  narrative  
forms  of  self-­‐‑awareness  are  deeply  entwined.  More  specifically,  I  have  claimed  
that   while   affectivity   is   to   be   considered   as   a   fundamental   dimension   of  
minimal   selfhood,   there   are   various   dynamics   through   which   affective  
experience  both  shapes  and   is  shaped  by  narrative  self-­‐‑understanding,  so   that  
the  two  are  phenomenologically  inextricable.  
  
As  highlighted  in  Chapter  1,  the  notion  of  pre-­‐‑reflective  self-­‐‑consciousness  is  at  
the   core   of   Gallagher   and   Zahavi’s   conception   of   minimal   selfhood   (e.g.  
Gallagher,  2000;  Gallagher  and  Zahavi,  2008;  Zahavi,  2007;  2008;  2010).   In   this  
context,  pre-­‐‑reflective  self-­‐‑consciousness  is  characterised  as  a  pre-­‐‑linguistic  and  
pre-­‐‑conceptual   awareness   of   the   self   as   the   subject   of   experience   and   it   is  
claimed   that   this   form   of   self-­‐‑awareness   is   intrinsic   to   any   phenomenally  
conscious  state.  The  sense  of  ownership  and  the  sense  of  agency  are  considered  
to  be  fundamental  features  of  minimal  self-­‐‑experience,  but  it  is  also  maintained  
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that   the  minimal   self   is   embodied,   embedded,   and   temporally   extended.   The  
notion  of  narrative  selfhood,  on  the  other  hand,  refers  to  a  self  which  possesses  
an  individual  history  and  personality  and  is  constituted  primarily  through  the  
stories   that   we   and   others   tell   about   ourselves.   While   the   minimal   self   is  
identified   with   pre-­‐‑reflective   self-­‐‑experience,   reflectivity   and,   in   particular,  
evaluative   position-­‐‑taking   are   fundamental   characteristics   of   narrative   self-­‐‑
understanding.    
  
According   to   the  phenomenological   approach,   the  minimal   and  narrative   self  
are  usually   integrated  but   separable   facets  of   selfhood.  More   specifically,   it   is  
suggested  that  the  minimal  self  is  impervious  to  the  dynamics  which  operate  at  
the  level  of  narrative  self-­‐‑understanding.  This  conception  is  particularly  visible  
in   the   way   in   which   the   distinction   between   minimal   and   narrative   self   has  
been  applied  in  the  field  of  philosophy  of  psychiatry.  From  this  perspective,  the  
distinction  has  been  employed  to  account  for  the  disturbances  of  self-­‐‑awareness  
characteristic  of  different  forms  of  psychopathological  experience.  In  particular,  
it  has  been  claimed  that  while  schizophrenia   involves  disturbances  of  the  pre-­‐‑
reflective   level  of   self-­‐‑experience   (e.g.  Parnas  and  Sass,  2001;  Sass  and  Parnas,  
2003)  -­‐‑  thus  amounting  to  a  radical  alteration  of  the  structure  of  selfhood  -­‐‑  the  
disruptions  of   self-­‐‑consciousness   typical  of  depression   (e.g.  Stanghellini,  2004)  
and  borderline  personality  disorder  (Fuchs,  2007)  occur  at  the  level  of  narrative  
understanding  and  are  therefore  less  profound.      
  
I   claimed   that   this   account   is   problematic   for   two   main   reasons.   In   the   first  
place,  while  it  is  argued  that,  in  order  for  a  narrative  self  to  develop,  a  minimal  
form  of   self-­‐‑experience   should  already  be   in  place,  no  explanation   is  given  of  
how   such   form  of   self-­‐‑experience   impacts   on   narrative   self-­‐‑understanding.   In  
other   terms,   it   is   not   explained   which   are   the   pre-­‐‑reflective   dimensions   and  
dynamics   in   which   autobiographical   narrativity   originates.   Secondly,   it   is  
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questionable  whether  the  minimal  self  is  as  independent  from  the  narrative  self  
as   this  position   claims.  The   idea   that  disturbances  of  narrative   selfhood   leave  
the   experiential   sense   of   self   unaffected   indeed   suggests   that   the   two  
dimensions  are  not  structurally  entangled.  However,  various  supporters  of  the  
narrative   account   of   selfhood   maintain   that   narrative   understanding   has   the  
power  to  shape  our  experience  and  it  is  arguable  that  this  is  the  case  also  with  
regard  to  pre-­‐‑reflective  self-­‐‑consciousness.    
  
Moving   from   the   idea   that   more   clarity   in   regard   to   the   questions   raised   in  
Chapter   1   could   be   achieved   by   taking   into   consideration   the   structure   of  
affective   experience,   in  Chapter   2   I   examined  how  existing  phenomenological  
accounts   conceive   of   the   relationship   between   affectivity,   selfhood,   and   self-­‐‑
consciousness.  Affectivity  has  been  an  important  research  topic  in  both  classical  
and  contemporary  phenomenology,  but  comparatively  few  contributions  have  
been  made  to  the  analysis  of  how  affective  experience  is  related  to  the  minimal  
and  narrative  self.   In  this  regard,  I  showed,  affectivity  is  often  associated  with  
pre-­‐‑reflective  forms  of  bodily  and  self-­‐‑experience  (e.g.  Colombetti,  2011;  Slaby,  
2008),  thus  suggesting  that  it  can  be  conceived  as  a  fundamental  dimension  of  
minimal   selfhood,   an   idea   that   is   consonant   with   some   of   the   insights  
developed  in  phenomenological  psychopathology  (e.g.  Parnas  et  al.,  2005)  and  
in  the  field  of  cognitive  science  (e.g.  Damasio,  2000;  2012).    
  
Some   phenomenological   approaches,   however,   claim   that   affectivity   is  
connected  also  to  more  complex  forms  of  self-­‐‑consciousness  and  selfhood  (e.g.  
De   Monticelli,   2003;   2006;   Scheler,   1973a).   In   particular,   these   approaches  
emphasise   that   affective   experience,   by   virtue   of   the   role   it   plays   in   the  
development   of   an   individual   evaluative   perspective,   is   fundamental   to   the  
constitution   of   “personality”   or   “personhood”.   In   so   doing,   these   accounts,  
despite   not   being   explicitly   concerned   with   the   notion   of   narrativity,  
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acknowledge  the  existence  of  a  relationship  between  affectivity  and  some  of  the  
features   that   phenomenologists   such   as   Gallagher   and   Zahavi   consider   to   be  
essential  to  the  notion  of  narrative  self-­‐‑understanding.    
  
Therefore,   the   conception  of   the   relationship  between  affectivity  and   selfhood  
that  can  be  drawn  on   the  basis  of  existing  phenomenological  accounts   is   two-­‐‑
fold.  On  the  one  hand  it  is  recognised  that  the  feelings  which  are  implicated  in  
affective   experience   are   forms   of   pre-­‐‑reflective   self-­‐‑consciousness,   thus  
associating   affectivity  with  minimal   selfhood.  On   the   other,   it   is   claimed   that  
affectivity  is  essentially  involved  in  the  constitution  of  a  form  of  selfhood  akin  
to  the  narrative  self.    I  claimed  that  such  a  conception  correctly  identifies  some  
aspects  of   the  relationship  between  affectivity  and  selfhood,  but   is   incomplete  
in   so   far   as   it   overlooks   the   fact   that   narrativity   is   indeed   a   fundamental  
dimension  of  personhood.  Therefore,  endorsing  the   intuition  that  affectivity   is  
cardinal  also  to  the  constitution  of  a  form  of  selfhood  that  cannot  be  identified  
with  the  minimal  self,  but  accepting  the  claim  that  narrativity  is  integral  to  this  
form  of  selfhood,  in  the  rest  of  my  thesis  I  aimed  to  provide  a  cohesive  account  
of   the  relationship  between  affectivity  and  narrativity.   In  so  doing,   I  extended  
the  phenomenological  view  of  the  relationship  between  affectivity  and  the  self  
presented  in  Chapter  2  and  expanded  and  refined  the  account  of  minimal  and  
narrative  selfhood  discussed  in  Chapter  1.  
  
In  Chapter  3  I  argued  that  affectivity  plays  a  constitutive  role  in  the  emergence  
and   development   of   narrative   self-­‐‑understanding.   In   particular,   I   highlighted  
various   dynamics   through   which   affective   experience   shapes   the   form   and  
contents  of  our  life  stories,  thus  providing  an  account  of  how  minimal  forms  of  
self-­‐‑awareness  can  impact  on  the  structure  of  the  narrative  self.    
  
Drawing   on   the  work   of  Hogan   (2011),   I   started   by   suggesting   that   emotions  
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fundamentally  shape  the   temporal  organisation  of  stories.   I   then  claimed  that,  
because   of   their   evaluative   character,   emotions   fundamentally   influence   the  
selection   of   narrative   contents.   From   this   perspective,   relying   on  Hardcastle’s  
work  (2003;  2008)  and  on  some  of  the  phenomenological  insights  illustrated  in  
Chapter  2,  I  suggested  that  by  marking  certain  events  and  experiences  as  salient  
in   specific   ways,   emotions   allow   us   to   choose   what   to   include   in   our   life  
narratives.   In   addition,   I   maintained   that,   due   to   their   being   forms   of   self-­‐‑
consciousness,   emotions   fundamentally   contribute   to   our  motivation   to   tell   a  
story  about  ourselves.    
  
Drawing  on  Schechtman’s  notion  of  “empathic  access”  (1996;  2001;  2007)  I  then  
suggested  that  affective  experience  fundamentally  contributes  to  the  continuity  
of  the  narrative  self.  Schechtman  claims  that  in  order  for  personal  identity  to  be  
preserved  despite   the  various  changes  we  can  undergo,   it   is  not  enough  to  be  
able  to  tell  a  coherent  story  about  those  changes.  What  is  necessary  is  rather  the  
ability   to   retain   a   particular   form   of   experiential   access   to   one’s   past   mental  
states,   access  which   depends   on   the   fact   that   those   states   are   not   completely  
over  and  still  have  a  role  in  the  person’s  life.  I  claimed  that,  due  to  the  role  they  
play   in   the   constitution   of   the   person’s   evaluative   perspective   and   in   the  
motivation   of   her   behaviour,   affective   states   are   central   to   the   dynamics  
identified   by   Schechtman.   More   specifically,   I   argued   that   in   order   for   the  
person   to   retain   emphatic   access   to   her   past   experience   at   least   some   of   her  
affective   states  must  persist  over   time.  As   such,   I   suggested,   the  continuity  of  
the   narrative   self   fundamentally   depends   on   the   continuity   of   its   affective  
experience.    
  
Another  way   in  which   affectivity   shapes  narrativity  has   to  do  with   a   specific  
phenomenological   feature   of   narrative   self-­‐‑understanding.   In   this   regard,   I  
drew  attention  to  the  fact   that  not  all   the  autobiographical  stories  we  craft  are  
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perceived  as  possessing  the  same  degree  of  authenticity:  some  stories,   indeed,  
are  felt  as  being  more  “true  to  ourselves”  than  others.  I  suggested  that  the  sense  
of   authenticity   associated   with   some   life   narratives   depends   on   the   level   of  
congruence   which   exists   between   the   emotions   that   are   experienced   and   the  
emotions  that  are  narrated.  When  there  is  a  degree  of  correspondence  between  
the  two  dimensions,  that  is  when  the  contents  of  the  person’s  autobiographical  
narratives   are   consonant   with   her   affective   experience,   the   narratives  
themselves  are  perceived  as  being  authentic.  
  
I  then  claimed  that,  because  of  their  “pre-­‐‑intentional”  character  (Ratcliffe,  2010),  
existential   feelings   play   a   distinct   role   in   the   structuring   of   narrative   self-­‐‑
understanding.  More  specifically,  I  suggested  that,  in  virtue  of  the  fact  that  they  
constrain   the   range   of  mental   states   that  we   can   entertain,   these   feelings   also  
constrain   the   range   of   stories   that   we   are   able   to   conceive   -­‐‑   our   “narrative  
repertoire”  -­‐‑  in  various  ways.  In  this  regard,  I  first  drew  attention  to  the  “sense  
of  effectiveness”,  namely  a  felt  sense  of  our  capacity  to  have  an  impact  on  the  
external  world   and   to   deal  with   the   circumstances  we   face.   This   experiential  
structure,   which   is   akin   to   what   Slaby   calls   “sense   of   ability”   (2012),   can   be  
characterised  as  an  existential  feeling  and  I  argued  that  it  influences  the  way  in  
which  we  attribute  agency  to  ourselves  and  others  in  the  stories  we  craft.  I  then  
claimed   that,   due   to   being   fundamentally   connected   to   the   evaluative  
dimension   (Slaby   and   Stephan,   2008),   existential   feelings   determine   which  
kinds  of   evaluative  positions   it   is  possible   for  us   to   take   in   the  narrative   self-­‐‑
understanding  process.    
  
Having   identified   in   Chapter   3   various   dynamics   through   which   affectivity  
impacts   on   narrativity,   in   Chapter   4   I   explored   how   autobiographical  
narrativity   shapes   affective   experience.   In   this   regard,   some   scholars   have  
drawn   attention   to   the   fact   that,   although   language   is   often   used   simply   to  
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report   our   feelings,   linguistic   expression   can   also   have   a   deeper   impact   on  
affective  experience.  Colombetti  (2009),  for  example,  suggests  that  language  can  
clarify  and  enhance  emotions,  as  well  as  being  central  to  the  dynamics  through  
which  affective  labels  and  classifications  impact  on  the  person’s  experience  and  
are   in   turn   impacted  upon  by  her  behaviour.  From  this  perspective,   linguistic  
expression   is  constitutive  of  affective  experience  and  I  suggested  that  narrative  
forms  of  understanding  are  also  central  to  these  dynamics.  
  
Drawing  on  Goldie’s  account  (2002;  2011;  2012a),  I   then  argued  that,  by  virtue  
of   their   being   incorporated   in   implicit   or   explicit   forms   of   story-­‐‑telling,  
emotions  are  organised  and  experienced  as  unitary  and  meaningful  processes  
which   comprise   various   components   and   unfold   over   time   in   characteristic  
ways.  Narrativity   is  what  makes   it   possible   for   us   to   conceive   of   the   various  
emotion  constituents  as  intelligibly  related,  thus  allowing  for  a  complexification  
of   the   structure   of   affective   experience.   I   claimed   that   such   a   theoretical  
framework   is   also   capable   of   accounting   for   the   cultural   differences   and  
similarities  in  the  experience  and  conceptualisation  of  emotions  and  for  the  way  
in  which  they  change  during  development.  
  
I  then  argued  that  narrativity  influences  the  experiential  structure  of  affectivity  
also  by  being   involved   in  a  variety  of  affective   regulation  processes.  Drawing  
on   some   of   the   insights   advanced   in   the   field   of   Emotion   Focused   Therapy  
(Angus   and  Greenberg,   2011),   I   suggested   that   narratives  make   it   possible   to  
contextualise   emotions   by   giving   them   specific   temporal   and   spatial  
boundaries,  allowing  us   to  experience   these  emotions  as  circumscribed  events  
which  we  are,   to  a  certain  extent,  capable  of  managing.   In  addition,   I   claimed  
that   the   act   of   narrating   itself,   by   virtue   of   its   being   an   active   process,   can  
counteract   the   feelings   of   passivity   associated  with   affective   experience,   thus  
enhancing  our  sense  of  being  in  control  of  our  emotions.  Finally,  I  maintained  
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that   the   evaluative   position-­‐‑taking   abilities   which   are   integral   to   narrative  
understanding  also  contribute  to  the  regulation  of  affective  experience,  since,  by  
taking  a  stance  towards  our  emotions,  we  can,  to  a  certain  extent,  control  their  
development.  
  
In  the  last  part  of  the  thesis  I  moved  to  apply  the  insights  previously  developed  
to   the   analysis   of   some   features   of   depression   and   borderline   personality  
disorder.   Doing   so   allowed   me   to   extend   the   phenomenological   accounts   of  
these   disorders   in   various   respects,  while   at   the   same   time   providing   further  
examples  of  the  dynamics  discussed  in  Chapter  3  and  4  and  corroborating  the  
claim  that  minimal  and  narrative  forms  of  self-­‐‑experience  are  deeply  entangled.  
  
Various   scholars   have   recognised   that   depression   is   characterised   by  
disturbances  of  narrative  selfhood.  Further  developing  some  of  the  intuitions  at  
the   core   of   Stanghellini   and  Englebert’s   account   (Stanghellini,   2004;  Englebert  
and   Stanghellini,   forthcoming),   I   argued   that   the   life   stories   with   which   the  
depressed   person   identified   prior   to   the   illness,   due   to   being   no   longer  
congruent  with  the  patient’s  emotions,  come  to  be  experienced  as  inauthentic,  a  
process   which   leads   to   a   weakening   or   abandonment   of   the   narratives  
themselves.   Depression,   however,   is   also   characterised   by   the   emergence   of  
new  narratives  which  possess   specific   characteristics   and   I   claimed   that   these  
are  rooted  in  particular  configurations  of  affective  experience.  More  specifically,  
I  focused  on  the  tendency  shown  by  depressed  patients  to  explain  bad  events  in  
personal,   permanent,   and   pervasive   terms,   namely   their   pessimistic  
“explanatory   style”   (Seligman,  2006),   showing  how   this   stems   from  particular  
existential  feelings.    
  
In   the   first  place,   I   suggested   that   it   is  because  of   the  experience  of  particular  
feelings  of  guilt  that  depressed  people  tend  to  hold  themselves  responsible  for  
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the  occurrence  of  negative  events.  According  to  Ratcliffe  (2010),  in  certain  cases  
of  severe  depression  guilt  acquires  an  existential  character  and  is  experienced  as  
an  irrevocable  condition  that  radically  constrains  the  range  of  intentional  states  
the   person   is   capable   of   undergoing.   In   these   cases,   guilt   becomes   an   all-­‐‑
encompassing  experience  and  it  is  very  difficult  for  the  patient  not  to  conceive  
of   himself   as   inherently   culpable.   I   suggested   that   it   is   because   of   this  
predicament   that  when   depressed   patients   have   to   explain   the   causes   of   bad  
events   they   are   inclined   to   attribute   responsibility   to   themselves   rather   than  
others   or   external   factors.   In   addition,   I  maintained   that   this   feature   depends  
also  on  the  high  level  of  self-­‐‑absorption  that  characterises  depression.  
  
I  claimed  that  also  the  tendency  of  the  depressed  person  to  explain  bad  events  
in   permanent   terms   stems   from   a   specific   form   of   affective   experience.  
According   to   Ratcliffe   (2013b),   at   least   in   certain   cases   of   severe   depression,  
what  is  experienced  is  not  the  loss  of  some  intentional  hopes,  but  rather  a  more  
radical   loss   of   the   “possibility   of   hoping”,   an   existential   transformation   that  
significantly   alters   the   way   in   which   the   person   experiences   herself   and   the  
world.  I  suggested  that  such  feelings  of  hopelessness  negatively  impact  on  the  
patients’   ability   to   conceive   of   negative   events   as   transient.   In   addition,   I  
claimed  that  these  transformations  are  also  related  to  the  alterations  of  temporal  
experience  typical  of  the  disorder.  
  
I   then  suggested   that  at   the  origin  of   the  depressed  person’s   tendency   to  give  
pervasive  interpretations  of  negative  events  is  a  particular  way  of  experiencing  
space.   Further   developing   some   insights   put   forward   by   Binswanger   in   his  
analysis   of   schizophrenia   (2001),   I   argued   that   people   affected   by   depression  
experience  little  or  no  separation  between  the  various  dimensions  of  their   life,  




Finally,  drawing  on   the   insights   into   the   relationship  between  narrativity  and  
affect  regulation  presented  in  Chapter  4,  I  drew  attention  to  how  the  narratives  
constructed  by  the  depressed  person  negatively  influence  his  ability  to  regulate  
his  emotions  by  exacerbating  feelings  of  helplessness  and  lack  of  control  and  by  
inhibiting   the   person’s   capacity   to   take   an   evaluative   stance   towards   his  
affective  states.  
  
Disturbances   of   narrativity   have   been   argued   to   be   central   also   to   borderline  
personality   disorder   (BPD).   Fuchs   (2007),   in   particular,   has   claimed   that  
cardinal   to   the   illness   is   a   “fragmentation”   of   narrative   selfhood,   namely   the  
inability   to   form   a   conception   of   self   and   others   where   both   positive   and  
negative   aspects   are   coherently   integrated.   In   this   study   I   developed   Fuchs’  
account  in  various  directions.  In  the  first  place,  I  suggested  that  the  instability  
and   polarisation   characteristic   of   the   way   in   which   the   borderline   person  
evaluates   himself   and   others   originate   in   a   particular   configuration   of  
existential   feelings.   More   specifically,   I   claimed   that   central   to   BPD   is   the  
alternation   of   existential   forms   of   shame   and   anger.   I   suggested   that   the  
evaluations   of   self   and   other   intrinsic   to   these   affects   have   an   opposite  
structure:   while   in   shame   the   self   is   evaluated   as   defective   in   the   eyes   of   a  
righteous  other,  integral  to  anger  is  an  appraisal  of  the  other  as  defective  in  the  
eyes  of  a   righteous   self.  Due   to   the   fact   that   shame  and  anger   in   the  disorder  
have   a   pre-­‐‑intentional   character,   when   the   person   is   experiencing   one   of   the  
two  feelings,  it  becomes  very  difficult  to  access  the  cognitive  and  affective  states  
that   are   associated   with   the   other.   As   a   result,   the   continuity   of   affective  
experience  is  disrupted  and  the  person  lacks  empathic  access  to  a  wide  range  of  
her   previous   mental   states,   thus   generating   the   fragmentation   of   narrative  
understanding  at  the  core  of  the  illness.    
  
I   then   illustrated   how   the   disruptions   of   narrativity   in   turn   impact   on   the  
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borderline   person’s   affective   experience.   I   suggested   that   the   narrative  
disturbances  negatively   influence   the  patients’   ability   to   identify  and  describe  
their   emotions   and   that,   as   a   result   of   this,   they   experience   vague   states   of  
arousal  rather  than  clearly  differentiated  affective  states.  In  addition,  I  claimed  
that   when   narrativity   is   impaired,   affectivity   tends   to   have   predominantly   a  
bodily   character   and   that   this   is   exemplified   by   the  way   in  which   borderline  
patients  both  experience  and  express  emotions.  I  maintained  that  also  the  self-­‐‑
injurious  behaviours  characteristic  of  the  disorder  can  be  understood  in  relation  
to   this   feature,   as   patients   reportedly   engage   in   self-­‐‑harm   to   communicate,  
trigger,  or  manage  certain  feelings.      
  
I  subsequently  moved  to  consider  how  the  narrative  disturbances  influence  the  
borderline  person’s  ability   to  regulate  her  emotions.   I  stressed  that,  since   they  
are   not   included   in   stories   that   connect   past,   present,   and   future   events,  
emotions   in   the   disorder   are   fully   focused   on   the   subject’s   current  
circumstances   and,  when   these   change,   also   the   emotions   rapidly   change.  On  
the   other   hand,   due   to   her   impaired   narrative   abilities,   it   is   difficult   for   the  
borderline   person   to   take   an   evaluative   stance   in   regard   to   her   affective  
experience  and  thus  exert  a   level  of  control  over   its  development.   In  addition,  
emotions  which  are  not  narrativised   lack  meaningfulness  and  this  hinders   the  
borderline  person’s  capacity  to  understand  and  communicate  them.  
  
The  accounts  of  depression  and  borderline  personality  disorder  I  developed  in  
Chapter   5   and   6   provided   various   examples   of   the   dynamics   through  which  
affectivity   and   narrativity   constitutively   shape   each   other,   thus   further  
corroborating  the   idea  that  minimal  and  narrative   levels  of  self-­‐‑experience  are  
phenomenologically   inextricable.   As   such,   my   analysis   challenged   the   claim  
that  these  disorders  are  best  understood  as  disturbances  of  narrative  selfhood.  
Indeed,  while  I  acknowledged  that  alterations  of  narrativity  are  crucial  to  both  
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forms   of   psychiatric   illness,   by   identifying   the   affective   underpinnings   and  
implications   of   these   alterations,   I   showed   that   disturbances   of   minimal  
selfhood  are  equally  central  to  these  disorders.    
  
My  thesis  thus  contributes  to  the  debate  on  the  nature  of  selfhood  by  arguing,  
on   the   basis   of   a   phenomenological   analysis   of   the   relationship   between  
affectivity   and   narrativity,   that   minimal   and   narrative   forms   of   self-­‐‑
consciousness   are   deeply   entwined.   This   account,   however,   does   not   suggest  
that   the  distinction  between  minimal  and  narrative  self  should  be  abandoned,  
but   rather   illustrates   a   particular   way   in   which   it   could   be   refined.   I   have  
indeed   shown   that   the   structure   of   affective   experience,   and   thus   the   pre-­‐‑
reflective  level  of  awareness  to  which  it  is  integral,  is  shaped  by  narrative  self-­‐‑
understanding   in   various   ways,   but   I   have   acknowledged   that   this   is   the  
outcome  of  a  process  that  requires  the  development  of  certain  cognitive  abilities  
and  that  affective  forms  of  self-­‐‑consciousness  predate,  and  drive,  the  emergence  
of  autobiographical  narrativity.      
  
The  research  developed   in   this   thesis  could  be  extended   in  various  directions.  
As   far   as   the   field   of   phenomenological   psychopathology   is   concerned,   the  
present   work   has   focused   on   various   aspects   of   the   relationship   between  
affectivity,   narrativity,   and   selfhood   in   depression   and   borderline   personality  
disorder.   It   would   thus   be   interesting   to   expand   this   account   by   taking   into  
consideration   other   forms  of   psychiatric   or   neurological   illness,   especially   the  
ones   which   are   considered   to   involve   significant   disturbances   of   affective  
experience   or   narrative   abilities.   It   has   been   claimed   for   example   that  
dysnarrativia   is   typical   of   pathologies   such   as   Alzheimer’s   disease   and  
Korsakov’s   syndrome   (Bruner,   2003:   86),   but   the   relation   that   these   narrative  
impairments   have   with   affective   experience   and   self-­‐‑awareness   is   still   to   be  
explored.  The  theoretical  framework  developed  in  this  thesis  could  be  a  fruitful  
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starting   point   for   the   investigation   of   this   topic   and   it   could   itself   be   further  
clarified   and   extended   through   the   analysis   of   the   experiential   structures  
characteristic  of  these  disorders.  
  
The   insights  advanced   in   this  work  have   implications  not  only   for   the  way   in  
which   we   conceive   of   selfhood   and   its   pathologies,   but   also   for   our  
understanding   of   the   structure   of   affective   experience.   In   this   thesis   I   have  
shown  that  narrativity  constitutively  shapes  affectivity  in  various  ways  and  this  
account  could  be  expanded  by  considering  how  it  could  help  to  refine  existing  
affective   taxonomies.   Some   scholars   differentiate   between   primary   or   basic  
emotions   and   more   complex   kinds   of   affective   experience   which,   in   their  
opinion,   can   only   be   undergone   once   relatively   complex   forms   of   self-­‐‑
consciousness   have   emerged   (e.g.   Lewis,   1992).   It   would   be   interesting   to  
explore   whether   the   analysis   of   the   relationship   between   affectivity   and  
narrativity   supports   this   view,   for   example   by   trying   to   understand   if   some  
emotions  only  exist  in  a  narrative  form  or  all  emotions  can  have  both  narrative  
and  non-­‐‑narrative  variants.  
  
Finally,  the  research  conducted  in  this  thesis  could  be  expanded  by  considering  
how   intersubjectivity   is   involved   in   the   relationship   between   affectivity   and  
narrativity.   The   scholars   who   support   narrative   accounts   of   selfhood   often  
emphasise  the  role  played  by  social  interactions  in  shaping  our  life  stories,  thus  
establishing  a  close  connection  between  narrative  understanding  and  the  social  
dimension.  However,  others  have  claimed   that  an  excessive   reliance  on  social  
models  when  crafting  one’s  autobiographical  narratives  can  be  at  the  origin  of  
disturbances  of  selfhood  such  as  those  present  in  depression  (e.g.  Stanghellini,  
2004).  In  this  regard,  it  would  be  valuable  to  investigate  the  dynamics  through  
which  the  individual  becomes  able  to  confer  on  the  stories  he  authors  a  certain  
degree  of  originality  and  independence  from  the  social  scripts  available  to  him  
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